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This document relates and synthesizes my research and research management experience since I joined the
EDELWEISS team led by Olivier Corby in 2011 for a postdoctoral position at Inria Sophia Antipolis. Then,
in 2012, I got a “Starting Research Position” at Inria Sophia Antipolis in the WIMMICS (Web Instrumented
Man-Machine Interactions, Communities and Semantics)1, a joint team between Inria, University of Nice
Sophia Antipolis and CNRS, led by Fabien Gandon2. In October 2015, I got a Researcher position (Chargé
de Recherche – CR1) at CNRS. WIMMICS is a sub-group of the SPARKS3 team (Scalable and Pervasive
softwARe and Knowledge Systems) in I3S which has been structured into three themes in 2015. My research
activity mainly contributes to the FORUM theme (FORmalising and Reasoning with Users and Models).
Throughout this 10-year period, I was involved in several research projects and my role has progressively
evolved from junior researcher to scientific leader of research actions. I initiated several research projects on
my own, and I supervised several PhD thesis. In the meantime, I was also involved in the scientific animation
of my research community (e.g., member of the CA of the AFIA association, chairing of conferences and
workshops, PCs, . . . ).
My research area is Artificial Intelligence, with a particular interest in Knowledge Representation and
Reasoning (KRR). More precisely, the majority of my works are in the area of argumentation theory. Argu-
mentation theory is considered as a reasoning model based on the construction and evaluation of arguments.
Arguments are supposed to support, contradict or explain statements, and they are used to support decision
making. My background is a PhD in Artificial Intelligence, and more specifically in Argumentation Theory
and Multiagent Systems, supervised by Guido Boella at the University of Turin (Italy) and Leendert van der
Torre at the University of Luxembourg. During my PhD, I worked on the definition of the methodology and
techniques of meta-argumentation to model argumentation. The methodology of meta-argumentation in-
stantiates Dung’s abstract argumentation theory with an extended argumentation theory, and it is thus based
on a combination of the methodology of instantiating abstract arguments, and the methodology of extend-
ing Dung’s basic argumentation frameworks with other relations among abstract arguments. The technique
of meta-argumentation applies Dung’s theory of abstract argumentation to itself, by instantiating Dung’s
abstract arguments with meta-arguments using a technique called flattening. I characterized the domain
of instantiation using a representation technique based on soundness and completeness. I applied this in-
novative technique to three different kinds of reasoning problems: (i) reasoning about support in bipolar
1In 2010, the Inria EDELWEISS team and the I3S KEWI team merged to become WIMMICS.
2http://wimmics.inria.fr/
3http://sparks.i3s.unice.fr/
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abstract argumentation, (ii) reasoning about trust in multiagent systems, and (iii) reasoning about coalitions
in multiagent systems.
After my PhD, my research topics gradually evolved from formal computational models of argument to
natural models of arguments, where arguments in natural language are considered and mined from hetero-
geneous sources. I am one of the very first initiators of the research topic, very popular nowadays, called
Argument Mining. I have also studied the impact of emotions on the argumentation online debaters express
on the Web. These two research lines are highly multidisciplinary, and they have been addressed thanks
to a fruitful collaboration with linguists and cognitive scientists. The rationale behind my research work
(and more generally behind the whole research activity of the WIMMICS team) is that decision (being them
from artificial or human agents) need to be supported and justified through arguments and other factors, like
emotions, mental states and trust, and the Web represents a invaluable interaction architecture and informa-
tion source to be leveraged in order to support decision making and the subsequent justification about such
deliberation.
1.1 Research areas
In this section, I provide an overview of the three main research areas my contributions deal with, i.e., I
contribute to the areas of computational models of argument, argument mining, and normative reasoning.
Computational Models of Argument
In everyday life, arguments are “reasons to believe and reasons to act”. The idea of “argumentation” as
the process of creating arguments for and against competing claims, has long been a subject of interest to
philosophers and lawyers. In recent years, however, there has been a growth of interest in the subject from
formal and technical perspectives in Computer Science, and a wide use of argumentation technologies in
practical applications. In Computer Science, argumentation is viewed as a mechanical procedure for inter-
preting events, organizing and presenting documents and making decisions about actions. From a theoretical
perspective, argumentation offers a novel framework casting new light on classical forms of reasoning, such
as logical deduction, induction, abduction and plausible reasoning, communication explanations of advice.
These forms of reasoning support discussion and negotiation in computer-supported cooperative work, and
learning. From a human-computer interaction point of view, argumentation is a versatile technique that facil-
itates natural system behavior and is more easily understood by human users and operators. Argumentation
theory involves different ways for analyzing arguments and their relationships. In particular, my research
focuses on abstract argumentation proposed by Dung in 1995 that sees each argument as an abstract entity
and in which arguments are related to each other by means of attack relations.
Complex technical systems and services increasingly require several autonomous agents that have to
collaborate and communicate in order to achieve required objectives, because of the inherent interdepen-
dencies and constraints that exist between their goals and tasks. Increasingly they depend upon complex
conversations concerned with negotiation, persuasion and trustworthiness where agents have different capa-
bilities and viewpoints. Such dialogues have at their heart an exchange of proposals, claims or offers. What
distinguishes argumentation-based discussions from other approaches is that proposals can be justified by
the arguments that support, or oppose, them. This permits greater flexibility than in other decision-making
and communication schemes since, for instance, it makes it possible to persuade agents to change their view
of a claim by identifying information or knowledge that is not being considered, or by introducing a new
relevant factor in the middle of a negotiation or to resolve an impasse.
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Argumentation is the process by which arguments are constructed and handled. Thus argumentation
means that arguments are compared, evaluated in some respect and judged in order to establish whether any
of them are warranted. Each argument is a set of assumptions that, together with a conclusion, is obtained
by a reasoning process [42]. The layout of an argument has been studied by Toulmin in 1958 [302] who
identified the pieces of information composing an argument. These key components are the data, the claim,
the warrant and the rebuttal. A claim is a conclusion which is drawn if the warrant holds and the rebuttal
does not hold. The data, supported by the warrant, imply the claim. Argumentation as exchange of pieces
of information and reasoning about them involves groups of agents. We can assume that each argument has
at least a proponent, the person who puts forward the argument, and an audience, the person who receives
the argument. Two kinds of views on argumentation can be highlighted in multiagent systems, monological
and dialogical. In the former, a single agent or a group of agents with the same role has the knowledge to
construct arguments to support and attack a conclusion while, in the latter, a group of agents interacts to
construct arguments supporting or attacking a particular claim.
There are, at the higher level, two ways to formalize a set of arguments and their relationships, abstract
argumentation and logical argumentation. Abstract argumentation has been introduced by Dung [133], and
it names only the arguments without describing them at all; it just represents that an argument is attacked by
another one. Logical argumentation [2, 42, 263] is a framework in which more details about the arguments
are considered. In particular, each argument is seen as composed by the premises, the claim and the inference
rules used to achieve the claim from the premises.
My past research activity concentrated mainly on Dung-like abstract argumentation systems. The mo-
tivation of the meta-argumentation methodology proposed in my PhD thesis comes from the well known
and generally accepted observation that Dung’s theory of abstract argumentation cannot be used directly
when modeling argumentation in many realistic examples, such as multiagent argumentation and dialogues,
decision making, coalition formation, combining Toulmin’s micro arguments, normative reasoning. The
development of the meta-argumentation methodology is the main contribution of my PhD thesis. My key
idea was that meta-argumentation instantiates Dung’s theory with meta-arguments, such that Dung’s theory
is used to reason about itself. In my thesis, I applied the methodology of meta-argumentation to three chal-
lenges that in recent years have involved the research area of argumentation theory: reasoning about support
relations among arguments, reasoning about trust, and reasoning about coalitions of agents.
After the thesis, I exploited my results in representing bipolar argumentation using meta-argumentation
in two different fields which offer challenging open issues to reason over the acceptability of the arguments:
inconsistencies detection in requirements engineering4 (together with Isabelle Mirbel (UNS), Isabelle Mir-
bel, Serena Villata. Enhancing Goal-Based Requirements Consistency: An Argumentation-Based Approach.
13th International Workshop on Computational Logic in Multi-Agent Systems (CLIMA 2012): 110-127),
and in question-answering over the Web (together with Elena Cabrio (UNS), Elena Cabrio, Serena Villata,
Alessio Palmero Aprosio. A RADAR for information reconciliation in Question Answering systems over
Linked Data. Semantic Web Journal 8(4): 601-617 (2017)).
Concerning reasoning about trust, one challenge I tackled in my contributions was to use argumenta-
tion theory not only to model whether an information source is trusted or not, but also to understand the
reasons, modeled under the form of arguments, for trusting the sources in case of conflicts concerning their
trustability. In this line of work, I started from the meta-argumentation methodology I defined in my PhD
thesis, and I extended it to be applied to reasoning about conflicts in trust. This contribution has been pub-
lished at the ECSQARU conference (Serena Villata, Guido Boella, Dov M. Gabbay, Leendert van der Torre.
4http://www-sop.inria.fr/members/Serena.Villata/argRE.html
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Arguing about the Trustworthiness of the Information Sources. 11th European Conference Symbolic and
Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty (ECSQARU 2011): 74-85) and on the International
Journal on Approximate Reasoning (Serena Villata, Guido Boella, Dov M. Gabbay, Leendert van der Torre.
A socio-cognitive model of trust using argumentation theory. Int. J. Approx. Reasoning 54(4): 541-559
(2013)).
In addition, I proposed (together with Celia da Costa Pereira (UNS) and Andrea Tettamanzi (UNS)) a
fuzzy labeling algorithm to assign arguments in an abstract argumentation framework with an acceptability
degree depending on the trustworthiness of the source proposing them. This contribution has been published
at the IJCAI and SUM conferences: Célia da Costa Pereira, Andrea Tettamanzi, Serena Villata. Changing
One’s Mind: Erase or Rewind? 22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2011):
164-171 and Célia da Costa Pereira, Mauro Dragoni, Andrea Tettamanzi, Serena Villata. Fuzzy Labeling for
Abstract Argumentation: An Empirical Evaluation. 10th International Conference on Scalable Uncertainty
Management (SUM 2016): 126-139. This line of work has been continued in the PhD thesis of Amel Ben
Othmane [34, 33, 32], I supervised with Andrea Tettamanzi and Nhan Le Than. The title of the thesis is
“CARS - A multi-agent framework to support the decision making in uncertain spatio-temporal real-world
applications”, and Amel successfully defended it on October 12th, 2017.
Finally, in the area of computational models of arguments, I also proposed a formal approach to modular-
ity and decomposability of argumentation frameworks. I studied argumentation frameworks as interacting
components, characterized by an Input/Output behavior, rather than as isolated monolithic entities. This
modeling stance is particularly relevant in applications like argument summarization and explanation. To-
gether with Massimiliano Giacomin and Pietro Baroni from the University of Brescia (Italy), we have started
by introducing a general modeling approach and providing a comprehensive set of theoretical results putting
the intuitive notion of Input/Output behavior of argumentation frameworks on a solid formal ground. This
contribution has been published on the Artificial Intelligence Journal (Pietro Baroni, Guido Boella, Federico
Cerutti, Massimiliano Giacomin, Leendert van der Torre, Serena Villata. On the Input/Output behavior of
argumentation frameworks. Artif. Intell. 217: 144-197 (2014)).
In 2015, I also organized, together with Matthias Thimm (Koblenz University) the First International
Competition on Computational Models of Argumentation (ICCMA 2015). In this competition, different
solvers have been compared over the resolution of a set of abstract argumentation frameworks with respect
to standard Dung semantics. The analysis of the results has been published on the Artificial Intelligence
Journal (Matthias Thimm, Serena Villata. The first international competition on computational models of
argumentation: Results and analysis. Artif. Intell. 252: 267-294 (2017)).
Together with many other colleagues in the area of Computational Models of Arguments, I have also
authored a popularization paper for AI Magazine with an overview of the research area challenges (Katie
Atkinson, Pietro Baroni, Massimiliano Giacomin, Anthony Hunter, Henry Prakken, Chris Reed, Guillermo
Ricardo Simari, Matthias Thimm, Serena Villata. Towards Artificial Argumentation. AI Magazine 38(3):
25-36 (2017)).
Argument Mining
In the last years, the growing of the Web and the daily increasing number of textual data published there
with different purposes have highlighted the need to process such data in order to identify, structure and
summarize this huge amount of information. Online newspapers, blogs, online debate platforms and social
networks, but also normative and technical documents provide an heterogeneous flow of information where
natural language arguments can be identified, and analyzed. The availability of such data, together with
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the advances in Natural Language Processing and Machine Learning, supported the rise of a new research
area called argument mining. The main goal of argument mining is the automated extraction of natural
language arguments and their relations from generic textual corpora, with the final goal to provide machine-
readable structured data for computational models of argument and reasoning engines. Together with Elena
Cabrio, I was one of the initiators of this research field, with a first paper on argument mining published
at ECAI-2012 (Elena Cabrio, Serena Villata. Natural Language Arguments: A Combined Approach. 20th
European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI 2012): 205-210) and the organization of the workshop
“Frontiers and Connections between Argumentation Theory and Natural Language Processing” in July 2014.
Two main stages have to be considered in the typical argument mining pipeline, from the unstructured
natural language documents towards structured (possibly machine-readable) data:
Arguments’ extraction : The first stage of the pipeline is to detect arguments within the input natural lan-
guage texts. Referring to standard argument graphs, the retrieved arguments will thus represent the
nodes in the final argument graph returned by the system. This step may be further split in two dif-
ferent stages such as the extraction of arguments and the further detection of their boundaries. Many
approaches have recently tackled such challenge adopting different methodologies like for instance
Support Vector Machines [248, 250, 290, 141, 207], Naive Bayes classifiers [44], Logistic Regres-
sion [198].
Relations’ extraction : The second stage of the pipeline consists in constructing the argument graph to be
returned as output of the system. The goal is to predict what are the relations holding between the
arguments identified in the first stage. This is an extremely complex task, as it involves high-level
knowledge representation and reasoning issues. The relations between the arguments may be of het-
erogeneous nature, like attack, support or entailment [70]. This stage is also in charge of predicting,
in structured argumentation, the internal relations of the argument’s components, such as the connec-
tion between the premises and the claim [44, 290]. Being it an extremely challenging task, existing
approaches assume simplifying hypotheses, like the fact that evidence is always associated with a
claim [1]
To address these issues, solve problems and build applications upon, tools must be developed to analyze,
aggregate, synthesize, structure, summarize, and reason about arguments in texts. However, to do so, more
linguistic sophistication is required as well as newer techniques than currently found in Natural Language
Processing.
Moreover, to tackle these challenging tasks, high-quality annotated corpora are needed, as those pro-
posed in [271, 248, 198, 1, 290, 73, 164], to be used as a training set for any kind of aforementioned
prediction. These corpora are mainly composed by three different elements: an annotated dataset which
represents the gold standard whose annotation has been checked and validated by expert annotators and is
used to train the system for the required task (i.e., arguments or relations extraction), a set of guidelines to
explain in a detailed way how the data has been annotated, and finally, the unlabelled raw corpus that can be
used to test the system after the training phase. The reliability of a corpus is assured by the calculation of the
inter-annotator agreement that measures the degree of agreement in performing the annotation task among
the involved annotators.5 Current prototypes of argument mining systems require to be trained against the
5The number of involved annotators should be > 1 in order to allow for the calculation of this measure and, as a consequence,
produce a reliable resource.
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data the task is addressed to, and the construction of such annotated corpora remains among the most time
consuming activities in this pipeline.
Together with Elena Cabrio (UNS), I proposed a combined framework of natural language processing
and argumentation theory to support human users in their interactions. The framework combines a natural
language processing module which exploits the Textual Entailment (TE) approach and detects the arguments
in natural language debates and the relationships among them, and an argumentation module which repre-
sents the debates as graphs and detects the accepted arguments. The argumentation module is grounded on
bipolar argumentation, and on the results previously achieved during my PhD thesis. Moreover, I studied
the relation among the notion of support in bipolar argumentation, and the notion of TE in Natural Lan-
guage Processing (NLP). The results of this research has been published both in the Computational Models
of Argument venues (Elena Cabrio, Serena Villata. Generating Abstract Arguments: A Natural Language
Approach. Computational Models of Argument (COMMA 2012): 454-461 and Elena Cabrio, Serena Vil-
lata. A natural language bipolar argumentation approach to support users in online debate interactions.
Argument & Computation 4(3): 209-230 (2013)) and in Natural Language Processing ones (Elena Cabrio,
Serena Villata. Combining Textual Entailment and Argumentation Theory for Supporting Online Debates
Interactions. 50th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (ACL 2012): 208-212).
This research line about natural models of argumentation resulted in the NoDE Benchmark6, a bench-
mark of natural arguments extracted from different kinds of textual sources. It is composed of three datasets
of natural language arguments, released in two machine-readable formats, i.e., the standard XML format,
and XML/RDF format adopting the SIOC-Argumentation vocabulary (extended). Arguments are connected
by two kinds of relations: a positive (i.e., support) relation, and a negative (i.e., attack) relation, leading to
the definition of bipolar argumentation graphs.
I started also to investigate the mapping between argumentation schemes in argumentation theory,
and discourse in Natural Language Processing, together with Elena Cabrio (UNS) and Sara Tonelli (FBK
Trento).
Since 2012, I continued to work on argument mining, facing the challenges raised by different domains,
i.e., social media like Twitter (publications on this topic: Tom Bosc, Elena Cabrio, Serena Villata. Tweeties
Squabbling: Positive and Negative Results in Applying Argument Mining on Social Media. Computational
Models of Argument (COMMA 2016): 21-32, Tom Bosc, Elena Cabrio, Serena Villata. DART: a Dataset
of Arguments and their Relations on Twitter. Tenth International Conference on Language Resources and
Evaluation (LREC 2016), and Mihai Dusmanu, Elena Cabrio, Serena Villata. Argument Mining on Twitter:
Arguments, Facts and Sources. 2017 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing
(EMNLP 2017): 2317-2322), political speeches in collaboration with Sara Tonelli and Stefano Menini from
FBK-Trento (publication on this topic: Stefano Menini, Elena Cabrio, Sara Tonelli, Serena Villata. Never
Retreat, Never Retract: Argumentation Analysis for Political Speeches. Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (AAAI 2018)), and legal cases in collaboration with Laura Alonso Alemany, Cristian
Cardellino and Milagro Teruel from the University of Cordoba in Argentina (publication on this topic: Mi-
lagro Teruel, Cristian Cardellino, Laura Alonso Alemany, Serena Villata. Increasing Argument Annotation
Reproducibility by Using Inter-annotator Agreement to Improve Guidelines. 11th edition of the Language
Resources and Evaluation Conference (LREC 2018)).
6http://www-sop.inria.fr/NoDE/
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Normative Reasoning
Normative systems are systems in the behavior of which norms play a role and which need normative con-
cepts in order to be described or specified. A normative multi-agent system combines models for normative
systems (dealing for example with obligations, permissions and prohibitions) with models for multi-agent
systems. Normative multi-agent systems provide a promising model for human and artificial agent coordi-
nation because they integrate norms and individual intelligence. In particular, I adopt deontic logic to reason
about licenses compatibility and composition. Deontic logic is the study of the logical relations among
propositions that assert that certain actions or states of affairs are obligatory, forbidden or permitted.
The Web is evolving from an information space for sharing textual documents into a medium for pub-
lishing structured data too. The Linked Data initiative aims at fostering the publication and interlinking
of data on the Web, giving birth to the so called Web of Data, an interconnected global dataspace where
data providers publish their content publicly or under open licenses. Heath and Bizer underline that “the
absence of clarity for data consumers about the terms under which they can reuse a particular dataset, and
the absence of common guidelines for data licensing, are likely to hinder use and reuse of data”. Therefore,
all Linked Data on the Web should include explicit licensing terms. The explicit definition of the licens-
ing terms under which the data is released is an open problem both for the data provider and for the data
consumer. The former needs to explicit the licensing terms to ensure use and reuse of the data compliant
with her requirements. The latter, instead, needs to know the licenses constraining the released data to avoid
misusing and even illegal reuse of such data.
In the context of the Datalift project, I defined a fine-grained context-aware access control model for the
Web of Data. I introduced the Social Semantic SPARQL Security for Access Control vocabulary S4AC7, a
lightweight ontology which allows to define fine-grained access control policies for RDF data.
Concerning licensing information, I proposed, together with Guido Governatori (Data61 - CSIRO) and
Antonino Rotolo (University of Bologna), a formal framework based on deontic logic to verify the com-
patibility of a set of access rights and composed them into a unique set of access rights to be associated to
a query result. This contribution has been published in AI & Law conferences: Antonino Rotolo, Serena
Villata, Fabien Gandon. A deontic logic semantics for licenses composition in the web of data. International
Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law (ICAIL 2013): 111-120 and Guido Governatori, Ho-Pun Lam,
Antonino Rotolo, Serena Villata, Fabien Gandon. Heuristics for Licenses Composition. Twenty-Sixth An-
nual Conference Legal Knowledge and Information Systems (JURIX 2013): 77-86. Then, through a fruitful
collaboration with the University of Cordoba, this framework has been associated to a new module, which
has the aim to move from natural language formulations of the licenses to the machine readable ones (using
RDF). This research line resulted in the design and development of the Licentia suite of services8, to support
users to choose the best license for their data. Still in collaboration with the University of Cordoba, we are
currently working on a Named Entities Recognizer, Classifier and Linker for the legal domain so as to be
able to support Information Extraction methods applied to legal documents. The results of this research line
have been published in Natural Language Processing venues and AI & Law ones: Cristian Cardellino, Mila-
gro Teruel, Laura Alonso Alemany, Serena Villata. A low-cost, high-coverage legal named entity recognizer,
classifier and linker. 16th edition of the International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law (ICAIL
2017): 9-18, Cristian Cardellino, Milagro Teruel, Laura Alonso Alemany, Serena Villata. Legal NERC
with ontologies, Wikipedia and curriculum learning. 15th Conference of the European Chapter of the As-
sociation for Computational Linguistics (EACL 2017): 254-259, and Cristian Cardellino, Milagro Teruel,
7http://ns.inria.fr/s4ac/
8http://licentia.inria.fr/
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Laura Alonso Alemany, Serena Villata. Learning Slowly To Learn Better: Curriculum Learning for Legal
Ontology Population. Thirtieth International Florida Artificial Intelligence Research Society Conference
(FLAIRS 2017): 252-257.
1.2 Application Domains and Research Projects
In this section, I report about my involvement in research projects in the above mentioned research areas.
Argumentation and Argument Mining
Regarding my activity in the argument mining domain applied to social media, I was the co-leader (together
with Elena Cabrio (UNS)) for Inria of the CARNOT Project (2014-2015) with the start-up Vigiglobe. The
goal of this project was to apply the argument mining pipeline to Twitter data. Understanding and interpret-
ing the flow of messages exchanged in real time on social platforms, like Twitter, raises several important
issues. The big amount of information exchanged on these platforms represents a significant value for who
is able to read and enrich this multitude of information. Users directly provide this information, and it is
interesting to analyze such data both from the quantitative and from the qualitative point of view, especially
for what concerns reputation and marketing issues (regarding brands, institutions or public actors). More-
over, the automated treatment of this type of data and the constraints it presents (e.g., limited number of
characters, tweets with a particular writing style, amount of data, real-time communication) offer a new and
rich context for a challenging use of existing tools for argument mining. In the context of this project, I
supervised the activity of Tom Bosc, a research engineer, now doing a PhD in Canada. Also in the context
of this project, I supervised the 3-month internship of Mihai Dusmanu (École normale supérieure, Paris)
about Argument Detection on Twitter. The publications related to this research line have been listed above.
My research activity dealing with emotions in argumentation started with the SEEMPAD9 project (Joint
Research Team with Heron Lab – 2014-2016). The goal of this project was to study the different dimen-
sions of exchanges arising on online discussion platforms. More precisely, we concentrated on the study
and analysis of the impact of emotions and mental states on the argumentation in online debates, with a par-
ticular attention to the application of argumentative persuasion strategies. The results of this research line
have been published both in AI venues (Sahbi Benlamine, Maher Chaouachi, Serena Villata, Elena Cabrio,
Claude Frasson, Fabien Gandon. Emotions in Argumentation: an Empirical Evaluation. Twenty-Fourth In-
ternational Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2015): 156-163), in Cognitive Science venues
(Sahbi Benlamine, Serena Villata, Ramla Ghali, Claude Frasson, Fabien Gandon, Elena Cabrio. Persua-
sive Argumentation and Emotions: An Empirical Evaluation with Users. 19th International Conference on
Human-Computer Interaction (HCI 2017): 659-671), and on the Argument & Computation journal (Serena
Villata, Elena Cabrio, Iméne Jraidi, Sahbi Benlamine, Maher Chaouachi, Claude Frasson, Fabien Gandon.
Emotions and personality traits in argumentation: An empirical evaluation1. Argument & Computation
8(1): 61-87 (2017)).
Again about argument mining, I am the French co-leader (together with Elena Cabrio) of the EIT CREEP
(Cyberbulling Effect Prevention – 2018-2019) project. The purpose of CREEP is to provide a set of tools
to support the detection and prevention of psychological/behavioral problems of cyberbullying teenage vic-
tims. The objective will be achieved combining social media monitoring and motivational technologies
(virtual coaches integrating chatbots). Starting from February 2018, I supervise the activity of two research
9https://project.inria.fr/seempad/
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engineers, Pinar Arslan and Michele Corazza, working on mining arguments where cyberbullism features
are identified.
Moreover, I co-supervise with Leendert van der Torre the PhD thesis (2017 - 2020) of Shohreh Haddadan
on argument mining in political debates.
I am also currently involved in the UCA IADB project (Intégration et Analyse de Donn’ees Biomédicales
– 2017-2020). The goal of the project is to define the methods to access, process and extract information
from a huge quantity of biomedical data from heterogeneous sources and of different nature (e.g., texts,
images, . . . ). In the context of this project, I supervise (together with Johan Montagnat and Celine Poudat)
the PhD thesis of Tobias Mayer about “Argument Mining on Clinical Trials”, starting from October 2017.
I am also involved in the Programme d’Investissements d’Avenir “Grans Defis Du Numerique Big Data”
ANSWER Project (Advanced aNd Secured Web Experience and seaRch – 2018-2020). The goal of the
project is to build the next generation of search engines. My involvement is related to the supervision
of the PhD thesis of Vorakit Vorakitphan about emotion-based argument detection, to go beyond standard
sentiment analysis techniques, and empower search engines with the ability to deal with emotional criteria
as well.
Normative reasoning
My post-doc at Inria Sophia Antipolis was in the context of the ANR Datalift project (2010-2013). The
goal of DataLift was to provide a complete path from raw data to fully interlinked, identified, qualified and
“certified” linked data sets. The resulting Datalift platform supported the processes of selecting ontologies
for publishing data; converting data to the appropriate format (RDF using the selected ontology); interlinking
data with other data sources; publishing linked data. My task in the project was the definition of a right
expression and management module for the Web of Data.
In the context of normative reasoning, I am the French principal investigator of the European Union’s
Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme Marie Sklodowska-Curie MIREL project (Mining and
Reasoning with Legal Texts – 2016-2019). The goal of MIREL is to create an international and inter-
sectorial network to define a formal framework and to develop tools for mining and reasoning with legal
texts, with the aim of translating these legal texts into formal representations that can be used for querying
norms, compliance checking, and decision support. MIREL addresses both conceptual challenges, such as
the role of legal interpretation in mining and reasoning, and computational challenges, such as the handling
of big legal data, and the complexity of regulatory compliance. It bridges the gap between the community
working on legal ontologies and NLP parsers and the community working on reasoning methods and formal
logic. Moreover, it is the first project of its kind to involve industrial partners in the future development of
innovative products and services in legal reasoning and their deployment in the market. In the context of the
MIREL project, I co-supervise (together with Laura Alonso Alemany, Professor at the University of Cor-
doba, Argentina) two PhD students of the University of Cordoba: Cristian Cardellino (whom I supervised
in his 6-months internship) and Milagro Teruel, both working on legal information extraction and argument
mining applied to the legal domain.
In the context of normative reasoning and ethics, I am involved in a long term collaboration with Guido
Governatori (Data61 - CSIRO, Australia) and Antonino Rotolo (Law Department, University of Bologna,
Italy). This research is indirectly funded by the above cited projects. Always in this context, I supervised,
together with Leendert van der Torre (University of Luxembourg) and Guido Governatori (Data61), the PhD
of Javed Ahmed. The PhD was funded by the Joint International Doctoral (Ph.D.) Degree in Law, Science
and Technology (LAST-JD) for the period: September 2013-2017. The title of the thesis is “Contextual
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integrity and tie strength in online social networks: social theory, user study, ontology, and validation”, and
the PhD defense hold on September 29th, 2017 in Bologna.
Domain-independent projects
A new collaboration with the company Accenture is ongoing, and a project titled “Justifying Machine Deci-
sions through Argumentation and Semantics” has been funded by the company through a 12-month research
engineer position. The context of this project is the following. Robots helping humans in performing their
everyday activities are becoming nowadays very popular, given the valuable impact they may bring on soci-
ety, e.g., robots assisting elderly people in their places to support them in their everyday tasks. However, in
order to concretely interact with humans, intelligent systems are required to show some human-like abilities
such as the ability to explain their own decisions. The research question we target for this project is “how to
explain and justify machine decisions to humans?”. I will co-supervise the activity of this research engineer
(Nicholas Halliwell), together with Freddy Lecue (Accenture), starting from July 2018.
This document is structured to describe my (unconventional) way in the broad area of argumentation the-
ory, starting from formal computational models of argument to argumentation for humans. More precisely,
the remainder of this document is organized as follows: Chapter 1 presents my contributions on modeling
and decomposing abstract argumentation frameworks, Chapter 2 presents my contributions on reasoning
about trust using argumentation theory, Chapter 3 presents my contributions on using argumentation theory
and sources confidence to explain machine decisions, Chapter 4 presents my contributions on mining natural
language arguments and their relations from texts, and finally, Chapter 5 presents my contributions on study-
ing the relation between argumentation and persuasion, and emotions on debate participants. Conclusions
summarize my work in the area of argumentation theory, and discuss future perspectives.
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Chapter 2
Modularity and decomposability of
argumentation frameworks
2.1 Introduction
This chapter synthesizes my contributions in the area of computational models of argument, dealing, more
precisely, with the notion of modularity in abstract argumentation theory [131] and its computational proper-
ties. These contributions have been published in two papers in the Elsevier Artificial Intelligence journal [20,
301]:
• Pietro Baroni, Guido Boella, Federico Cerutti, Massimiliano Giacomin, Leendert van der Torre, Ser-
ena Villata. On the Input/Output behavior of argumentation frameworks. Artif. Intell. 217: 144-197
(2014)
• Matthias Thimm, Serena Villata. The first international competition on computational models of
argumentation: Results and analysis. Artif. Intell. 252: 267-294 (2017)).
This chapter summarizes the results of my collaboration with Pietro Baroni and Massimiliano Giacomin
from the University of Brescia, and the results of the first international competition on computational models
of argumentation I organized with Matthias Thimm (Koblenz University). My collaboration with Leendert
van der Torre (University of Luxembourg), my former PhD thesis supervisor, has continued since the defense
of my thesis.
While the formalism of abstract argumentation frameworks [131] and the relevant argumentation seman-
tics (see [13] for a survey) do not appear to have been designed with modularity in mind, investigating their
relevant properties is an important research topic which, after having been somehow overlooked, is attracting
increasing attention in recent years. An argumentation framework is basically a directed graph representing
the conflicts between a set of arguments (the nodes of the graph) and an argumentation semantics can be
regarded as a method to answer (typically in a non univocal way, i.e. producing a set of alternative answers)
the “justification question”: “Which is the justification status of arguments given the conflict?”
Referring to a representative set of semantics proposed in the literature, (namely admissible, complete,
grounded, preferred, stable, semi-stable and ideal semantics), this chapter provides a systematic and com-
prehensive assessment of modularity in abstract argumentation, by identifying and analyzing in this context
the formal counterparts of the general notions of separability and interchangeability.
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2.2 Motivation and research questions
The “Merriam-Webster Learner’s Dictionary” defines modular as “having parts that can be connected or
combined in different ways” while the “Free Dictionary online” remarks that modularity is intended “for
easy assembly and repair or flexible arrangement and use”. As such, modularity is a highly desirable prop-
erty, often enforced by design, in any kind of either material (like the popular Lego toys) or immaterial (like
programs developed according to the object-oriented paradigm) artifacts, including knowledge representa-
tion and reasoning formalisms.
Roughly speaking, modularity involves two main properties, namely separability and interchangeability
of modules. As to the former, it has to be possible to describe and analyse the global behavior of an artifact
in terms of the combination of the local behaviors of the modules composing it. Each local behavior can
be characterized individually in a way which is independent of the internal details of the other modules
(and, in a sense, of the module itself) and captures only the connections and mutual interactions between the
module and the other ones. To put it in other words, each module can be described as a black-box whose
Input/Output behavior fully determines its role in the global behavior of any artifact it is plugged in. As
to the latter, the interest in replacing a module with another one is very common and arises from a large
variety of motivations, either at the operational or design level. Interchangeability of two modules requires
first of all that they are compatible as far as the connections with the rest of the artifact are concerned,
i.e. that the interfaces they expose are such that wherever one of the modules can be “plugged in”, the
other can too. Besides this plug-level interchangeability, it is of great interest to characterize the behavior-
level interchangeability of modules, namely to identify the situations where internally different modules
can be freely interchanged without affecting the global behavior of the artifact they belong to, since their
Input/Output behavior is equivalent in this respect.
Given a partition of an argumentation framework into partial (or local) interacting subframeworks,
analyzing separability consists in addressing the following issues:
• Is it possible to define a local counterpart of the notion of semantics? i.e. Is there a method to
produce local answers to the justification question, taking into account the interactions with other
subframeworks?
• Can the set of justification answers prescribed by the (global) semantics be obtained by properly
combining (in a bottom-up fashion) the sets of local answers produced in the subframeworks by its
local counterpart?
• symmetrically, Can the sets of local answers be obtained (in a top-down fashion) as projections onto
the subframeworks of the global answers?
As to the first issue, we introduce the notion of local function for a subframework1 and show that under
very mild requirements, satisfied by all semantics considered in this chapter, it is possible (and easy) to
identify the canonical local function for a global semantics. As to the second and third issues, we introduce
the formal notions of top-down and bottom-up decomposability, which, jointly, correspond to the notion of
(full) decomposability of an argumentation semantics.
Strong as it may seem, full decomposability with respect to every arbitrary partition of every argumenta-
tion framework is not unattainable. Indeed, we show that it is satisfied by some of the semantics considered
1Technically, a subframework is captured by the formal notion of argumentation framework with input provided in Definition
13.
CHAPTER 2. MODULARITY AND DECOMPOSABILITY OF AF 13
in this chapter, while some others are able to achieve at least top-down decomposability and the remaining
ones lack all decomposability properties.
As arbitrary partitions correspond to a completely free (if not anarchical) notion of modularity, we
also consider a “tidier” style of partitioning, involving the graph-theoretical notion of strongly connected
components. It turns out that, restricting the set of partitions this way, helps some, but not all, semantics to
recover full decomposability.
Turning to interchangeability, we deal with both its plug-level and behavior-level aspects. As to the plug-
level, borrowing some terminology from circuit theory, we introduce the notion of argumentation multipole
as a generic replaceable argumentation component, namely a partial framework interacting through an input
and output relation with an external set of invariant arguments.
Plug-level compatibility of two multipoles is a very relaxed notion, since it is only required that two
multipoles refer to the same set of external arguments. This is motivated by the fact that imposing a tighter
correspondence between Input/Ouput “terminals” of the multipoles would unnecessarily restrict the scope of
the subsequent analysis on behavior-level compatibility. In fact, our analysis shows that a sensible notion of
behavioral equivalence between multipoles (called Input/Output equivalence) can be introduced by requiring
that the effect of the multipoles on the external arguments is the same: it may well be the case that multipoles
with different “terminals” have the same effect in behavioral terms. Of course, Input/Output equivalence
is a semantics-dependent notion since the behavior of a multipole can only be defined by referring to a
specific semantics using the notion of local function mentioned above. In particular, it may be the case that
two multipoles are equivalent with respect to some semantics and not equivalent with respect to another
semantics.
Input/Output equivalence is the basis for the analysis of the operation of replacement within an ar-
gumentation framework. Basically, a replacement consists in substituting a part of the framework with a
plug-level compatible multipole. While this notion per se allows for arbitrary substitutions, one is inter-
ested in analysing those replacements which have a sound basis. In this perspective, building on multipole
equivalence, it is possible to identify the semantics-dependent notions of legitimate and contextually legiti-
mate replacement. Briefly, a replacement is legitimate if it involves “fully” equivalent multipoles, while it is
contextually legitimate if it involves multipoles which are equivalent in the context where the replacement
takes place, while not necessarily being equivalent in other contexts. Cleary, legitimate replacements are a
(typically strict) subset of contextually legitimate replacements.
One might expect that, given a semantics, legitimate (with respect to that semantics) replacements en-
sure that the invariant part of the framework is unaffected (in a sense, that it does not notice the change).
This property is called semantics transparency. A stronger expectation (since the requirement on the re-
placements is weaker) would be that the invariant part of the framework is unaffected for any contextually
legitimate replacement: this property is called strong transparency.
Natural as it may seem, transparency is not achieved by all semantics and requires a detailed analysis,
showing that different levels of transparency are achieved by the semantics considered in this chapter, also
taking into account different restrictions on the set of allowed replacements.
These results provide a reference context and fundamental answers to modularity-related issues in ab-
stract argumentation, which, up to now, have been considered in the literature focusing on specific aspects
and hence obtaining partial and problem-specific results. Moreover, while being theoretical by nature, the
achievements of this chapter have several significant application-oriented implications.
On the one hand, semantics decomposability properties provide a sound basis for exploiting various
forms of incremental computation which may deliver important efficiency gains in two main respects. First,
they enable (and characterize the limits of) the application of divide-and-conquer strategies in the design of
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algorithms for computational problems in abstract argumentation frameworks. As most of these problems
are intractable in the worst case, facing reduced-size subproblems separately and then combining the partial
results in an efficient manner may significantly improve performances on the average. Second, there is
a significant application interest in argumentation dynamics, which captures all contexts where a given
framework is updated incrementally, as a consequence of the acquisition of new information and/or of the
actions of the participants to a multi-agent system. Clearly, if the modification to the initial framework is
limited, one is interested to partially reuse the results of previous computations in the new framework rather
than redoing all computations from scratch. Again, decomposability properties enable (and characterize
the limits of) the use of incremental computation techniques based on the separation between modified and
unmodified parts in the updated framework.
On the other hand, the notions and properties concerning multipole equivalence and semantics trans-
parency are applicable in all contexts where there is an interest in replacing a part of a framework with
another one. As an example, the activities of summarization and explanation involved in reasoning and
communicating at different levels of granularity are, basically, alternative forms of replacement. In the for-
mer, a complex part of an argumentation process (e.g. the analysis and discussion of factual evidences in
a legal case) is summarized (i.e. replaced) by a more synthetic representation (e.g. focusing on the facts
which turn out to have an actual impact on the case decision) which, while leaving out unnecessary details,
must ensure that the global outcome is preserved. Dually, explanation can be regarded as the replacement
of a synthetic representation with a more detailed/articulated one, again ensuring that this does not induce
undesired side-effects outside the replaced part. Further, and more specific of the abstract argumentation
field, the basic formalism of argumentation frameworks is often used as a “ground level” representation for
other richer and/or more specific formalisms. For instance, formalisms involving the explicit representation
of preferences, values, and attacks to attacks can be translated (or flattened) to the basic formalism through
suitable procedures. As these procedures typically consist of a set of local replacement rules, multipole
equivalence and semantics transparency are very effective tools to analyze their behavior, soundness and
applicability under various semantics.
The chapter is organized as follows. After recalling the necessary background in Section 2.3, the
general notions concerning semantics decomposability are introduced and discussed in Section 2.4, while
Section 2.5 provides decomposability results for the seven semantics considered in this chapter. Section
2.6 deals with the key technical notion of effect-dictated semantics and Section 2.7 then introduces the
fundamental concepts concerning interchangeability, namely argumentation multipoles, their Input/Output
equivalence, the replacement operator and the properties of semantics transparency. Section 2.8 analyzes
the relationships between decomposability and transparency at a general level, while Section 2.9 provides
transparency results for the seven semantics considered in this chapter. Application examples are given in
Section 2.10, Section 2.11 discusses related works and, finally, Section 2.12 concludes the chapter.
2.3 Background
We follow the traditional definition of argumentation framework introduced by Dung [131] and define its
restriction to a subset of arguments.
Definition 1. An argumentation framework is a pair AF = (Ar,→) in which Ar is a finite set of arguments
and→⊆ Ar×Ar. An argument A such that there is no B such that (B,A) ∈→ is called initial. An argument
B such that (B,B) ∈→ is called self-attacking. Given a set Args⊆ Ar, the restriction of AF to Args, denoted
as AF↓Args is the argumentation framework (Args,→∩(Args×Args)).
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Dung [131] presents several acceptability semantics which produce zero, one, or several sets of accepted
arguments. These semantics are grounded on two main concepts, called conflict-freeness and defence.
Definition 2. (Conflict-free, Defence) Let Γ ⊆ Ar. A set Γ is conflict-free if and only if there exist no
A,B∈ Γ such that A→ B. A set Γ defends an argument A if and only if for each argument B∈ Ar if B attacks
A then there exists C ∈ Γ such that C attacks B.
Definition 3. (Acceptability semantics) Let Γ be a conflict-free set of arguments, and let D : 2Ar 7→ 2Ar be
a function such that D(Γ) = {A|Γ de f ends A}.
• Γ is admissible if and only if Γ⊆D(Γ).
• Γ is a complete extension if and only if C = D(Γ).
• Γ is a grounded extension if and only if it is the smallest (w.r.t. set inclusion) complete extension.
• Γ is a preferred extension if and only if it is a maximal (w.r.t. set inclusion) complete extension.
• Γ is a stable extension if and only if it is a preferred extension that attacks all arguments in Ar \Γ.
The concepts of Dung’s semantics are originally stated in terms of sets of arguments. It is equal to ex-
press these concepts using argument labeling. This approach has been proposed firstly by [176] and [305],
and then further developed by [84] with the aim of providing quality postulates for dealing with the rein-
statement of arguments. Given that A→ B and B→C, we have that argument A reinstates argument C, i.e.,
it makes argument C accepted by attacking the attacker of C.
In this chapter, we use the labelling-based approach to the definition of argumentation semantics. As
shown in [81, 13], for the semantics considered in this chapter there is a direct correspondence with the “tra-
ditional” extension-based approach, hence the results presented in this chapter are valid in both approaches.
The labelling-based definitions have been adopted only because they allow simpler proofs.
A labelling assigns to each argument of an argumentation framework a label taken from a predefined set
Λ. For technical reasons, we define labellings both for argumentation frameworks and for arbitrary sets of
arguments.
Definition 4. Let Λ be a set of labels. Given a set of arguments Args, a labelling of Args is a total function
Lab : Args−→ Λ. The set of all labellings of Args is denoted as LArgs. Given an argumentation framework
AF = (Ar,→), a labelling of AF is a labelling of Ar. The set of all labellings of AF is denoted as L(AF).
For a labelling Lab of Args, the restriction of Lab to a set of arguments Args′ ⊆ Args, denoted as Lab↓Args′ ,
is defined as Lab∩ (Args′×Λ).
We adopt the most common choice for Λ, i.e. {in,out,undec}, where the label in means that the
argument is accepted, the label out means that the argument is rejected, and the label undec means that
the status of the argument is undecided. As explained after Definition 10, an exception is made for stable
semantics, which can be more conveniently defined assuming Λ = {in,out}. Given a labelling Lab, we
write in(Lab) for {A | Lab(A) = in}, out(Lab) for {A | Lab(A) = out} and undec(Lab) for {A | Lab(A) =
undec}.
A labelling-based semantics prescribes a set of labellings for each argumentation framework.
Definition 5. Given an argumentation framework AF = (Ar,→), a labelling-based semantics S associates
with AF a subset of L(AF), denoted as LS(AF).
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In general, a semantics encompasses a set of alternative labellings for a single argumentation frame-
work. However, a semantics may be defined so that a unique labelling is always prescribed, i.e. for every
argumentation framework AF , |LS(AF)|= 1. In this case the semantics is said to be single-status, while in
the general case it is said to be multiple-status.
In the labelling-based approach, a semantics definition relies on some legality constraints relating the
label of an argument to those of its attackers.
Definition 6. Let Lab be a labelling of the argumentation framework (Ar,→). An in-labelled argument is
said to be legally in iff all its attackers are labelled out. An out-labelled argument is said to be legally out
iff it has at least one attacker that is labelled in. An undec-labelled argument is said to be legally undec iff
not all its attackers are labelled out and it does not have an attacker that is labelled in.
We now introduce the definitions of labellings corresponding to traditional admissible2 and complete
semantics.
Definition 7. Let AF = (Ar,→) be an argumentation framework. An admissible labelling is a labelling Lab
where every in-labelled argument is legally in and every out-labelled argument is legally out.
Definition 8. A complete labelling is a labelling where every in-labelled argument is legally in, every
out-labelled argument is legally out and every undec-labelled argument is legally undec.
On this basis, the labelling-based definitions of several argumentation semantics can be introduced. To
simplify the technical treatment in the following, grounded and preferred semantics are defined by referring
to the commitment relation between labellings [13].
Definition 9. Let Lab1 and Lab2 be two labellings. We say that Lab2 is more or equally committed than
Lab1 (Lab1 v Lab2) iff in(Lab1)⊆ in(Lab2) and out(Lab1)⊆ out(Lab2).
Definition 10. Let AF = (Ar,→) be an argumentation framework. A stable labelling of AF is a complete
labelling without undec-labelled arguments. The grounded labelling of AF is the minimal (w.r.t. v) la-
belling among all complete labellings. A preferred labelling of AF is a maximal (w.r.t. v) labelling among
all complete labellings. The ideal labelling of AF is the maximal (under v) complete3 labelling Lab that is
less or equally committed than each preferred labelling of AF (i.e. for each preferred labelling LabP it holds
that Labv LabP). A semi-stable labelling of AF is a complete labelling Lab where undec(Lab) is minimal
(w.r.t. set inclusion) among all complete labellings.
While stable semantics is defined by assuming Λ = {in,out,undec}, the definition of stable labelling
entails that stable semantics can be equivalently defined with reference to the set of labels Λ = {in,out}.
In this case, a stable labelling is simply a complete labelling, since the codomain Λ does not include undec.
In the sequel we implicitly assume that, for stable semantics only, Λ = {in,out}: this allows a simpler
treatment of such semantics without any loss of generality.
The uniqueness of the grounded and the ideal labelling has been proved in [82]. Accordingly, grounded
and ideal semantics are single-status, the other semantics are multiple-status. Admissible, complete, stable,
2It can be remarked that (unlike the other semantics) admissible labellings are not in a one-to-one correspondence to admissible
sets since several admissible labellings might correspond to the same admissible set.
3Literally, the original definition refers to an admissible labelling rather than a complete labelling. However, the definition
adopted here is equivalent to the original one, since it can be shown that the ideal labelling is a complete labelling [82].
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grounded, preferred, ideal and semi-stable semantics are denoted in the following as AD, CO, ST, GR, PR,
ID and SST, respectively.
We also recall the traditional notions of skeptical and credulous justification of an argument with respect
to a semantics.
Definition 11. Given a labelling-based semantics S and an argumentation framework AF , an argument A is
skeptically justified under S if ∀Lab ∈ LS(AF) Lab(A) = in; an argument A is credulously justified under S
if ∃Lab ∈ LS(AF) : Lab(A) = in.
Finally, a comment is in order on a special case of argumentation framework that is explicitly consid-
ered in the chapter, i.e. the empty argumentation framework AF/0 , ( /0, /0). By definition the only possible
labelling of AF/0 is the empty set, thus a semantics can either prescribe /0 for AF/0 or it can prescribe no
labelling at all. In this respect, for any semantics S introduced above it holds LS(AF/0) = { /0}, i.e. the empty
set is actually prescribed by S. Note in particular that /0 is a stable labelling, since it is complete and does
not include undec-labelled arguments.
2.4 Decomposability of Argumentation Semantics
The notion of local function
The first step to define the notion of semantics decomposability is to introduce a formal setting to express the
interactions between the partial frameworks induced by an arbitrary partitioning of an argumentation frame-
work. Intuitively, given an argumentation framework AF = (Ar,→) and a subset Args of its arguments, the
elements affecting AF↓Args include the arguments attacking Args from the outside, called input arguments,
and the attack relation from the input arguments to Args, called conditioning relation.
Definition 12. Given AF = (Ar,→) and a set Args ⊆ Ar, the input of Args, denoted as Argsinp, is the set
{B ∈ Ar \Args | ∃A ∈ Args,(B,A) ∈→}, the conditioning relation of Args, denoted as ArgsR, is defined as
→∩(Argsinp×Args).
Example 1. Consider AF = ({A,B,C,D},{(A,B),(B,C),(C,A),(A,D),(D,A)}) with reference to the par-
tial frameworks induced by the sets {A,B,C} and {D} (see Figure 2.1). It holds that {A,B,C}inp = {D}
and {A,B,C}R = {(D,A)}, while {D}inp = {A} and {D}R = {(A,D)}.
Given a partial argumentation framework AF↓Args (possibly AF itself) affected by a (possibly empty)
set of arguments Argsinp attacking Args according to ArgsR, one may wonder whether fixing the labelling
assigned to the input arguments allows one to determine the set of labellings of AF↓Args. As shown in the
following, this question cannot be answered once and for all, since different semantics exhibit different
behaviours in this respect, and, for some semantics, a dependency holds under specific constraints on the
considered partition of the argumentation framework. In order to express such a dependency (whenever it
holds), we introduce the notions of argumentation framework with input, consisting of an argumentation
framework AF = (Ar,→) (playing the role of a partial argumentation framework), a set of external input
arguments I , a labelling LI assigned to them and an attack relation RI from I to Ar, and of a local
function which, given an argumentation framework with input, returns a corresponding set of labellings of
AF .





Figure 2.1: Running example: a partition of a simple framework (Examples 1 - 5).
Definition 13. An argumentation framework with input is a tuple (AF,I ,LI ,RI ), including an argumen-
tation framework4 AF = (Ar,→), a set of arguments I such that I ∩Ar = /0, a labelling LI ∈ LI and
a relation RI ⊆ I ×Ar. A local function assigns to any argumentation framework with input a (possibly
empty) set of labellings of AF , i.e. F(AF,I ,LI ,RI ) ∈ 2L(AF).
For any semantics, a “sensible” local function, called canonical local function, is the one that describes
the labellings of the so-called standard argumentation frameworks.
Definition 14. Given an argumentation framework with input (AF,I ,LI ,RI ), the standard argumentation
framework w.r.t. (AF,I ,LI ,RI ) is defined as AF ′ = (Ar ∪I ′,→ ∪R′I ), where I ′ = I ∪ {A′ | A ∈
out(LI )} and R′I = RI ∪{(A′,A) | A ∈ out(LI )}∪{(A,A) | A ∈ undec(LI )}.
Roughly, the standard argumentation framework puts AF under the influence of (I ,LI ,RI ), by adding
I to Ar and RI to→, and by enforcing5 the label LI for the arguments of I in this way:
• for each argument A∈I such that LI (A)= out, an unattacked argument A′ is included which attacks
A, in order to get A labelled out by all labellings of AF ′;
• for each argument A ∈ I such that LI (A) = undec, a self-attack is added to A in order to get it
labelled undec by all labellings of AF ′;
• each argument A∈I such that LI (A) = in is left unattacked, so that it is labelled in by all labellings
of AF ′.
Definition 15. Given a semantics S, the canonical local function of S (also called local function of S) is
defined as FS(AF,I ,LI ,RI ) = {Lab↓Ar | Lab ∈ LS(AF ′)}, where AF = (Ar,→) and AF ′ is the standard
argumentation framework w.r.t. (AF,I ,LI ,RI ).
Note that in the case of stable semantics undec /∈ Λ, thus R′I does not include self-attacks.
In case I = /0 (entailing LI = /0 and RI = /0) the canonical local function returns the labellings of AF ,
as shown by Proposition 1. All proofs are available online at https://www.sciencedirect.com/
science/article/pii/S0004370214001131?via%3Dihub.
4In the following, unless otherwise specified, we will implicitly assume AF = (Ar,→).
5Actually, the enforcement is a bit different for admissible semantics. This exception has no consequences on the technical
development of the chapter.
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Proposition 1. Given a semantics S and an argumentation framework AF , FS(AF, /0, /0, /0) = LS(AF).
While the canonical local function is defined for any semantics, its definition is best suited for complete-
compatible semantics, i.e. semantics satisfying a number of intuitive constraints.
Definition 16. A semantics S is complete-compatible iff the following conditions hold:
1. For any argumentation framework AF = (Ar,→), every labelling L ∈ LS(AF) satisfies the following
conditions:
• if A ∈ Ar is initial, then L(A) = in
• if B ∈ Ar and there is an initial argument A which attacks B, then L(B) = out
• if C ∈ Ar is self-attacking, and there are no attackers of C besides C itself, then L(C) = undec
2. for any set of arguments I and any labelling LI ∈LI , the argumentation framework AF ′ = (I ′,→′
), where I ′=I ∪{A′ |A∈ out(LI )} and→′= {(A′,A) |A∈ out(LI )}∪{(A,A) |A∈ undec(LI )},
admits a (unique) labelling, i.e. |LS(AF ′)|= 1.
It should be noted that, in case undec /∈Λ, the third bullet of condition 1 entails that there is no labelling
if a self-attacking argument C is attacked by C only, and in condition 2 it necessarily holds that undec(LI )=
/0.
As shown by Proposition 2, the requirements of the previous definition guarantee that the construction
of the standard argumentation framework makes sense, i.e. given a standard argumentation framework w.r.t.
(AF,I ,LI ,RI ), a complete-compatible semantics enforces the labelling LI for the arguments of I as
described above.
Proposition 2. Let S be a complete-compatible semantics and let AF ′ = (Ar∪I ′,→∪R′I ) be the standard
argumentation framework w.r.t. an argumentation framework with input (AF,I ,LI ,RI ). Then for any
Lab ∈ LS(AF ′) it holds that Lab↓I ′ = {(A′,in) | A ∈ out(LI )}∪LI and Lab↓I = LI .
Moreover, when applied to the empty argumentation framework (which by definition does not receive
attacks from I ) the canonical local function of a complete-compatible semantics always returns the empty
set as a unique labelling.
Proposition 3. Given a complete-compatible semantics S, a set of arguments I and a labelling LI ∈ LI ,
it holds that FS(AF/0,I ,LI , /0) = { /0}.
Taking into account Proposition 1 this result entails that LS(AF/0) = { /0}, corresponding to the second
requirement of Definition 16 with I = /0.
All the semantics considered in the chapter are complete-compatible, with the exception of admissible
semantics.
Proposition 4. GR,CO,ST,PR,SST,ID are all complete-compatible semantics.
Admissible semantics is not complete-compatible, as it can be seen by considering e.g. the argumenta-
tion framework AF = ({A}, /0), where LAD(AF) = {(A,undec),(A,in)}.
The following example clarifies the notion of canonical local function, considering in particular com-
plete semantics.





Figure 2.2: The standard argumentation framework w.r.t. (AF↓{A,B,C},{D},{(D,out)},{(D,A)}) (Example
2).
Example 2. Let us refer again to the argumentation framework AF of Figure 2.1. For the canonical local
function of complete semantics it holds that FCO(AF↓{A,B,C},{D},{(D,out)},
{(D,A)}) = {{(A,undec),(B,undec),(C,undec)}}, due to the fact that the standard argumentation frame-
work w.r.t. (AF↓{A,B,C},{D},{(D,out)},{(D,A)}), shown in Figure 2.2, admits as the unique complete
labelling {(D′,in),(D,out),(A,undec),(B,undec),(C,undec)}. In a similar way, it is easy to show that
FCO(AF↓{A,B,C},{D},{(D,in)},{(D,A)}) = {{(A,out),(B,in),(C,out)}} and FCO(AF↓{A,B,C},{D},
{(D,undec)},{(D,A)}) = {{(A,undec),(B,undec),(C,undec)}}.
Considering the application of FCO to AF↓{D}, FCO(AF↓{D},{A},{(A,out)},{(A,D)}) = {{(D,in)}},
FCO(AF↓{D},{A},{(A,in)},{(A,D)}) = {{(D,out)}} and FCO(AF↓{D},{A},{(A,undec)},{(A,D)}) =
{{(D,undec)}}.
As shown in Section 2.5, for any semantics considered in this chapter the local function admits a compact
representation, without the need to refer to standard argumentation frameworks.
Decomposability properties of argumentation semantics
We now aim at introducing a formal notion of semantics decomposability. To this purpose, consider a
generic argumentation framework AF = (Ar,→) and an arbitrary partition of Ar, i.e. a set {P1, . . . ,Pn} such
that ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} Pi ⊆ Ar and Pi 6= /0,
⋃
i=1...n Pi = Ar and Pi∩Pj = /0 for i 6= j. Such a partition identifies
the restricted argumentation frameworks AF↓P1 , . . . ,AF↓Pn , that affect each other with the relevant input
arguments and conditioning relations as stated in Definition 12. Intuititively a semantics S is decomposable
if S can be put in correspondence with a local function F such that:
• every labelling prescribed by S on AF , namely every element of LS(AF), corresponds to the union of n
“compatible” labellings LP1 , . . . ,LPn of the restricted argumentation frameworks, all of them obtained
applying F ;
• in turn, each union of n “compatible” labellings LP1 , . . . ,LPn obtained applying F to the restricted
frameworks gives rise to a labelling of AF .
The “compatibility” constraint mentioned above reflects the fact that any labelling of a restricted frame-
work is used by F for computing the other ones: LPi plays a role in determining LP1 , . . . ,LPi−1 ,LPi+1 , . . . ,LPn
and vice versa. This means that LP1 , . . . ,LPn are “compatible” if each LPi is produced by F for AF↓Pi with the
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input arguments Piinp labelled according to LP1 , . . . ,LPi−1 ,LPi+1 , . . . ,LPn . Definition 17 synthesizes all these
considerations.
Definition 17. A semantics S is fully decomposable (or simply decomposable) iff there is a local function
F such that for every argumentation framework AF = (Ar,→) and every partition P = {P1, . . . ,Pn} of Ar,
LS(AF) = U (P,AF,F) where U (P,AF,F) , {LP1 ∪ . . . ∪ LPn | LPi ∈ F(AF↓Pi ,Piinp,
(
⋃
j=1...n, j 6=i LPj)↓Piinp
,PiR)}.
Example 3. Considering again the argumentation framework AF of Figure 2.1 and the partition {{A,B,C},
{D}}, full decomposability of complete semantics requires a local function such that the labellings of AF
are exactly those obtained by the union of the compatible labellings of AF↓{A,B,C} and AF↓{D} given by
the local function itself. Let us consider the canonical local function6 of CO (refer to Example 2). The
labelling {(A,out),(B,in),(C,out)} is compatible with {(D,in)}, since the first is obtained by FCO with
D labelled in, and the latter is obtained by FCO with A labelled out. On the other hand, the labelling
{(A,out),(B,in),(C,out)} is not compatible e.g. with {(D,out)}. Overall, exactly two global labellings
arise from the combinations of the compatible outcomes of FCO, namely {(A,undec),(B,undec),(C,undec),
(D,undec)} and {(A,out),(B,in),(C,out),(D,in)}, corresponding to the complete labellings of AF .
The behavior of complete semantics in this example is not incidental: we will prove in Section 2.5 that
complete semantics is fully decomposable.
Proposition 5 shows that, if a complete-compatible semantics S is fully decomposable, then the local
function appearing in Definition 17 coincides with the canonical local function FS.
Proposition 5. Given a complete-compatible semantics S, if S is fully decomposable then there is a unique
local function satisfying the conditions of Definition 17, coinciding with the canonical local function FS.
Full decomposability can be viewed as the conjunction of two partial decomposability properties, namely
top-down decomposability and bottom-up decomposability.
In words, a semantics is top-down decomposable if the procedure to compute the global labellings identi-
fied by Definition 17 is complete, i.e. all of the global labellings can be obtained by combining the labellings
prescribed by FS for the restricted subframeworks, even if putting together labellings of the restricted sub-
frameworks may give rise to some “spurious” labellings besides the correct ones. The following definition
formalizes this intuition.
Definition 18. A complete-compatible semantics S is top-down decomposable iff for any argumentation
framework AF = (Ar,→) and any partition P = {P1, . . . ,Pn} of Ar, it holds that LS(AF)⊆U (P,AF,FS).
While top-down decomposability corresponds to completeness of the procedure identified by Definition
17, bottom-up decomposability requires its soundness, i.e. that any combination of local labellings is a
global labelling, while it is not guaranteed that all global labellings can be obtained in this way.
Definition 19. A complete-compatible semantics S is bottom-up decomposable iff for any argumentation
framework AF = (Ar,→) and any partition P = {P1, . . . ,Pn} of Ar, it holds that LS(AF)⊇U (P,AF,FS).
6It is shown in Proposition 5 that considering the canonical local function is without loss of generality.
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A comment on the two definitions above is in order. While the definition of full decomposability ap-
plies to any kind of semantics and requires the existence of a local function satisfying the decomposability
property, Definitions 18 and 19 are restricted to complete-compatible semantics and refer to the canonical
local function FS to avoid triviality: the local function returning all the possible labellings of AF trivially
satisfies the inclusion condition of Definition 18 for any semantics, while the local function always returning
the empty set trivially satisfies the condition of Definition 19. This is the reason why both definitions refer
to the specific canonical local function, which makes sense for complete-compatible semantics in the light
of Proposition 5. If a semantics is not complete-compatible7 then the notion of canonical local function is
meaningless, since the labelling LI would not be in general enforced for the arguments of I in the standard
argumentation framework w.r.t. (AF,I ,LI ,RI ) (see Proposition 2).
As shown in Section 2.5, some semantics that do not satisfy full decomposability are still able to satisfy
top-down decomposability. Moreover, there are semantics that do not satisfy either of them: in this case
it is interesting to investigate whether decomposability holds by restricting the possible partitions of the
argumentation frameworks to those satisfying a given set of constraints. To express this restriction, we first
introduce the notion of partition selector.
Definition 20. A partition selector F is a function receiving as input an argumentation framework AF =
(Ar,→) and returning a set of partitions of Ar.
A partition selector is defined as a function of argumentation frameworks, since different argumentation
frameworks with the same set of arguments may allow different sets of partitions, depending on the attack
relation.
The decomposability notions introduced so far can then be extended to take into account a specific
restriction on the considered partitions.
Definition 21. Let F be a partition selector. A complete-compatible semantics S is top-down decomposable
w.r.t. F iff for any argumentation framework AF and any partition P = {P1, . . . ,Pn} ∈F (AF), it holds
that LS(AF)⊆U (P,AF,FS). A complete-compatible semantics S is bottom-up decomposable w.r.t. F iff
for any argumentation framework AF and any partition {P1, . . . ,Pn} ∈F (AF), LS(AF)⊇U (P,AF,FS). A
complete-compatible semantics is fully decomposable (or simply decomposable) w.r.t. a partition selector
F iff it is both top-down and bottom-up decomposable w.r.t. F .
Of course, full decomposability, top-down decomposability and bottom-up decomposability as intro-
duced in Definitions 17, 18 and 19, respectively, are equivalent to the corresponding decomposability prop-
erties w.r.t. FALL, i.e. the selector returning all possible partitions.
Definition 22. For any argumentation framework AF = (Ar,→), FALL(AF) , {{P1, . . . ,Pn} | {P1, . . . ,Pn}
is a partition of Ar}.
Apart from this limit case, a particular partition selector that has received attention in the literature and
will be considered in this chapter is the one based on the notion of strongly connected component (SCC)
of an argumentation framework. Its importance is due to the fact that most argumentation semantics in the
literature are SCC-recursive [245], which, briefly, means that the semantics can be defined in terms of a
base function operating at the level of single strongly connected components. Roughly, this also implies
7Besides admissible semantics, in the literature there are a few examples of non complete-compatible semantics, like stage
semantics [306] and various forms of prudent semantics [115].
CHAPTER 2. MODULARITY AND DECOMPOSABILITY OF AF 23
AD CO ST GR PR ID SST
Full decomposability (Def. 17) Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Top-down decomposability (Def. 18) - Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Bottom-up decomposability (Def. 19) - Yes Yes No No No No
Full decomposability w.r.t. F∪SCC and FSCC (Def. 21) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Top-down decomposability w.r.t. F∪SCC and FSCC (Def. 21) - Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Bottom-up decomposability w.r.t. F∪SCC and FSCC (Def. 21) - Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Table 2.1: Decomposability properties of argumentation semantics.
that an incremental computation procedure based on the decomposition of the framework into its strongly
connected components can be defined, a property exploited in several subsequent works [201, 272, 98].
Here we introduce the necessary basic definitions, leaving further discussion on this subject to Section 2.11.
Definition 23. Given an argumentation framework AF = (Ar,→), the set of strongly connected components
of AF , denoted as SCCSAF , consists of the equivalence classes of arguments induced by the binary relation
of path-equivalence, i.e. the relation ρ(A,B) defined over Ar×Ar such that ρ(A,B) holds if and only if
A = B or there are directed paths from A to B and from B to A in AF .
For instance, the argumentation framework of Figure 2.1 has a unique strongly connected component
including all of the arguments, while for the argumentation framework AF of Figure 2.2 it holds that
SCCSAF = {{D′},{D},{A,B,C}}.
At least two partition selectors based on strongly connected components can be considered. The simplest
selector, denoted as FSCC, includes for each argumentation framework AF the unique partition consisting of
the strongly connected components SCCSAF . A second selector, denoted as F∪SCC, includes all the partitions
such that every element is the union of some (possibly unconnected) strongly connected components.
Definition 24. For any argumentation framework AF =(Ar,→), FSCC(AF), {SCCSAF}\{ /0}, F∪SCC(AF),
{{P1, . . . ,Pn} | {P1, . . . ,Pn} is a partition of Ar and ∀i ((S ∈ SCCSAF ∧Pi∩S 6= /0)→ S⊆ Pi}).
It is immediate to see that, for any AF , FSCC(AF) ⊆F∪SCC(AF). As to the first part of the definition,
note that the set SCCSAF includes /0 only in case AF = AF/0, which does not admit any partition (since all
the elements of a partition must be nonempty), thus FSCC(AF/0) = /0.
2.5 Analyzing semantics decomposability
In this section we discuss the decomposability properties of the semantics reviewed in Section 2.3. A syn-
thetic view of the results is given in Table 2.1 (note that for all semantics full, top-down and bottom-up
decomposability w.r.t. F∪SCC turn out to be satisfied if and only if full, top-down and bottom-up decompos-
ability w.r.t. FSCC are satisfied, respectively). Since admissible semantics is not complete-compatible, only
the notion of full decomposability is applicable to it.
Admissible and complete semantics
We first analyze admissible and complete semantics, since they are the basis for the other ones considered
in this chapter: according to Definition 10, stable, grounded, preferred, ideal, and semi-stable semantics
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select labellings among the complete ones, which are admissible by definition. Given this, it would be very
unpleasant if complete (and thus admissible) semantics would not be decomposable. As shown by Theorems
1 and 3, luckily both admissible and complete semantics turn out to be fully decomposable.
The following definition introduces the canonical local function of admissible semantics, by extending
the definition of admissible labelling in order to account for “external” input arguments in the obvious way.
The proof that the definition is correct is provided by Theorem 2.
Definition 25. Given an argumentation framework with input (AF,I ,LI ,RI ), FAD(AF,I ,LI ,RI ) ,
{Lab ∈ L(AF) |
Lab(A) = in→ ((∀B ∈ Ar : (B,A) ∈→,Lab(B) = out)∧ (∀B ∈I : (B,A) ∈ RI ,LI (B) = out)),
Lab(A) = out→ ((∃B ∈ Ar : (B,A) ∈→∧Lab(B) = in)∨ (∃B ∈I : (B,A) ∈ RI ∧LI (B) = in))}.
Theorem 1 proves that admissible semantics is fully decomposable, showing that the local function FAD
introduced in Definition 25 satisfies the conditions of Definition 17.
Theorem 1. Admissible semantics AD is fully decomposable, with FAD satisfying the conditions of Defini-
tion 17.
The following theorem confirms that Definition 25 actually corresponds to the canonical local function
of admissible semantics.
Theorem 2. The canonical local function of admissible semantics is FAD, as defined in Definition 25.
Also the canonical local function of complete semantics can be guessed on the basis of the definition of
complete labelling.
Definition 26. Given an argumentation framework with input (AF,I ,LI ,RI ), FCO(AF,I ,LI ,RI ) ,
{Lab ∈ L(AF) |
Lab(A) = in→ ((∀B ∈ Ar : (B,A) ∈→,Lab(B) = out)∧ (∀B ∈I : (B,A) ∈ RI ,LI (B) = out)),
Lab(A) = out→ ((∃B ∈ Ar : (B,A) ∈→∧Lab(B) = in)∨ (∃B ∈I : (B,A) ∈ RI ∧LI (B) = in)),
Lab(A) = undec→ (((∀B∈Ar : (B,A)∈→,Lab(B) 6= in)∧(∀B∈I : (B,A)∈RI ,LI (B) 6= in))∧((∃B∈
Ar : (B,A) ∈→∧Lab(B) = undec)∨ (∃B ∈I : (B,A) ∈ RI ∧LI (B) = undec)))}.
It is easy to see that FCO(AF,I ,LI ,RI )⊆FAD(AF,I ,LI ,RI ), i.e. every “locally complete” labelling
is also “locally admissible”.
Theorem 3 shows that also complete semantics is fully decomposable8. Since the proof adopts FCO as
the local function and CO is complete-compatible,
by Proposition 5 it holds that FCO is actually the canonical local function of complete semantics.
Theorem 3. Complete semantics CO is fully decomposable and FCO is its canonical local function.
8Proposition 3 of [272] proves a weaker property of complete semantics, corresponding to bottom-up decomposability in the
extension-based approach.
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Stable semantics
Stable semantics inherits full decomposability from complete semantics: the reason is that the definition of
stable labelling corresponds to that of complete labelling with the additional requirement that no argument
is labelled undec, and this requirement holds at the level of the whole argumentation framework iff it holds
in any of its subframeworks. The relevant local function can easily be identified by taking into account this
requirement (again, the fact that such local function is the canonical one holds in virtue of Proposition 5).
Definition 27. Given an argumentation framework with input (AF,I ,LI ,RI ), FST(AF,I ,LI ,RI ) ,
{Lab ∈ FCO(AF,I ,LI ,RI ) | ∀A ∈ Ar,Lab(A) 6= undec}.
Theorem 4. Stable semantics ST is fully decomposable and FST is its canonical local function.
Example 4. Consider again the running example of Figure 2.1. Taking into account the results provided in
Example 2 for the local function of complete semantics, it is easy to see that FST(AF↓{A,B,C},{D},{(D,out)},
{(D,A)}) = /0, that FST(AF↓{A,B,C},{D},{(D,in)},{(D,A)}) = {{(A,out),(B,in),(C,out)}}, and for
AF↓{D} that FST(AF↓{D},{A},{(A,out)},{(A,D)})= {{(D,in)}}, FST(AF↓{D},{A},{(A,in)},{(A,D)})=
{{(D,out)}}. Accordingly, there is just a pair of compatible local labellings, namely {(A,out),(B,in),
(C,out)} and {(D,in)}, giving rise to the unique stable labelling {(A,out),(B,in),(C,out),(D,in)}.
Grounded and Preferred semantics
As in the previous cases, the canonical local functions of grounded and preferred semantics can be obtained
by extending the definition of grounded and preferred labelling, respectively. Proposition 6 identifies these
functions, also showing that the relevant definitions are well-founded, in particular, that there is always a
unique minimal labelling in FCO(AF,I ,LI ,RI ) and that FPR(AF,I ,LI ,RI ) is nonempty.
Proposition 6. The canonical local function of grounded and preferred semantics are defined as
• FGR(AF,I ,LI ,RI ), {L∗}, where L∗ is the minimal (w.r.t. v) labelling in FCO(AF,I ,LI ,RI )
• FPR(AF,I ,LI ,RI ), {L | L is a maximal (w.r.t. v) labelling in FCO(AF,I ,LI ,RI )}.
Differently from stable semantics, grounded semantics and preferred semantics do not inherit decompos-
ability from complete semantics. The reason is that the definition of grounded/preferred labelling includes
a minimization/maximization requirement, and satisfying this requirement in all of the subframeworks does
not entail satisfying it at the level of the whole framework. To show this, consider the following counterex-
ample.9
Example 5. We have shown in Example 2 that in the running example of Figure 2.1 the outcome of FCO
is a unique labelling in all cases, thus by definition it coincides with the outcome of FGR and FPR. Given
the compatibility constraint, exactly two global labellings arise from the combinations of the outcomes
of FCO, namely {(A,undec),(B,undec),(C,undec),(D,undec)} and {(A,out),(B,in),(C,out),(D,in)}.
The former is the grounded labelling, the latter is the preferred labelling: it turns out that the combination
of two “locally grounded” labellings gives rise not just to the “global” grounded labelling but also to the
preferred labelling, and analogously that the combination of two “locally preferred” labellings gives rise not
9A counterexample to decomposability of grounded semantics is provided also in [272].
CHAPTER 2. MODULARITY AND DECOMPOSABILITY OF AF 26
just to the “global” preferred labelling but also to the grounded one. This shows that grounded and preferred
semantics are not bottom-up decomposable.
Now, a question arises as to whether satisfying the minimization/maximization requirement at the level
of the whole argumentation framework entails that such requirement is satisfied at the local level, i.e.
whether grounded and preferred semantics are top-down decomposable. This result turns out to be true
and is achieved through some intermediate steps.
First, Lemma 1 shows that if a labelling produced by FAD does not belong to FCO then there is an
undec-labelled argument which can be labelled in or out obtaining a labelling still in FAD.
Lemma 1. Given an argumentation framework with input (AF,I ,LI ,RI ), where AF = (Ar,→), let L be
a labelling such that L ∈ FAD(AF,I ,LI ,RI ) and L /∈ FCO(AF,I ,LI ,RI ). Then there is an argument
A ∈ Ar such that L(A) = undec and a labelling LA ∈ FAD(AF,I ,LI ,RI ) such that LA(A) ∈ {in,out} and
∀B ∈ Ar : B 6= A, LA(B) = L(B).
Lemma 2 shows that for every labelling produced by FAD there is a more or equally committed labelling
produced by FCO.
Lemma 2. Given an argumentation framework with input (AF,I ,LI ,RI ), for every labelling
L1 ∈ FAD(AF,I ,LI ,RI ) there exists a labelling L2 ∈ FCO(AF,I ,LI ,RI ) such that L1 v L2.
Proposition 7 shows a sort of monotonicity property of FCO with respect to the v relation.
Proposition 7. Given an argumentation framework with input (AF,I ,LI ,RI ), let LI 1,LI 2 ∈ LI be two
labellings of I such that LI 1 v LI 2. Then it holds that
1. ∀L1 ∈ FCO(AF,I ,LI 1,RI ),∃L2 ∈ FCO(AF,I ,LI 2,RI ) such that L1 v L2; and
2. ∀L2 ∈ FCO(AF,I ,LI 2,RI ),∃L1 ∈ FCO(AF,I ,LI 1,RI ) such that L1 v L2.
Building on the above results (more specifically, using the first point for Theorem 6 and the second
point for Theorem 5) we are now in a position to prove that grounded and preferred semantics are top-down
decomposable.
Theorem 5. Given an argumentation framework AF = (Ar,→), let L be the grounded labelling of AF. For
any set P⊆ Ar, L↓P ∈ FGR(AF↓P,Pinp,L↓Pinp ,P
R).
Theorem 6. Given an argumentation framework AF = (Ar,→), let L be a preferred labelling of AF. For
any set P⊆ Ar, L↓P ∈ FPR(AF↓P,Pinp,L↓Pinp ,P
R).
While preferred and complete semantics fail to achieve bottom-up decomposability for arbitrary par-
titions, they turn out to be bottom-up decomposable (thus fully decomposable) w.r.t. F∪SCC. The re-
sult, proved in Theorem 7, is based on a preliminary lemma, which roughly states that if a semantics
S is top-down decomposable then a kind of top-down decomposability relation holds for any labelling
L ∈ FS(AF,I ,LI ,RI ) w.r.t. any set of arguments P in AF . More specifically, given such a labelling
L and P, it is possible to refer to a “restricted” argumentation framework with input based on P, namely
(AF↓P,PF-inp,(L∪LI )↓
PF-inp
,PRF ), where intuitively P
F-inp, (L∪LI )↓
PF-inp
, and PRF are obtained by
considering both I and AF (outside P). Then, the restriction of L to P is produced by FS when applied to
the restricted argumentation framework with input mentioned above.







Figure 2.3: A partition belonging to F∪SCC (Example 6).
Lemma 3. Let S be a complete-compatible semantics which is top-down decomposable, with the canon-
ical local function FS. Given an argumentation framework with input (AF,I ,LI ,RI ), consider a la-
belling L ∈ FS(AF,I ,LI ,RI ) and let P ⊆ Ar be an arbitrary set of arguments of AF . Then, letting




Theorem 7. Grounded and preferred semantics are decomposable w.r.t. F∪SCC.
Example 6. Consider AF = ({A,B,C,D,E},{(A,B),(B,C),(C,D),(D,C),(D,B),(C,E),(D,E)}) and the
partition {P1,P2} ∈ F∪SCC(AF) where P1 = {A,E} and P2 = {B,C,D} (see Figure 2.3). It holds that
P1inp = {C,D}, P1R = {(C,E),(D,E)}, P2inp = {A}, P2R = {(A,B)}. Note that the partition is not “acyclic”,
in that P1 attacks P2 and P2 attacks P1. We show that both in the case of grounded semantics and of pre-
ferred semantics the union of compatible local labellings gives rise to the grounded labelling or a pre-
ferred labelling, respectively. First, note that any labelling returned by FGR and FPR applied to AF↓P1
prescribes that A is labelled in, therefore it suffices to consider the labelling {(A,in)} for the unique in-
put argument of P2. As to grounded semantics, it turns out that FGR(AF↓P2 ,{A},{(A,in)},{(A,B)}) =
{{(B,out),(C,undec),(D,undec)}}, while FGR(AF↓P1 ,{C,D},{(C,undec),(D,undec)},
{(C,E),(D,E)}) = {{(A,in),(E,undec)}}. We have a unique pair of compatible local labellings which
give rise to the global labelling {(A,in),(B,out),(C,undec),(D,undec),(E,undec)}, i.e. the grounded
labelling of AF . As to preferred semantics, FPR(AF↓P2 ,{A},{(A,in)},{(A,B)}) returns two labellings, i.e.
{(B,out),(C,in),(D,out)} and {(B,out),(C,out),(D,in)}, while FPR(AF↓P1 ,{C,D},{(C,in),(D,out)},
{(C,E),(D,E)}) = FPR(AF↓P1 ,{C,D},{(C,out),(D,in)},{(C,E),(D,E)}) = {{(A,in),(E,out)}}. Ac-
cordingly, the union of compatible local labellings gives rise to {(A,in),(B,out),(C,in),(D,out),(E,out)}
and {(A,in),(B,out),(C,out),(D,in),(E,out)}, i.e. the preferred labellings of AF .
Ideal semantics
Similarly to the cases analyzed in the previous sections, the canonical local function of ideal semantics
corresponds to an extension of the definition of ideal labelling. The following proposition identifies the rel-






Figure 2.4: Ideal semantics is neither top-down nor bottom-up decomposable w.r.t. FSCC (Example 7).
evant definition, also showing that it is well founded (in particular, that FID(AF,I ,LI ,RI ) always returns
a unique labelling).
Proposition 8. The canonical local function of ideal semantics is defined as FID(AF,I ,LI ,RI ) , {L∗},
where L∗ is the maximal (w.r.t. v) labelling in FCO(AF,I ,LI ,RI ) such that for each
LP ∈ FPR(AF,I ,LI ,RI ) it holds that L∗ v LP.
Ideal semantics has some common features both with preferred and with grounded semantics: on the one
hand, its definition is based on the preferred labellings, on the other hand it yields a unique labelling, like
the grounded semantics. As a matter of fact, a formal skepticism comparison between semantics shows that
ideal semantics lies between grounded and preferred semantics [16]. Ideal semantics does not inherit any
decomposability property from them: the following example shows that ideal semantics is neither top-down
nor bottom-up decomposable even w.r.t. FSCC.
Example 7. AF = ({A,B,C,D,E},{(A,B),(B,A),(A,C),(C,A),(B,C),(C,B),(C,D),(D,E),(E,D)}) has
the unique partition {S1,S2} ∈ FSCC(AF), where S1 = {A,B,C} and S2 = {D,E} are the strongly con-
nected components of AF (see Figure 2.4). There are 5 preferred labellings of AF and there is no argu-
ment which is labelled in in all of them, thus the ideal labelling L∗ leaves all of the arguments unde-
cided. To show that ideal semantics is not top-down decomposable w.r.t. FSCC, it is sufficient to note
that L∗↓S2 = {(D,undec),(E,undec)}, while it turns out that FID(AF↓S2 ,{C},{(C,undec)},{(C,D)}) =
{{(D,out),(E,in)}}.
To show that ideal semantics is not bottom-up decomposable w.r.t. FSCC, consider first the application of
FID to AF↓S1 : it is easy to see that FID(AF↓S1 , /0, /0, /0) = {(A,undec),(B,undec),(C,undec)}, since AF↓S1
admits the three preferred labellings where one of the three arguments {A,B,C} is in and the others are out.
Moreover, we already know that FID(AF↓S2 ,{C},{(C,undec)},{(C,D)}) = {{(D,out),(E,in)}}, thus the
labellings {(A,undec),(B,undec),(C,undec)} and {{(D,out),(E,in)}} are compatible. However, the
union of these two labellings does not coincide with the ideal labelling L∗.
The previous example contradicts10 a result presented in [201], according to which ideal semantics is
decomposable w.r.t. partitions including two elements one of which is unattacked (i.e. does not receive
attacks from outside, S1 in Figure 2.4). The reason why ideal semantics is not decomposable is that, con-
sidering a strongly connected component P, the restriction of the ideal labelling to the input arguments of
P does not always carry enough information to compute the restriction of the ideal labelling to P. In the
10A detailed discussion of this matter is given in [18].






Figure 2.5: Semi-stable semantics is not top-down decomposable w.r.t. FSCC (Example 8).
previous example, argument C is labelled undec by the ideal labelling while it is labelled in or out by the
preferred labellings, i.e. those which actually determine the ideal labelling according to Definition 10.
Semi-stable semantics
The definition of semi-stable semantics somewhat resembles that of preferred semantics, in that semi-stable
labellings correspond to those preferred labellings which satisfy the additional requirement of minimizing
the set of arguments labelled undec. The following proposition shows that the canonical local function is
defined accordingly.
Proposition 9. The canonical local function of semi-stable semantics is defined as FSST(AF,I ,LI ,RI ),
{L | L ∈ FCO(AF,I ,LI ,RI ) such that undec(L) is minimal w.r.t. set inclusion}.
Differently from all semantics considered above, semi-stable semantics is not directional [15], i.e. given
an unattacked set of arguments S the labellings computed in AF↓S do not correspond to the restrictions of
the labellings of AF in S. As shown in the following two examples, this behavior prevents the satisfaction
of top-down and bottom-up decomposability even w.r.t. FSCC.
Example 8. To show that semi-stable semantics is not top-down decomposable w.r.t. FSCC, consider
AF = ({A,B,C,D},{(A,B),(B,A),(B,C),(C,B),(C,C),(A,D),(D,D)}), where SCCSAF = {P1,P2} with
P1 = {A,B,C} and P2 = {D} (see Figure 2.5). There are two semi-stable labellings in AF , namely L1 =
{(A,in),(B,out),(C,undec),(D,out)} and L2 = {(A,out),(B,in),(C,out),(D,undec)}. Consider then
the partition {P1,P2} ∈FSCC(AF) where P1 is unattacked. Note in particular that L1↓P1 = {(A,in),(B,out),
(C,undec)}, which however does not belong to FSST(AF↓P1 , /0, /0, /0), since the only semi-stable labelling in
AF↓P1 is {(A,out),(B,in),(C,out)}.
Example 9. To show that semi-stable semantics is not bottom-up decomposable w.r.t. FSCC, consider
the argumentation framework AF = ({A,B,C},{(A,B),(B,A),(B,C),(C,C)}) and the partition {P1,P2} ∈
FSCC(AF) with P1 = {A,B} and P2 = {C} (see Figure 2.6). It is easy to see that {(A,in),(B,out)} ∈
FSST(AF↓P1 , /0, /0, /0), and that FSST(AF↓P2 ,{B},{(B,out)},{(B,C)}) = {{(C,undec)}}. Now, the union of
these compatible labellings, i.e. {(A,in),(B,out),(C,undec)}, is not a semi-stable labelling of AF , since
the unique semi-stable labelling of AF is {(A,out),(B,in),(C,out)}.




Figure 2.6: Semi-stable semantics is not bottom-up decomposable w.r.t. FSCC (Example 9).
2.6 Effect-dictated semantics
This short section introduces the simple concept of effect-dictated semantics, which is crucial for the analysis
to be carried out in the next section. For every semantics S analyzed in Section 2.5, it can be noted that
FS(AF,I ,LI ,RI ) may return the same result given different I , LI and RI . For instance, if an argument
A of AF is attacked by an argument of I which is labelled in, then FS returns the same set of labellings
independently of the presence and the number of additional attackers of A in I . The effect of (I ,LI ,RI )
on the arguments Args of AF can be modelled as the labelling that would be induced on Args by neglecting
the attacks inside AF . For instance, if an argument A of AF is only attacked through RI by out-labelled
arguments according to LI , then A would be in in the case that it does not receive other attacks inside AF .11
The following definition formalizes this intuition.
Definition 28. Given a set of arguments I , a labelling LI ∈ LI , a set of arguments Args such that I ∩
Args= /0 and a relation RINP⊆I ×Args, the effect of (I ,LI ,RINP) on Args, denoted as effArgs(I ,LI ,RINP),
is defined as
{(A,out) | A ∈ Args,∃B ∈I : (B,A) ∈ RINP∧LI (B) = in} ∪
{(A,undec) | A ∈ Args,∃B ∈I : (B,A) ∈ RINP∧LI (B) = undec,@C ∈I : (C,A) ∈ RINP∧LI (C) = in} ∪
{(A,in) | A ∈ Args,@B ∈I : (B,A) ∈ RINP∧LI (B) ∈ {in,undec}}
By definition, effArgs(I ,LI ,RINP) only depends on the labelling of the arguments in I that attack
Args through RINP. Moreover each argument in Args not receiving attacks from I is labelled in according
to effArgs(I ,LI ,RINP). Thus, in the particular case where I = /0 (thus also LI and RINP are empty), it
turns out that effArgs( /0, /0, /0) = {(A,in) | A ∈ Args}.
The following lemma proves a monotonic relation between labellings and effects.
Lemma 4. Given a set of arguments I , two labellings L1I ,L
2
I ∈LI , a set of arguments Args such that I ∩
Args = /0 and a relation RINP ⊆I ×Args, if L1I v L2I then effArgs(I ,L1I ,RINP)v effArgs(I ,L2I ,RINP).
A semantics S is said to be effect-dictated if, given AF = (Ar,→), FS(AF,I ,LI ,RI ) only depends on
effAr(I ,LI ,RI ), rather than on the whole labelling LI and the specific relation RI .
Definition 29. A semantics S is effect-dictated if (effAr(I1,LI1 ,RI1) = effAr(I2,LI2 ,RI2)) ⇒
FS(AF,I1,LI1 ,RI1) = FS(AF,I2,LI2 ,RI2) for every AF , I1, I2, LI1 , LI2 , RI1 and RI2 , where AF =
(Ar,→) is an argumentation framework, I1 and I2 are two sets of arguments such that I1 ∩Ar = /0 and
11The effect is a bit different for admissible semantics, but this does not affect its technical treatment, as well as the subsequent
results.







Figure 2.7: Summarizing a chain of arguments (Example 10).
I2∩Ar = /0, LI1 ∈ LI1 and LI2 ∈ LI2 two labellings of I1 and I2 respectively, and RI1 ⊆I1×Ar and
RI2 ⊆I2×Ar two relations.
All the semantics considered in this chapter are effect-dictated as shown by the following proposition.
Proposition 10. Every semantics S ∈ {AD,CO,ST,GR,PR,ID,SST} is effect-dictated.
2.7 Argumentation Multipoles and their interchangeability
In this section, we introduce argumentation multipoles, that are conceived as modular components equipped
with a well-defined interface to connect with each other and may play the role of “partial” frameworks in
the context of a global one. This yields the possibility of replacing a component with another one which is
equivalent as far as the Input/Output behavior is concerned.
The notion of Argumentation Multipole
The first step to provide a systematic treatment of argumentation multipoles is to identify a definition to
capture their structure in the most general way. To this aim, we consider a number of examples, starting
from a common component, i.e. a chain of arguments.
Example 10. Consider the argumentation frameworks AF1 and AF2 shown in Figure 2.7. AF2 can be ob-
tained from AF1 by “summarizing” the component M1, including the arguments A1,A2,A3,A4, with the
component M2, including the arguments A1 and A2: according to any complete-compatible semantics con-
sidered in this chapter, the labellings restricted to E1 and E2, i.e. the arguments common to AF1 and AF2, are
the same in the two frameworks, i.e. E1 is labelled in and E2 is labelled out. More generally, consider a
finite sequence of n arguments A1, . . . ,An such that each argument attacks the subsequent one, i.e. Ai attacks
Ai+1 with 1 ≤ i < n and suppose that only A1 can receive further attacks from other arguments and only
An can attack other arguments. Then it is intuitive to see that the “black-box behavior” of a sequence of
arguments of this kind, whose external “terminals” are A1 and An, only depends on whether n is even or odd.
In fact, the behavior of any even-length sequence is the same as in the case n = 2 (if A1 is in then An is out,
if A1 is out then An is in, if A1 is undec then An is undec),
while for any odd-length sequence the behavior is the same as the one of A1 alone (with n odd, An gets
necessarily the same label as A1).













Figure 2.8: Summarizing two chains of arguments attacking an argument O (Example 11).
On the basis of the previous example, a modular component may tentatively be defined as an argumen-
tation framework12 where the “input terminals” and the “output terminals” are explicitly identified (e.g.
AF1↓{A1,...,A4} in the example, where A1 is the unique input terminal and A4 in the unique output terminal).
Two components can be interchanged only if they have the same input and output terminals, and this inter-
change does not modify the attacks relating these terminals with the unchanged arguments (E1 and E2 in the
example). However, the following two examples show that this approach is too restrictive, since there are
cases where it is useful to modify both the set of input and output terminals as well as the relevant attack
relation.
Example 11. Consider the argumentation frameworks AF1 and AF2 shown in Figure 2.8. AF2 can be ob-
tained from AF1 by summarizing the component M1, including the arguments A1,A2,B1,B2,O, with the
component M2 including the argument O only: according to all complete-compatible semantics considered
in this chapter the arguments E1, E2 and E3 are labelled in both in AF1 and AF2. More generally, the black-
box behavior of M1 is the same as the one of M2, since in M1 A2 gets the same label as E1 and B2 gets the
same label as E2, thus the label of O is the same as in M2. As a consequence, one may expect that M1 can
be interchanged with M2 also in more articulated examples. Note that while M1 has two input terminals,
M2 has only one input terminal coinciding with the unique output one.
Example 12. Consider the argumentation frameworks AF1 and AF2 shown in Figure 2.9 and assume pre-
ferred semantics is adopted. AF2 can be obtained from AF1 by summarizing the component M1, including
the arguments A1,A2 and O, with the component M2 including the arguments I and O: both in AF1 and AF2
the argument E1 is labelled in, E2 is labelled out and E3 is labelled in. More generally, under preferred
semantics the black-box behavior of M1 is the same as the one of M2: if E2 is in then O is in, if E2 is out
then O is out (in particular M1 admits a labelling where A1 is in, A2 is out and O is out, and a labelling
where A1 is out, A2 is in and O is out), if E2 is undec then O is undec. As a consequence, one may expect
that M1 can be interchanged with M2 also in more articulated examples. Note that while M1 receives two
attacks from E2 in AF1, M2 receives one attack only in AF2.
The previous examples show that the definition of a modular component should include the input attack
relation RINP, consisting of the attacks from the arguments that are not part of the component to the argu-
ments that belong to the component itself: this way, the definition leaves room for replacements of modular
12This approach has been followed in our chapter [23], leading to the notion of Input/Output Argumentation Framework.











Figure 2.9: Summarizing two contradicting arguments attacking an argument O (Example 12).
components that lead to changes in the input attack relation, as in the previous example. A similar reasoning
concerns the output attack relation ROUT P, including the attacks from a modular component towards the
outside arguments. In any case, there is no need to explicitly model the input and output terminals, since
they can easily be derived from the input and output attack relations. Inspired by the digital logic field, we
call the resulting structure an Argumentation Multipole. In order to express RINP and ROUT P, without loss of
generality we define an Argumentation Multipole w.r.t. a set E, i.e. w.r.t. the set of arguments that are not
part of the multipole and thus remain unchanged if the multipole is replaced.
Definition 30. An Argumentation Multipole (or, briefly, multipole) M w.r.t. a set E is a tuple (AF,RINP,ROUT P),
where letting AF = (Ar,→) it holds that Ar ∩E = /0, RINP ⊆ E ×Ar, and ROUT P ⊆ Ar×E. Extending
the notation introduced in Definition 12, we denote as M inp the set {A ∈ E | ∃B ∈ Ar,(A,B) ∈ RINP},
i.e. including the arguments of E which attack Ar through RINP. Moreover, we denote as M outp the set
{A ∈ Ar | ∃B ∈ E,(A,B) ∈ ROUT P}, i.e. including the arguments of AF attacking E through ROUT P.
Figure 2.10 provides a graphical representation of the definition. For instance, in Example 10 M1 =
(AF1↓{A1,A2,A3,A4},{(E1,A1)},{(A4,E2)}) and M2 = (AF2↓{A1,A2},{(E1,A1)},{(A2,E2)}), in Example 11 it
holds that M1 = (AF1↓{A1,A2,B1,B2,O},{(E1,A1),(E2,B1)},
{(O,E3)}) and M2 =(AF2↓{O},{(E1,O),(E2,O)},{(O,E3)}), in Example 12 M1 =(AF1↓{A1,A2,O},{(E2,A1),
(E2,A2)},{(O,E3)}) and M2 = (AF2↓{I,O},{(E2, I)},{(O,E3)}).
A particular multipole which is useful to consider in some practical examples is the empty multipole
M /0 , (AF/0, /0, /0), i.e. including the empty argumentation framework AF/0. It is easy to see that M /0inp =
M /0
outp = /0.
Input/Output equivalence of Argumentation Multipoles
After having introduced the definition of argumentation multipole, the next step is to formally characterize
the relevant “black-box behavior”: this way, the Input/Output equivalence relation between multipoles can
be identified as the one relating the multipoles having the same behavior.
When a multipole w.r.t. a set E is “connected to the external world” it “receives” some input from outside
through the relation RINP and “produces” an output which is induced by the labellings of the multipole
and transferred to the set E through the relation ROUT P. Technically speaking, the labellings and thus










Figure 2.10: A graphical representation of the notion of argumentation multipole.
the relation between input and output are determined by a (semantics specific) local function, thus the
equivalence relation between argumentation multipoles depends on the considered semantics S, and is called
S-equivalence to reflect this dependency. For instance, in Example 12 M1 and M2 are PR-equivalent (i.e.
equivalent under preferred semantics), while they are not GR-equivalent, since under grounded semantics
if E2 is labelled out then O in M1 is labelled undec, while O in M2 is labelled out. Intuitively, M1 is
GR-equivalent e.g. to a multipole M ′2 obtained from M2 by adding a self-attack from I to I itself.
According to the above examples, two argumentation multipoles w.r.t. the same set E may be tentatively
defined as S-equivalent if for any possible input, i.e. any labelling of E, FS produces the same labellings
of the output terminals in the two argumentation multipoles. For instance, in Example 12 under preferred
semantics O is in for any labelling where E2 is in, it is out for any labelling where E2 is out and it is
undec for any labelling where E2 is undec. However, this approach works only in case the two multipoles
have the same output terminals. Moreover, as the following example shows, the way E is affected by the
labellings of an argumentation multipole (AF,RINP,ROUT P) also depends on the attack relation ROUT P.
Example 13. Consider the argumentation frameworks AF1 and AF2 shown in Figure 2.11 and the application
of preferred semantics. The multipole M1 = (AF1↓{O1,O2}, /0,{(O1,E),(O2,E)}) w.r.t. {E} in AF1 affects
the argument E by means of the two arguments O1 and O2, while M2 = (AF2↓{O}, /0,{(O,E)}) in AF2 affects
E by means of the argument O. Intuitively, under preferred semantics M1 and M2 are equivalent: in M1
there are two preferred labellings, i.e. {(O1,in),(O2,out)} and {(O1,out),(O2,in)}, thus in any case an
argument labelled in attacks E making it out, and similarly M2 interacts with E making it out, since M2
admits the unique labelling {(O,in)}.
We can formalize these intuitions by extending the notion of effect to multipoles (see Definition 28). Let
us consider a semantics S. Given a multipole M w.r.t. a set E, for any “input” labelling LE ∈ LE the local
function FS prescribes a set of labellings for M . Each of these labellings has its own effect on E, therefore
the global effect of the multipole receiving an input LE is a set of labellings of E whose members are all the
single effects.
Definition 31. Let M = (AF,RINP,ROUT P) a multipole w.r.t. a set E and S an argumentation seman-
tics. Given a labelling LE ∈ LE , the S-effect of (M ,LE) on E, denoted as S-effE(M ,LE), is defined as

























Figure 2.12: Summarizing a 4-length cycle of arguments (Example 14).
Note that if FS(AF,M inp,LE↓
M inp
,RINP) = /0, i.e. the local function prescribes no labelling, then
S-effE(M ,LE) = /0.
Example 14. Consider the argumentation frameworks AF1 and AF2 shown in Figure 2.12, and the multipoles
M1 = (AF1↓{A1,A2,A3,A4}, /0,{(A3,E)}) w.r.t. {E} and M2 = (AF2↓{B1,B2}, /0,{(B2,E)}) w.r.t. {E}. M1 has
two preferred labellings, one where A3 is in and another where A3 is out, hence PR-eff{E}(M1, /0) =
{{(E1,in)},{(E1,out)}}. Similarly, M2 has two preferred labellings, one where B2 is in and another
where B2 is out, leading to PR-eff{E}(M1, /0) = PR-eff{E}(M2, /0).
It is worth considering the effect of the empty multipole M /0. Intuitively, M /0 should have no effect on
the arguments of E, i.e. all of them should be assigned the label in according to the effect itself. Technically,
this is guaranteed if the semantics is defined in such a way as to prescribe the unique possible labelling /0
to the empty argumentation framework AF/0, as it happens for any semantics considered in this chapter.
Intuitively, if this were not the case the empty multipole would prevent the identification of any labelling
for the whole argumentation framework, yielding to a pathological behavior. Accordingly, the condition
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LS(AF/0) = { /0} is required in all the following propositions and theorems13 referring to a generic semantics
S.
Proposition 11. Consider a semantics S such that LS(AF/0) = { /0}. Given a set of arguments E and a
labelling LE ∈ LE , it holds that S-effE(M /0,LE) = {{(A,in) | A ∈ E}}.
Two multipoles M1 and M2 w.r.t. E can be considered S-equivalent if, for any possible labelling
LE ∈ LE , S-effE(M1,LE) = S-effE(M2,LE). For reasons that will be clear later, it is also useful to
identify multipoles that have the same effect only for a subset of input labellings: in order to capture this
possibility, we define equivalence under a set of labellings of E.
Definition 32. Two multipoles M1 and M2 w.r.t. a set E
are Input/Output S-equivalent (or simply S-equivalent) under a set of labellings L′ ⊆ LE iff for any
labelling LE ∈ L′ it holds that S-effE(M1,LE) = S-effE(M2,LE). The multipoles M1 and M2 are S-
equivalent iff they are S-equivalent under LE .
It is easy to see that if two multipoles w.r.t. E are S-equivalent then they are S-equivalent under any set
L′ ⊆ LE .
In Example 10, Example 11 and Example 14 M1 and M2 are GR-equivalent and PR-equivalent, while
in Example 12 and Example 13 M1 and M2 are PR-equivalent but not GR-equivalent.
Replacements and transparent argumentation semantics
As anticipated by previous examples, an argumentation multipole can be viewed as a component of an ar-
gumentation framework that can be replaced with another multipole giving rise to a (possibly) different
argumentation framework. In particular, given an argumentation framework AF = (Ar,→), one may par-
tition the set of arguments Args into two sets, i.e. a set E which is not involved in the replacement and
the set D1 = Ar \E which is replaced along with the relevant attacks: the set D1 identifies the multipole
M1 = (AF↓D1 ,→ ∩(E ×D1),→ ∩(D1×E)) w.r.t. E, which can be replaced with another multipole M2
w.r.t. the same set E. For later use in the chapter, it is worth identifying those replacements such that a
partition belonging to the set returned by a selector F is enforced both before and after the replacement.
Definition 33. Let AF = (Ar,→) be an argumentation framework, and E ⊆ Ar be a subset of its arguments.
Let D1 =Ar\E, R1INP =→∩(E×D1) and R1OUT P =→∩(D1×E). A replacement R is a tuple (AF,M1,M2)
where M1 = (AF↓D1 ,R1INP,R1OUT P) and M2 is an argumentation multipole w.r.t. E. The set E is called the




OUT P), the result of the replacement
R, denoted as T (R), is the argumentation framework AF2 = (E ∪D2,(→∩E×E)∪R2INP∪RD2 ∪R2OUT P).
Given a partition selector F , a replacement (AF,M1,M2) is F -preserving if both ({E,D1}\ /0) ∈F (AF)
and ({E,D2}\ /0) ∈F (T (AF,M1,M2)).
It is easy to see that T (AF,M1,M1) = AF . Moreover, letting AF2 = T (AF,M1,M2) it holds that
T (AF2,M2,M1) = AF . Note that, in the definition of F -preserving replacement, the empty set is excluded
from the requirement of belonging to F (AF). The reason is that by definition the empty set does not belong
to any partition, however in case one of the sets in {E,D1} or {E,D2} is empty then it is sensible to require
only the nonempty set to belong to F (AF).
13The reader may wonder why this condition has never been considered in the context of decomposability properties. The
reason is that decomposability refers to partitions of the argumentation framework, which by definition include nonempty sets only.










Figure 2.13: A contextually PR-legitimate replacement (Examples 15 and 17).
In Examples 10–14, the result of the replacement (AF1,M1,M2) is the argumentation framework AF2.
While Definition 33 leaves room for any possible replacement, not all of them can be considered legiti-
mate. In particular, we seek for replacements involving multipoles having the same Input/Output behavior,
otherwise in most cases the labellings of the resulting frameworks would be different in the invariant set E,
leading to changes in the status assignment of the relevant arguments. For instance, in Example 10 replac-
ing M1 in AF1 with a multipole including a single argument (or an odd-length chain of arguments) would
change the label assigned to E2 from out to in. In order to explore the notion of legitimate replacements,
let us consider an issue arising e.g. in the following example.
Example 15. Consider the application of preferred semantics on the argumentation frameworks AF1 and AF2
shown in Figure 2.13, where M1 = (AF1↓{A1,A2,A3},{(E1,A1),(E2,A1)},{(A3,E1)}) and
M2 = (AF2↓{C},{(E1,C),(E2,C)},{(C,E1)}) are two argumentation multipoles w.r.t. {E1,E2}, AF2 =
T (R) with R = (AF1,M1,M2), and the invariant set of the replacement R is E = {E1,E2}. The multipole
M1 is not PR-equivalent to M2: considering the labelling {(E1,out),(E2,out)} FPR prescribes for M1 the
unique labelling {(A1,undec),(A2,undec),(A3,undec)}, whose effect on {E1,E2} is {(E1,undec),(E2,in)},
while FPR prescribes for M2 the unique labelling {(C,in)}, whose effect on {E1,E2} is {(E1,out),(E2,in)}.
However, taking into account the possible labellings of M1 and M2, it can be noted that the labelling
{(E1,out),(E2,out)} is impossible both in AF1 and in AF2. As to AF1, if A3 is in then FPR prescribes for
{E1,E2} the labelling {(E1,out),(E2,in)}, if A3 is out then it prescribes the labellings {(E1,out),(E2,in)}
and {(E1,in),(E2,out)}, if A3 is undec then it prescribes the labelling {(E1,out),(E2,in)}. As to AF2,
the situation is the same. Summing up, the set of labellings that can be “seen” by M1 and M2 is LPRR =
{{(E1,out),(E2,in)},{(E1,in),(E2,out)}}, under which M1 and M2 turn out to be PR-equivalent. In
fact, for each of the labellings in LPRR , FPR prescribes for M1 the unique labelling {(A1,out),(A2,in),
(A3,out)}, whose effect on {E1,E2} is {(E1,in),(E2,in)}, and FPR prescribes for M2 the unique labelling
{(C,out)}, whose effect on {E1,E2} is again {(E1,in),(E2,in)}.
Thus, a replacement may be considered as legitimate even if the involved multipoles are not equivalent
under all labellings, provided that they are equivalent under the possible ones (in a sense, input labellings
that never occur are neglected as the “don’t care terms” in digital logic). Of course, one may accept to
replace a multipole only with an equivalent one, since in this case equivalence holds independently of the
context (in particular, the multipoles would remain equivalent even modifying the attack relations between
arguments of the invariant set E). In order to distinguish between the two cases, a replacement is called
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contextually legitimate in the first case, and simply legitimate in the latter. Independently of its legitimacy
properties, we call safe a replacement that does not yield modifications of the labellings in E.
Definition 34. Let S be an argumentation semantics and AF = (Ar,→) be an argumentation framework. A
replacement R =(AF,M1,M2) with invariant set E is S-legitimate if M1 and M2 are S-equivalent, it is con-
textually S-legitimate if M1 and M2 are S-equivalent under LSR , where L
S
R , {FS(AF↓E ,M1
outp,L1,R1OUT P) |
L1 ∈ LM1outp}∪{FS(AF↓E ,M2
outp,L2,R2OUT P) | L2 ∈ LM2outp}. Moreover, R is S-safe if {L↓E | L ∈
LS(AF)}= {L↓E | L ∈ LS(T (AF,M1,M2))}.
It is easy to see that every legitimate replacement is also contextually legitimate. For instance, in Exam-
ple 12 the replacement (AF1,M1,M2) is PR-legitimate and PR-safe, it is not contextually GR-legitimate
nor GR-safe. In Example 15 the replacement (AF1,M1,M2) is contextually PR-legitimate (but not PR-
legitimate) and PR-safe, and the same holds according to grounded semantics.
The examples presented so far may give the impression that for any semantics S a (possibly contextually)
S-legitimate replacement is always S-safe, i.e. replacing a multipole with an equivalent multipole preserves
the labellings in the invariant set of the replacement. This property may seem natural and easy to prove,
however it is shown in Section 2.9 that it does not hold for all semantics: we denote as transparent the
semantics such that legitimate replacements are always safe, strongly transparent the semantics such that
contextually legitimate replacements are always safe. Similarly to decomposability, also transparency may
hold under a restriction on the partition identified by the multipoles that are replaced: accordingly, we
introduce the concept of transparency w.r.t. a partition selector F .
Definition 35. A semantics S is transparent if any S-legitimate replacement is S-safe, it is strongly trans-
parent if any contextually S-legitimate replacement is S-safe. Given a partition selector F , a semantics S is
transparent w.r.t. F if any F -preserving and S-legitimate replacement is S-safe, it is strongly transparent
w.r.t. F if any F -preserving and contextually S-legitimate replacement is S-safe.
Since any (F -preserving) legitimate replacement is also contextually legitimate, any strongly transpar-
ent semantics (w.r.t. F ) is also transparent (w.r.t. F ).
A limit case which is theoretically interesting to consider is a replacement (AF,M1,M2) with the in-
variant set E equal to the empty set, i.e. when an entire argumentation framework is replaced by another
one.
Proposition 12. Consider a semantics S such that LS(AF/0) = { /0} and a replacement R = (AF,M1,M2)
with invariant set E = /0. Letting AF2 = T (R), the following conditions are equivalent:
• R is S-legitimate
• R is contextually S-legitimate
• |LS(AF)|> 0∧|LS(AF2)|> 0, or LS(AF) = LS(AF2) = /0
• R is S-safe.
Intuitively, there are no preserved arguments, thus the effect of any labelling of AF on the outside empty
set is the same as the effect of any labelling of AF2. The only difference arises in the case that AF “crashes”
(i.e. admits no labellings) while AF2 does not exhibit such pathological behavior, or vice versa.
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Note that the notions of replacement and transparent semantics refer to partitions of argumentation
frameworks into just two subframeworks, i.e. one corresponding to the replaced multipole M1 (or the
replacing one M2) and the other identified by the invariant set E. This is not restrictive, since one can treat a
multiple replacement of several multipoles as a sequence of replacements each involving just one multipole.
The following proposition shows that safeness is preserved by a sequence of safe replacements, and the
same holds for skeptical and credulous justification of those arguments that are not replaced.
Proposition 13. Let AF = (Ar,→) be an argumentation framework. Consider a sequence of replacements
(R1,R2, . . . ,Rn) where Ri = (AFi,Mi,1,Mi,2), Ei is the invariant set of Ri, AF1 = AF and, for any 1 < i ≤
n, AFi = T (AFi−1,Mi−1,1,Mi−1,2). Let AF∗ be the result of the sequence of replacements, i.e. AF∗ =
T (AFn,Mn,1,Mn,2). If all replacements Ri are S-safe, then letting E = E1 ∩ ·· · ∩En it holds that {L↓E |
L ∈ LS(AF)} = {L↓E | L ∈ LS(AF∗)}. Moreover, any argument A ∈ E is skeptically/credulously justified
according to S in AF if and only if it is skeptically/credulously justified according to S in AF∗.
2.8 The relationship between decomposability and transparency
Intuitively, there is a close relationship between decomposability and transparency: if a semantics is de-
composable, i.e. the labellings prescribed for an argumentation framework are completely determined by
applying the canonical local function to the elements of a partition, then one may expect that replacing a
multipole with another one having the same Input/Output behavior has no impact on the invariant set of the
replacement. This intuition is confirmed by Theorem 8, showing that decomposability of a semantics S is a
sufficient condition for strong transparency.
Theorem 8. Consider an effect-dictated semantics S such that LS(AF/0) = { /0}. If S is decomposable w.r.t.
a partition selector F then S is strongly transparent w.r.t. F .
While full decomposability is a sufficient condition for strong transparency, it is not necessary. In partic-
ular, for a single-status semantics which is top-down decomposable a relaxed form of bottom-up decompos-
ability is sufficient to ensure strong transparency. More specifically, in this case bottom-up decomposability
requires the union of local labellings to coincide with the (unique) global labelling. However, just requiring
the union of local labellings to be more or equally committed than the global labelling is enough to achieve
strong transparency, as shown by Theorem 9.
Theorem 9. Let S be an effect-dictated single-status semantics such that LS(AF/0) = { /0}. Suppose that
S is top-down decomposable w.r.t. a partition selector F and satisfies the following property: for any
argumentation framework AF and any partition {E,D} ∈F (AF), letting L be the labelling prescribed by
S for AF, if LE ∈ LE and LD ∈ LD are two labellings such that LE ∈ FS(AF↓E ,Einp,LD↓Einp ,E
R) and
LD ∈ FS(AF↓D,Dinp,LE↓Dinp ,D
R), then Lv LE ∪LD. Then S is strongly transparent w.r.t. F .
2.9 Analyzing transparency of argumentation semantics
In this section we discuss the transparency properties of the semantics reviewed in Section 2.3. A synthetic
view of the results is given in Table 2.2 (for all semantics strong transparency turns out to be equivalent to
transparency, and any transparency property w.r.t. F∪SCC holds if and only if the same property holds w.r.t.
FSCC).
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AD CO ST GR PR ID SST
(Strong) transparency Yes Yes Yes Yes No∗ No No
(Strong) transparency w.r.t. F∪SCC and FSCC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
(Strong) transparency in case of acyclic multipoles Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
* holds under additional conditions (see Definitions 36 and 37).
Table 2.2: Transparency properties of argumentation semantics.
Admissible, complete and stable semantics
As shown in Section 2.5, admissible, complete and stable semantics satisfy full decomposability: this easily
yields strong transparency for such semantics.
Theorem 10. Admissible semantics AD, complete semantics CO and stable semantics ST are strongly
transparent.
For instance, in Examples 10 and 11 the replacement R = (AF1,M1,M2) is S-legitimate, where S ∈
{AD,CO,ST}, therefore it is also S-safe, i.e. {L↓E | L ∈ LS(AF1)} = {L↓E | L ∈ LS(AF2)}. In Examples
12, 13 and 14 R is ST-legitimate, in Example 15 it is contextually ST-legitimate, therefore in all cases R
is ST-safe. In particular, in Example 15 LST(AF1) = {{(E1,in),(E2,out),(A1,out),(A2,in),(A3,out)},
{(E1,out),(E2,in),(A1,out),(A2,in),(A3,out)}} and LST(AF2) = {{(E1,in),(E2,out),(C,out)},
{(E1,out),(E2,in),(C,out)}}, thus the stable labellings restricted to {E1,E2} are {(E1,out),(E2,in)}
and {(E1,in),(E2,out)} both in AF1 and in AF2.
Grounded semantics
As shown in Section 2.5, grounded semantics is not fully decomposable but only top-down decomposable.
Theorem 11 shows however that grounded semantics is strongly transparent, building on the result
proved in Theorem 9.
Theorem 11. Grounded semantics GR is strongly transparent.
For instance, in Examples 10, 11 and 14 the replacement (AF1,M1,M2) is GR-legitimate, therefore it
is also GR-safe. In Example 15 the replacement R = (AF1,M1,M2) is contextually GR-legitimate, since
LGRR = {{(E1,undec),(E2,undec)},{(E1,out),(E2,in)}} and M1 and M2 are GR-equivalent under LGRR :
as a consequence, R is GR-safe, as it can be seen by considering that both the grounded labelling of AF1
and the grounded labelling of AF2 assign to all arguments the label undec.
Preferred semantics
Like grounded semantics, preferred semantics is top-down decomposable but not fully decomposable. How-
ever, differently from grounded semantics, preferred semantics is not transparent, as shown by the following
counterexample.
Example 16. Consider the argumentation frameworks AF1 and AF2 shown in Figure 2.14, where AF2 =
T (R) with R = (AF1,M1,M2), and the invariant set of the replacement R is E = {E1,E2}. It turns out















Figure 2.14: Preferred semantics is not transparent (Examples 16 and 18).
that M1 and M2 are PR-equivalent, thus R is PR-legitimate. In fact, for any label Lin ∈ LE such that E1 is
labelled in the local function FPR prescribes for M1 the unique labelling {(A1,out),(A2,in),(O,undec)},
therefore PR-effE(M1,Lin) = {{(E2,undec),(E1,in)}}, and it prescribes for M2 the unique labelling
{(B,out),(C,in),(A1,out),(A2,out),(O,undec)}, therefore also PR-effE(M2,Lin) = {{(E2,undec),
(E1,in)}}. For any label Lout ∈ LE such that E1 is labelled out FPR prescribes for M1 the labellings
{(A1,in),(A2,out),(O,out)} and {(A1,out),(A2,in),(O,undec)}, for M2 the labellings {(B,in),(C,out),
(A1,in),(A2,out),(O,out)} and {(B,in),(C,out),(A1,out),(A2,in),(O,undec)}, thus
PR-effE(M1,Lout) =PR-effE(M2,Lout) = {{(E2,in),(E1,in)},{(E2,undec),(E1,in)}}. For any label
Lundec ∈ LE such that E1 is labelled undec, FPR prescribes for M1 the unique labelling {(A1,out),(A2,in),
(O,undec)}, and it prescribes for M2 the unique labelling {(B,undec),(C,undec),(A1,undec),(A2,undec),
(O,undec)}, therefore PR-effE(M1,Lundec) = PR-effE(M2,Lundec) = {{(E2,undec),(E1,in)}}. How-
ever, the replacement (AF1,M1,M2) is not PR-safe. In fact, the preferred labellings of AF1 are {(A1,in),
(A2,out),(O,out),(E2,in),(E1,out)} and {(A1,out),(A2,in),(O,undec),(E2,undec),(E1,undec)},
while {(B,in),(C,out),(A1,in),(A2,out),(O,out),(E2,in),(E1,out)} is the only preferred labelling of
AF2. Note in particular that E2 is skeptically justified in AF2 but not in AF1.
Interestingly enough, considering the application of stable semantics it can be checked that the replacement
(AF1,M1,M2) is ST-legitimate, therefore according to Theorem 10 it is also ST-safe. In fact, LST(AF1) =
{{(A1,in),(A2,out),(O,out),(E2,in),(E1,out)}} and LST(AF2)= {{(B,in),(C,out),(A1,in),(A2,out),
(O,out),(E2,in),(E1,out)}}, therefore both in AF1 and in AF2 the argument E1 is labelled out and E2 is
labelled in by all stable labellings.
In the previous example a PR-legitimate replacement yields a change in the status assignment of argu-
ments belonging to the invariant set E, however it can be noted that their credulous justification is preserved,
i.e. E2 is credulously justified both in AF1 and AF2, E1 is not credulously justified either in AF1 or in AF2.
Theorem 12 proves that this result holds in general.
Theorem 12. For any contextually PR-legitimate replacement R = (AF,M1,M2) with invariant set E,
any argument A ∈ E is credulously justified according to PR in AF if and only if it is credulously justified
according to PR in T (AF,M1,M2).
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While the obtained result is somewhat weak, as it concerns credulous justification only, it has to be ac-
knowledged that the counterexample against transparency of PR (Example 16) is rather tricky. In particular,
M1 and M2 are PR-equivalent, but they differ in the following aspect. On the one hand, in M1, the local
function FPR prescribes for any input labelling Lundec the unique labelling {(A1,out),(A2,in),(O,undec)},
and with the “more committed” input labelling Lout ∈ LE it returns (among others) the labelling {(A1,in),
(A2,out),(O,out)} which is not “more committed” than {(A1,out),(A2,in),(O,undec)}, i.e. it is not the
case that {(A1,out),(A2,in),(O,undec)}v {(A1,in),(A2,out),(O,out)}. On the other hand, in M2 both
the labellings returned by the local function FPR with the input labelling Lout are “more committed” than the
labelling returned by FPR with the input labelling Lundec, i.e. it holds that {(B,undec),(C,undec),(A1,undec),
(A2,undec),(O,undec)} v {(B,in),(C,out),(A1,in),(A2,out),(O,out)}, {(B,undec),(C,undec),
(A1,undec),(A2,undec),(O,undec)} v {(B,in),(C,out),(A1,out),(A2,in),(O,undec)}. More gener-
ally, we define the notion of homogeneously equivalent argumentation multipoles, corresponding to equiva-
lent multipoles that exhibit a sort of mutually regular behavior.




OUT P) w.r.t. a set E are
homogeneously S-equivalent under a set of labellings L′ ⊆ LE iff they are S-equivalent under L′ and the
following two symmetric conditions hold:
1. Given L1E ,L2E ∈ L′ such that L1E v L2E ,
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In Example 16, it can be seen that the argumentation multipoles M1 and M2, while being PR-equivalent,
are not homogeneously PR-equivalent.
It turns out that strong transparency of preferred semantics is recovered in case of replacements involving
homogeneously PR-equivalent multipoles.
Theorem 13. Any replacement R = (AF1,M1,M2) with invariant set E, such that M1 and M2 are homo-
geneously PR-equivalent under LPRR , is PR-safe.
Given two equivalent multipoles, a sufficient condition for their homogeneous equivalence is that each
multipole is “internally homogeneous”, i.e. the labellings prescribed by the local function are related by
set-inclusion in a regular way w.r.t. the commitment relation between the input labellings. Definition 37
formalizes this intuition, while the sufficiency result is proved by Lemma 5 and Corollary 1.
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Definition 37. Consider an argumentation semantics S. An argumentation multipole M =(AF,RINP,ROUT P)
w.r.t. a set E is internally S-homogeneous under a set of labellings L′ ⊆ LE iff for all labellings L1E ,L2E ∈ L′
such that L1E vL2E , it holds that ∀L1 ∈FS(AF,M inp,L1E↓M inp ,RINP), ∀L2 ∈FS(AF,M
inp,L2E↓M inp ,RINP)
such that effE(M outp,L1↓Moutp ,ROUT P) v effE(M
outp,L2↓Moutp ,ROUT P), there is a labelling L
′
2 ∈
FS(AF,M inp,L2E↓M inp ,RINP) such that effE(M
outp,L2↓Moutp ,ROUT P) = effE(M
outp,L′2↓Moutp ,
ROUT P) and L1 v L′2.




OUT P) w.r.t. a set
E which are internally S-homogeneous under a set of labellings L′ ⊆ LE . If M1 and M2 are S-equivalent
under L′, then they are homogeneously S-equivalent under L′.
Corollary 1. Any replacement R = (AF1,M1,M2) with invariant set E, such that M1 and M2 are PR-
equivalent under LPRR and both M1 and M2 are internally PR-homogeneous under L
PR
R , is PR-safe.
Example 17. Consider again the replacement R = (AF1,M1,M2) depicted in Figure 2.13. As shown in
Example 15, LPRR = {{(E1,out),(E2,in)},{(E1,in),(E2,out)}} and M1, M2 are PR-equivalent under
LPRR . Since there are no distinct labellings L
1
E ,L2E ∈ LPRR such that L1E v L2E , M1 and M2 are trivially
internally PR-homogeneous under LPRR . As a consequence, by Corollary 1 the replacement R is PR-safe.
In fact, there are two preferred labellings in AF1, namely {(E1,in),(E2,out),(A1,out),(A2,in),(A3,out)}
and {(E1,out),(E2,in),(A1,out),(A2,in),(A3,out)}, while in AF2 the preferred labellings are {(E1,in),
(E2,out),(C,out)} and {(E1,out),(E2,in),(C,out)}. Thus, the restriction of the preferred labellings to
{E1,E2} are {(E1,out),(E2,in)} and {(E1,in),(E2,out)} both in AF1 and in AF2.
Turning to non arbitrary partitionings, strong transparency of preferred semantics is recovered without
additional conditions for replacements involving the union of strongly connected components.
Theorem 14. Preferred semantics PR is strongly transparent w.r.t. F∪SCC.
Example 18. The multipoles M1 and M2 shown in Figure 2.14 can be safely interchanged if they corre-
spond to the union of strongly connected components. For instance, removing the attack from E2 to E1
makes the replacement (AF1,M1,M2) F∪SCC-preserving, thus such replacement is safe. In fact, in this case
there is a unique preferred labelling in AF1 and a unique preferred labelling in AF2, and in both cases E1 is
labelled in and E2 is labelled undec.
It is easy to see that in Examples 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 the replacement R = (AF1,M1,M2) is F∪SCC-
preserving and PR-legitimate. As a consequence, in all cases the replacement R is safe, i.e. {L↓E | L ∈
LPR(AF1)}= {L↓E | L ∈ LPR(AF2)}. Moreover, it can be seen that in all cases the multipoles are internally
PR-homogeneous, therefore they could be safely interchanged also in the context of non F∪SCC-preserving
replacements.
Ideal semantics
The transparency properties of ideal semantics mirror the discouraging decomposability properties analyzed
in Section 2.5: the following example, inspired by Example 7, shows that ideal semantics is not transparent
even w.r.t. FSCC.










Figure 2.15: Ideal semantics is not transparent w.r.t. FSCC (Example 19).
Example 19. Consider the argumentation frameworks AF1 and AF2 shown in Figure 2.15, where AF2 =
T (R) with R = (AF1,M1,M2), and the invariant set of the replacement R is E = {E1,E2}. It is easy to see
that M1 and M2 are ID-equivalent, since FID prescribes for M1 the labelling {(A1,undec),(A2,undec)}
and for M2 the labelling {(B1,undec),(B2,undec),(B3,undec)}. As a consequence, the replacement R is
ID-legitimate, and it is also easy to see that it is FSCC-preserving. However, R is not ID-safe, since the ideal
labelling of AF1 leaves all the arguments undec, while the ideal labelling of AF2 is {(B1,undec),(B2,undec),
(B3,undec),(E1,out),(E2,in)}.
Transparency is recovered in the (somewhat specific) case of replacements involving multipoles for
which FCO always prescribes a unique labelling.
Definition 38. Consider an argumentation semantics S. An argumentation multipole M =(AF,RINP,ROUT P)




The following lemmas prove some specific results holding in the case of CO-univocal argumentation
multipoles.
Lemma 6. Let M be an argumentation multipole (AF,RINP,ROUT P) w.r.t. a set E which is CO- univocal un-





RINP) for any S ∈ {GR,PR,ID,SST}.
Lemma 7. Let M be an argumentation multipole (AF,RINP,ROUT P) w.r.t. a set E which is CO- univocal
under a set of labellings L′⊆LE , and let L1E ,L2E be two labellings of L′ such that L1E vL2E . Then, for any two
labellings L1, L2 such that L1 ∈FPR(AF,M inp,L1E↓M inp ,RINP) and L2 ∈FPR(AF,M
inp,L2E↓M inp ,RINP),
it holds that L1 v L2.
Lemma 8. Let M be an argumentation multipole (AF,RINP,ROUT P) w.r.t. a set E which is CO- univocal
under a set of labellings L′ ⊆ LE . Then M is internally PR-homogeneous under L′.









Figure 2.16: Two multipoles that can be safely interchanged under ideal semantics (Example 20).
On this basis, Theorem 15 shows that contextually CO-legitimate replacements are ID-safe if they in-
volve CO-univocal multipoles. Note that the theorem requires the involved multipoles to be CO-equivalent
under LCOR . In the light of Lemma 6, this is tantamount to requiring them to be S-equivalent for any
S ∈ {GR,PR,ID,SST}. We cannot, however, replace LCOR with e.g. LPRR , since LCOR may be a strict
superset of LPRR .
Theorem 15. Any contextually CO-legitimate replacement R = (AF1,M1,M2) with invariant set E, such
that M1 and M2 are CO-univocal under LCOR , is ID-safe.
As shown in Section 2.9, the previous theorem applies in particular to acyclic argumentation multipoles,
while the next example shows that there are cases of equivalent multipoles containing cycles that can be
safely interchanged under ideal semantics.
Example 20. It is easy to see that the multipoles M1 and M2 shown in Figure 2.16 are CO-equivalent and
both of them are CO-univocal under any set. Thus, by Theorem 15 they can be safely replaced each other
under the ideal semantics, i.e. the replacement maintains the labels assigned by the ideal labelling to the
arguments of the invariant set. It is also easy to see that the same holds by replacing the three-length cycles
in M1 with any odd-length cycle.
Semi-stable semantics
As in the case of ideal semantics, semi-stable semantics inherits from its lack of decomposability proper-
ties the inability of guaranteeing safeness of legitimate replacements: the following example, inspired by
Examples 8 and 9, shows that semi-stable semantics is not transparent even w.r.t. FSCC.
Example 21. Consider the argumentation frameworks AF1 and AF2 shown in Figure 2.17, where AF2 =
T (R) with R = (AF1,M1,M2), and the invariant set of the replacement R is {E1}. It is easy to see that
M1 and M2 are SST-equivalent, since FSST prescribes for M1 the unique labelling {(A1,out),(A2,in)}
and for M2 the unique labelling {(B1,out),(B2,in),(B3,out)}, thus the effect on {E1} is {{(E1,in)}}
in both cases. As a consequence, the replacement R is SST-legitimate, and it is also easy to see that it is
FSCC-preserving. However, R is not SST-safe, since in AF1 there is only one semi-stable labelling, namely
{(A1,out),(A2,in),(E1,undec)}, which assigns to E1 the label undec, while there are two semi-stable
labellings in AF2, namely {(B1,in),(B2,out),(B3,undec),(E1,out)} and {(B1,out),(B2,in),(B3,out),
(E1,undec)}, which assign to E1 the label out and undec, respectively.











Figure 2.17: Semi-stable semantics is not transparent w.r.t. FSCC (Example 21).
The case of acyclic multipoles
It is well-known that an argumentation framework with an acyclic attack relation admits a unique complete
labelling which is thus also grounded, preferred, ideal, stable and semi-stable. It is then interesting to
specifically consider acyclic multipoles, and to investigate whether they benefit of specific properties as far
as replaceability is concerned.
Definition 39. A multipole M = (AF,RINP,ROUT P), where AF = (Ar,→), is acyclic if there is no sequence
A1, . . . ,An of distinct arguments with Ai ∈ Ar such that n > 1, (Ai,Ai+1) ∈→ for 1≤ i < n, and (An,A1) ∈→.
Note that this definition does not prevent an acyclic multipole to contain self-attacking arguments, i.e.
arguments attacking themselves.
The following proposition shows that the property of acyclic frameworks mentioned above can be ex-
tended to acyclic multipoles.
Proposition 14. An acyclic argumentation multipole M = (AF,RINP,ROUT P) w.r.t. a set E is CO-univocal
under any set of labellings L′ ⊆ LE .
The above result entails that all semantics considered in this chapter, with the exception of semi-stable
semantics, become strongly transparent in case replacements involve acyclic multipoles. Since admissible,
complete, stable and grounded semantics are strongly transparent, it suffices to consider preferred and ideal
semantics.
Proposition 15. Any contextually PR-legitimate (ID-legitimate) replacement R = (AF1,M1,M2) with
invariant set E, such that M1 and M2 are acyclic, is PR-safe (ID-safe).
The following example shows that this result cannot be extended to semi-stable semantics, i.e. there are
acyclic SST-equivalent multipoles that cannot be safely interchanged.
Example 22. Consider the argumentation frameworks AF1 and AF2 shown in Figure 2.18, where AF2 =
T (R) with R = (AF1,M1,M2), and the invariant set of R is {E1,E2,E3,E4}. The acyclic multipoles M1
and M2 are trivially SST-equivalent, since they do not attack E (for both of them, the effect on E includes a
unique labelling which assigns to all arguments the label in). However, the replacement R is not SST-safe,
since there is a unique semi-stable labelling in AF1, namely {(E1,undec),(E2,out),(E3,in),(E4,out),
















Figure 2.18: Semi-stable semantics is not transparent even considering acyclic multipoles (Example 22).
(A1,undec),(A2,in)}, while AF2 admits {(E1,undec),(E2,out),(E3,in),(E4,out),(B1,undec),
(B2,undec),(B3,in),(B4,out),(B5,undec)} and {(E1,undec),(E2,undec),(E3,out),(E4,in),
(B1,undec),(B2,undec),(B3,out),(B4,in),(B5,out)} as the two semi-stable labellings. For instance, ar-
gument E4 is assigned the unique label out in AF1 and the labels in and out in AF2.
2.10 Putting modularity at work
As modularity is a very useful and pervasive property, the notions and results introduced in this chapter
have an open-ended range of applications. In fact, they can be exploited in all contexts, either theoretical
or practical, where a non-monolithic approach is appropriate, ranging from the management of dynamics
in argumentation to the study of efficient divide-and-conquer algorithms. While an extensive discussion of
related works with pointers to future research directions is given in Section 2.11, in this section we use, as
sample case-studies, the tasks of summarization and translation of argumentation frameworks and develop
in detail some relevant application examples.
Summarizing argumentation frameworks
In this subsection we illustrate an example of application of the notion of equivalence between argumentation
multipoles for the purpose of summarization of argumentation frameworks. In particular we take from the
literature two argument-based recontructions of the court’s decision of the Popov v. Hayashi case and show
that, in spite of many differences in the details, they can be reduced to a comparable basic structure through
considerations based on multipole equivalence.
We borrow a synthetic description of the facts originating the case from [324]. “The case concerned the
possession of the baseball which Barry Bonds hit for his record breaking 73rd home run in the 2001 season.
Such a ball is very valuable (Mark McGwire’s 1998 70th home run ball sold at auction for $3,000,000).
When the ball was struck into the crowd, Popov caught it in the upper part of the webbing of his baseball
glove. Such a catch, a snowcone catch because the ball is not fully in the mitt, does not give certainty of
retaining control of the ball, particularly since Popov was stretching and may have fallen. However, Popov



































Figure 2.19: The argumentation framework AFJ for the Popov v. Hayashi case from [324].
was not given the chance to complete his catch since, as it entered his glove, he was tackled and thrown to
the ground by others trying to secure the ball, which became dislodged from his glove. Hayashi (himself
innocent of the attack on Popov), then picked up the ball and put it in his pocket, so securing possession.”
Popov then claimed possession of the ball and sued Hayashi. The court finally decided that the ball
should be sold and the proceeds divided between the two.
The rather articulated motivations underlying the decision have attracted the attention of researchers and
have been the subject of several chapters, culminating in a special issue of the Artificial Intelligenge and Law
journal devoted to the modelling of this case [11]. In the following subsections we present the argument-
based formalizations provided by Wyner and Bench-Capon [324] and by Prakken [262] respectively. Then
we show how the notions and results presented in previous sections can be used to summarize the two
formalizations and simplify their comparison.
For the sake of uniformity with the original formalizations, in the following we will sometimes refer to
the extension-based rather than the labelling-based approach. In particular, an S extension (e.g. the grounded
extension) is the set of arguments labelled in by an S labelling (e.g. the grounded labelling).
The formalization by Wyner and Bench-Capon
In [324] the legal analysis of the case is synthesized by the argumentation framework presented in Figure
2.19 (the chapter also presents an analysis of the values underlying the final decision using the formalism of
value-based argumentation frameworks, which is beyond the scope of the present chapter). In the original
figure of [324] the boxes representing arguments are labeled with an identifier Ax, where x is a number, while
a few other boxes have no label and contain a statement corresponding to the conclusion of the argument. In
Figure 2.19 all arguments have both a label (on top of the box and corresponding to the original one where
present) and a text synthesizing their conclusion. Each argument labeled as Ax derives from the application
of a rule with some premises and a conclusion, while the other four arguments are intended to represent
default answers to some questions: quoting [324], “if the argument is not defeated, the contrary has not
been shown”. The conclusion of an argument may correspond to the undercut of some rule. An argument
attacks another argument if the conclusion of the former contradicts the conclusion or some premise of the
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Figure 2.20: The only extension of AFJ .
latter or undercuts the rule used for its construction. Default arguments can only attack another argument
on its premises. Turning to a quick explanation of Figure 2.19, we can proceed backwards starting from
the mutually attacking arguments A1 and A2, concerning who has possession of the ball. A2 is undercut
by A13: the rule that Hayashi has possession of the ball because he retrieved it is not applicable given that
Popov was active in catching the ball before Hayashi retrieved it. A13 is attacked by the default argument P-
na, which is in turn attacked by A11 based on factual evidence of the snowcone catch. A2 is also undercut by
A3, whose premise (by the way, the same as of A1) is that Popov caught the ball before Hayashi. However
both A1 and A3 are attacked by the default argument that the ball was not caught by Popov. This is in turn
attacked by A4, based on the fact that the ball was in Popov’s glove. A4 is undercut by A5 and A6, the
former based on the fact that the ball was still in motion, the latter on the fact that Popov was not in control
of the ball. Both A5 and A6 are undercut by A10 based on the fact that Popov was active. A10 is hence
attacked by the default argument P-na and is also undercut by A12, based on the custom and practice of the
stands in baseball. Moreover A5 is attacked by the default argument P-ic, which is attacked by A7 based on
the fact that Popov did not retain the ball in the glove. A7 is undercut by A8, based on the fact that Popov
lost the ball due to an intentional contact of other people. Finally, A8 is attacked by the default argument CI
which is in turn attacked by A9 based on factual evidence that Popov was assaulted.
It can be seen that for the argumentation framework represented in Figure 2.19 the grounded extension
is also the only complete, stable, semi-stable, ideal and preferred extension. It consists of the arguments A9,
A11, A12, A13, A6, A8, P-ic, P-nc, which are evidenced in grey in Figure 2.20. We note that both A1 and
A2 are rejected according to any semantics, leaving the issue of the possession of the ball unresolved.
The formalization by Prakken
The reconstruction of the case given in [262] adopts ASPIC+, which is essentially a rule-based formalism
for the construction of arguments and the identification of their subargument and attack relations. It is worth
remarking that the latter takes into account the former: if an argument attacks another argument then it
attacks also all its superarguments. In ASPIC+ argument status evaluation follows Dung’s approach: an
argumentation framework consisting only of the arguments and their attack relations can be derived and
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then the semantics deemed most appropriate can be applied.
Coming back to Popov and Hayashi, the reconstruction of [262] covers a lot of details concerning argu-
ment construction and, as such, is much more articulated than the one of [324] as shown by Figures 2.21 and
2.22 which correspond to the aggregation of five distinct but linked figures included in [262]. Direct subar-
gument relationships are represented by dashed lines ending with a solid dot on the superargument, attack
relationships are represented by solid arrows ending on the attacked argument. The text in an argument box
essentially gives an idea on its conclusion. Figure 2.21 is referred to as the upper part, while Figure 2.22
is referred to as the lower part, they are linked only by two subargument relations: VR-MC8 and VR-r1 in
Figure 2.22 are direct subarguments respectively of EQ and H-hr in Figure 2.21.
For a detailed description of the whole reconstruction, which is clearly beyond the scope of the present
chapter, the reader is referred to [262]. At a general level we can observe that:
• a lot of attention is reserved to issues concerning the validity of rules (sometimes based in turn on the
validity of other rules), their adoption and their applicability to the case into question;
• the lower part (Figure 2.22) essentially concerns the question whether Popov gained possession of
the ball. There are two alternative reasoning lines leading to this conclusion, composed respectively
by arguments VR-cs4, P-cc(1), P-ca(1), P-ph(1), P-hp(1), and P-wit, P-cb, VR-cs2, P-cc(2), P-ca(2),
P-ph(2), P-hp(2). Both lines are defeated, the former by argument NV-cs4 stating the invalidity of the
rule cs4 which is the starting point of the whole line, the latter by argument P-inc stating that Popov’s
testimony, on which the whole line is based, is not credible.
• the upper part (Figure 2.21) essentially concerns the action to be taken: three mutually exclusive alter-
natives (corresponding to the three mutually attacking arguments H-hr, H-nr, and EQ) are considered:
Hayashi has to return the ball, Hayashi has not to return the ball, the ball is equally shared. Each
of the three arguments is derived through a quite articulated reasoning line. Both H-hr and H-nr are
defeated, the former by argument NV-rp, stating that the rule rp is not valid, the latter by argument
NA-r4, stating that the rule r4 is not applicable.
If one considers the attack relations only (i.e. focuses on the argumentation framework to be used
for argument status evaluation) the picture is simplified, as shown in Figure 2.23, since a large number of
arguments are neither attacking nor attacked by others. It can be seen that for the argumentation framework
represented in Figure 2.23 the grounded extension is also the only complete, stable, semi-stable, ideal and
preferred extension and consists of the arguments evidenced in grey. We note that of the three arguments
corresponding to the possible final decisions both H-hr and H-nr are rejected, while EQ is accepted.
Summarizing and comparing the two formalizations
We can now use considerations based on the equivalence properties examined in the previous sections to
identify some fundamental similarities between the two reconstructions of the case.
As to the argumentation framework AFJ = (Ar,→) of Figure 2.19, let us start by considering the ar-
gumentation multipole M1 = (AFJ↓{A11, P-na}, /0,{(P-na, A10),(P-na, A13)}) with respect to E1 = Ar \
{A11, P-na}. It is rather easy to see that for any labeling LE1 of E1 (actually irrelevant since the multipole
does not receive attacks) and for any semantics S (all behave the same on such a simple subframework) it
holds that S-effE1(M1,LE1) = {(A,in) | A ∈ E1}= S-effE1(M /0,LE1).




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.21: Upper part of the representation of the Popov v. Hayashi case from [262].


















































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.22: Lower part of the representation of the Popov v. Hayashi case from [262].









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.23: The representation of the Popov v. Hayashi case from [262] without the subargument relation.







Popov not caught UNDERCUT (R2)
Figure 2.24: The argumentation framework AF−J summarizing the reconstruction from [324].
In other words, the multipole M1 is S-equivalent to the empty multipole for any semantics S. It follows
that the replacement R = (AFJ,M1,M /0) is S-legitimate. Intuitively this means that the arguments A11 and
P−na can be canceled from AFJ without any consequence on the evaluation of other arguments, provided
that a suitable transparency property holds for S. Since both multipoles M1 and M /0 are acyclic, the results
summarized in Table 2.2 ensure that the replacement is safe for any semantics considered in this chapter
except semi-stable semantics (by the way, the replacement is safe also for semi-stable semantics, given that
in this case its labellings coincide with stable labellings).
Iterating the same kind of reasoning, it can be seen that the following pairs of arguments can pro-
gressively (and safely) be cancelled: {A12, A10}, {A9, CI}, {A8, A7}, {P-ic, A5}, {A6, A4}. In virtue of
Proposition 13 we have that we can safely restrict AFJ to the set of arguments E∗= {A1, A2, A3, A13, P-nc}
without affecting the labellings of the arguments in E∗. This could have been done (in a single, more labori-
ous, step) also showing that the big multipole consisting of the set of arguments {A11, P-na, A12, A10, A9,
CI, A8, A7, P-ic, A5, A6, A4} is S-equivalent to the empty multipole.
Assuming that the main focus concerns the evaluation of arguments A1 and A2, we can also see that A3
can be suppressed in AF∗J =AFJ↓E∗ : given the multipole M2 =(AF∗J ↓{A3, P-nc}, /0,{(P-nc, A1),(A3, A2)})
with respect to E2 = {A1, A2, A13}, it is again easy to see that for any (actually irrelevant) labelling
LE2 of E2 and for any semantics S it holds that S-effE2(M2,LE2) = {(A1,out),(A2,in),(A13,in)} =
S-effE2(M3,LE2) where M3 , (({P-nc}, /0), /0,{(P-nc, A1)}). Using again the fact that both M2 and M3
are acyclic we get that the replacement is safe, i.e. that A3 can be cancelled.
Summing up, we get the simplified argumentation framework AF−J shown in Figure 2.24 which, for any
semantics considered in this chapter, is equivalent to the original one as far as the evaluation of the remaining
arguments is concerned.
Turning now to the argumentation framework AFK of Figure 2.23, we first note that all the isolated
(i.e. both unattacking and unattacked) arguments can be suppressed. This follows from the fact that, for
any semantics S and for any argumentation framework AFU such that LS(AFU) 6= /0, given the multipole
MU = (AFU , /0, /0) with respect to any (actually irrelevant) set E, for any labeling LE of E it holds that
S-effE(MU ,LE) = {(A,in)|A ∈ E}= S-effE1(M /0,LE).
Supposing that the main interest concerns the final decision, i.e. the evaluation of the arguments H-hr, H-
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Figure 2.25: The argumentation framework AF−K summarizing the reconstruction from [262].
nr and EQ, and using the same reasoning as above we can also see that all the arguments concerning the issue
of Popov’s possession, not attacking nor being attacked by arguments outside the set, can be suppressed.
Then, using a reasoning which is completely analogous to the one applied to the multipole M2 above,
we can also suppress the arguments H-hp, P-nhp, and Vr-rp, getting finally the argumentation framework
AF−K represented in Figure 2.25.
Comparing now Figures 2.24 and 2.25 we observe that:
• arguments A1 and A2 in AF−J correspond respectively to arguments H-hr and H-nr in AF
−
K and have
the same status of rejected;
• similarly, we can also say that arguments P-nc and A13 in AF−J correspond respectively to arguments
NV-rp and NA-r4 in in AF−K ;
• the argument EQ of AF−K has no counterpart in AF
−
J due to the fact that in [324] the final decision is
represented only in the context of the value-based formalization.
Leaving apart EQ, we note therefore a basic structural similarity between the two simplified frameworks:
in both reconstructions the arguments corresponding to giving the ball to one of the contendants are rejected
due to one main reason. One may then wonder whether the reasons for these rejections are actually the same
in the two reconstructions.
As to the rejection of the decision in favor of Hayashi, in AF−J it is due to the undercut of A2 by A13,
which is based on the fact that Popov was “ably and actively engaged in establishing control” of the ball.
Similarly, in AF−K the rejection of H-nr is due to the fact that a rule used to derive that Hayashi has possession
of the ball, is shown not to be applicable in this case through argument NA-r4, based on the fact that the ball
was not loose (due to the previous attempt of Popov) when Hayashi retrieved it.
While basically similar as far as the previous point is concerned, the two reconstructions turn out to
be different as to the rejection of the decision in favor of Popov: in AF−J A1 is attacked by P-nc which
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corresponds to the conclusion that Popov did not catch the ball, thus denying the premise of A1, while in
AF−K H-hr is attacked by NV-rp, which concerns the validity of the rule rp. It is interesting to note that in
[262] the argument NV-rp is essentially based on the fact that “rule rp does not promote fundamental fairness
as regards Popov’s claim” and that, indeed, fairness is the primary value considered in the value-based part
of [324] as a justification of the final decision.
Thus the difference arises from the fact that in the formalism adopted in [262] reasoning about values
is embedded into arguments that are at the same level as other arguments, while in [324] reasoning about
values is carried out in a separate layer. A discussion about the pros and cons of either approach to deal with
values is clearly out of the scope of this chapter.
To conclude this section we remark that the identification of some basic commonalities and differences
between two argument-based reconstructions of a real law case has been greatly simplified by the possi-
bility to summarize frameworks in a general and technically sound way. In this perspective the notion of
argumentation multipole and the decomposability and equivalence properties investigated in this chapter
can be regarded as enabling techniques for the investigation of methods for (possibly automated) analysis,
synthesis and comparison of argumentation frameworks.
Translations of argumentation frameworks
Translating an argumentation framework AF1 into another framework AF2 such that AF2 has some desirable
features and, at the same time, preserves some specific properties of AF1 is a generic problem with significant
theoretical and practical implications. In particular in [140] the problem of intertraslatability is considered,
which is defined as follows: “Given an argumentation framework F and argumentation semantics σ and
σ ′, find a function Tr such that the σ -extensions of F are in certain correspondence to the σ ′-extensions of
Tr(F).” As a matter of fact, in [140] modularity is one of the general requirements of a translation procedure,
informally stated as “the translation can be done independently for certain parts of the framework”. While
this generic notion may have different technical counterparts depending on the kind of translation addressed,
our results provide a systematic and sound basis for ensuring modularity in any context where there is
an interest in replacing a subframework with a translated counterpart. A broad investigation of this issue
is clearly a matter for future work, here we provide two specific examples taken from the literature: the
former concerns a subframework replacement considered in the context of the analysis of the properties of
weighted argument systems, while the latter concerns the translation (also called flattening) of argumentation
frameworks with attacks to attacks into “traditional” Dung’s frameworks.
Reducing the attacks involving single arguments under grounded semantics
A weighted argument system (WAS in the following), as defined in [134], is basically an argumentation
framework with a numerical weight (actually a non-negative real number) attached to each attack. In the
analysis of the computational properties of WASs, it turns out to be convenient to consider a translation from
a WAS into another one such that no argument attacks or is attacked by more than 2 arguments and some
conditions are satisfied. Leaving apart the aspects of the translation and the conditions involving weights,
which are not relevant to the present chapter, basically the translation described in [134] involves replacing
the subframework consisting of an argument z receiving more than two attacks (from arguments y1, . . . ,yk)
with a subframework with additional arguments p1 and q1 where z receives only two attacks (from p1 and
and y1), while p1 is attacked by q1 and q1 is attacked by the arguments y2, . . . ,yk (see Figure 2.26). The
replacement can then be iterated focusing on q1 and adding p2 and q2 until qk−2 is only attacked by yk−1 and
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Figure 2.26: A translation in the context of WAS.
yk. The claim (proved in [134] as part of Lemma 1) is that the grounded extension of the original framework
is the same as the grounded extension of the framework resulting from the replacements mentioned above.
Note that Lemma 1 of [134] concerns an arbitrary WAS, i.e. its hypotheses do not put any restriction on
other attacks present in the original framework. In particular, as explicitly remarked in [134], there can be
attacks between some of the attackers of z, but also (not explicitly remarked in [134]) z might counterattack
some of its attackers or there could be longer loops involving z, some of its attackers and possibly other
arguments in the framework.
Given these remarks, the proof of Lemma 1 provided in [134] is not completely satisfactory: it consists
in local considerations on the arguments involved in the replacement described above without dealing with
possible effects involving other arguments in the framework. The absence of these effects, however, can
not be taken for granted. To give an example, when considering (to contradiction) a generic argument
x included in the grounded extension of the original framework but not in the grounded extension of the
translated framework it is stated that this implies that there is an attacker u of x in the translated framework
such that (u,x) was not an attack in the original framework. This immediately leads to identify x as z and
u as p1 and to apply only local considerations. However, in general, an argument might be excluded from
the grounded extension not just because it has an additional attacker but also because one of its attackers
has a different justification state in the new framework. In a sense, the proof of Lemma 1 of [134] seems to
implicitly assume the property of transparency of grounded semantics (which, of course is not obvious per
se) and (partially) shows a sort of local equivalence of the original fragment and of its translated counterpart.
Actually, the result of Lemma 1 of [134] is valid and this can be shown in a relatively straightforward
way using the results of the present chapter. First, given that grounded semantics is strongly transparent,
to obtain the result it is sufficient to show that the translation step depicted in Figure 2.26 involves the
replacement of an argumentation multipole with another one which is Input/Output GR-equivalent. The
fact that the translation may involve several such steps is then covered by the result of Proposition 13.
As to the identification of the equivalent multipoles M1 = (AF1,R1INP,R
1
OUT P) and M2 = (AF
2,R2INP,
R2OUT P), observe that the basic idea consists in replacing the argument z with the attack chain composed by
the three arguments p1, q1, and z itself within an arbitrary argumentation framework AF = (Ar,→) where
{y1, . . . ,yk} is the set of attackers of z with k > 2. Then M1 and M2 are defined with respect to the same
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Figure 2.27: Another translation in the context of WAS.
invariant set E = Ar \{z}, and the relevant frameworks are AF1 = ({z}, /0) and AF2 = ({p1,q1,z},{(q1, p1),
(p1,z)}). Moreover M1 and M2 have the same output relation: R1OUT P = R2OUT P =→∩({z}×Ar), while
they differ in the input relation: R1INP = {(yi,z) | 1≤ i≤ k}; R2INP = {(y1,z)}∪{(yi,q1) | 2≤ i≤ k}. We have
now to show that M1 and M2 are GR-equivalent, i.e. that for any labelling LE ∈ LE , GR-effE(M1,LE) =
GR-effE(M2,LE), which, recalling Definition 31, amounts to show that {effE(M1outp,L↓M1outp ,



















R1OUT P) and effE(M2
outp,L↓
M2
outp ,R2OUT P) are totally determined by the label assigned to z by FGR
given the labelling of the arguments in the input set {y1, . . . ,yk} (which is the same for both multipoles).
Now it is easy to see that the label assigned to z is the same for any labelling of the arguments {y1, . . . ,yk}
considering three basic cases: i) ∃yi ∈ {y1, . . . ,yk} : Lab(yi) = in; ii) ∀yi ∈ {y1, . . . ,yk} : Lab(yi) = out; iii)
@yi ∈ {y1, . . . ,yk} : Lab(yi) = in∧∃yi ∈ {y1, . . . ,yk} : Lab(yi) = undec.
In the case i), clearly z is assigned the label out by FGR in M1 and this also holds in M2 since either
z is attacked directly by an argument labelled in (if Lab(y1) = in) or, if this is not the case, necessarily
∃yi ∈ {y2, . . . ,yk} : Lab(yi) = in and then Lab(q1) = out, Lab(p1) = in, Lab(z) = out.
In the case ii), clearly z is assigned the label in by FGR in M1 and this also holds in M2: given ∀yi ∈
{y1, . . . ,yk} : Lab(yi) = out it follows Lab(q1) = in, Lab(p1) = out and then both attackers (y1 and p1) of
z are labelled out and z is labelled in.
In the case iii), clearly z is assigned the label undec by FGR in M1. As to M2, first note that y1 is either
labelled undec or out (in the latter case necessarily ∃yi ∈ {y2, . . . ,yk} : Lab(yi) = undec). Moreover, q1
is either labelled in or undec and consequently p1 is labelled out or undec (both are necessarily undec
if Lab(y1) = out). Summing up, z is either attacked by two arguments labelled undec or by one labelled
undec and one labelled out and hence is labelled undec by FGR, as required.
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A similar reasoning applies to the case where an argument attacks more than two other arguments, using
the replacement sketched in Figure 2.27.
Flattening attacks to attacks
In recent years several extensions of Dung’s framework encompassing attacks to attacks have been consid-
ered, like the EAF (Extended Argumentation Framework) formalism [228], mainly designed for the purpose
of preference modelling, and the more general (as, differently from EAF, they allow unlimited recursion of
attacks on attacks) AFRA (Argumentation Framework with Recursive Attacks) [22, 21] and HLAF (Higher
Level Argumentation Framework) [150].
For the sake of keeping the example compact, we focus here on the EAF formalism whose definition
(taken from [228]) is given below.
Definition 40. An Extended Argumentation Framework (EAF) is a tuple (Args,R,D) such that Args is a
set of arguments and:
• R ⊆ Args×Args
• D ⊆ Args×R
• if (X ,(Y,Z)),(X ′,(Z,Y )) ∈D then (X ,X ′),(X ′,X) ∈R.
As typical in any kind of extension of Dung’s framework, there is an interest in defining a translation
procedure from the extended formalism to the basic one. This is useful for several purposes, including the
opportunity to reuse or adapt, in the extended context, the large corpus of theoretical results available in
Dung’s framework, in particular as far as computational complexity is concerned.
In the case of attacks to attacks, as to our knowledge, two main translation procedures have been pro-
posed in the literature. The first procedure (considered with some slight variants in [229, 150, 54]) involves
replacing an attacked attack with an attack chain consisting in two additional arguments, then every at-
tack towards the replaced attack becomes an attack towards the second additional argument. The second
procedure (considered in [22, 21]) involves replacing an attack with a single new argument, with a proper
rearrangement of the incoming and outcoming attacks involving it. We present in the following the formal
definition of these procedures tailored to the case of EAF.
Definition 41. Let Γ = (Args,R,D) be an EAF and let us define D→(Γ) = {(A,B)|D∩(Args×{(A,B)}) 6=
/0} i.e. the set of attacks receiving at least an attack according to the relation D .
• The chain-style flattening of Γ is the argumentation framework AFΓc = (Argsc,→c) where Argsc =
Args∪{XA,B,YA,B|(A,B)∈D→(Γ)} and→c=R∪{(A,XA,B),(XA,B,YA,B),(YA,B,B)|(A,B)∈D→(Γ)}∪
{(C,YA,B)|(C,(A,B)) ∈D}
• The single-argument flattening of Γ is the argumentation framework AFΓsa = (Argssa,→sa) where
Argssa = Args∪{AB|(A,B)∈D→(Γ)} and→sa= (R \{(A,B)|(A,B)∈D→(Γ)})∪{(AB,B)|(A,B)∈
D→(Γ)}∪{(D,AB)|(A,B) ∈D→(Γ)∧ (D,A) ∈R}∪{(C,AB)|(C,(A,B)) ∈D}.
In words, in chain-style flattening two arguments XA,B and YA,B are added in replacement of every at-
tacked attack (A,B) (with A,XA,B,YA,B,B forming an attack chain) and the arguments attacking (A,B) ac-
cording to the relation D of Γ attack YA,B in AFc (while the attacks between arguments in R remain the




































Figure 2.28: The two translation procedures of attacks to attacks.
same). In single-argument flattening every attacked attack (A,B) is replaced by a single argument AB which
attacks B (instead of A) and is attacked by all attackers of A in R and by all attackers of (A,B) in D .
The two translation procedures are illustrated in Figure 2.28.
Of course one may wonder whether the operational differences in the two flattening procedures give
rise to any actual difference in the final outcome (i.e. in the justification status of the arguments originally
included in Γ) or, indeed, the two flattened frameworks treat the arguments originally included in Γ in the
same way, showing that the two procedures, different as they are, basically capture the same intuition.
To answer this question first observe that, given an EAF Γ = (Args,R,D), both the argumentation
frameworks AFΓc and AF
Γ
sa include all the original arguments Args and that they locally differ in correspon-
dence of the additional arguments used to represent the elements of D→(Γ). So AFΓsa can be obtained from
AFΓc (and vice versa) through the replacements of a (possibly quite articulated) multipole Mc with another
multipole Msa, both referring to the same set of invariant arguments Args. Thus, answering the question
amounts to analysing the safeness of this replacement, based in turn on the equivalence between these mul-
tipoles.
First, observe that the multipoles Mc and Msa consist of the union of |D→(Γ)| disjoint and non-
interacting “submultipoles” each having the form illustrated in Figure 2.28. In virtue of Proposition 13,
we can then consider a sequence of (similar) replacements leading from AFΓsa to AF
Γ
c and, to ensure that
the whole sequence of replacements is safe (as far as the arguments Args are concerned), it is sufficient to
show that each single step is safe, i.e. to analyze equivalence between the two multipoles representing the
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translation of a single attack to attack.
To this purpose, referring again to Figure 2.28, we can identify the multipoles Mc = (AFc,RcINP,R
c
OUT P)
with AFc =({XA,B,YA,B},(XA,B,YA,B)), RcINP = {(A,XA,B)}∪{(C1,YA,B), . . . ,(Cn,YA,B)}, RcOUT P = {(YA,B,B)},
and Msa = (AFsa,RsaINP,R
sa
OUT P) with AF
sa = ({AB}, /0), RsaINP = {(D1,AB), . . . ,(Dm,AB)}∪{(C1,AB), . . . ,
(Cn,AB)}, and RsaOUT P = {(AB,B)}.
It is immediate to observe that the replacement of Mc with Msa (or vice versa) is in general not legit-
imate: for instance, Mc and Msa are in general not equivalent if one considers a labelling Lab such that
Lab(D1) = in and Lab(A) = in. However, this labelling is clearly illegal in a context where D1 attacks
A. More generally, the labels of arguments D1, . . . ,Dm completely determine the label of A, thus one may
check whether the replacement is contextually legitimate. So, for any semantics S, we are interested in
showing that Mc and Msa are S-equivalent with respect to LSR , {FS(AF↓Args,Mc
outp,Lc,RcOUT P) | Lc ∈
L
Mc
outp}∪{FS(AF↓Args,Msaoutp,Lsa,RsaOUT P) | Lsa ∈ LMsaoutp}.
Observe that since the output relation of both Mc and Msa consists of a single attack (arising from YA,B
and AB respectively) the two multipoles are equivalent if and only if the labels assigned to YA,B and AB are
the same for any labelling in LSR . Moreover, we focus on CO-equivalence of multipoles without loss of
generality: in fact, it turns out (and it is easy to see) that, in any case, for both AFc and AFsa, the local
function of complete semantics prescribes exactly one complete labelling, which implies that this is the only
labelling also for all the other complete-compatible semantics considered in this chapter.
A remark is now in order concerning the labellings of the arguments outside the multipoles, i.e. LCOR
(note that LCOR ⊇ LSR for any complete-compatible semantics S considered in this chapter). As we are
interested in proving an equivalence result whatever the remaining part of the framework is (in addition to
the arguments depicted in Figure 2.28), the set of labellings LCOR can not be precisely characterized as it
also depends on the (unspecified) remaining part of the framework. As a consequence, we prove a sligthly
stronger result, considering any labelling in the set LCOR consisting of the labellings compatible with the
attacks from the arguments Di to the argument A. Since LCOR ⊇ L
CO
R this implies the desired equivalence
result.
Now, the examination of labellings in LCOR can be carried out considering nine cases, i.e., all possible
combination, for the sets {D1, . . . ,Dm} and {C1, . . . ,Cn}, of three basic cases: i) there is an argument la-
belled in; ii) all arguments are labelled out; iii) otherwise (note in particular that Lab(A) is determined
by the labelling of the set {D1, . . . ,Dm} in both multipoles). As all cases are rather simple, for the sake of
compactness we synthesize the analysis in Table 2.3 rather than providing trivial and verbose explanations:
by inspection of the last two columns it appears that Lab(YA,B) = Lab(AB) in all cases, as desired.
We have thus proved that the replacement of the considered multipoles is contextually S-legitimate for
any complete-compatible semantics S considered in this chapter. Then, the replacement is safe for any such
semantics S which is strongly transparent with respect to these multipoles. Given that the multipoles are
acyclic, from the results recalled in Table 2.2 it follows that the replacement is guaranteed to be safe for all
semantics considered in this chapter, but SST, for which the answer is negative in general and the question
is open for this specific case.
The lesson learned is twofold: first, we have given a substantial formal confirmation of the intuition that
the two translation procedures are equivalent as far as the “external effects” are concerned for a compre-
hensive set of semantics, second we have seen however that even “simple” and basically correct intuitions
require a careful semantics-specific scrutiny which may point out specific exceptions or critical issues (like
for semi-stable semantics in our case).
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{D1, . . . ,Dm} {C1, . . . ,Cn} Lab(A) Lab(XA,B) Lab(YA,B) LabAB
∃in ∃in out in out out
∃in ∀out out in out out
∃in @in∧∃undec out in out out
∀out ∃in in out out out
∀out ∀out in out in in
∀out @in∧∃undec in out undec undec
@in∧∃undec ∃in undec undec out out
@in∧∃undec ∀out undec undec undec undec
@in∧∃undec @in∧∃undec undec undec undec undec
Table 2.3: Contextually CO-legitimate replacement of Mc with Msa.
2.11 Related work
As mentioned in Section 2.1, the work presented in this chapter has connections with three main (and non-
disjoint) topics in the area of computational argumentation namely:
• local evaluation in argumentation semantics;
• argumentation dynamics;
• equivalence and interchangeability between argumentation frameworks.
We discuss the relationships with the relevant literature orderly in the following subsections.
Local evaluation in argumentation semantics
As to our knowledge the first analyses of semantics’ properties exploitable for the purpose of local evalua-
tion in the literature are provided by the work on SCC-recursiveness [245] and the notion of directionality
introduced in [15].
Starting from the latter, in a nutshell a semantics is directional when it is guaranteed that, as far as exten-
sions are concerned, a part of the framework which does not receive attacks from the rest of the framework
is unaffected by the rest of the framework itself. Letting U be a set of arguments not receiving attacks from
arguments not in U , this means that the same results (i.e. the same set of local extensions) are obtained
either by computing the global extensions and then intersecting them with U , or by directly computing the
extensions of the restricted framework consisting of the arguments in U and of the attacks among them.
Directionality allows for local computation when the results one is interested in can be obtained by
focusing on an unattacked set, but has no embedded notion of progressive construction: it simply prescribes
a relation of inclusion between the local extensions and the global ones. As such it is poorly related with
the properties of semantics decomposability and transparency. To give some examples, stable semantics,
which is not directional, is fully decomposable (and hence strongly transparent) while semi-stable semantics
(which is non directional too) lacks any form of decomposability and transparency. Admissible and complete
semantics are directional, fully decomposable and strongly transparent, while ideal semantics (which is
directional too) lacks any form of decomposability and satisfies only a very weak form of transparency. To
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complete the picture, recall that grounded and preferred semantics (which feature intermediate properties)
are directional too.
The notion of SCC-recursiveness has closer relationships with the present work, as already evidenced
by the fact that we considered partition selectors based on the notion of SCC. Basically, the SCC-recursive
scheme provides a general method to build the global extensions prescribed by a semantics by proceeding
progressively following the (partial) order among SCCs induced by the attack relation (recall that the graph
obtained by considering each SCC as a single node is acyclic). The SCC-recursive scheme applies to each
SCC a semantics-specific base function and then prescribes how to “propagate the effects” of the choices
made in the previous SCCs to the subsequent ones before applying in turn the base function to them. As
such, SCC-recursiveness directly implies the property of semantics decomposability with respect to the
selector FSCC.
Five of the semantics we have considered in this chapter are SCC-recursive (namely admissible, com-
plete, stable, grounded, and preferred semantics), and indeed we have proved that all of them feature stronger
decomposability properties than the one implied by SCC-recursiveness. Moreover, the notion of local func-
tion introduced in this chapter can be seen as a generalization of the notion of base function in the SCC-
recursive scheme.
Drawing a more detailed analysis of the relationships of SCC-recursiveness with decomposability and
transparency properties is an interesting line of future work. As a first note in this direction, we can observe
that the two semantics lacking SCC-recursiveness considered in this chapter (namely semi-stable and ideal
semantics) lack also any decomposability property.
In [272] the problem of combining local evaluations is addressed in a multi-agent scenario context
where each agent owns a part of the framework and may locally adopt a different semantics. This gives
rise to the notion of multi-sorted argumentation framework where a global argumentation framework is
regarded as composed of a set of interacting cells, each associated with a (possibly) different semantics.
In this context, the investigation in [272] follows a sort of top-down approach: given a (global) set of
arguments S, it addresses the problem of checking whether S is an extension of the multi-sorted framework,
according to local evaluations carried out for each cell. Basically, the definition of local evaluation at the
cell level, directly reuses notions taken from the SCC-recursive scheme, as explicitly stated in [272]: the
acceptance functions used at the cell level (Definition 5 in [272]) correspond to the base functions of the
SCC-recursive scheme, while the notions of subframework and qualified arguments of a subframework
(Definitions 7 and 8 in [272]) also have a direct correspondence with key technical elements of the SCC-
recursive scheme (respectively with AF↓UPAF (S,E) and UAF(S,E) in Definition 20 of [245]). Thus, in a sense,
the work of [272] reuses some of the main notions of the SCC-recursive scheme by applying them into
two important directions of generalization: considering arbitrary (rather than SCC-based) partitions of the
framework and allowing heterogeneous local evaluations. However, the direct reuse of notions specifically
conceived in the context of the SCC-recursive scheme limits the possibility to fully encompass situations of
mutual interaction and cyclic dependence between cells, which are impossible in the case of SCCs but are
possible with arbitrary partitions. The present work addresses the study of homogeneous local evaluations
for arbitrary partitions of an argumentation framework by introducing novel notions to capture the more
complex interactions between subframeworks arising in this context. Extending the results presented in this
chapter to the case of heterogeneous local evaluations is an important direction of future work.
It has also to be mentioned that some results concerning the use of the same semantics (or of semantics
with common properties) in all cells are provided in [272] (in particular the notion of Uniform Case Exten-
sion Equivalence in Definition 10 of [272] roughly corresponds to our notion of semantics decomposability).
These results are not directly comparable with ours, due to the different modeling of the interactions between
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subframeworks mentioned previously. For instance, in Example 5 of [272] a counterexample is given dis-
proving (a sort of) top-down decomposability of grounded semantics in multi-sorted frameworks, while in
our context grounded semantics is actually top-down decomposable.
In the notion of conditional acceptance function introduced in [57], basically the acceptance function,
corresponding to a given semantics, accepts as input not only an argumentation framework but also an
(externally imposed) condition, which corresponds to the set of possible labellings of the framework. In
other words, the acceptance function is constrained to produce a set of labellings which is a subset of the
given condition. This expresses some form of external influence on argument evaluation, and in this sense
could be related to our notion of argumentation framework with input. However, it is based on a rather
different intuition, since it expresses a constraint on the labels of all arguments, independently of any attack
relation coming from outside, while in our approach external influences manifest themselves through attack
relations involving a well-identified set of arguments in the conditioned framework. In [57] the generic
notion of conditional acceptance function is instantiated only for complete semantics, while its application
to other semantics is, as to our knowledge, still to be developed.
Abstract dialectical frameworks (ADFs) [62] generalize Dung’s framework by detaching the meaning
of attack from the binary relation between arguments, so that each element of this relation is just a link
representing a dependency. The meaning of the dependencies for each argument s is then expressed by an
acceptance condition Cs which associates each subset of the set of parents of s with either in or out, namely
gives a binary decision on the acceptance of s given the set of its parents which are accepted. Hence, in
ADFs argument evaluation is, by definition, based on a strictly local criterion and any global evaluation
arises bottom-up from the combination of the local ones.
While the present work is strictly focused on Dung’s framework and the relevant semantics based on the
attack relation, it appears that the basic ideas underlying our analysis have significant commonalities with
the process of bottom-up evaluation in ADFs. Generalizing the results we have obtained to the context of
ADFs is therefore a very important direction of future work.
Argumentation dynamics
Broadly speaking, in the context of abstract argumentation, dynamics concerns the evolution of a given
framework to which one or more modifications (i.e. additions and/or deletions of arguments and/or attacks)
are applied. These modifications can be exogenous and neutral, namely determined by some external event,
or endogenous and goal-oriented, namely deliberately induced by an agent to reach some goal, like the
acceptance of a desired argument. In the former case, the main interest is in determining the effect of
the external modifications, in the latter, in identifying the minimal set of modifications sufficient to reach
the goal. In both cases, one is typically interested in reusing as far as possible the results of previous
computations carried out in the original framework so as to limit the amount of new computation required
by the modification. Hence some of the pre-existing computation results have to be combined with the
results of some partial computations in the new framework. Clearly the results presented in this chapter
are specifically related to this facet of argumentation dynamics and we focus on the relevant literature. A
detailed analysis of the broader implications of our work on argumentation dynamics is beyond the scope of
the present chapter.
In [201] to save computation in a dynamic context the division-based method is proposed. Essentially,
after a modification, the considered framework is divided into two parts, one unaffected and one affected.
Briefly, the affected part consists of those arguments which are reachable (through a directed path of attacks)
starting from any argument or attack involved in the modification. The identification of the unaffected part
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relies on the directionality property, which is required for the application of the method. To formalize the
influence of the unaffected part over the affected part, the notion of conditioned argumentation framework
is introduced, namely an argumentation framework receiving some attacks from arguments included in
another argumentation framework. The chapter then deals with incremental computation for some semantics
satisfying the directionality property, namely complete, grounded, preferred and ideal14 semantics. After the
modification, one needs to recompute the extensions only for the affected part (modeled as a conditioned
argumentation framework w.r.t. the unaffected part).
Some basic notions underlying the division-based method are related to our work. In particular, the
notion of conditioned argumentation framework in [201] is similar to the notions of conditioning relation and
of argumentation framework with input in our Definitions 12 and 13. Moreover, the incremental computation
in a conditioned framework is analogous to the application of the local function introduced in Definition 13.
There is however an important difference due to the fact that the division-based method is essentially
based on the directionality principle and, in particular, requires that there are no paths from the affected part
to the unaffected part. As a consequence, the division-based method covers the cases where a framework is
partitioned into two subframeworks such that one has an output, without having an input, and the other has
an input (from the former) without having an output. The results concerning incremental computation of
the four semantics considered in [201] correspond to a restricted form of semantics decomposability under
these restrictive assumptions: both the unaffected and the affected part consist of a set of SCCs such that
the SCCs included in the unaffected part precede those included in the affected part according to the partial
order induced by the attack relation. Given this observation, the notion of decomposability in this context
basically corresponds to a mild generalization of decomposability w.r.t.. FSCC(AF), i.e. of the weakest
notion of decomposability considered in this chapter, and is definitely weaker than decomposability w.r.t..
F∪SCC(AF). Our work is definitely more general as it concerns arbitrary partitions and does not rely on
the directionality property. In particular, we prove full decomposability of stable semantics, which is not
directional.
The work on splitting argumentation frameworks [29] focuses on modifications involving only additions
of arguments or attacks (called expansions) and, apart of this restriction, shares the main basic assumptions
with [201]. Considering a subclass of expansions called weak expansions, a splitting divides an argumenta-
tion framework into two subframeworks, such that only one of them receives attacks from the other: the two
subframeworks correspond to the unaffected and affected parts of [201]. To model the effect of the unaf-
fected subframework on the affected one, in [29] a modification of the affected subframework is introduced,
which involves the addition of self-attacks and bears some similarity with our notion of standard argumen-
tation framework for an argumentation framework with input. Then, the splitting theorem of [29] provides
a decomposability result for stable, admissible, preferred, complete and grounded semantics, which, due to
the restriction on the partitions considered, as in the case of [201], are weaker than the ones considered in
this chapter.
The restrictions that one of the two parts can not receive attacks from the other one is lifted in [30] where
an arbitrary partition of a framework into two parts is called quasi splitting and, using a technical arsenal
rather different than ours, the decomposability property of stable semantics is proved. We achieved the
same result for stable semantics in the context of a more general analysis, covering six additional literature
semantics.
On the performance side, there are some empirical evidences that both the division-based method [200]
and the splitting approach [28] may significantly reduce the computation time required for some standard
14Actually the claim concerning ideal semantics turns out to be flawed, as recently pointed out in [18].
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problems in abstract argumentation w.r.t. to algorithms adopting a “monolithic” approach. Investigating the
advantages provided by our more general approach in this respect is an important direction of future work.
Equivalence and interchangeability between argumentation frameworks
Various notions of equivalence for argumentation frameworks have been considered in the literature. The
most basic ones focus either on structural correspondences (like the notion of syntactical equivalence, i.e.
equality of arguments and attacks, used in [240] or the notion of isomorphism used in [15]) or on equality
of extensions (w.r.t. a given semantics), which is called equivalence tout court in [240] and is analogous to
the notion of equivalence between logic programs [203]. These notions are poorly or not at all related with
modularity and interchangeability issues, that may arise in various contexts and in particular in presence of
some form of argumentation dynamics.
To address this limitation, the notion of strong equivalence between argumentation framework (again,
analogous to the one of strong equivalence between logic programs [203]) is introduced and investigated in
[240]: two frameworks F and G are strongly equivalent w.r.t. a given semantics if for any argumentation
framework H, the frameworks F∪H and G∪H have the same extensions. Basically, F and G must preserve
the same outcomes in front of any operation of expansion. Since this requirement is, in fact, very strong,
weaker notions of equivalence have subsequently been considered in the literature by restricting the set of
expansions of the original frameworks encompassed. In particular four subclasses of expansions (called
normal, weak, strong, and local15) are considered in [25] giving rise to four correspondent definitions of
expansion equivalence all weaker than strong equivalence. A different notion of equivalence, introduced in
[26], refers to the problem of minimal change: given a framework and a set of arguments E whose (credu-
lous) acceptance has to be enforced, one is interested in identifying the minimal number of modifications that
ensure the desired enforcement result. Two frameworks are minimal change equivalent, if for any set E the
minimal number of modifications required to enforce E is the same in both frameworks. The relationships
between all the above mentioned notions of equivalence have been analyzed in detail in [27].
The approach presented in this chapter is complementary to the ones reviewed above: while these refer
to several forms of invariance over the whole framework w.r.t. an operation of expansion, our work concerns
invariance only in the unmodified part of the framework w.r.t. an operation of replacement. This involves
a notion of equivalence in terms of Input/Output behavior and the study of the property of semantics trans-
parency, which have no counterpart in the works cited above. As already mentioned, they can be related with
the notion of strong equivalence in logic programming, while our approach is closer in spirit to the notion
of modular equivalence between logic programs [239] and, more generally, with the study of modularity in
this context [177]. A detailed analysis of the possible interplay between our results and the area of modular
logic programming is beyond the scope of the present chapter and is left for future work.
The issue of substitutions within an argumentation framework is explicitly addressed by the notion of
fibring [149] which indeed covers the more general case of combining together networks of different nature
(e.g. embedding a neural network or a Bayesian network into an argumentation framework), including the
special case of combination of networks of the same nature, called self-fibring. Due to the potential hetero-
geneity of the networks involved, however, fibring concerns the substitution of a single node of a network
with an entire other network (neither of them having a notion of “interface” with the rest of the framework)
and hence addresses a different kind of replacement than the one considered in this chapter, which involves
15This terminology, taken out of its context, may be a bit misleading: normal expansions are not the most general case of
expansions, and the terms weak and strong here refer to the additional arguments, so strong expansions are not a subset of weak
expansions.
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the two argumentation multipoles, i.e. two partial networks with well-defined interface. Moreover, the
study presented in [149] covers generalized argumentation frameworks, featuring a richer set of relations
(e.g. support, attacks to attacks, attacks arising from attacks, collective and disjoint attacks) than Dung’s
framework, and investigates how this conceptual and technical arsenal can be used to properly transform the
incoming and outcoming links involving just one node into links involving the nodes of the network replac-
ing that node. Thus, the analysis in [149] goes deeply into these complex structural manipulations, which
are mostly semantics independent, and does not concern the study of specific semantics properties. Our
work, as already mentioned, concerns a different kind of replacement and lies in the context of traditional
Dung frameworks, where we provide a systematic assessment of interchangeability-related properties for a
comprehensive set of literature semantics. Extending and relating our results to generalized frameworks in
the spirit of [149] is a further interesting direction of future work.
In [308] the notion of argumentation pattern is introduced in order to capture “general reusable solutions
to commonly occurring problems in the design of argumentation frameworks”. Hence an argumentation
pattern is understood as a reusable and modular component, in a spirit which has some analogy with the
idea of argumentation multipole introduced in this chapter. It has however to be observed that the notion
of argumentation pattern lies at a higher level of abstraction than the one of argumentation multipole: the
definition of argumentation pattern given in [308] involves a set of arguments and, basically, a set of possi-
ble labellings of these arguments. No notion of attack is explicitly involved, since an argumentation pattern
captures a set of evaluation outcomes which together represent a “typical situation” seen from outside, inde-
pendently of the (in fact, not necessarily univocal) underlying structure giving rise to this situation. Indeed,
in [308] methods to translate (or flatten) a pattern into an argumentation framework and vice versa to ex-
tract a pattern from an argumentation framework (where arguments to be included in the pattern have been
preliminarily identified) are devised. Our work, lying at different level, provides suitable technical founda-
tions for further developments of the study of argumentation patterns. Indeed, our analysis concerning the
equivalence of alternative representations of attacks to attacks in Section 2.10 strenghtens the analysis of
patterns for so called higher-order attacks in Section 3.2 of [308]. Moreover in [308] the issue of pattern
combination is mentioned as a matter of future research, which may certainly benefit from the systematic
set of results provided in this chapter, applicable to the underlying flattened representation.
2.12 Conclusion
This chapter contributes to the emerging research direction on modularity-based properties and techniques
in abstract argumentation, by introducing a novel comprehensive formal corpus to describe the Input/Output
behavior of argumentation frameworks along with the relevant semantics properties, and by providing a sys-
tematic assessment of seven well-known argumentation semantics in this context. Due to their foundational
nature, we believe these results may play an enabling role in the development of a variety of more specific
investigation lines, ranging from the sound combination of heterogeneous semantics to the definition of
reusable argumentation patterns. As to future work, in addition to the many issues already included in the
discussion of Section 2.11, we mention three further interesting lines. First, the extension of the analysis
carried out in the chapter to other literature semantics like the ones mainly based on the notion of conflict-
freeness (e.g. stage [306], CF2 [17, 245], stage2 [152] semantics) or those featuring a parametric definition
(e.g. resolution-based semantics [14]). Second, the study of argumentation synthesis problems, namely,
given a desired Input/Output behavior generating an argumentation framework which produces it, possibly
under some constraints concerning its structure and/or the semantics to be adopted. Third, a systematic
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definition of modularity-related variations of traditional computational problems in abstract argumentation,




Reasoning about trust through
argumentation
3.1 Introduction
This chapter synthesizes my contributions in the area of computational models of argument, dealing, more
precisely, with the use of abstract argumentation to reason about trust in multiagent systems. These contri-
butions have been published in several venues:
• Serena Villata, Guido Boella, Dov M. Gabbay, Leendert van der Torre. Arguing about the Trustwor-
thiness of the Information Sources. 11th European Conference Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches
to Reasoning with Uncertainty (ECSQARU 2011): 74-85 [310],
• Célia da Costa Pereira, Andrea Tettamanzi, Serena Villata. Changing One’s Mind: Erase or Rewind?
22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2011): 164-171 [112],
• Célia da Costa Pereira, Mauro Dragoni, Andrea Tettamanzi, Serena Villata. Fuzzy Labeling for
Abstract Argumentation: An Empirical Evaluation. 10th International Conference on Scalable Un-
certainty Management (SUM 2016): 126-139 [114],
• Fabio Paglieri, Cristiano Castelfranchi, Célia da Costa Pereira, Rino Falcone, Andrea Tettamanzi,
Serena Villata. Trusting the messenger because of the message: feedback dynamics from information
quality to source evaluation. Computational & Mathematical Organization Theory 20(2): 176-194
(2014) [247],
• Serena Villata, Guido Boella, Dov M. Gabbay, Leendert van der Torre. A socio-cognitive model of
trust using argumentation theory. Int. J. Approx. Reasoning 54(4): 541-559 (2013) [309].
The contributions reported in this chapter are the result of my fruitful collaboration with Celia da Costa
Pereira (UNS) and Andrea Tettamanzi (UNS). They also resulted from a collaboration with Fabio Paglieri
(CNR Rome), Rino Falcone (CNRS Rome) and Cristiano Castelfranchi (CNR Rome). Part of the contri-
butions presented in this chapter originated from the results I published in my PhD thesis, i.e., the meta-
argumentation methodology here applied to reasoning about conflicts in trust. Finally, this line of work has
been continued in the PhD thesis of Amel Ben Othmane that I supervised with Andrea Tettamanzi and Nhan
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Le Than. She successfully defended her PhD thesis titled “CARS - A multi-agent framework to support the
decision making in uncertain spatio-temporal real-world applications” on October 2017.
Trust is a mechanism for managing uncertain information in decision making, taking into account also
the sources besides the content of information only. In their interactions, agents have to reason to decide
whether they should trust or not the other sources of information, and on the extent to which they trust those
other sources. This is important, for example, in medical contexts, where doctors have to inform the patient
of the pro and con evidence from different sources concerning some treatment, in decision support systems
where the user is not satisfied by an answer without explanations, or in trials where judges have to specify
the motivations about which conflicting evidence they trust. A cognitive analysis of trust is fundamental
to predict very different strategies for building or increasing trust, for founding mechanisms of reputation,
persuasion, and argumentation in trust building [90]. The contribution of this chapter is twofold: on the
one side, we present an argumentation-based approach to reason on trust conflicts using the methodology
of meta-argumentation I introduced in my PhD thesis [307], and, on the other hand, we present a fuzzy
labeling algorithm to label arguments in an argumentation framework based on the trustworthiness of the
source proposing them.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 describes the challenges of reasoning about trust con-
flicts using meta-argumentation and presents the proposed formal framework, and Section 3.3 describes
the fuzzy labeling algorithm and how it can be employed in a belief revision scenario in a multiagent sys-
tem. Section 3.4 compares the proposed approaches to reason about trust using argumentation theory to the
related literature, and conclusions end the chapter.
3.2 A cognitive model of conflicts in trust using argumentation
In this section, we start from the cognitive model of trust introduced by Castelfranchi and Falcone [90], and
we present a cognitive model of conflicts in trust using argumentation. In particular, the reasoning process
addressed by the agents concerning the extent to which they trust the other information sources leads to
the emergence not only of conflicts among the information but also of the conflicts among the sources.
Since argumentation is a mechanism to reason about conflicting information [127] it seems the suitable
methodology for reason about trust. When two pieces of information coming from different sources are
conflicting, they can be seen as two arguments attacking each other. When an information source explicitly
expresses a negative evaluation of the trustworthiness of another source, it can be seen as an “attack” to the
trustworthiness of the second source modelled as an argument as well. To deal with the dimension of conflict
in handling trust, we propose to use argumentation theory, modelling both information and information
sources as arguments and arguing about them. In argumentation theory [266], the arguments are considered
to be accepted or not depending on the attacks against them. In standard argumentation frameworks, neither
the information sources proposing the arguments nor their trustworthiness are considered. In recent years,
the area has seen a number of proposals [261, 293, 216, 253, 310, 113] to introduce the trust component
in the evaluation process of the arguments. The common drawback of these approaches is that they do not
return the intrinsic complexity of the trust notion, as highlighted instead by socio-cognitive models like [90].
The challenge of this work is to use argumentation theory not only to model whether an information
source is trusted or not, but also to understand the reasons, modeled under the form of arguments, for trust-
ing the sources in case of conflicts concerning their trustability. This means that we need to distinguish the
conflicts about the content of the arguments which are usually specified through an attack relation, and the
conflicts about the different opinions of the sources on the trustworthiness of the other sources. These are
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two separate reasoning levels, and the challenge is to model both of them using argumentation theory. In
particular, we present a way to deal with the conflicts about trust using Dung’s abstract argumentation frame-
work [133]. It is not obvious how to model in a Dung argumentation framework the trust about arguments
and the conflicts about sources’ trustworthiness. A Dung argumentation framework can be instantiated by
the arguments and attacks defined by a knowledge base. The knowledge base inferences are defined in terms
of the claims of the justified arguments, e.g., the ASPIC+ framework [263] instantiates Dung frameworks
with accounts of the structure of arguments, the nature of attack and the use of preferences. In such a kind
of framework, arguments are instantiated by sentences of a single knowledge base, without reference to the
information sources. The only possibility is to include sources and trust inside the content of the argument.
This makes it difficult to distinguish between the object level concerning content of information and the
meta-level concerning trust, sources and the conflicts among them. In reasoning about trust, the informa-
tion about the trustworthiness relations among the sources are meta-level information, and they cannot be
inserted directly into the argumentation framework. They influence the behavior of the framework in the
sense that they lead to further conflicts among the sources and their information items, i.e., what the sources
claim.
The following example presents informally the opinions of several witnesses during a trial, illustrating
conflicts about trust among the sources and not only among the pieces of information they provide, where
the external evaluator is the judge:
• Witness1: I suspect that the man killed his boss in Rome. (a)
• Witness1: But his car was broken, thus he could not reach the crime scene. (b)
• Witness2: Witness1 is a compulsive liar. (c)
• Witness3: I repaired the suspect’s car at 12pm of the crime day. (d)
• Witness4: I believe that Witness3 is not able to repair that kind of car. (e)
• Witness5: The suspect has another car. (f)
• Witness6: Witness5 saw that the suspect parked 2 cars in my underground parking garage 3 weeks ago. (g)
• Witness2: Witness5 was on holidays 3 weeks ago. (h)
• Witness7: Witness5 cannot go on holidays because of his working contract. (i)
• Witness3: Witness7 is not competent about the working contracts of the underground parking garage. (l)
• Witness1: Witness7 does not really think that Witness5 cannot go on holidays because of his working con-
tract. (m)
In these sentences, different kinds of conflicts are highlighted among the sources concerning their trustabil-
ity. What we call the object level is illustrated by the arguments (a) and (b): Witness1 would believe the
suspect is the murderer but he explains that another argument (the car was broken) prevents this conclusion.
Thus argument (b) attacks argument (a) since they are conflicting. But attacks can concern also the trusta-
bility of sources, once this aspect is modelled in terms of arguments (meta-arguments) as well. First, the
sources can attack the trustworthiness of the other sources, see, e.g., argument (c) attacking the trustwor-
thiness of Wintess1. Second, we must model the connection between the argument about the trustability of
Witness1 and the arguments (a) and (b) - as well as the attack between the two arguments - he advances.
The sources must be modelled as evidence motivating their arguments or attacks, which otherwise should
be considered as unacceptable. Moreover, sources can provide evidence also concerning the other sources’
arguments, e.g., argument (g) provides evidence for argument ( f ). Third, while attacks like the one done
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by argument (c) are addressed against the sources’ trustworthiness as a whole (represented through a meta-
argument), conflicts about trust can be restricted to a particular argument or attack proposed by a source who
is not considered untrustworthy in general. E.g., argument (h) expresses concerns about the trustworthiness
of argument (g) and not about the source itself. Fourth, conflicts about the trustworthiness of the sources can
be further detailed in order to deal with the competence of the sources, e.g., argument (l), and their sincerity,
e.g., argument (m). The example leaves as implicit the issue of a feedback between the trustworthiness of
the information items and the sources’ trustworthiness when what they said is attacked.
As mentioned before, in standard argumentation frameworks [266] it is difficult to formalize the example
above with sentences from a single knowledge base only, e.g., to model it in ASPIC+ style instantiated
argumentation. Moreover, meta-level information such as the distinction about conflicts based on sincerity
and those based on competence cannot be represented in those frameworks. These two trust dimensions
might be independently evaluated in the argumentation process: Bob’s sincerity/honesty (Alice believes that
Bob has told her the truth) vs. Bob’s competence (Alice trusts the judgment of Bob if he is expert). Finally,
it has to be modeled the fact that attacking Bob’s argument means attacking Bob and his credibility and
trustworthiness as source. This is fundamental, both in the case in which it is intentional and it is the real
objective of the attack, or when it is not intended but is a consequence of the invalidation of the arguments.
This is because of the bidirectional link between the source and its information items: the provided item is
more or less believable on the basis of the source trustworthiness, but the invalidation of the item feedbacks
on the source’s credibility.
In this section, we address the following research question:
• How to model the socio-cognitive aspects of trust using argumentation theory?
The research question breaks down into the following subquestions:
1. How to represent the information sources and attack their trustworthiness?
2. How to represent pro and con evidence, as done in Carneades [156]?
3. How to attack the sources’ trustworthiness about single information items?
4. How to represent the trust feedback between the sources and their information items?
5. How to distinguish the two dimensions of trust, i.e., sincerity and competence?
To answer the research questions, we propose meta-argumentation [176, 230, 54, 93, 307]. Meta-
argumentation provides a way to instantiate abstract arguments, i.e., abstract arguments are treated as meta-
arguments: arguments about other arguments. It allows us not only to reason about arguments such as
sentences from a knowledge base indexed by the information source, but also to introduce in the framework,
at the meta-level, other instances like arguments about the trustworthiness of sources. The advantage of
adopting meta-argumentation is that we do not extend Dung’s framework in order to introduce trust but
we instantiate his theory with meta-arguments. For a further discussion about meta-argumentation, see
Villata [307].
The sources are introduced into the argumentation framework under the form of meta-arguments of the
kind “agent i is trustable”. An attack to the trustworthiness of a source is modeled as an attack to the
meta-argument “agent i is trustable”. Similarly, in meta-argumentation, both arguments and attacks are
represented as meta-arguments, thus allowing arguments to attack attacks.
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Each source motivates the information items it proposes via meta-arguments which represent the need
of evidence to make an argument acceptable. Each argument simply “put on the table” is considered unac-
ceptable if no sources provide an evidence motivating it by being considered trustable. We show that the
property such that an argument which is not motivated by evidence is not accepted holds in our model.
The information sources propose information items, i.e., arguments, and attacks among these arguments.
An attack to the trustworthiness of an item or an attack is modeled as an attack in the meta-level to the
evidence provided by the source for that item. We prove that in our model it holds that if there is only one
untrustworthy source showing evidence in favor of an argument then this argument cannot be accepted.
The feedback from the sources to the information items and back is modeled again by introducing new
meta-arguments, and the attacks among them. These meta-arguments model a sort of threshold such that if
a number of attackers of the information items proposed by a source are accepted, i.e., trustable, thus the
attacked source cannot be considered trustworthy.
Finally, the two dimensions of sincerity and competence are modeled using a meta-argument of the
kind “a is believed by source i” representing the fact that argument a is believed by the source, and thus
the source is sincere in proposing a. This meta-argument supports the “real” meta-argument which models
argument a in the meta-level. An attack towards the source’s sincerity is modeled as an attack towards the
meta-argument representing the believed argument while an attack to the competence is directed towards
the motivation the “believed” meta-argument provides to the “content” meta-argument. We show that in our
model it holds that if a trustworthy source attacks the trustworthiness of argument, then the extensions are
the same if it attacks the sincerity or the competence about the argument.
Note that we do not claim that argumentation is the only way to model trust, but we underline that,
when the sources argue, they are strongly influenced by the trustworthiness they assign to the other sources.
Moreover, we do not assign a numerical value associated to trust, because we are more interested in reason-
ing about the motivations of the sources, e.g., in the case of Witness1 we have that he explains that he does
not believe a and that this is due to argument b. Finally, we do not treat converging and diverging beliefs
sources, and the source’s subjective uncertainty [90]. This is left as future work.
Meta-argumentation
Meta-argumentation instantiates Dung’s theory with meta-arguments, such that Dung’s theory is used to
reason about itself [53, 54, 307]. Meta-argumentation is a particular way to define mappings from argumen-
tation frameworks to extended argumentation frameworks: arguments are interpreted as meta-arguments,
of which some are mapped to “argument a is accepted”, acc(a), where a is an abstract argument from the
extended argumentation framework (EAF). Moreover, auxiliary arguments are introduced to represent, for
example, attacks, so that, by being arguments themselves, they can be attacked or attack other arguments.
The meta-argumentation methodology is summarized in Figure 1.
Like Baroni and Giacomin [15], we use a function E mapping an argumentation framework 〈Ar,→〉 to
its set of extensions, i.e., to a set of sets of arguments. Since they do not give a name to the function E , and
it maps argumentation frameworks to the set of accepted arguments, we call E the acceptance function.
Definition 42. Let U be the universe of arguments. An acceptance function E : 2U × 2U ×U → 22U is
a partial function which is defined for each argumentation framework 〈Ar,→〉 with finite Ar ⊆ U and
→⊆ Ar×Ar, and maps an argumentation framework 〈Ar,→〉 to sets of subsets of Ar: E (〈Ar,→〉)⊆ 2Ar.
The function f assigns to each argument a in the EAF , a meta-argument “argument a is accepted” in
the basic argumentation framework. The function f−1 instantiates an AF with an EAF . We use Dung’s









Figure 3.1: The meta-argumentation methodology workflow.
acceptance functions E to find functions E ′ between EAFs and the acceptable arguments AA′ they re-
turn. The acceptable arguments of the meta-argumentation framework are a function of the extended ar-
gumentation framework: AA′ = E ′(EAF). The transformation function consists of two parts: the func-
tion f−1, transforming an argumentation framework to an extended argumentation framework, and a func-
tion g which transforms the acceptable arguments of the argumentation framework into acceptable argu-
ments of the extended argumentation framework. Summarizing, E ′ = {( f−1(a),g(b)) | (a,b) ∈ E } and
AA′ = E ′(EAF) = g(AA) = g(E (AF)) = g(E ( f (EAF))).
The first step of the meta-argumentation approach is to define the set of extended argumentation frame-
works. The second step consists of defining flattening algorithms as a function from this set of EAFs to the
set of all basic AF : f : EAF → AF . The inverse of the flattening is the instantiation of the argumentation
framework. See [54, 307] for further details. We define an EAF as a set of partial argumentation frameworks
of the sources 〈Ar,〈Ar1,→1〉, . . . ,〈Arn,→n〉,→〉 [116].
Definition 43. An extended argumentation framework (EAF) is a tuple
〈Ar,〈Ar1,→1〉, . . . ,〈Arn,→n〉,→〉 where for each source 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Ari ⊆ Ar ⊆ U is a set of arguments,
→ is a binary attack relation on Ar×Ar, and →i is a binary relation on Ari×Ari. The universe of meta-
arguments is MU = {acc(a) | a ∈ U } ∪ {Xa,b,Ya,b | a,b ∈ U }, where Xa,b,Ya,b are the meta-arguments
corresponding to the attack a→ b. The flattening function f is given by f (EAF) = 〈MA, 7−→〉, where MA
is the set of meta-arguments and 7−→ is the meta-attack relation. For a set of arguments B⊆MU , the unflat-
tening function g is given by g(B) = {a | acc(a) ∈ B}, and for sets of subsets of arguments AA⊆ 2MU , it is
given by g(AA) = {g(B) | B ∈ AA}.
Given an acceptance function E for an AF , the extensions of accepted arguments of an EAF are given by
E ′(EAF) = g(E ( f (EAF))). The derived acceptance function E ′ of the EAF is thus E ′ = {( f−1(a),g(b)) |
(a,b) ∈ E }. We say that the source i provides evidence in support of argument a when a ∈ Ari, and that the
source i supports the attack a→ b when a→ b ∈→i.
Note that the union of all the Ari does not produce Ar because Ar contains also those arguments which
are not supported by the sources, and are just “put on the table”. Definition 44 presents the instantiation of
a basic argumentation framework as a set of partial argumentation frameworks of the sources using meta-
argumentation.
Definition 44. Given an EAF = 〈Ar,〈Ar1,→1〉, . . . ,〈Arn,→n〉,→〉 where for each source 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Ari ⊆
Ar ⊆U is a set of arguments,→⊆ Ar×Ar, and→i⊆ Ari×Ari is a binary relation over Ari. MA⊆MU is
{acc(a) | a ∈ Ar1 ∪ . . . ∪ Arn}, and 7−→⊆MA×MA is a binary relation on MA such that:
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acc(a) 7−→ Xa,b,Xa,b 7−→ Ya,b,Ya,b 7−→ acc(b) if and only if there is a source 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that a,b ∈ Ari
and a→ b ∈→i.
Intuitively, the Xa,b auxiliary argument means that the attack a→ b is “inactive”, and the Ya,b auxil-
iary argument means that the attack is “active”. An argument of an EAF is acceptable if and only if it is
acceptable in the flattened argumentation framework.
Modelling trust in meta-argumentation
In this section, we formally define our cognitive model of trust using meta-argumentation. Using the running
example described in the introduction, we show how the model can be used to formally model it, and we
present some desired properties of our model.
Information sources. The reason why abstract argumentation is not suited to model trust is that an ar-
gument, if it is not attacked by another acceptable argument, is considered acceptable. This prevents us
from modeling the situation where, for an argument to be acceptable, it must be related to some trusted
sources which provide the evidence for such an argument to be accepted. Without an explicit representation
of the sources, it becomes impossible to talk about trust: the argument can only be attacked by conflicting
information, but it cannot be made unacceptable due to the lack of trust in the source.
Modelling evidence is another challenge: sources are a particular type of evidence. Arguments need-
ing evidence are well known in legal argumentation, where the notion of burden of proof has been intro-
duced [156]. Meta-argumentation provides a means to model burden of proof in abstract argumentation
without extending argumentation. The idea is to associate to each argument a∈ Ar put on the table, which is
represented by means of meta-argument acc(a), an auxiliary argument Wacc(a) attacking it. Being auxiliary
this argument is filtered out during the unflattening process. This means that without further information,
just as being “put on the table”, argument a is not acceptable since it is attacked by the acceptable argument
Wacc(a), and there is no evidence defending it against this “default” attack, as visualized in Figure 3.2 for
arguments a and b. In the figures, we represent the meta-arguments associated to the information sources as
boxes, and the arguments as circles where grey elements are the acceptable ones. This evidence is modeled
by means of the attacks towards these auxiliary arguments, e.g., Wacc(a), leading to a reinstatement of meta-
argument acc(a). Attacks are modeled as arguments as well, so they need evidence to be acceptable. For





Figure 3.2: Arguments and attacks without evidence.
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Sources are introduced in the meta-argumentation framework under the form of meta-arguments “source
s is trustable”, trust(s), for all the sources s. Each argument a in the sources’ mind is motivated by means
of an attack on Wacc(a). We represent the fact that one or more information sources provide evidence for the
same argument by letting them attack the same Wacc(a) auxiliary argument. An example of multiple evidence









Figure 3.3: An example of multiple evidence.
Notice that the assumption that there must be evidence for an argument to be accepted is a very general
and often used reasoning pattern, e.g., in causal reasoning, where everything needs to be explained, i.e., to
have a cause / to be caused, as in the Yale shooting problem for instance. For more details about causal
reasoning, see Bochman [52].
We have now to discuss which semantics we adopt for assessing the acceptability of the arguments
and the sources. For example, suppose that two sources claim they are each untrustworthy. What is the
extension? We adopt admissibility based semantics, i.e., Γ ∈ Eadmiss(AF). We do not ask for completeness
because if one wants to know whether a particular argument is acceptable, the whole model is not needed,
just the part related to this particular argument is needed.
The reader should not be confused by the similarity between evidence and support [55]. The meaning
of Boella et al. [55]’s notion of support is that if argument a is acceptable then argument b is acceptable too.
Note that the supported argument b is acceptable (if not attacked) even without the support of a, i.e., a is not
acceptable. Support exploits an auxiliary argument Z, but with some difference with the auxiliary argument
W . First, given a supporting b, there is a Za,b such that b attacks Za,b and Za,b attacks a, while, here, Wacc(a)
attacks the argument needing evidence. Second, there is a Z meta-argument for each supporting argument,
while, here, there is only one W meta-argument attacked by all the arguments and agents giving an evidence.
For more details about this model of support in argumentation, see Boella et al. [55].
We extend the definition of EAF (Definition 43) by adding evidence provided by the information sources
and second-order attacks, such as attacks from an argument or attack to another attack. For more details
about second-order attacks in meta-argumentation, see [230, 54]. The unflattening function g and the accep-
tance function E ′ are defined as above.
Definition 45. A trust-based extended argumentation framework T EAF2 with second-order attacks is a
tuple 〈Ar,〈Ar1,→1,→21〉, . . . ,〈Arn,→n,→2n〉,→〉 where for each source 1≤ i≤ n, Ari ⊆ Ar ⊆U is a set of
arguments,→⊆ Ar×Ar,→i is a binary relation on Ari×Ari,→2i is a binary relation on (Ari∪→i)×→i.
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Definition 46 presents the instantiation of a T EAF2 with second-order attacks as a set of partial frame-
works of the sources using meta-argumentation.
Definition 46. Given a T EAF2 = 〈Ar,〈Ar1,→1,→21〉 . . . ,〈Arn,→n,→2n〉,→〉, the set of meta-arguments MA
is {trust(i) | 1≤ i≤ n}∪{acc(a) | a ∈ Ar1∪ . . .∪Arn}∪{Xa,b,Ya,b | a,b ∈ Ar1∪ . . .∪Arn}∪{Wacc(a) | a ∈
Ar1∪ . . .∪Arn} and 7−→⊆MA×MA is a binary relation on MA such that:
• acc(a) 7−→Xa,b iff a,b∈Ari and a→i b, and Xa,b 7−→Ya,b iff a,b∈Ari and a→i b, and Ya,b 7−→ acc(b)
iff a,b ∈ Ari and a→i b, and
• trust(i) 7−→Wacc(a) iff a ∈ Ari, and Wacc(a) 7−→ acc(a) iff a ∈ Ar, and
• trust(i) 7−→WYa,b iff a,b ∈ Ari and a→i b, and WYa,b 7−→ Ya,b iff a,b ∈ Ari and a→i b, and
• acc(a) 7−→ Xa,b→c iff a,b,c ∈ Ari and a →2i (b →i c), and Xa,b→c 7−→ Ya,b→c iff a,b,c ∈ Ari and
a→2i (b→i c), and Ya,b→c 7−→ Yb,c iff a,b,c ∈ Ari and a→2i (b→i c), and
• Ya,b 7−→ Yc,d iff a,b,c ∈ Ari and (a→i b)→2i (c→i d).
We say that source i is trustworthy when meta-argument trust(i) is acceptable, and we say that i provides








Figure 3.4: Introducing the sources in the argumentation frameworks.
Example 23. Consider the informal dialogue provided in the introduction. We represent the sources in
the argumentation framework, as shown in Figure 3.4. Witness1 proposes a and b and the attack a→ b.
Using the flattening function of Definition 46, we add meta-argument trust(1) for representing Witness1 in
the framework, and we add meta-arguments acc(a) and acc(b) for the arguments of Witness1. Witness1
provides evidence for these arguments, and the attack b→ a by attacking the respective auxiliary arguments
W . In the remainder of the chapter, we model the other conflicts highlighted in the dialogue.
Let trust(i) be the information source i and acc(a) and Ya,b the argument a ∈ Ari and the attack a→
b ∈→i respectively, as defined in Definitions 43 and 44. Meta-argument trust(i) can provide evidence for
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acc(a) and Ya,b. Sources can attack other sources as well as their arguments and attacks. With a slight abuse
of notation, we write a ∈ E ′(EAF), even if the latter is a set of extensions, with the intended meaning that a
is in some of the extensions of E ′. We now provide some properties of our model.
Proposition 16. If an argument a ∈ Ar is not motivated by evidence, i.e., a 6∈ Ari for all i, then a is not
accepted, a 6∈ E ′(EAF).
Proof. We assume admissibility based semantics. We prove the contrapositive: if argument a is accepted,
then argument a is motivated by evidence. Assume argument a is accepted. Then auxiliary argument Wacc(a)
is rejected due to the conflict-free principle. Meta-argument acc(a) is defended, so Wacc(a) is attacked by
an accepted argument using admissible semantics. Auxiliary argument Wacc(a) can only be attacked by
meta-argument trust(i). We conclude that a is motivated by evidence.
Proposition 16 is strengthened to Proposition 17.
Proposition 17. If there is no evidence for argument a, a 6∈ Ari, then the extensions E ′(EAF) are precisely
the same as the extensions of an EAF in which a 6∈ Ar, and where there are no attacks on or by a, i.e., there
is no argument b attacking argument a and there is no argument c attacked by argument a.
Proof. We assume admissibility based semantics. Assume argument a is not motivated by evidence. This
means that meta-argument Wacc(a) is accepted, and meta-argument acc(a) is rejected. Assume there exist an
argument b such that b attacks a, b→ a, and an argument c such that a attacks c, a→ c. We prove that the
extensions of the EAF with argument a are precisely the same as the extensions of the AF in which a does
not exist, and there are no attacks on or by a. We use case analysis.
Case 1 Assume arguments b and c are not attacked, or they are attacked by unaccepted arguments. Then, we
have that meta-argument acc(b) is accepted and meta-argument Yb,a is accepted, and meta-argument
acc(c) is accepted, meta-argument Xa,c is accepted, Ya,c is rejected, and acc(a) is rejected due to the
conflict-free principle because it is attacked by the accepted meta-argument Wacc(a). The extension of
this EAF includes b and c, but it does not include a.
Case 2 Assume arguments b and c are attacked by accepted arguments. Then, we have that meta-argument
acc(b) is rejected and meta-argument Yb,a is rejected, meta-argument acc(c) is rejected, meta-argument
Xa,c is accepted, Ya,c is rejected, and acc(a) is rejected due to the conflict-free principle. The extension
of this EAF does not include a, b, and c.
Case 3 Assume argument b is not attacked or it is attacked by unaccepted arguments, and c is attacked by
accepted arguments. Then, we have that meta-argument acc(b) is accepted and meta-argument Yb,a
is accepted, meta-argument acc(c) is rejected, meta-argument Xa,c is accepted, Ya,c is rejected, and
acc(a) is not accepted due to the conflict-free principle. The extension of this EAF includes b, but it
does not include a and c.
Case 4 Assume argument b is attacked by accepted arguments and c is not attacked or it is attacked by
unaccepted arguments. Then, we have that meta-argument acc(b) is rejected and meta-argument Yb,a
is rejected, meta-argument acc(c) is accepted, meta-argument Xa,c is accepted, Ya,c is rejected, and
acc(a) is rejected due to the conflict-free principle. The extension of this EAF includes c, but it does
not include a and b.
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Now we consider the same EAF without argument a, such that the attacks b→ a and a→ c do not exist.
Case 1 Assume arguments b and c are not attacked, or they are attacked by unaccepted arguments. Then,
we have that meta-argument acc(b) is accepted and meta-argument acc(c) is accepted too. Each
extension of this AF includes b and c.
Case 2 Assume arguments b and c are attacked by accepted arguments. Then, we have that meta-argument
acc(b) is rejected due to the conflict-free principle, and meta-argument acc(c) is rejected too. Each
extension of this AF does not include b, and c.
Case 3 Assume argument b is not attacked or it is attacked by unaccepted arguments, and c is attacked
by accepted arguments. Then, we have that meta-argument acc(b) is accepted, and meta-argument
acc(c) is rejected due to the conflict-free principle. Each extension of this AF includes b, but it does
not include c.
Case 4 Assume argument b is attacked by accepted arguments and c is not attacked or it is attacked by
unaccepted arguments. Then, we have that meta-argument acc(b) is rejected due to the conflict-free
principle, and meta-argument acc(c) is accepted. Each extension of this AF includes c, but it does not
include b.
Thus, the extensions of the EAF including argument a without evidence, and the EAF not including
argument a are the same.
Proposition 18. If there is no evidence for attack a→ b, i.e., a→ b 6∈→i, then the extensions E ′(EAF) are
precisely the same as the extensions of the EAF , in which the attack does not exist, a→ b 6∈→.
The proof of Proposition 18 follows the proof of Proposition 17.
Proposition 19. Assume EAF is a framework in which argument a is motivated by evidence by the trust-
worthy source i, and there is another trustworthy source j. In that case, the extensions are the same if also j
provides an evidence for a.
Proof. We assume admissibility based semantics. Assume argument a is motivated by evidence by the
trustworthy source i. This means that trust(i) is accepted. It provides evidence for argument a which means
that meta-argument trust(i) attacks meta-argument Wacc(a): meta-argument trust(i) is accepted, thus meta-
argument Xtrust(i),Wacc(a) is rejected, meta-argument Ytrust(i),Wacc(a) is accepted and meta-argument Wacc(a) is
rejected. Thus, meta-argument acc(a) is accepted. We use case analysis.
Case 1 : Let argument a not be attacked or be attacked by unaccepted arguments. This means that meta-
argument acc(a) is accepted, and argument a is part of each extension of the EAF .
Case 2 : Let argument a be attacked by accepted arguments. This means that meta-argument acc(a) is
rejected, and argument a is not part of the extensions of the EAF .
Assume there is another trustworthy source j. This means that meta-argument trust( j) is accepted. This
source provides evidence for argument a, too. This means that trust( j) attacks meta-argument Wacc(a): meta-
argument trust( j) is accepted, thus meta-argument Xtrust( j),Wacc(a) is rejected, meta-argument Ytrust( j),Wacc(a) is
accepted and meta-argument Wacc(a) is rejected. Thus, meta-argument acc(a) is accepted. We use case
analysis.
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Case 1 : Let argument a not be attacked or be attacked by unaccepted arguments. This means that meta-
argument acc(a) is accepted, and argument a is part of each extension of the EAF .
Case 2 : Let argument a be attacked by accepted arguments. This means that meta-argument acc(a) is
rejected, and argument a is not part of the extensions of the EAF .
Thus, the extensions of the EAF are the same if there is also another source j, in addition to i, motivating
by evidence argument a.
Evidence for arguments. The evidence in favor of the arguments is an evidence provided by the agents
for the arguments/attacks they propose. At the meta-level, this is modeled as an attack from meta-argument
trust(i) to W auxiliary arguments. However, there are other cases in which more evidence is necessary to
motivate the acceptability of an argument. Consider the case of Witness1. His trustworthiness is attacked
by Witness2. What happens to the evidence provided by Witness1? Since the source is not trustworthy
then it cannot provide evidence. Meta-argument trust(1) becomes rejected and the same happens to all its
arguments and attacks. What is needed to make them acceptable again is more evidence. This evidence
can be provided under the form of another argument which reinstates the acceptability of these information
items.
Definition 46 allows only the sources to directly provide evidence for the information items. As for
Witness5 and Witness6 in the dialogue, sources can provide evidence also by means of other arguments.
This cannot be represented using the extended argumentation framework of Definition 46, this is why we
need to extend it with an evidence relation # representing evidence provided under the form of arguments
for the information items of the other sources.
Definition 47. A T EAF2 with evidence is a tuple 〈Ar,〈Ar1,→1,→21,#1〉, . . . ,
〈Arn,→n,→2n,#n〉,→〉 where #i is a binary relation on Ari×Ar j and the set of meta-arguments MA is
{trust(i) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}∪ {acc(a) | a ∈ Ar1 ∪ . . .∪Arn}∪ {Xa,b,Ya,b | a,b ∈ Ar1 ∪ . . .∪Arn}∪ {Wacc(a) | a ∈
Ar1 ∪ . . .∪Arn} and 7−→⊆ MA×MA is a binary relation on MA such that hold the conditions of Defini-
tion 46, and: acc(a) 7−→Wacc(b) iff a ∈ Ari,b ∈ Ar j and a #i b, and Wacc(b) 7−→ acc(b) iff a ∈ Ari,b ∈ Ar j
and a #i b.
We say that a source i provides evidence in favor of the evidence provided by other source j to argument
a when a ∈ Ari,b ∈ Ar j, and acc(a) 7−→Wacc(b).
The following properties hold for Definition 47.
Proposition 20. If there are multiple arguments a1 ∈ Ar1, . . . ,an ∈ Arn motivating by evidence an argument
b∈ Ark (or an attack), and there are no attacks on the arguments, c1→ a1 6∈→1, . . . ,cn→ an 6∈→n, then b (or
the attack) is accepted, b ∈ E ′(EAF), iff at least one of the sources motivating by evidence the arguments
a1, . . . ,an is trustworthy, i.e., trust( j) ∈ E ( f (EAF)) with j ∈ 1, . . . ,n.
Proof. Assume argument b is not directly motivated by evidence by an information source or the source
supporting it is untrustworthy, and assume admissibility based semantics. This means that meta-argument
Wacc(b) is accepted, and meta-argument acc(b) is rejected due to the conflict-free principle. Assume now
that argument b is not attacked by other arguments, or it is attacked by unaccepted arguments, and assume
there are n arguments a1, . . . ,an motivating by evidence argument b. Assume there not exist argument ci
such that it attacks ai, and ci is accepted.
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First, we show that if there is at least one trustworthy source proposing an argument ai which provides
evidence for argument b, then b is accepted. This means that trust(i) is accepted for 1≤ i≥ n. Then Wacc(ai)
is rejected, and acc(a) is accepted, Wacc(b) is rejected and acc(b) is accepted.
Now, we show that if argument b is accepted then there is at least one trustworthy source motivating it by
evidence through argument ai. This means that acc(b) is accepted, and Wacc(b) is not accepted. Thus there is
at least on Yacc(ai),Wacc(b) which is accepted. This means that acc(ai) is accepted, and trust(i) is accepted.
Proposition 21. Suppose two sources i and j provide evidence through arguments b and c respectively for
the same argument a, i.e., b # a ∈#i and c # a ∈# j, then it is the same whether a trustworthy source k
provides evidence in favor of the evidence provided by i or j, i.e., d ∈ Ark.
Proof. Assume source k is trustworthy and assume admissibility based semantics. Source k provides ev-
idence for argument d. Assume there are no other attacks on d. This means that meta-argument trust(k)
attacks meta-argument Wacc(d) and Wacc(d) attacks meta-argument acc(d). The accepted meta-arguments are
acc(d) and trust(k). We use case analysis.
Case 1 : Let the sources i and j be trustworthy, and let their arguments not be attacked by other arguments.
This means that meta-arguments trust(i) and trust( j) are accepted, meta-arguments acc(b) and acc(c)
are accepted and meta-argument acc(a) is accepted. The evidence of source k through argument
d consists in an attack from meta-argument acc(d) to meta-argument Wacc(b) or to meta-argument
Wacc(c). Both these meta-arguments are rejected because of the attacks from trust(i) and trust( j),
respectively.
Case 2 : Let the sources i and j be untrustworthy, and let their arguments not be attacked by other argu-
ments. This means that meta-arguments trust(i) and trust( j) are rejected. Thus, meta-arguments
acc(b) and acc(c) are rejected. The evidence provided through argument d by source k consists in
an attack from meta-argument acc(d) to meta-argument Wacc(b) or Wacc(c). Independently on which
meta-argument is attacked, this means that meta-argument acc(b) or meta-argument acc(c) is ac-
cepted, meta-argument Wacc(a) is rejected, and meta-argument acc(a) is accepted.
Case 3 : Let source i (or j) be trustworthy and source j (or i) be untrustworthy, and let their arguments not be
attacked by other arguments. This means that meta-argument trust(i) is accepted and meta-argument
trust( j) is rejected, meta-argument Wacc(b) is accepted and meta-argument Wacc(c) is rejected, meta-
argument acc(b) is accepted and meta-argument acc(c) is rejected. Thus meta-argument Wacc(a) is
not accepted and meta-argument acc(a) is accepted. The evidence provided through argument d
to argument a does not change if meta-argument acc(d) attacks meta-argument Wacc(b) or Wacc(c),
because meta-argument Wacc(a) is attacked by both acc(b) and acc(c). We conclude that argument a
is accepted independently from the evidence provided by argument d.
Example 24. Consider the dialogue in the introduction. Argument g by Witness6 is an evidence for ar-
gument f by Witness5. This evidence is expressed in meta-argumentation in the same way as evidence
provided by the sources, such as an attack to Wacc( f ) attacking acc( f ). In this case, it is meta-argument
acc(g) which attacks Wacc( f ), as visualized in Figure 3.5.











Figure 3.5: Introducing evidence for the arguments.
Focused trust relationships. In our model, trust is represented as the absence of an attack towards the
sources or towards their information items, and as the presence of evidence in favor of the pieces of infor-
mation. On the contrary, the distrust relationship is modeled as a lack of evidence in favor of the information
items or as a direct attack towards the sources and their pieces of information.
In the informal dialogue, Witness2 attacks the trustworthiness of Witness1 as a credible witness. In this
way, she is attacking each argument and attack proposed by Witness1. Witness4, instead, is not arguing
against Witness3 but she is arguing against the attack d → b as it is proposed by Witness3. Finally, for
Witness2 the untrustworthiness of Witness6 is related only to the argument g. We propose a focused view of
trust in which the information sources may be attacked for being untrustworthy or for being untrustworthy
only concerning a particular argument or attack. Definition 48 presents an EAF in which a new relation DT
between sources is given to represent distrust.
Definition 48. A trust-based extended argumentation framework DT EAF2 is a tuple 〈Ar,〈Ar1,→1,→21,#1
,DT1〉, . . . ,〈Arn,→n,→2n,#n,DTn〉,→〉where for each source 1≤ i≤ n, Ari⊆Ar⊆U is a set of arguments,
→⊆ Ar×Ar,→i⊆ Ari×Ari is a binary relation,→2i is a binary relation on (Ari∪→i)×→i, #i is a binary
relation on Ari×Ar j, and DT ⊆ Ari×ϑ is a binary relation such that ϑ = j or ϑ ∈ Ar j or ϑ ∈→ j.
Definition 49 shows how to instantiate a DT EAF2 enriched with a distrust relation with meta-arguments.
In particular, the last three points of Definition 49 model, respectively, a distrust relationship towards an
agent, a distrust relationship towards an argument, and a distrust relationship towards an attack. The unflat-
tening function g and the acceptance function E ′ are defined as above.
Definition 49. Given a DT EAF2 = 〈Ar,〈Ar1,→1,→21,#1,DT1〉, . . . ,
〈Arn,→n,→2n,#n,DTn〉,→〉, see Definition 48, the set of meta-arguments MA is {trust(i) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}∪
{acc(a) | a ∈ Ar1 ∪ . . .∪ Arn} ∪ {Xa,b,Ya,b | a,b ∈ Ar1 ∪ . . .∪ Arn} ∪ {Wacc(a) | a ∈ Ar1 ∪ . . .∪ Arn} and
7−→⊆MA×MA is a binary relation on MA such that hold the conditions of Definitions 46 and 47, and:
• acc(a) 7−→Xa,b iff a,b∈Ari and a→i b, and Xa,b 7−→Ya,b iff a,b∈Ari and a→i b, and Ya,b 7−→ acc(b)
iff a,b ∈ Ari and a→i b, and
• trust(i) 7−→Xtrust(i),Wacc(a) iff a∈Ari, and Xtrust(i),Wacc(a) 7−→Ytrust(i),Wacc(a) iff a∈Ari, and Ytrust(i),Wacc(a) 7−→
Wacc(a) iff a ∈ Ari, and Wacc(a) 7−→ acc(a) iff a ∈ Ari, and
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• trust(i) 7−→ Xtrust(i),WYa,b iff a,b ∈ Ari and a→i b, and Xtrust(i),WYa,b 7−→ Ytrust(i),WYa,b iff a,b ∈ Ari and
a→i b, and Ytrust(i),WYa,b 7−→WYa,b iff a,b ∈ Ari and a→i b, and WYa,b 7−→Ya,b iff a,b ∈ Ari and a→i b,
and
• trust(i) 7−→Wacc(a) iff a ∈ Ari and aDTitrust( j), and Wacc(a) 7−→ acc(a) iff a ∈ Ar and aDTitrust( j),
and acc(a) 7−→ Xacc(a),trust( j) iff a ∈ Ari and aDTitrust( j), and Xacc(a),trust( j) 7−→ Yacc(a),trust( j) iff a ∈
Ari and aDTitrust( j), and Yacc(a),trust( j) 7−→ trust( j) iff a ∈ Ari and aDTitrust( j), and
• trust(i) 7−→Wacc(a) iff a ∈ Ari,b ∈ Ar j and aDTib, and Wacc(a) 7−→ acc(a) iff a ∈ Ar,b ∈ Ar j and
aDTib, and acc(a) 7−→ Xacc(a),Ytrust( j),Wacc(b) iff a ∈ Ari,b ∈ Ar j and aDTib, and Xacc(a),Ytrust( j),Wacc(b) 7−→
Yacc(a),Ytrust( j),Wacc(b) iff a∈Ari,b∈Ar j and aDTib, and Yacc(a),Ytrust( j),Wacc(b) 7−→Ytrust( j),Wacc(b) iff a∈Ari,b∈
Ar j and aDTib, and
• trust(i) 7−→Wacc(a) iff a ∈ Ari,b,c ∈ Ar j and aDTi(b→ j c), and Wacc(a) 7−→ acc(a) iff a ∈ Ar,b,c ∈
Ar j and aDTi(b→ j c), and acc(a) 7−→ Xacc(a),Ytrust( j),WYb,c
iff a ∈ Ari,b,c ∈ Ar j and aDTi(b→ j c), and
Xacc(a),Ytrust( j),WYb,c
7−→Yacc(a),Ytrust( j),WYb,c
iff a∈Ari,b,c∈Ar j and aDTi(b→ j c), and Yacc(a),Ytrust( j),WYb,c
7−→
Ytrust( j),WYb,c iff a ∈ Ari,b,c ∈ Ar j and aDTi(b→ j c).
We say that a source j is untrustworthy when there is an attack from an argument a∈Ari to j, aDTitrust( j).
We say that an argument a ∈ Ar j or attack a→ j b ∈→ j is untrustworthy when there is an attack from an
argument c ∈ Ari to a or a→ j b, cDTia or cDTi(a→ j b).
Proposition 22. Assume that source i is the only source motivating by evidence argument a ∈ Ari and
attack c→ b ∈→i. If the information source i is considered to be untrustworthy, then a and c→ b are not
acceptable.
Proof. We assume admissibility based semantics. We prove the contrapositive: if the arguments and attacks
supported by an information source i are acceptable then the information source i is considered to be trust-
worthy. Assume the source supports argument a and the attack c→ b and assume that this argument and
this attack are acceptable. Then auxiliary arguments Wacc(a) and WYc,b are rejected due to the conflict-free
principle. Meta-arguments acc(a) and Yc,b are defended, thus Wacc(a) and WYc,b are attacked by an acceptable
argument, using admissible semantics. We assumed that this argument and this attack have no other evi-
dence, so auxiliary arguments Wacc(a) and WYc,b can only be attacked by meta-argument trust(i). Since they
are attacked by an acceptable argument, we conclude that the source i is acceptable.
Example 25. Figure 3.6.a shows that Witness2 attacks the trustworthiness of Witness1 by means of ar-
gument c. In meta-argumentation, we have that trust(2) provides evidence for acc(c) by attacking meta-
argument Wacc(c) and, with meta-arguments X ,Y , it attacks trust(1). This means that if Witness1 is untrust-
worthy then each of his arguments and attacks cannot be acceptable either, if there is no more evidence. The
set of acceptable arguments for the meta-argumentation framework is E ( f ( f ocus1)) = {trust(2),acc(c),
Yacc(c),trust(1)}. In Figure 3.6.b-c, instead, the attack is directed against a precise information item pro-
vided by the source. In particular, Witness4 attacks the attack d → b as provided by Witness3. This is
achieved in meta-argumentation by means of an attack from meta-argument acc(e), for which trust(4) pro-
vides evidence, to the attack characterized by auxiliary argument Yd,b. The set of acceptable arguments is
E ( f ( f ocus2)) = {trust(4), trust(3),acc(d),acc(e),acc(b),Yacc(e),Ytrust(3),WYb,d
,WYd,b}. Witness3’s attack d →















































Figure 3.6: Focused trust in argumentation.
b is evaluated as untrustworthy by Witness4 and thus it is not acceptable. Finally, Witness2 evaluates
Witness6 as untrustworthy concerning argument g. In meta-argumentation, trust(2), by means of meta-
argument acc(h), attacks meta-argument acc(g) proposed by trust(6). The set of acceptable arguments is
E ( f ( f ocus3)) = {trust(2), trust(6),acc(h),Yacc(h),Ytrust(6),Wacc(g) ,Wacc(g)}.
CHAPTER 3. REASONING ABOUT TRUST THROUGH ARGUMENTATION 85
Feedback from information items to sources and back. In the previous sections, we have introduced
the information sources in the argumentation framework in order to deal with the conflicts about trust.
Moreover, in our framework, the agents are allowed to attack the trustworthiness of the other information
sources or the trustworthiness of the single information items the sources propose. The relation, concerning
trust, among the sources and the arguments or attacks they motivate is in one direction only. In particular, if
an agent is considered to be untrustworthy, then also all the information items proposed by such an agent are
considered untrustworthy. But what happens to the trustworthiness of an agent which is not directly attacked
but it has all its information items (or at least n information items) attacked? In the current framework, these
attacked items do not effect the trustworthiness of the sources proposing them, e.g., if a source has the
trustworthiness of all its information items attacked, the source’s trustworthiness is accepted.
The idea proposed by Castelfranchi and Falcone [90] is that there is a bidirectional link between the
source and its information items: the provided data is more or less believable on the basis of the source’s
trustworthiness, but there is feedback such that the invalidation of the data feeds back on the sources’ cred-
ibility. The overall amount and sign (increment or decrement) of the feedback depends on how much the
overall quality of the message surprises the agent, with respect to its prior assessment of the source trustwor-
thiness. This captures the principle that information quality should change one’s assessment of its source
only when the agent learns something new about the capacity of the source to deliver information of either
high or low quality. In other words, there should be a feedback on the source only when the quality of its
argument tells me something new about the source’s trustworthiness, revealing my previous opinion to be
wrong. Otherwise, the quality of the new argument just confirms my previous assessment of the source, and
confirmation, by definition, consolidates a pre-existing judgment, rather than modifying it. This points to
the role of prediction in feedback dynamics from arguments to sources, and this prediction is based on the
pre-existing degree of trustworthiness of the source of a given argument. In this chapter, we do not represent
the increment of the feedback towards the information source. In our framework, a trustworthy source is
mirrored in an accepted meta-argument of the kind trust(i), and this acceptability cannot be improved. The
representation of this kind of feedback would be possible in numerical approaches to trust representation in














e.g., maximum number 




Figure 3.7: Feedback between the information items and sources.
In this section, we rely on this analysis of the trust dynamics phenomenon, in order to model the feedback
from the information items to the sources. For instance, the fact that the major part of the arguments of
a source are considered untrustworthy is seen as a negative experience, and leads to the decrease of the
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trustworthiness of the sources itself. In this chapter, we do not consider the unpredictable cases analyzed by
Castelfranchi and Falcone [90], where trust decreases with positive experiences, and increases with negative
ones. The representation of these cases is left as future work.
We introduce the feedback from the information items to the sources, in such a way that, following
different criteria, the untrustworthiness of the items influences the trustworthiness of its source. The general
idea of our approach is visualized in Figure 3.7. First, we insert in the framework a pattern which is activated
if the number of attacks to this pattern exceeds a certain threshold. In this case, the pattern activates an
attack towards the meta-argument representing the information source. The activation pattern is visualized
in Figure 3.8, and it comes from the idea of conjunctive and proof standard patterns defined by Villata et
al. [308]. The arguments attacking the information items proposed by the source attack also the pattern, in
particular, each argument arg attacking the items attacks also one of the X meta-arguments of the pattern.
These meta-arguments conjunctively attack argument s, which attacks the meta-argument representing the












Figure 3.8: The activation pattern with a threshold of n arguments.
Second, for each attack to the trustworthiness of one of the information items of a source, this attack is
duplicated and it is addressed also towards the pattern which attacks the information source. Summarizing,
every attack to the arguments or attacks of a source is addressed also towards the pattern which has the aim
to attack directly the trustworthiness of the source, if the number of attack exceeds the given threshold.
Example 26. Let us consider now the example proposed in Figure 3.7. In the informal dialogue, Wit-
ness1 proposes two arguments a and b, and the attack between them. Consider now the introduction of
a new argument n, which attacks the trustworthiness of argument b as proposed by Witness1. In the flat-
tened framework, the meta-argument trust(1) provides evidence for meta-arguments acc(a) and acc(b) by
attacking the auxiliary arguments Wacc(a) and Wacc(b). The attack of the new argument is addressed from
meta-argument acc(n) to the auxiliary argument YWacc(b) which attacks Wacc(b). Since we are interested in
modeling also the feedback from the information items to the sources, we add an additional attack from
meta-argument acc(n) to the pattern we use to measure the number of attacks to the information items pro-
posed by Witness1. From this pattern, an attack is raised against the meta-argument trust(1). If the number
of attacks towards the pattern overcomes the given threshold, then the attack against trust(1) becomes ac-
tive, and trust(1) becomes unacceptable, i.e., Witness1 is considered untrustworthy: so argument a is not
acceptable.
We model feedback using the pattern associated with the threshold in order to maintain the choice of
meta-argumentation, and avoiding the introduction of numerical techniques, as done for instance by da Costa
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Pereira et al. [113].
Modeling trust as a multidimensional concept. In this section, we investigate two dimensions of trust
that have to be independently evaluated such as the sincerity or credibility of a source and its competence.
We simplify Castelfranchi and Falcone’s model [90], and focus only on two broad categories of relevant
features in the source: competence (to what extent the source is deemed able to deliver a correct argument),
and sincerity (to what extent the source is considered willing to provide a correct argument), both of which
contribute to determine the source’s overall trustworthiness. The evaluations of competence and sincerity are
allowed to change across different domains. For instance, a reliable doctor will be considered competent in
the health domain, but not necessarily so when suggesting a restaurant; conversely, a food critic is typically
assumed to be trustworthy on the latter domain but not on the former. Similarly, one might think that a
colleague who is competing with her for a promotion is likely to be insincere in giving her tips on how to
improve her career, and yet there is no reason to doubt his sincerity when he suggests a movie. Here, we
consider competence and sincerity as two possible dimensions for assessing the trustworthiness of a source.
We represent competence and sincerity using meta-arguments, and the attacks to these meta-arguments
represent the conflicts about trust regarding a precise dimension of trust. The introduction in our framework
of these two dimensions is visualized in Figure 3.9. We start from the usual situation in which an information
source supports an argument, namely Witness7 supports argument i in the informal dialogue. We want to
distinguish the two possible conflicts concerning argument i: a conflict meaning that Witness7 is considered
untrustworthy on the competence regarding argument i, and a conflict meaning that Witness7 is considered
untrustworthy on the sincerity in proposing argument i. An example of the first case is given in the dialogue
by the attack of argument l to argument i, and an example of the second case is given by the attack of
argument m to argument i. Note that even if both arguments l and m attack argument i, they attack different
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Figure 3.9: Modelling competence and sincerity.
We model sincerity and competence as visualized in Figure 3.9. Meta-argument Bi represents the belief
associated to the information source concerning argument i, and it means “the source believes argument i”
where argument i is the argument supported by the beliefs of the source. The meta-argument Bi provides
evidence in favor of argument i, as a result of the competence attributed to the source. In this framework,
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an attack towards the sincerity of the source is addressed against the meta-argument representing the belief
of the source, i.e., against meta-argument Bi. An attack towards the competence of the source is addressed,
instead, against the evidence provided by meta-argument Bi to argument i. This attack means that the source
believes argument i but it is not evaluated competent concerning i. Note that an attack towards argument i is
treated as in the previous sections, since it is a direct attack towards the content of argument i.
Definition 50. A trust-based extended argumentation framework DT EAF2CS is a tuple 〈Ar,〈Ar1,→1,→21
,#1,DT1,DT1s,DT1c〉, . . . ,〈Arn,→n,→2n,#n,DTn,DTns,DTnc〉,→〉 where for each source 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Ari ⊆
Ar ⊆U is a set of arguments,→⊆ Ar×Ar,→i⊆ Ari×Ari is a binary relation,→2i is a binary relation on
(Ari∪→i)×→i, #i is a binary relation on Ari×Ar j, and DT ⊆ Ari×ϑ is a binary relation such that ϑ = j,
and DTs ⊆ Ari×ϑ is a binary relation such that ϑ ∈ Ar j or ϑ ∈→ j, and DTc ⊆ Ari×ϑ is a binary relation
such that ϑ ∈ Ar j or ϑ ∈→ j.
Definition 51 shows how to instantiate an extended argumentation framework enriched with a distrust
relation, which distinguishes distrust concerning competence and sincerity. The unflattening function g and
the acceptance function E ′ are defined as above.
Definition 51. Given a DT EAF2CS = 〈Ar,〈Ar1,→1,→21,#1,DT1,DT1s,DT1c〉, . . . ,
〈Arn,→n,→2n,#n,DTn,DTns,DTnc〉,→〉, see Definition 50, the set of meta-arguments MA is {trust(i) | 1≤
i≤ n}∪{acc(a) | a ∈ Ar1∪ . . .∪Arn}∪{Xa,b,Ya,b | a,b ∈ Ar1∪ . . .∪Arn}∪{Wacc(a) | a ∈ Ar1∪ . . .∪Arn}∪
{Ba | a ∈ Ar1∪ . . .∪Arn} and 7−→⊆MA×MA is a binary relation on MA such that hold the conditions of
Definitions 46, 47, and 49, and:
• Ba 7−→ XBa,a iff a ∈ Ari, and XBa,a 7−→ YBa,a iff a ∈ Ari, and YBa,a 7−→WBa,a iff a ∈ Ari, and WBa,a 7−→
acc(a) iff a ∈ Ari and
• Ba→b 7−→ XBa→b,a→b iff a→ b ∈→i, and XBa→b,a→b 7−→ YBa→b,a→b iff a→ b ∈→i, and YBa→b,a→b 7−→
WBa→b,a→b iff a→ b ∈→i, and WBa→b,a→b 7−→ Ya,b iff a→ b ∈→i and
• trust(i) 7−→Xtrust(i),Wacc(a) iff a∈Ari, and Xtrust(i),Wacc(a) 7−→Ytrust(i),Wacc(a) iff a∈Ari, and Ytrust(i),Wacc(a) 7−→
Wacc(a) iff a ∈ Ari, and Wacc(a) 7−→ Ba iff a ∈ Ari, and
• trust(i) 7−→ Xtrust(i),WYa,b iff a,b ∈ Ari and a→i b, and Xtrust(i),WYa,b 7−→ Ytrust(i),WYa,b iff a,b ∈ Ari and
a→i b, and Ytrust(i),WYa,b 7−→WYa,b iff a,b∈ Ari and a→i b, and WYa,b 7−→ Ba→b iff a,b∈ Ari and a→i b,
and
• acc(a) 7−→ Bb iff a ∈ Ari,b ∈ Ar j and aDTisb, and
• acc(a) 7−→ YBa,a iff a ∈ Ari,b ∈ Ar j and aDTicb, and
• acc(a) 7−→ Bb→c iff a ∈ Ari,b,c ∈ Ar j and aDTis(b→ j c), and
• acc(a) 7−→ YBb→c,b→c iff a ∈ Ari,b,c ∈ Ar j and aDTic(b→ j c).
We say that an argument a ∈ Ari or attack a→ b ∈→i is untrustworthy concerning sincerity when there
is an attack from an argument c ∈ Ar j to Ba or Ba→b, cDTjsa or cDTjs(a→ b). We say that an argument
a ∈ Ari or attack a→ b ∈→i is untrustworthy concerning competence when there is an attack from an
argument c ∈ Ar j to YBa,a or YBa→b,a→b, cDTjca or cDTjc(a→ b).
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Figure 3.10: The flattening of the competence and sincerity’s framework.
The flattening of the new framework distinguishing between attacks towards the sincerity of a source in
proposing an information item, and attacks towards the competence of a source in proposing an information
item is formalized in Definition 51. An example of flattening is visualized in Figure 3.10.
Example 27. The meta-argument representing Witness7, trust(7), provides evidence by means of the aux-
iliary argument Wacc(i) to meta-argument Bi representing the fact that argument i is believed by Witness7. If
this meta-argument is accepted, it means that there are no doubts about the sincerity of Witness7 concerning
argument i. Meta-argument Bi provides evidence for meta-argument acc(i), representing argument i in the
meta-level. This evidence is built in the same way as the evidence provided by the sources for their informa-
tion items, which means that meta-argument Bi attacks, towards auxiliary arguments X and Y , the auxiliary
argument WBi,i. This auxiliary argument attacks, always by means of X and Y auxiliary arguments, the meta-
argument acc(i). In this framework, the acceptability of meta-argument acc(i) depends on the acceptability
of the belief regarding argument i. An attack towards the competence of argument i, instead, is addressed
against meta-argument YBi,i. In this way, argument acc(i) can be made unacceptable in two ways: (1) by at-
tacking directly meta-argument Bi (sincerity), and (2) by attacking the attack from Bi to WBi,i (competence).
Figure 3.10 shows these two cases with the attacks from argument m and argument l, respectively.
The following property holds for our model of competence and sincerity.
Proposition 23. Suppose a trustworthy source i provides evidence for argument a, and another trustworthy
source j provides evidence for an argument b where b attacks the trustworthiness of argument a, then the
extensions are the same if argument b attacks the sincerity or the competence about argument a.
Proof. We assume admissibility based semantics. Assume argument a and argument b are not attacked by
other arguments. We use case analysis.
Case 1 Let argument b attack the sincerity dimension of the trustworthiness of argument a. Meta-argument
acc(b) is accepted, due to the conflict-free principle, as motivated by evidence by a trustworthy source
and not attacked by external arguments, and meta-argument Yacc(b),Ba is accepted. This means that
meta-argument Ba is rejected, and thus argument WBa,a is accepted, and meta-argument acc(a) is
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rejected. Argument a is not part of any admissibility-based extension, and argument b is part of the
admissibility-based extensions.
Case 2 Let argument b attack the competence dimension of the trustworthiness of argument a. Meta-
argument acc(b) is accepted, as supported by a trustworthy source and not attacked by external ar-
guments, and argument Ba is accepted, as supported by a trustworthy source. Then meta-argument
YBa,a is rejected, as attacked by argument acc(b), due to the conflict-free principle. This means that
meta-argument WBa,a is accepted, and meta-argument acc(a) is rejected. Argument a is not part of
any admissibility-based extension, and argument b is part of the admissibility-based extensions.
We conclude that the extensions are the same whether argument b attacks the sincerity or the competence of
argument a.
In the next section, we will highlight that in certain scenarios a numerical approach to reason on trust
using argumentation theory is required, and we will introduce our fuzzy labeling algorithm to weight argu-
ments in the framework depending on the trustworthiness degree of the source proposing them.
3.3 Fuzzy argumentation labeling for trust
In a multiagent environment, belief revision aims at describing the changes in the agent’s mind in response
to new information. On the other hand, one of the important concerns in argumentation is the strategies
employed by an agent in order to succeed in changing the mind of another agent. To this aim, the agent
must provide good enough reasons to (justify and then) succeed in such request of change. We can then
view argumentation as an “incitement” to make an agent change its mind.
This section is not “just” about integrating belief revision and argumentation in a single framework. It
aims at using the strength resulting from such a combination to solve the problem of loss of information
in the case of reinstatement of previous information in multiagent systems. More precisely, we answer the
question “in case of such a reinstatement, how to recover from the loss of previous information which should
become acceptable with new information, and to which extent old information should be recovered?”
The proposed framework integrates the first three basic steps considered by Falappa and colleagues.
Indeed, in order to represent real situations more faithfully, we consider that new information is associated
with a degree of plausibility which represents the trustworthiness, for the agent, of the source of information.
This is in line with some work in the literature, like, for example, [111], but the originality, which is the main
difference with the previously cited authors, lies in the fact that a piece of information is represented as an
argument which can be more or less acceptable. Therefore, such a degree directly influences the evaluation,
performed by an agent, of new information and, as a consequence, it also influences the extent to which an
agent changes its mind. Based on these considerations, we propose a fuzzy reinstatement algorithm which
provides a satisfactory answer to our research question, which may be broken down into the following
subquestions:
• How to represent arguments and beliefs in this setting?
• How to define a fuzzy evaluation of the arguments?
• How to address the change in the agent’s cognitive state?
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The first step is about determining the most suitable representation of partially trusted arguments and
beliefs. Arguments, of the form 〈Φ,φ〉, support the agents’ beliefs, which can be represented as the con-
clusions of structured arguments. The trustworthiness of a source can be measured by using probabilities
only in the case in which data are available based on past experiences, for example. In many realistic cases,
such data is not available. It is well known that possibilistic logic is well suited to deal with incomplete
information. For example, [3] introduce a unified negotiation framework based on possibilistic logic to rep-
resent the agent’s beliefs, preferences, decision, and revision under an argumentation point of view. A fuzzy
labeling will then determine the fuzzy set of the agent’s beliefs. [111] adopt the representation of uncertain
beliefs proposed in [130]. The main point of their proposal may be described as belonging to the fourth
among the basic steps proposed by [143], in the sense that they derive the most useful goals from the most
plausible beliefs and desires. However, their approach for representing the changes in the agent’s beliefs is
not argumentation-based and cannot treat reinstatement in a satisfactory way.
The second step is about defining an algorithm which allows a fuzzy evaluation of the arguments. In crisp
argumentation, arguments are evaluated, following a specific semantics, as acceptable or not acceptable,
as shown by [133]. Intuitively, accepted arguments are those arguments which are not attacked by other
accepted arguments and unaccepted arguments are those attacked by accepted arguments. Given an accepted
argument, its conclusion can be adopted as belief in the agent’s belief base. To represent the degrees of trust,
we rethink the usual crisp argument evaluation [133, 84] by evaluating arguments in terms of fuzzy degrees
of acceptability.
The third step is the choice about how to address the change in the cognitive state of the agent. As
observed by [129] and [123], for example, the main approaches to belief revision adopt the principle of the
“priority to incoming information” but, in the context of multiagent systems, this principle presents some
drawbacks. In particular, in a static situation, the chronological sequence of arrival of distinct pieces of
information has nothing to do with their trustability or importance. This is supported also by [151], where
revision algorithms are presented in order to take into account the history of previous revisions as well
as possible revision options which were first discarded but may now be pursued. The assumption we put
forward in this chapter is that, even if the agent accepts the incoming information throwing away part of
the previously adopted belief base, this change must not be irrevocable. This means that, in the future, new
information may turn the tide in such a way to have the past incoming information excluded from the belief-
base and the original belief somehow reintegrated. This is exactly what happens in argumentation under
the name of reinstatement principle. The difference, which is also one of the original contributions of this
chapter, is that the extent of the integration depends on the agent’s trust in the source. Indeed, we evaluate
arguments in a gradual way depending on such a degree of trust.
A schematic illustration of the proposed framework is visualized in Figure 3.11. The framework may be
regarded as a belief revision model, based on argumentation. An agent interacts with the world by receiving
arguments A from one or more sources. The agent’s internal mental state is completely described by a fuzzy
set of trustful arguments Ar, from which the beliefs of the agent may be derived. A trust module, whose
details are not covered in this chapter, assigns a trust degree τ to each source. As new arguments A are
received, they are added to Ar with the same membership degree as the degree τ to which their source is
trusted. Fuzzy labeling of Ar yields a fuzzy reinstatement labeling α , which may be regarded as a fuzzy
set of acceptable arguments, whose consequences induce a possibility distribution π , from which an explicit
representation B of the agent’s beliefs is constructed as the necessity measure N of possibility distribution
π . Notice that we do not make any further assumptions on the trust model. This is out of the scope of this
chapter.
A classical propositional language may be used to represent information for manipulation by a cognitive
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Figure 3.11: A schematic illustration of the proposed framework.
agent.
Definition 52 (Language). Let Prop be a finite1 set of atomic propositions and let L be the propositional
language such that Prop∪{>,⊥} ⊆L , and, ∀φ ,ψ ∈L , ¬φ ∈L , φ ∧ψ ∈L , φ ∨ψ ∈L .
As usual, one may define additional logical connectives and consider them as useful shorthands for
combinations of connectives of L , e.g., φ ⊃ ψ ≡ ¬φ ∨ψ .
We will denote by Ω = {0,1}Prop the set of all interpretations on Prop. An interpretation I ∈ Ω is
a function I : Prop→ {0,1} assigning a truth value pI to every atomic proposition p ∈ Prop and, by
extension, a truth value φI to all formulas φ ∈ L . We will denote by [φ ] the set of all models of φ ,
[φ ] = {I : I |= φ}.
We can give the arguments a structure, and the attack relation is defined in terms of such a structure of
the arguments, following the example of [41].
Definition 53. An argument is a pair 〈Φ,φ〉, with φ ∈L and Φ⊂L , such that
1. Φ 0⊥,
2. Φ ` φ , and
3. Φ is minimal w.r.t. set inclusion.
We say that 〈Φ,φ〉 is an argument for φ . We call φ the conclusion and Φ the support of the argument.
The more specific forms of conflict are called undercut and rebuttal.
Definition 54. (Undercut, Rebuttal) An undercut for an argument 〈Φ,φ〉 is an argument 〈Ψ,ψ〉 where
ψ = ¬(φ1 ∧ . . .∧ φn) and {φ1, . . . ,φn} ⊆ Φ. A rebuttal for an argument 〈Φ,φ〉 is an argument 〈Ψ,ψ〉 iff
ψ ⇔¬φ is a tautology.
Argument A attacks argument B where A = 〈Ψ,ψ〉 and B = 〈Φ,φ〉 if either A undercuts B or A rebuts B.
Throughout the section, we will make the assumption that Ar is finite. Indeed, if Ar is the set of ar-
guments that has been “received” by an agent, it is very reasonable to assume that the agent, who started
1Like in [37], we adopt the restriction to the finite case in order to use standard definitions of possibilistic logic. Extensions of
possibilistic logic to the infinite case are discussed for example in [122].
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operating at some time in the past and has a finite history, may have received, during its finite life, a finite
number of arguments from finitely many sources.
Another assumption that we make is that an agent never forgets an argument it has been offered. There-
fore, Ar may never shrink in time, i.e., if we denote by Art the set of arguments received by an agent up to
time t,
t1 < t2⇒ Art1 ⊆ Art2 . (3.1)
Given an argument A ∈ Ar, we will denote by src(A) the set of the sources of A.
Fuzzy Labeling. In order to provide the intuition behind the idea of a fuzzy labeling of the arguments,
consider the following dialogue in the context of a murder.
Example 28. The judge has to decide whether John has killed Mary. The agents are Wit1 and Wit2, two
witnesses, a coroner Cor and the judge Jud. Assume the judge completely trusts the two witnesses but he
does not quite trust (lower degree of trust) the coroner because it is well-known that he is almost always
drunk. The judge starts with argument A: “If John did not kill Mary, then John is innocent” where the
premise is “If John did not kill Mary” and the conclusion is “John is innocent”. Then, the judge listens to
the depositions of the two witnesses. Wit1 asserts argument B: “I saw John killing Mary, thus John killed
Mary”. Argument B attacks A’s premise so we have an attack B→ A. Wit2 claims C: “John was at the
theater with me when Mary was killed, thus John did not kill Mary”. Argument C attacks B’s conclusion
and this leads to C→ B. Finally, the judge listens to the deposition of the coroner who asserts D: “Mary
was killed before 6 p.m., thus when Mary was killed the show was still to begin”. Argument D attacks C’s
premise introducing an attack D→C. The attack relation is as follows: D→C,C→ B,B→ A.
Example 28 presents a scenario where the arguments cannot be evaluated from the beginning in the
same way because of the degree of trust assigned to their source. In order to account for the fact that
arguments may originate from sources that are trusted only to a certain degree, we extend the (crisp) abstract
argumentation structure described in Section 2.3 by allowing gradual membership of arguments in the set of
arguments Ar. In other words, Ar is a fuzzy set of trustful arguments, and Ar(A), the membership degree of





where τs is the degree to which source s ∈ src(A) is trusted.
It must be stressed that the fuzzy contribution in our approach is different from the one proposed by
Janssen [179]. Their fuzzy approach enriches the expressive power of classical argumentation by allowing to
represent the relative strength of the attack relations between the arguments, while in our approach the attack
relations remains crisp; fuzzyness is introduced to represent uncertainty due to the fact that information
sources can also be “just” partially trusted.
Parsons et al. [296] introduce a framework for decision making where they define trust-extended argu-
mentation graphs in which each premise, inference rule and conclusion is associated to the trustworthiness
degree of the source proposing it. Thus, given two arguments rebutting each others, the argument whose
conclusion has an higher trust value is accepted. The difference is that in such a framework the “labels”,
2Here, we suppose that the agent is optmistic. To represent the behaviour of a pessimistic agent, we should use the min operator,
for example.
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i.e., the trust values, associated to the arguments never change and the arguments are always accepted with
the same degree even if they are attacked by more trusted arguments.
This fuzzification of Ar provides a natural way of associating strengths to arguments, and suggests re-
thinking the labeling of an argumentation framework in terms of fuzzy degrees of argument acceptability.
Matt and Toni [217] define the strength of the argument the proponent embraces as his long run expected
payoff. The difference with our fuzzy labeling is that they compute these strengths from probability distri-
butions on the values of a game. The idea in common with our work is to replace the three-valued labeling
with a graded labeling function.
Definition 55. (Fuzzy AF-labeling) Let 〈Ar,→〉 be an abstract argumentation framework. A fuzzy AF-
labeling is a total function α : Ar→ [0,1].
Such an α may also be regarded as (the membership function of) the fuzzy set of acceptable arguments:
α(A) = 0 means the argument is outright unacceptable, α(A) = 1 means the argument is fully acceptable,
and all cases inbetween are provided for.
Intuitively, the acceptability of an argument should not be greater than the degree to which the arguments




This is, indeed, a fuzzy reformulation of two basic postulates for reinstatement proposed by Caminada [84]
to characterize the labeling of arguments: (1) an argument must be in iff all of its attackers are out; (2) an
argument must be out iff there exists an in argument that attacks it.
Furthermore, it seems reasonable to require that
α(A)≤ Ar(A), (3.4)
i.e., an argument cannot be more acceptable than the degree to which its sources are trusted.
By combining the above two postulates, we obtain the following definition.
Definition 56. (Fuzzy Reinstatement Labeling) Let α be a fuzzy AF-labeling. We say that α is a fuzzy
reinstatement labeling iff, for all arguments A,
α(A) = min{Ar(A),1− max
B:B→A
α(B)}. (3.5)
We can verify that the fuzzy reinstatement labeling is a generalization of the crisp reinstatement labeling
defined by Caminada, whose in and out labels are particular cases corresponding, respectively, to α(A) = 1
and α(A) = 0. What about the undec label in the fuzzy case? One might argue that it corresponds to
α(A) = 0.5; however, an exam of the case of two arguments attacking each other, A→ B and B→ A, with
Ar(A) = Ar(B) = 1, reveals that any fuzzy reinstatement labeling α must satisfy the equation
α(A) = 1−α(B), (3.6)
which has infinitely many solutions with α(A) ∈ [0,1]. We can conclude that there are infinitely many
degrees of “undecidedness” due to the trustworthiness of the source, of which 0.5 is but the most unde-
cided representative. These degrees of “undecidedness” express how much the agent tends to accept those
arguments proposed by not fully trusted agents.
Given a fuzzy argumentation framework, how to compute its fuzzy reinstatement labeling? The answer
to this question amounts to solving a system of n non-linear equations, where n = ‖supp(Ar)‖, i.e., the
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number of arguments belonging to some non-zero degree in the fuzzy argumentation framework, of the
same form as Equation 3.5, in n unknown variables, namely, the labels α(A) for all A ∈ supp(Ar). Since
iterative methods are usually the only choice for solving systems of non-linear equations, we will resort to
this technique, but with an eye to how the labeling is computed in the crisp case. In particular, we draw some
inspiration from Caminada [83]’s idea. We start with an all-in labeling (a labeling in which every argument
is labeled with the degree it belongs to Ar). We introduce the notion of illegal labeling for argument A with
respect to Definition 56.
Definition 57. (Illegal labeling) Let α be a fuzzy labeling and A be an argument. We say that A is illegally
labeled iff α(A) 6= min{Ar(A),1−maxB:B→A α(B)}.
In order to have an admissible labeling, the absence of illegally labeled arguments is required. As
Caminada [83], we need a way of changing the illegal label of an argument, without creating other illegally
labeled arguments.
We denote by α0 = Ar the initial labeling, and by αt the labeling obtained after the tth iteration of the
labeling algorithm.
Definition 58. Let αt be a fuzzy labeling. An iteration in αt is carried out by computing a new labeling αt+1










Note that Equation 3.7 guarantees that αt(A) ≤ Ar(A) for all arguments A and for each step of the
algorithm.
The above definition actually defines a sequence {αt}t=0,1,... of labelings.
Theorem 16. The sequence {αt}t=0,1,... defined above converges.
Proof. We have to prove that, for all A, there exists a real number LA ∈ [0,Ar(A)] such that, for all ε > 0,
there exists NA such that, for every t > NA, |αt(A)−LA|< ε .
The proof is quite straightforward if one assumes the attack relation to be acyclic. In that case, the thesis
can be proved by structural induction on the attack relation: the basis is that if argument A is not attacked








and, since α0 = Ar(A), the sequence is constant and thus trivially converges to Ar(A). The inductive
step consists of assuming that {αt(B)}t=0,1,... converges for all arguments B such that B→ A, and prov-
ing that then {αt(A)}t=0,1,... converges as well. If all {αt(B)}t=0,1,... converge, then so does {µt(A)}t =
{min{Ar(A),1−maxB:B→A αt(B)}}t , i.e., there exists a real number LA ∈ [0,Ar(A)] such that, for all ε > 0,
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We have to distinguish two cases. If αt+1(A)≥ LA,





























Otherwise, αt+1(A)< LA, and





























Therefore, |αt(A)−LA|< |α0(A)−LA|2−t + ε2−t ≤ 2−t + ε2−t = ε1 + ε2.
The proof in the general case where attack cycles may exist is based on the idea that convergence in
cycles may be proved separately, by assuming that {αt(B)}t=0,1,... converges for all arguments B attacking
any of the arguments in the cycle.
Let arguments A0,A1, . . . ,An−1 form a cycle, i.e., for all i = 0, . . . ,n−1, Ai→ Ai+1 mod n, and let




be the upper bound of the feasible values for α(Ai). Note that a cycle with no external arguments attacking
arguments of the cycle is a special case, whereby u(Ai) = Ar(Ai) for all arguments in the cycle.
For every pair of arguments (Ai,Ai+1 mod n), for α to be a fuzzy reinstatement labeling it should be
















Now, if αt is not yet a solution of Equation 3.5, there are two cases:
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t αt(A) αt(B) αt(C)
0 1 0.4 0.2
1 0.9 0.2 0.2
2 0.85 0.15 0.2
3 0.825 0.15 0.2
4 0.8125 0.1625 0.2
5 0.8 0.175 ↓
6 ↓ 0.2
Figure 3.12: Fuzzy labeling on AF : A→ B,B→C,C→ A.
1. either ∑n−1i=0 αt(Ai)>
n
2 , and there exists at least an argument Ai such that αt(Ai)> 1−αt(Ai+1 mod n);
in this case, then,
min{u(Ai),1−αt(Ai+1 mod n)} ≤
1−αt(Ai+1 mod n) < αt(Ai)









2. or ∑n−1i=0 αt(Ai)<
n
2 , and there exists at least an argument Ai such that
αt(Ai)< min{u(Ai),1−αt(Ai+1 mod n)};









Therefore, αt converges for all the arguments in the cycle, and this concludes the proof.
An example of the calculation of the fuzzy labeling for an odd cycle with three arguments A, B, and C,
such that A→ B,B→C,C→ A and Ar(A) = 1, Ar(B) = 0.4, and Ar(C) = 0.2, is presented in Figure 3.12.
We may now define the fuzzy labeling of a fuzzy argumentation framework as the limit of {αt}t=0,1,....
Definition 59. Let 〈Ar,→〉 be a fuzzy argumentation framework. A fuzzy reinstatement labeling for such




The convergence speed of the labeling algorithm is linear, as the proof of convergence suggests: in
practice, a small number of iterations is enough to get so close to the limit that the error is less than the
precision with which the membership degrees are represented in the computer.
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Example 29 (Continued). Consider again the dialogue in the context of a murder. The judge fully trusts the
two witnesses but he assigns a lower degree of trustworthiness to the coroner. The labels of the arguments
at the beginning are: α(A) = Ar(A) = 1, α(B) = Ar(B) = 1, α(C) = Ar(C) = 1, α(D) = Ar(D) = 0.3.
The fuzzy reinstatement labeling returns the following values: α(D) = 0.3, α(C) = 0.7, α(B) = 0.3, and
α(A) = 0.7.
Belief revision. In the proposed framework, belief reinstatement is then guaranteed thanks to the integra-
tion of the argumentation framework with the belief-change phase. More precisely, when a new argument
arrives, the argumentation framework is updated using the fuzzy labeling algorithm. Therefore, each ar-
gument reinstated by the algorithm will induce the reinstatement, to some extent, of the conclusion of the
argument in the belief set and of all the formulas that logically follow from the belief set.
The membership function of a fuzzy set describes the more or less possible and mutually exclusive
values of one (or more) variable(s). Such a function can then be seen as a possibility distribution [329]. If πx
is the fuzzy set of possible values of variable x, πx is called the possibility distribution associated to x; πx(v)
is the possibility degree of x being equal to v. A possibility distribution for which there exists a completely
possible value (∃v0 : π(v0) = 1) is said to be normalized.
Definition 60. (Possibility and Necessity Measures) A possibility distribution π induces a possibility mea-
sure and its dual necessity measure, denoted by Π and N respectively. Both measures apply to a crisp set A




N(A) = 1−Π(Ā) = inf
s∈Ā
{1−π(s)}. (3.10)
As convincingly argued by [117], a belief should be regarded as a necessity degree induced by a nor-
malized possibility distribution
π : Ω→ [0,1], (3.11)
which represents a plausibility order of possible states of affairs: π(I ) is the possibility degree of interpre-
tation I .
Starting from such an insight, a fuzzy reinstatement labeling α determines a set of beliefs in a natural
way. Given argument A = 〈Φ,φ〉, let con(A) denote the conclusion of A, i.e., con(〈Φ,φ〉) = φ . The pos-
sibility distribution π induced by a fuzzy argumentation framework may be constructed by letting, for all
interpretation I ,





The first maximum in the above equation accounts for the most convincing argument compatible with world
I , whereas the second maximum accounts for the most convincing argument against world I . A world
will be possible to an extent proportional to the difference between the acceptability of the most convincing
argument supporting it and the acceptability of the most convincing argument against it. The world will be
considered completely possible if such difference is positive or null, but it will be considered less and less
possible (or plausible) as such difference grows more and more negative.
Theorem 17. Any π defined as per Equation 3.12 is normalized.
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Proof. Either π(I ) = 1 for all I , and π is trivially normalized, or there exists an interpretation, say I0,






But then, let us consider the complementary interpretation I0, which maps all atoms to a truth value that
is the opposite of the truth value they are mapped to by I0. Clearly, all formulas satisfied by I0 are not
satisfied by I0 and vice versa. Therefore,





In other words, if a world is not completely plausible, its opposite must be completely plausible, and for this
reason π is always normalized.
The degree to which a given arbitrary formula φ ∈L is believed can be calculated from the possibility
distribution induced by the fuzzy argumentation framework as
B(φ) = N([φ ]) = 1−max
I 6|=φ
{π(I )}. (3.13)
Such B may be regarded, at the same time, as a fuzzy modal epistemic operator or as a fuzzy subset of L .
A powerful feature of such an approach based on a possibility distribution is that B(φ) can be computed
for any formula φ , not just for formulas that are the conclusion of some argument. For instance, if A is an
argument whose conclusion is p and B is an argument whose conclusion is p ⊃ q, and α(A) = α(B) = 1,
then not only B(p) = B(p⊃ q) = 1, but also B(q) = 1, B(p∧q) = 1, etc.
Straightforward consequences of the properties of possibility and necessity measures are that B(φ) >
0⇒ B(¬φ) = 0, this means that if the agent somehow believes φ then it cannot believe ¬φ at all;
B(>) = 1, (3.14)
B(⊥) = 0, (3.15)
B(φ ∧ψ) = min{B(φ),B(ψ)}, (3.16)
B(φ ∨ψ) ≥ max{B(φ),B(ψ)}. (3.17)
We can finally investigate the degree of the agent’s belief in terms of the labeling values of the arguments.
Let A, B, A0, and B0 represent arguments, and let µ ∈ (0,1] be a degree of belief. Then, for all φ ∈L ,
B(φ)≥ µ
⇔ ∀I 6|= φ π(I )≤ 1−µ, (Eq. 3.13)





α(B)≤ 1−µ, (Eq. 3.12)





⇔ ∀I 6|= φ ∃B0 : I 6|= con(B0),∀A : I |= con(A),
α(B0)−α(A)≥ µ.
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In words, a necessary and sufficient condition for formula φ to be believed to some extent is that, for all
interpretation I which does not satisfy φ , there exists an argument whose consequence is not satisfied by
I that is more accepted than every argument whose consequence is satisfied by I .
Therefore, the necessary and sufficient condition for formula φ not to be believed may be stated as
follows:
B(φ) = 0




⇔ ∃I0 6|= φ : π(I0) = 1,











In this case, a formula φ is not (or no more) believed by the agent iff there exists an interpretation I0
which does not satisfy φ and it is such that there exists an argument whose consequence is satisfied by I0
and is more accepted than all the arguments whose consequence is not satisfied by I0.
Therefore, if belief in φ is lost due to the arrival of an argument A which causes the labeling to change
so that B(φ) = 0, a sufficient condition for reinstatement of φ is that another argument A′ arrives causing
the labeling to change so that B(φ) > 0. However, this does not mean that the previous labeling must be
restored, but that it is enough that, for all I 6|= φ , there exists an argument BI whose consequence is not
satisfied by I , such that α(BI )> α(C), for all arguments C whose consequence is satisfied by I .
Example 30 (Continued). Suppose the judge finds that Wit1 is little reliable since he was in love with Mary
before they broke up because of John. The starting label of argument B becomes α(B) = Ar(B) = 0.2.
The degree to which con(A) is believed at the beginning of the dialogue is B(con(A)) = 1. Then the other
three arguments are put forward and the fuzzy reinstatement labeling returns the following values after 53
iterations: α(D) = 0.3, α(C) = 0.7, α(B) = 0.2, and α(A) = 0.8. The condition for reinstatement of con(A)
is that argument C causes the labeling to change such that B(con(A))> 0. At the end, the judge believes in
John’s innocence with a degree given by B(con(A)) = 0.8.
Evaluation. We study now the behavior and the performances of the fuzzy-labeling algorithm over a
benchmark for abstract argumentation, and then we report about the obtained results.
The aim of our experimental analysis is to assess the scalability of the fuzzy-labeling algorithm concern-
ing two perspectives:
• the number of iterations needed for convergence with respect to the number of the nodes in the graph,
and
• the time needed for convergence with respect to the number of the nodes in the graph.
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It must be stressed that the time needed for convergence depends on (i) the time needed for computing each
iteration, (ii) the time needed to update the α of each single argument, and (iii) the number of iterations
required for the labeling to converge.
The benchmark we used to evaluate the performances of the fuzzy labeling algorithm is composed of
different datasets for abstract argumentation tasks used in the literature. More precisely, we have considered
the following datasets:
• The Perugia dataset [46, 45, 47]:3 the dataset is composed of randomly generated directed-graphs.
To generate random graphs, they adopted two different libraries. The first one is the Java Universal
Network/Graph Framework (JUNG), a Java software library for the modeling, generation, analysis
and visualization of graphs. The second library they used is NetworkX, a Python software package for
the creation, manipulation, and study of the structure, dynamics, and functions of complex networks.
Three kinds of networks are generated:
– In the Erdős-Rényi graph model, the graph is constructed by randomly connecting n nodes.
Each edge is included in the graph with probability p independent from every other edge. For
the generation of these argumentation graphs, they adopted p = c logn/n (with c empirically set
to 2.5), which ensures the connectedness of such graphs.
– The Kleinberg graph model adds a number of directed long-range random links to an n×n lattice
network, where vertices are the nodes of a grid with undirected edges between any two adjacent
nodes. Links have a non-uniform distribution that favors edges to close nodes over more distant
ones.
– In the Barabási-Albert graph model, at each time step, a new vertex is created and connected to
existing vertices according to the principle of “preferential attachment”, such that vertices with
higher degree have a higher probability of being selected for attachment.
For more details about the generation of these networks as well as the graph models, we refer the
reader to [46, 45, 47].
• The dataset used by Cerutti et al. in their KR 2014 paper [97] (which we will call the KR dataset): the
dataset has been generated to evaluate a meta-algorithm for the computation of preferred labelings,
based on the general recursive schema for argumentation semantics called SCC-Recursiveness. The
dataset is composed of three sets of argumentation frameworks, namely:
– 790 randomly generated argumentation frameworks where the number of strongly connected
components (SCC) is 1, varying the number of arguments between 25 and 250 with a step of 25.
– 720 randomly generated argumentation frameworks where the number of strongly connected
components varies between 5 and 45 with a step of 5. The size of the SCCs is determined by
normal distributions with means between 20 and 40 with a step of 5, and with a fixed standard
deviation of 5. They similarly varied the probability of having attacks between arguments among
SCCs.
– 2800 randomly generated argumentation frameworks where the number of strongly connected
components is between 50 and 80 with a step of 5.
3The dataset is available at http://www.dmi.unipg.it/conarg/dwl/networks.tgz.
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a→ b, b→ a
a→ b, b→ a, b→ c
a→ b, b→ a, b→ c, c→ d, d→ c
a→ b, b→ c, c→ d, d→ e, e→ f , f → e
a→ b, b→ c, c→ d, d→ c
a→ b, b→ c, c→ a
a→ b, b→ a, b→ c, c→ c
a→ b, b→ a, b→ c, c→ c, d→ d
a→ b, b→ a, b→ c, a→ c, c→ d, d→ c
a→ b, b→ a, b→ c, a→ c, c→ d
a→ b, b→ c, c→ a, b→ d, a→ d, c→ d, d→ e, e→ d
a→ b, b→ c, e→ c, c→ d
a→ b, b→ a, b→ c, c→ d, d→ e, e→ c
a→ b, b→ c, c→ c
a→ b, b→ c, c→ a, a→ d, b→ d, c→ d
a→ b, a→ c, c→ a, c→ d, d→ c, d→ a, a→ d, c→ e, d→ f
Figure 3.13: The “patterns” used for constructing the Sophia Antipolis dataset.
• The dataset presented by Vallati et al. at ECAI 2014 [303] (which we will call the ECAI dataset): the
dataset was produced to study the features of argumentation frameworks. More precisely, it is com-
posed of 10,000 argumentation frameworks generated using a parametric random approach allow-
ing to select (probabilistically - average, standard deviation) the density of attacks for each strongly
connected component, and how many arguments (probabilistically) in each SCC attack how many
arguments (probabilistically) in how many (probabilistically) other SCCs. The number of arguments
ranges between 10 and 40,000, and they exploited a 10-fold cross-validation approach on a uniform
random permutation of the instances.
The availability of real-world benchmarks for argumentation problems is quite limited, with some few
exceptions like [73] or AIFdb.4 However, these benchmarks are tailored towards problems of argument
mining and their representation as abstract argumentation frameworks usually leads to topologically simple
graphs, such as cycle-free graphs. These kinds of graphs are not suitable for evaluating the computational
performance of solvers for abstract argumentation problems. For this reason, we decided to use artificially
generated graphs as benchmarks, in line with the preliminary performance evaluation of Bistarelli et al. [46].
In order to ensure the consideration of all kinds of interesting “patterns” that could appear in argu-
mentation frameworks (e.g., the abstract argumentation frameworks used to exemplify the behaviour of the
semantics in [19]), we have generated further graphs by composing these basic well-known examples of
interesting argumentation patterns (shown in Figure 3.13) into bigger frameworks.
Our generated dataset (which we will call the Sophia Antipolis dataset)5 consists of 20,000 argumen-
tation graphs created through a random aggregation of the patterns shown above. This process has been
executed with different settings in order to obtain complex graphs of specific sizes. In particular, a set of
1,000 argumentation graphs is generated for graph sizes from 5,000 to 100,000 nodes, with incremental steps
of 5,000 nodes each. The aggregation of patterns has been done incrementally, and the connections (edges)
4http://corpora.aifdb.org
5The Sophia Antipolis dataset is available at https://goo.gl/pN1M9r.
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between single patterns were generated randomly. The number of created graphs and their different sizes
should support the evaluation of argumentation reasoning algorithms under a broad number of scenarios.
Figures 3.14–3.23 summarize the behavior of the fuzzy-labeling algorithm on the four datasets we con-
sidered. For each dataset, we applied the algorithm to the argumentation graphs with all argument weights
set to 1 (i.e., arguments coming from fully trusted sources) and with random weights (i.e., arguments coming
from a variety of more or less trusted sources as it may be the case in application scenarios like multiagent
systems). From a first inspection of the figures, it is clear that certain graph types are harder than others: the
Sophia Antipolis appears to be the hardest, followed by the Erdős-Rényi, the Barabási-Albert, and the KR
+ EKAI datasets. The Kleinberg dataset appears to be the easiest. Furthermore, for all datasets, the graphs
with random weights never require a smaller number of iterations for convergence than their counterparts
with all weights fixed to 1.
Figures 3.14 and 3.15 show the behaviour of the fuzzy labeling algorithm when applied to the Barabási-
Albert dataset. In particular, Figure 3.14 (left-hand side) illustrates the evolution of the number of iterations
needed to reach convergence when all the weights are equal to 1. We can notice that the curve follows a
logarithmic rise with the increasing of the number of nodes. The figure illustrated through the (right-hand
side) curve represents the evolution of the time needed to reach the convergence. It shows a behaviour rather
linear. However, we can notice that the slope of the curve decreases with the increasing of the number of
nodes. A similar behaviour is depicted in Figure 3.15 which illustrates the evolution of the quantity of time
(in ms) needed to reach the convergence when the weights are assigned randomly. These two illustrations
clearly show the capability of the fuzzy labeling algorithm to handle a growing amount of data.
In Figures 3.16 and 3.17, we present the behaviour of the fuzzy labeling algorithm when applied to the
Erdős-Rényi dataset. We can notice that when all the weights are equal to 1, the convergence is reached very
quickly both when considering the number of iterations, and the quantity of time needed for convergence.
However, while such a quantity is quite similar with respect to the case in which the weights are randomly
assigned, we can notice that the number of iterations needed for convergence is higher with respect to the
behaviour illustrated in Figure 3.16. This can be due to the fact that the Erdős-Rényi dataset is constructed
by randomly connecting the nodes. As we can see in Figures 3.18 and 3.19, the convergence with the
Kleinberg dataset is even globally faster, either when all weights are equal to 1 or when the weights are
randomly assigned. Instead, the behaviour on the Sophia Antipolis dataset, shown in Figures 3.22 and 3.23,
is quite similar to the behaviors obtained with the Barabási-Albert dataset.
It is less evident, but the fuzzy-labeling algorithm behaves on the KR + ECAI dataset (illustrated in
Figures 3.20 and 3.21) much like it does on the Barabási-Albert and Sophia Antipolis datasets, with the
exception of a few small graphs which are outliers and which demand a relatively large number of itera-
tions to converge. Nevertheless, the time behavior of Barabási-Albert, Sophia Antipolis and KR + ECAI is
qualitatively identical.
Despite the differences among the various graph types, we have a rate of increase in time which is at
most log-linear for all graph types and for all weight assignments.
3.4 Related work
Cognitive model of conflicts in trust using argumentation. Dix et al. [127] present trust as a major
issue concerning the research challenges for argumentation. The question Which agents are trustworthy? is
important for taking decisions and weighing the arguments of the other agents.
CHAPTER 3. REASONING ABOUT TRUST THROUGH ARGUMENTATION 104















































Figure 3.14: Barabási-Albert dataset of the Perugia benchmark with all weights equal to 1.0.













































Figure 3.15: Barabási-Albert dataset of the Perugia benchmark with random weights.
Also Parsons et al. [252] present the provenance of trust as one of the mechanisms to be investigated
in argumentation. They claim that a problem, particularly of abstract approaches such as Dung [133],
is that they cannot express the provenance of trust, and the fact that argument b is attacked because b
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Figure 3.16: The Erdős-Rényi dataset of the Perugia benchmark with all weights equal to 1.0.















































Figure 3.17: The Erdős-Rényi dataset of the Perugia benchmark with random weights.
is proposed by source s, who is not trustworthy. Starting from this observation, we propose a model of
argumentation where the arguments are related to the sources and their acceptability is computed on the
basis of the trustworthiness of the sources. Furthermore, our approach goes beyond this observation by
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Figure 3.18: The Kleinberg dataset of the Perugia benchmark with all weights equal to 1.0.








































Figure 3.19: The Kleinberg dataset of the Perugia benchmark with random weights.
providing a feedback such that the final quality of the arguments influences the source evaluation as well.
Stranders et al. [293] propose an approach to trust based on argumentation that aims at exposing the
rationale behind such trusting decisions. The aim of our work is different: we are interested in evaluating
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Figure 3.20: The benchmark consisting of the KR + ECAI dataset with all weights equal to 1.0.






















































Figure 3.21: The benchmark consisting of the KR + ECAI dataset with random weights.
the arguments proposed by the sources with respect to their trustworthiness, instead of explaining, thanks to
argumentation theory, the decisions about trusting or not another agent.
Prade [261] presents a bipolar qualitative argumentative modeling of trust where trust and distrust are
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Figure 3.22: The Sophia Antipolis benchmark with all weights equal to 1.0.






















































Figure 3.23: The Sophia Antipolis benchmark with random weights.
assessed independently. The author introduces also a notion of reputation which is viewed as an input
information used by an agent for revising or updating his trust evaluation. Reputation contributes to provide
direct arguments in favor or against a trust evaluation. In this chapter, we do not use observed behavior and
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reputation to compute the starting trust value, and we model the socio-cognitive dynamics of trust such as
the feedback and the trust dimensions, differently from [261].
Matt et al. [216] propose to construct a Dempster-Shafer belief function both from statistical data and
from arguments in the context of contracts. We do not have arguments expressing the trustworthiness degree
assigned to the other agents, but we accept the arguments depending on the trustworthiness of their sources.
Moreover, in our model, the trustworthiness assigned to the arguments feeds back to the sources dynamically
changing their own trustworthiness. We distinguish also the two dimensions of sincerity and competence.
Tang et al. [296] and Parsons et al. [253] present a framework to introduce the sources in argumenta-
tion and to express the degrees of trust. They define trust-extended argumentation graphs in which each
premise, inference rule, and conclusion is associated to the trustworthiness degree of the source proposing
it. Thus, given two arguments rebutting each other, the argument whose conclusion has a higher trust value
is accepted. They do not have the possibility to directly attack the trustworthiness of the sources as well as
the trustworthiness of single arguments and attacks. Again, the feedback towards the source as well as the
distinction between competence and sincerity is not considered. We do not express the degrees of trust in a
fine-grained way as done in [296, 253].
A huge amount of research has been conducted on trust, and some of these works are described below,
even if in this chapter we limit our attention to the cognitive trust model of Castelfranchi and Falcone [90].
Castelfranchi and Falcone [90] stress the importance of this explicit cognitive account for trust in three
ways. First, they criticize the game-theoretic view of trust which is prisoner of the Prisoner Dilemma mental
frame, and reduce trust simply to a probability or perceived risk in decisions. Second, they find the quan-
titative aspects of trust (its strength or degree) on those mental ingredients (beliefs and goals) and on their
strength. Third, they claim that this cognitive analysis of trust is fundamental for distinguishing among very
different strategies for building or increasing trust; for founding mechanisms of image, reputation, persua-
sion, and argumentation in trust building. Apart from the cognitive model of Castelfranchi and Falcone [90]
that define trust as “a mental state, a complex attitude of an agent x towards another agent y about the
behaviour/action a relevant for the goal g”, many other definitions have been provided in the literature.
In sociology, Gambetta [153] states that “trust is the subjective probability by which an individual A
expects that another individual B performs a given action on which its welfare depends”. Castelfranchi and
Falcone [90] observe that this definition is correct. However, it is also quite a poor definition, since it just
refers to one dimension of trust, i.e., predictability, while ignoring the “competence” dimension; it does not
account for the meaning of “I trust B” where there is also the decision and the act of relying on B; and it
does not explain what is such an evaluation made of and based on. Common elements of these definitions
are a consistent degree of uncertainty and conflicting information associated with trust.
Another approach to model trust using modal logic is proposed by Lorini and Demolombe [212] where
they present a concept of trust that integrates the truster’s goal, the trustee’s action ensuring the achievement
of the truster’s goal, and the trustee’s ability and intention to do this action. In this chapter, we do not refer
to the actions of the sources, but we provide a model for representing the conflicts the sources have to deal
with trust. The introduction of the actions in our cognitive model is left as future work, and it will allow also
to model willingness (source s should think that source p not only is able and can do that action/task, but p
actually will do what s needs). In this chapter, we model only the competence and sincerity mental states of
trust.
Another proposal is presented by Liau [202], in which the influence of trust on the assimilation of
information into the source’s mind is considered. The idea is that “if agent i believes that agent j has told
him the truth on p, and he trusts the judgement of j on p, then he will also believe p”. Extending the model
by introducing goals to model the presented definitions is left for future work.
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Wang and Singh [321], instead, understand trust in terms of belief and certainty: A’s trust in B is reflected
in the strength of A’s belief that B is trustworthy. They formulate certainty in terms of evidence based on a
statistical measure defined over a probability distribution of positive outcomes. Both Liau [202] and Wang
and Singh [321] capture intuitions that play a role also in our approach, but they propose a simplified model
of the nature and dynamics of trust, as opposed to the socio-cognitive model discussed by Castelfranchi [90].
Fuzzy labeling algorithm. Despite the existence of such a clear complementarity between these two fields
of Artificial Intelligence, there are few works integrating them in a unitary multiagent framework. However,
a consensus exists on the opportunity of integrating belief revision and argumentation. Cayrol et al. [95] do
not integrate belief revision and argumentation, but propose a work on “revision in argumentation frame-
works” in which they transpose the basic issue of revision into argumentation theory. They study the impact
of the arrival of a new argument on the set of extensions of an abstract argumentation framework. Quignard
et al. [264] describe a model for argumentation in agent interaction that shows how belief conflicts may
be resolved by considering the relations between the agents’ cognitive states and their choice of relevant
argumentation moves. Paglieri et al. [246] claim that belief revision and argumentation can be seen as, re-
spectively, the cognitive and social sides of the same epistemic coin and propose a preliminary framework
which follows Toulmin’s layout of argumentation. Falappa and colleagues [143] survey relevant work com-
bining belief revision and argumentation. Besides, they develop a conceptual view on argumentation and
belief revision as complementary disciplines used to explain reasoning. They propose four basic steps of
reasoning in multiagent systems.
• Receiving new information: new information can be represented as a propositional fact provided with
a degree of plausibility;
• evaluating new information: the origin of new information decisively influences the agent’s willing-
ness to adopt it;
• changing beliefs: the agent uses belief revision techniques to change its epistemic state according to
the new adopted information;
• inference: the agent’s behavior is influenced by the most plausible beliefs resulting from its new
epistemic state.
3.5 Conclusion
Trust plays an important role in many research areas of artificial intelligence, particularly in the semantic
web and multiagent systems where the sources have to deal with conflicting information from other sources.
Building on the socio-cognitive model of trust described in Castelfranchi and Falcone [90], and on previ-
ous work integrating trust and argumentation [310], in this chapter we presented a formal framework for
modeling how different dimensions of the perceived trustworthiness of the source interact to determine the
acceptability of the message, and how deviations from such expectation produce a specific feedback on
source trustworthiness. Here, we applied this model to the case of sources exchanging and assessing ar-
guments, but it could easily be extended to the exchange of any kind of factual information. The reason
why we focused first on argumentation is because this provides a window on the agent’s reasoning. The
arguments in Section 3.2 are treated basically as black boxes, as it is most often the case in works based
on abstract argumentation, in the vein of Dung [133]. This is significant in two respects. First, we did
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not discuss the two-way relationship between source trustworthiness and trust in the message when what
is being communicated is not the argument as a whole, but rather one of its constituents, e.g., a premise,
its conclusion, or the inference rule licensing the argument, as in Parsons et al. [253]. Finding out that the
source is mistaken on the truth of some premise (hence the argument is unsound) rather than on the truth of
the inference (hence the argument is invalid) is likely to have very different effects for the feedback on the
source, which will have to be investigated in future work. Second, we treat only the case of valid arguments,
again as it is customary in abstract argumentation after Dung [133]. This is of course a huge idealization
with respect to everyday argumentation: as underlined by Walton [318], we rarely exchange deductively
valid arguments, while the vast majority of arguments are defeasible, which implies a different sort of con-
sequence relation. Finally, the framework does not capture the cumulative effect of converging sources on
argument acceptability. When more than one source offers the same information item, its acceptability is
positively affected, as discussed in [88].
In this chapter, we have also justified and developed an approach to graded reinstatement in belief
revision. The acceptability of arguments depends on a fuzzy labeling algorithm based on possibility theory.
An agent will believe the conclusions of the accepted arguments, as well as their consequences. Arguments
reinstatement induces the reinstatement of the beliefs grounded on these arguments. Arguments and beliefs
are reinstated depending on the trustworthiness of the sources proposing them. The framework can be
further improved following two directions: (i) specifying the trustworthiness degree by a cognitive model of
trust and, (ii) embedding the proposed framework into an integrated one where also desires and, afterwards,
goals are taken into account. The extent to which new information is accepted by an agent directly depends
on the content of the new claim and on how much the agent trusts the source providing it. However, trust
may also be influenced by information content. Indeed, even tough I might not particularly trust a source,
if it provides me a claim which is consistent with my beliefs, I will not change my beliefs. However, my
degree of trust for that source may increase. Trust depends thus on the agent’s own beliefs in general and,
in particular, on the agent’s opinion about the capability of the source to convey useful information. In
real-world situations, an agent’s beliefs about a source may be incomplete, for they may derive from the
opinions of other (partially) known agents and the agent may have had few (or none) exchanges with the
source. On the other hand, only an agent endowed with goals and beliefs can trust another agent [89]. In
other words, if an agent needs to trust a source, it is because it needs “something” from that source that
could help it fulfill its own goals. Therefore, the agent’s beliefs about the source’s goals in comparison with
its own goals must also play an important role in computing trust. These beliefs can be constructed from the
agent’s past interactions and the source’s reputation and/or recommendations. Because we are aware that
trust is not always the complement of distrust, here, we consider the bipolar side of trust. Our key idea here
is to capture the fact that some pieces of information can contribute to increase or decrease trust, and other
pieces of information can contribute to increase or decrease distrust.
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Chapter 4
Argumentation for Explanation and
Justification
4.1 Introduction
This chapter synthesizes my contribution about machine explanation and justification, where an argumentation-
based module has been integrated into a question-answering system to support the user in a better under-
standing about the results provided by the system. These contribution have been published in a paper on the
Semantic Web journal [74]: Elena Cabrio, Serena Villata, Alessio Palmero Aprosio. A RADAR for informa-
tion reconciliation in Question Answering systems over Linked Data. Semantic Web 8(4): 601-617 (2017).
These results benefited from the collaboration with Elena Cabrio (UNS) and Alessio Palmero Aprosio (FBK
Trento). This line of work, having as goal the use of argumentation theory to explain machine decisions, is
the core of the project with Accenture I coordinate, and that will start on July 2018. In this context, I will
supervise the activity of the research engineer (Nicholas Halliwell) we recruited.
In the Web of Data, it is possible to retrieve heterogeneous information items concerning a single real-
world object coming from different data sources, e.g., the results of a single SPARQL query on different
endpoints. It is not always the case that these results are identical, it may happen that they conflict with
each other, or they may be linked by some other relation like a specification. The automated detection of the
kind of relationship holding between different instances of a single object with the goal of reconciling them
is an open problem for consuming information in the Web of Data. In particular, this problem arises while
querying the language-specific chapters of DBpedia [221]. Such chapters, well connected through Wikipedia
instance interlinking, can in fact contain different information with respect to the English version. Assuming
we wish to query a set of language-specific DBpedia SPARQL endpoints with the same query, the answers
we collect can be either identical, or in some kind of specification relation, or they can be contradictory.
Consider for instance the following example: we query a set of language-specific DBpedia chapters about
How tall is the soccer player Stefano Tacconi?, receiving the following information: 1.88 from the Italian
chapter and the German one, 1.93 from the French chapter, and 1.90 from the English one. How can I
know what is the “correct” (or better, the more reliable) information, knowing that the height of a person is
unique? Addressing such kind of issues is the goal of the present chapter. More precisely, in this chapter,
we answer the research question: how to reconcile information provided by the language-specific chapters
of DBpedia?
This open issue is particularly relevant to Question Answering (QA) systems over DBpedia [210], where
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the user expects a unique (ideally correct) answer to her factual natural language question. A QA system
querying different data sources needs to weight them in an appropriate way to evaluate the information items
they provide accordingly. In this scenario, another open problem is how to explain and justify the answer
the system provides to the user in such a way that the overall QA system appears transparent and, as a
consequence, more reliable. Thus, our research question breaks down into the following subquestions:
1. How to automatically detect the relationships holding between information items returned by different
language-specific chapters of DBpedia?
2. How to compute the reliability degree of such information items to provide a unique answer?
3. How to justify and explain the answer the QA system returns to the user?
First, we need to classify the relations connecting each piece of information to the others returned by the
different data sources, i.e., the SPARQL endpoints of the language-specific DBpedia chapters. We adopt the
categorization of the relations existing between different information items retrieved with a unique SPARQL
query proposed by Cabrio et al. [76]. Up to our knowledge, this is the only available categorization that con-
siders linguistic, fine-grained relations among the information items returned by language-specific DBpedia
chapters, given a certain query. This categorization considers ten positive relations among heterogenous
information items (referring to widely accepted linguistic categories in the literature), and three negative re-
lations meaning inconsistency. Starting from this categorization, we propose the RADAR (ReconciliAtion
of Dbpedia through ARgumentation) framework, that adopts a classification method to return the relation
holding between two information items. This first step results in a graph-based representation of the result
set where each information item is a node, and edges represent the identified relations.
Second, we adopt argumentation theory [132], a suitable technique for reasoning about conflicting in-
formation, to assess the acceptability degree of the information items, depending on the relation holding
between them and the trustworthiness of their information source [112]. Roughly, an abstract argumenta-
tion framework is a directed labeled graph whose nodes are the arguments and the edges represent a conflict
relation. Since positive relations among the arguments may hold as well, we rely on bipolar argumenta-
tion [92] that considers also a positive support relation.
Third, the graph of the result set obtained after the classification step, together with the acceptability
degree of each information item obtained after the argumentation step, is used to justify and explain the
resulting information ranking (i.e., the order in which the answers are returned to the user).
We evaluate our approach as standalone (i.e., over a set of heterogeneous values extracted from a set
of language-specific DBpedia chapters), and through its integration in the QA system QAKiS [79], that ex-
ploits language-specific DBpedia chapters as RDF datasets to be queried using a natural language interface.
The reconciliation module is embedded to provide a (possibly unique) answer whose acceptability degree is
over a given threshold, and the graph structure linking the different answers highlights the underlying jus-
tification. Moreover, RADAR is applied to over 300 DBpedia properties in 15 languages, and the obtained
resource of reconciled DBpedia language-specific chapters is released.
Even if information reconciliation is a way to enhance Linked Data quality, this chapter does not ad-
dress the issue of Linked Data quality assessment and fusion [220, 63], nor ontology alignment. Finally,
argumentation theory in this chapter is not exploited to find agreements over ontology alignments [283].
Note that our approach is intended to reconcile and explain the answer of the system to the user. Ontology
alignment cannot be exploited to generate such a kind of explanations. This is why we decided to rely on
argumentation theory that is a way to exchange and explain viewpoints. In this chapter, we have addressed
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the open problem of reconciling and explaining a result set from language-specific DBpedia chapters using
well known conflict detection and explanation techniques, i.e., argumentation theory.
We are not aware of any other available QA system that queries several information sources (in our
case language-specific chapters of DBpedia) and then is able to verify the coherence of the proposed result
set, and show why a certain answer has been provided. The merit of the present chapter is to describe
the proposed framework (i.e., RADAR 2.0) with the addition of an extensive evaluation over standard QA
datasets.
In the remainder of the chapter, Section 4.2 presents our reconciliation framework for language-specific
DBpedia chapters, Section 4.3 reports on the experiments run over DBpedia to evaluate it, and Section 4.4
describes its integration in QAKiS. Section 4.5 reports on the related work. Finally, some conclusions are
drawn.
4.2 RADAR 2.0: a Framework for Information Reconciliation
The RADAR 2.0 (ReconciliAtion of Dbpedia through ARgumentation) framework for information recon-
ciliation is composed by three main modules (see Figure 4.1). It takes as input a collection of results from
one SPARQL query raised against the SPARQL endpoints of the language-specific DBpedia chapters (Sec-
tion 4.3 provides more details about the chapters considered in our experimental setting). Given such result
set, RADAR retrieves two kinds of information: (i) the sources proposing each particular element of the
result set, and (ii) the elements of the result set themselves. The first module of RADAR (module A, Fig-
ure 4.1) takes each information source, and following two different heuristics, assigns a confidence degree
to the source. Such confidence degree will affect the reconciliation in particular with respect to the possible
inconsistencies: information proposed by the more reliable source will obtain a higher acceptability degree.
The second module of RADAR (module B, Figure 4.1) instead starts from the result set, and it matches
every element with all the other returned elements, detecting the kind of relation holding between these two
elements. The result of such module is a graph composed by the elements of the result set connected with
each other by the relations of our categorization. Both the sources associated with a confidence score and
the result set in the form of a graph are then provided to the third module of RADAR, the argumentation
one (module C, Figure 4.1). The aim of such module is to reconcile the result set. The module considers
all positive relations as a support relation and all negative relations as an attack relation, building a bipolar
argumentation graph where each element of the result set is seen as an argument. Finally, adopting a bipolar
fuzzy labeling algorithm relying on the confidence of the sources to decide the acceptability of the informa-
tion, the module returns the acceptability degree of each argument, i.e., element of the result set. The output
of the RADAR framework is twofold. First, it returns the acceptable elements (a threshold is adopted), and
second the graph of the result set is provided, where each element is connected to the others by the identified
relations (i.e., the explanation about the choice of the acceptable arguments returned).
In the remainder of this section, we will describe how the confidence score of the sources is computed
(Section 4.2), and we will summarize the adopted categorization detailing how such relations are automati-
cally extracted (Section 4.2). Finally, the argumentation module is described in Section 4.2.
Assigning a confidence score to the source
Language-specific DBpedia chapters can contain different information on particular topics, e.g. providing
more or more specific information. Moreover, the knowledge of certain instances and the conceptualization
of certain relations can be culturally biased. For instance, we expect to have more precise (and possibly more
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Figure 4.1: RADAR 2.0 framework architecture.
reliable) information on the Italian actor Antonio Albanese on the Italian DBpedia, than on the English or
on the French ones.
To trust and reward the data sources, we need to calculate the reliability of the source with respect to the
contained information items. In [77], an apriori confidence score is assigned to the endpoints according to
their dimensions and solidity in terms of maintenance (the English chapter is assumed to be more reliable
than the others on all values, but this is not always the case). RADAR 2.0 assigns, instead, a confidence
score to the DBpedia language-specific chapter depending on the queried entity, according to the following
two criteria:
• Wikipedia page length. The chapter of the longest language-specific Wikipedia page describing the
queried entity is considered as fully trustworthy (i.e., it is assigned with a score of 1) while the others
are considered less trustworthy (i.e., they are associated with a score < 1). In choosing such heuristic,
we followed [51] that demonstrates that the article length is a very good predictor of its precision.
The length is calculated on the Wikipedia dump of the considered language (# of characters in the
text, ignoring image tags and tables). Thus, the longest page is assigned a score equal to 1, and a
proportional score is assigned to the other chapters.
• Entity geo-localization. The chapter of the language spoken in the places linked to the page of the
entity is considered as fully trustworthy (i.e., it is assigned with a score of 1) while the others are
considered less trustworthy (i.e., they are associated with a score < 1). We assume that if an entity
belongs to a certain place or is frequently referred to it, it is more likely that the DBpedia chapter
of such country contains updated and reliable information. All Wikipedia page hyperlinks are con-
sidered, and their presence in GeoNames1 is checked. If existing, the prevalent language in the place
(following the GeoNames matching country-language2) is extracted, and to the corresponding chapter
a score equal to 1 is assigned. As for page length, a proportional score is then assigned to the other
chapters (i.e. if an entity has e.g. 10 links to places in Italy and 2 to places in Germany, the score
assigned to the Italian DBpedia chapter is 1, while for the German chapter is 0.2).
1http://www.geonames.org/
2Such table connecting a country with its language can be found here: http://download.geonames.org/export/
dump/countryInfo.txt.
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Such metrics (the appropriateness of which for our purposes has been tested on the development set, see
Section 4.3) are then summed and normalized with a score ranging from 0 to 1, where 0 is the least reliable
chapter for a certain entity and 1 is the most reliable one. The obtained scores are then considered by the
argumentation module (Section 4.2) for information reconciliation.
Relations classification
Cabrio et al. [76] propose a classification of the semantic relations holding among the different instances
obtained by querying a set of language-specific DBpedia chapters with a certain query. More precisely, such
categories correspond to the lexical and discourse relations holding among heterogeneous instances obtained
querying two DBpedia chapters at a time, given a subject and an ontological property. In the following, we
list the positive relations between values resulting from the data-driven study in [76]. Then, in parallel, we
describe how RADAR 2.0 addresses the automatic classification of such relations.
Identity i.e., same value but in different languages (missing owl:sameAs link in DBpedia).
E.g., Dairy product vs Produits laitiers
Acronym i.e., initial components in a phrase or a word. E.g., PSDB vs Partito della Social Democrazia
Brasiliana
Disambiguated entity i.e., a value contains in the name the class of the entity. E.g., Michael Lewis
(Author) vs Michael Lewis
Coreference i.e., an expression referring to another expression describing the same thing (in particular, non
normalized expressions). E.g., William Burroughs vs William S. Burroughs
Given the high similarity among the relations belonging to these categories, we cluster them into a unique
category called surface variants of the same entity. Given two entities, RADAR automatically detects the
surface variants relation among them, if one of the following strategies is applicable: cross-lingual links3,
text identity (i.e. string matching), Wiki redirection and disambiguation pages.
Geo-specification i.e., ontological geographical knowledge. E.g., Queensland vs Australia
Renaming i.e., reformulation of the same entity name in time. E.g., Edo, old name of Tokyo
Given the way in which renaming has been defined in [76], it refers only to geographical renaming. For this
reason, we merge it to the category geo-specification. RADAR classifies a relation among two entities as
falling inside this category when in the GeoNames one entity is contained in the other one (geo-specification
is a directional relation between two entities). We also consider the alternative names gazette included in
GeoNames, and geographical information extracted from a set of English Wikipedia infoboxes, such as
Infobox former country4 or Infobox settlement.
3Based on WikiData, a free knowledge base that can be read and edited by humans and machines alike, http://www.
wikidata.org/, where data entered in any language is immediately available in all other languages. In WikiData, each entity
has the same ID in all languages for which a Wikipedia page exists, allowing us to overcome the problem of missing owl:sameAs
links in DBpedia (that was an issue in DBpedia versions prior to 3.9). Moreover, WikiData is constantly updated (we use April
2014 release).
4For instance, we extract the property “today” connecting historical entity names with the current ones (reconcilable with
GeoNames). We used Wikipedia dumps.
CHAPTER 4. ARGUMENTATION FOR EXPLANATION AND JUSTIFICATION 117
Meronymy i.e., a constituent part of, or a member of something. E.g., Justicialist Party is a part of
Front for Victory
Hyponymy i.e., relation between a specific and a general word when the latter is implied by the former.
E.g., alluminio vs metal
Metonymy i.e., a name of a thing/concept for that of the thing/concept meant. E.g., Joseph Hanna vs
Hanna-Barbera
Identity:stage name i.e., pen/stage names pointing to the same entity. E.g., Lemony Snicket vs Daniel
Handler
We cluster such semantic relations into a category called inclusion.5 To detect this category of relations,
RADAR exploits a set of features extracted from:
MusicBrainz6 to detect when a musician plays in a band, and when a label is owned by a bigger label.
BNCF (Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale di Firenze) Thesaurus7 for the broader term relation between
common names.
DBpedia, in particular the datasets connecting Wikipedia, GeoNames and MusicBrainz trough the owl:sameAs
relation.
WikiData for the part of, subclass of and instance of relations. It contains links to GeoNames, BNCF and
MusicBrainz, integrating DBpedia owl:sameAs.
Wikipedia contains hierarchical information in: infoboxes (e.g. property parent for companies, product
for goods, alter ego for biographies), categories (e.g., Gibson guitars), “see also” sections
and links in the first sentence (e.g., Skype was acquired by [United States]-based [Microsoft Corpo-
ration]).
Inclusion is a directional relation between two entities (the rules we apply to detect meronymy, hyponymy
and stage name allow us to track the direction of the relation, i.e. if a→ b, or b→ a).
Moreover, in the classification proposed in [76], the following negative relations (i.e., values mis-
matches) among possibly inconsistent data are identified:
Text mismatch i.e. unrelated entity. E.g., Palermo vs Modene
Date mismatch i.e. different date for the same event. E.g., 1215-04-25 vs 1214- 04-25
Numerical mismatch i.e. different numerical values. E.g., 1.91 vs 1.8
5Royo [274] defines both relations of meronymy and hyponymy as relations of inclusion, although they differ in the kind of
inclusion defined (hyponymy is a relation of the kind “B is a type of A”, while meronymy relates a whole with its different parts
or members). Slightly extending Royo’s definition, we joined to this category also the relation of metonymy, a figure of speech
scarcely detectable by automatic systems due to its complexity (and stage name, that can be considered as a particular case of
metonymy, i.e., the name of the character for the person herself).
6http://musicbrainz.org/
7http://thes.bncf.firenze.sbn.it/












Figure 4.2: Example of (a) an AF , (b) a bipolar AF , and (c) example provided in the introduction modeled
as a bipolar AF , where single lines represent attacks and double lines represent support.
RADAR labels a relation between instances (i.e., URIs) as negative, if every attempt to find one of the posi-
tive relations described above fails (i.e., negation as a failure). For numerical values, a numerical mismatch
identifies different values.8
The reader may argue that a machine learning approach could have been applied to this task, but a
supervised approach would have required an annotated dataset to learn the features. Unfortunately, at the
moment there is no such training set available to the research community. Moreover, given the fact that
our goal is to produce a resource as precise as possible for future reuse, the implementation of a rule-based
approach allows us to tune RADAR to reward precision in our experiments, in order to accomplish our
purpose.
Argumentation-based information reconciliation
This section details the RADAR 2.0 argumentation module, which extends the fuzzy labeling algorithm we
introduced in Section 3.3.
Figure 4.2.a shows an example of an AF. The arguments are visualized as nodes of the argumentation
graph, and the attack relation is visualized as edges. Gray arguments are the accepted ones. Using Dung’s
admissibility-based semantics [132], the set of accepted arguments is {b,c}.
Since we want to take into account the confidence associated with the information sources to compute
the acceptability degree of arguments, we rely on the computation of fuzzy confidence-based degrees of
acceptability. As the fuzzy labeling algorithm [112] exploits a scenario where the arguments are connected
by an attack relation only, in Cabrio et al. [77] we have proposed a bipolar version of this algorithm, to
consider also a positive, i.e., support, relation among the arguments (bipolar AFs) for the computation of the
fuzzy labels of the arguments.
Let Ar be a fuzzy set of trustful arguments, and Ar(A) be the membership degree of argument A in Ar,
we have that Ar(A) is given by the trust degree of the most reliable (i.e., trusted) source that offers argument
A9, and it is defined as follows: Ar(A) = maxs∈src(A) τs where τs is the degree to which source s ∈ src(A) is
evaluated as reliable. The starting confidence degree associated with the sources is provided by RADAR’s
first module. The bipolar fuzzy labeling algorithm [77] assumes that the following two constraints hold:
(i) an argument cannot attack and support another argument at the same time, and (ii) an argument cannot
support an argument attacking it, and vice versa. These constraints underlie the construction of the bipolar
AF itself. In the following, the attack relation is represented with→, and the support relation with⇒.
8At the moment no tolerance is admitted, if e.g. the height of a person differs of few millimeters in two DBpedia chapters, the
relation is labeled as numerical mismatch. We plan to add such tolerance for information reconciliation as future work.
9We follow the approach presented in Section 3.3 choosing the max operator (“optimistic” assignment of the labels), but the
min operator may be preferred for a pessimistic assignment.
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Table 4.1: BAF : a→ b,b→ c,c→ a,d⇒ c
t αt(a) αt(b) αt(c) αt(d)
0 1 0.4 0.2 1
1 0.9 0.2 0.6 ↓







Definition 61. Let 〈Ar,→,⇒〉 be an abstract bipolar argumentation framework where Ar is a fuzzy set
of (trustful) arguments, →⊆ Ar×Ar and ⇒⊆ Ar×Ar are two binary relations called attack and support,
respectively. A bipolar fuzzy labeling is a total function α : Ar→ [0,1].
Such an α may also be regarded as (the membership function of) the fuzzy set of acceptable arguments
where the label α(A) = 0 means that the argument is outright unacceptable, and α(A) = 1 means the argu-
ment is fully acceptable. All cases inbetween provide the degree of the acceptability of the arguments which
may be considered accepted in the end, if they exceed a certain threshold.
A bipolar fuzzy labeling is defined as follows10, where argument B is an argument attacking A and C is
an argument supporting A:
Definition 62. (Bipolar Fuzzy Labeling) A total function α : Ar→ [0,1] is a bipolar fuzzy labeling iff, for
all arguments A, α(A) = avg{min{Ar(A),1−maxB:B→A α(B)}; maxC:C⇒A α(C)}.
When the argumentation module receives the elements of the result set linked by the appropriate relation
and the confidence degree associated to each source, the bipolar fuzzy labeling algorithm is applied to the
argumentation framework to obtain the acceptability degree of each argument. In case of cyclic graphs, the
algorithm starts with the assignment of the trustworthiness degree of the source to the node, and then the
value converges in a finite number of steps to the final label. Note that when the argumentation framework
is composed by a cycle only, then all labels become equal to 0.5.
Consider the example in Figure 4.2.b, if we have Ar(a) = Ar(d) = 1, Ar(b) = 0.4 and Ar(c) = 0.2, then
the fuzzy labeling algorithm returns the following labels: α(a) = α(b) = 0.4, α(c) = 0.6, and α(d) = 1.
The step by step computation of the labels is shown in Table 4.1. Figure 4.2.c shows how the example
provided in the introduction is modeled as a bipolar argumentation framework, where we expect the Italian
DBpedia chapter to be the most reliable one, given that Stefano Tacconi is an Italian soccer player. The
result returned by the bipolar argumentation framework is that the trusted answer is 1.88. A more precise
instantiation of this example in the QA system is shown in the next section.
The fact that an argumentation framework can be used to provide an explanation and justify positions is
witnessed by a number of applications in different contexts [35], like for instance practical reasoning [316],
legal reasoning [36, 43], medical diagnosis [174]. This is the reason why we choose this formalism to
reconcile information, compute the set of reliable information items, and finally justify this result. Other
10For more details about the bipolar fuzzy labeling algorithm, see Cabrio et al. [77].
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possible solutions would be (weighted) voting mechanisms, where the preferences of some voters, i.e., the
most reliable information sources, carry more weight than the preferences of other voters. However, voting
mechanisms do not consider the presence of (positive and negative) relations among the items within the
list, and no justification beyond the basic trustworthiness of the sources is provided to motivate the ranking
of the information items.
Notice that argumentation is needed in our use case because we have to take into account the trustwor-
thiness of the information sources, and it provides an explanation of the ranking, which is not possible with
simple majority voting. Argumentation theory, used as a conflict detection technique, allows us to detect in-
consistencies and consider the trustworthiness evaluation of the information sources, as well as proposing a
single answer to the users. As far as we know, RADAR integrated in QAKiS is the first example of QA over
Linked Data system coping with this problem and providing a solution. Simpler methods would not allow
to cover both aspects mentioned above. We use bipolar argumentation instead of non-bipolar argumenta-
tion because we have not only the negative conflict relation but also the positive support relation among the
elements of the result set.
4.3 RADAR experimental setting and evaluation
In this section, we describe the dataset on which we evaluate the RADAR framework (Section 4.3), and we
discuss the obtained results (Section 4.3). Moreover, in Section 4.3 we describe the resource of reconciled
DBpedia information we create and release.
Dataset
To evaluate the RADAR framework, we rely on the dataset presented in Cabrio et al. [76], the only available
annotated dataset of possibly inconsistent information in DBpedia language-specific chapters to our knowl-
edge. It is composed of 400 annotated pairs of values (extracted from English, French and Italian DBpedia
chapters), a sample that is assumed to be representative of the linguistic relations holding between values
in DBpedia chapters. Note that the size of the DBpedia chapter does not bias the type of relations identi-
fied among the values, nor their distribution, meaning that given a specific property, each DBpedia chapter
deals with that property in the same way. We randomly divided such dataset into a development (to tune
RADAR) and a test set, keeping the proportion among the distribution of categories.11 Table 4.2 reports on
the dataset statistics, and shows how many annotated relations belong to each of the categories (described
in Section 4.2).
Table 4.2: Statistics on the dataset used for RADAR 2.0 evaluation
Dataset # triples # annotated positive relations # annotated negative relations
Surface-form Geo-specific. Inclusion Text mismatch Date mismatch Numerical mismatch
Dev set 104 28 18 20 13 13 12
Test set 295 84 48 55 36 37 35
Total 399 112 66 75 49 50 47
11The dataset is available at http://www.airpedia.org/radar-1.0.nt.bz2. The original work is based on DBpe-
dia 3.9, but we updated it to DBpedia 2014. Thus, we deleted one pair, since the DBpedia page of one of the annotated entities does
not exist anymore.
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Results and discussion
Table 4.3 shows the results obtained by RADAR on the relation classification task on the test set. As baseline,
we apply an algorithm exploiting only cross-lingual links (using WikiData), and exact string matching.
Since we want to produce a resource as precise as possible for future reuse, RADAR has been tuned to
reward precision (i.e., so that it does not generate false positives for a category), at the expense of recall
(errors follow from the generation of false negatives for positive classes). As expected, the highest recall is
obtained on the surface form category (our baseline performs even better than RADAR on such category).
The geo-specification category has the lowest recall, either due to missing alignments between DBpedia and
GeoNames (e.g. Ixelles and Bruxelles are not connected in GeoNames), or to the values complexity in the
renaming subcategory (e.g., Paris vs First French Empire, or Harburg (quarter) vs Hambourg). In general,
the results obtained are quite satisfying, fostering future work in this direction.
Table 4.3: Results of the system on relation classification
System Relation category Precision Recall F1
RADAR 2.0
surface form 0.91 0.83 0.87
geo-specification 0.94 0.60 0.73
inclusion 0.86 0.69 0.77
overall positive 1.00 0.74 0.85
text mismatch 0.45 1 0.62
baseline
surface form 1.00 0.44 0.61
geo-specification 0.00 0.00 0.00
inclusion 0.00 0.00 0.00
overall positive 1.00 0.21 0.35
text mismatch 0.21 1 0.35
Since we consider text mismatch as a negative class (Section 4.2), it includes the cases in which RADAR
fails to correctly classify a pair of values into one of the positive classes. For date and numerical mismatches,
F1 = 1 (detecting them is actually a trivial task, and therefore they are not included in Table 4.3. See footnote
8). Overall positive means that RADAR correctly understands the fact that the different answers to a certain
query are all correct and not conflicting. RADAR precision in this case is 1, and it is important to underline
this aspect in the evaluation, since this confirms the reliability of the released reconciled DBpedia in this
respect. The overall positive result is higher than the partial results because in the precision of partial
values we include the fact that if e.g., a surface form relation is wrongly labeled as geo-specification, we
consider this mistake both as a false negative for surface form, and as a false positive for geo-specification.
This means that RADAR is very precise in assigning positive relations, but it could provide a less precise
classification into finer-grained categories.
Reconciled DBpedia resource
We applied RADAR 2.0 on 300 DBpedia properties - the most frequent in terms of chapters mapping such
properties, corresponding to 47.8% of all properties in DBpedia. We considered ∼5M Wikipedia entities.
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The outcoming resource, a sort of universal DBpedia, counts ∼50M of reconciled triples from 15 DBpedia
chapters: Bulgarian, Catalan, Czech, German, English, Spanish, French, Hungarian, Indonesian, Italian,
Dutch, Polish, Portuguese, Slovenian, Turkish. Notice that we did not consider the endpoint availability as
a requirement to choose the DBpedia chapters: data are directly extracted from the resource.
For functional properties, the RADAR framework is applied as described in Section 4.2. In contrast,
the strategy to reconcile the values of non-functional properties is slightly different: when a list of values
is admitted (e.g. for properties child or instruments), RADAR merges the list of the elements pro-
vided by the DBpedia chapters, and ranks them with respect to the confidence assigned to their source,
after reconciling positive relations only (there is no way for lists to understand if an element is incorrect or
just missing, e.g. in the list of the instruments played by John Lennon). But since the distinction between
functional/non-functional properties is not precise in DBpedia, we manually annotated the 300 properties
with respect to this classification, to allow RADAR to apply the correct reconciliation strategy, and to pro-
duce a reliable resource. In total, we reconciled 3.2 million functional property values, with an average
accuracy computed from the precision and recall reported in Table 4.3. This resource is available here:
http://qakis.org/resources.htm.
Moreover, we carried out a merge and a light-weight reconciliation of DBpedia classes applying the
strategy called “DBpedia CL” in [6] where “CL” stands for cross-language (e.g., Michael Jackson is classi-
fied as a Person in the Italian and German DBpedia chapters, an Artist in the English DBpedia and a
MusicalArtist in the Spanish DBpedia. As Person, Artist and MusicalArtist lie on the same
path from the root of the DBpedia ontology, all of them are kept and used to classify Michael Jackson.
4.4 Integrating RADAR in a QA system
We integrate RADAR into a QA system over language-specific DBpedia chapters, given the importance
that information reconciliation has in this context. Indeed, a user expects a unique (and possibly correct)
answer to her factual natural language question, and would not trust a system providing her with different
and possibly inconsistent answers coming out of a black box. A QA system querying different data sources
needs therefore to weight in an appropriate way such sources in order to evaluate the information items they
provide accordingly.
As QA system we selected QAKiS (Question Answering wiKiFramework-based System) [79], because
it allows i) to query a set of language-specific DBpedia chapters using a natural language interface, and ii) its
modular architecture can be flexibly modified to account for the proposed extension. QAKiS addresses the
task of QA over structured knowledge-bases (e.g., DBpedia) [69], but taking into account also unstructured
relevant information, e.g., Wikipedia pages. It implements a relation-based match for question interpreta-
tion, to convert the user question into a query expressed in a query language (e.g., SPARQL), making use of
relational patterns (automatically extracted from Wikipedia), that capture different ways to express a certain
relation in a language. The actual version of QAKiS targets questions containing a Named Entity (NE)
related to the answer through one property of the ontology, as Which river does the Brooklyn Bridge cross?.
Such questions match a single pattern.
In QAKiS, the SPARQL query created after the question interpretation phase is sent to the SPARQL
endpoints of the language-specific DBpedia chapters (i.e., English, French, German and Italian) for answer
retrieval. The set of retrieved answers from each endpoint is then sent to RADAR 2.0 for answer reconcili-
ation.
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Figure 4.3: QAKiS + RADAR demo (functional properties)
Figure 4.4: QAKiS + RADAR demo (non-functional properties)
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Figure 4.5: Example about the question Who developed Skype?
To test RADAR integration into QAKiS12, the user can select the DBpedia chapter she wants to query
besides English (that must be selected as it is needed for NE recognition), i.e., French, German or Italian
DBpedia. Then the user can either write a question or select among a list of examples. Clicking on the tab
Reconciliation, a graph with the answers provided by the different endpoints and the relations among them
is shown to the user (as shown in Figures 4.3 and 4.4 for the questions How tall is Stefano Tacconi?, and List
the children of Margaret Thatcher, respectively). Each node has an associated confidence score, resulting
from the fuzzy labeling algorithm (described in Section 4.2). Moreover, each node is related to the others
by a relation of support or attack, and a further specification of such relations according to the categories
described in Section 4.2 is provided to the user as answer justification of why the information items have
been reconciled and ranked in this way.
Looking at these examples, the reader may argue that the former question can be answered by a simple
majority voting (Figure 4.3), and the latter can be answered by a grouping based on surface forms (Fig-
ure 4.4), without the need to introduce the complexity of the argumentation machinery. However, if we
consider the following example from our dataset, the advantage of using argumentation theory becomes
clear. Let us consider the question Who developed Skype?: in this case, we retrieve three different answers,
namely Microsoft (from FR DBpedia), Microsoft Skype Division (from FR DBpedia), and Skype Limited
(EN DBpedia). The relations assigned by RADAR are visualized in Figure 4.5. The answer, with the associ-
ated weights, returns first Microsoft (FR) with a confidence score of 0.74, and second, Skype Limited (EN,
FR) with a confidence score of 0.61. Note that this result cannot be achieved with simple majority voting
nor with grouping based on surface forms.
12Demo at http://qakis.org
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QA experimental setting
To provide a quantitative evaluation of RADAR integration into QAKiS on a standard dataset of natural
language questions, we consider the questions provided by the organizers of the QALD challenge (Question
Answering over Linked Data challenge), now at its fifth edition, for the DBpedia track.13 More specifically,
we collect the questions sets of QALD-2 (i.e. 100 questions of the training and 100 questions of the test
sets), the test set of QALD-4 (i.e. 50 questions), and the questions sets of QALD-5 (50 additional training
questions with respect to the previous years training set, and 59 questions in the test sets). These 359
questions correspond to all the questions released in the five years of the QALD challenge (given the fact
that the questions of QALD-1 are included into the question set of QALD-2, and the question set of QALD-
3 is the same as QALD-2, but translated into 6 languages, and the training sets of QALD-4 and 5 include
all the questions of QALD-2). QALD-3 also provides natural language questions for Spanish DBpedia, but
given that the current version of QAKiS cannot query the Spanish DBpedia, we could not use this question
set.
We extract from this reference dataset of 359 questions, the questions that the current version of QAKiS
is built to address (i.e. questions containing a NE related to the answer through one property of the ontology),
corresponding to 26 questions in QALD-2 training set, 32 questions in QALD-2 test sets, 12 in QALD-4
test set, 18 in QALD-5 training set, and 11 in QALD-5 test set. The discarded questions require either some
form of aggregation (e.g., counting or ordering), information from datasets different than DBpedia, involve
n-ary relations, or are boolean questions. We consider these 99 questions as the QALD reference dataset for
our experiments.
Results on QALD answers reconciliation
We run the questions contained into our QALD reference dataset on the English, German, French and Italian
chapters of DBpedia. Since the questions of QALD were created to query the English chapter of DBpedia
only, it turned out that only in 43/99 cases at least two endpoints provide an answer (in all the other cases the
answer is provided by the English chapter only, not useful for our purposes). For instance, given the question
Who developed Skype? the English DBpedia provides Skype Limited as the answer, while the French one
outputs Microsoft and Microsoft Skype Division. Or given the question How many employees does IBM
have?, the English and the German DBpedia chapters provide 426751 as answer, while the French DBpedia
433362. Table 4.5 lists these 43 QALD questions, specifying which DBpedia chapters (among the English,
German, French and Italian ones) contain at least one value for the queried relation. This list of question is
the reference question set for our evaluation.
We evaluated the ability of RADAR 2.0 to correctly classify the relations among the information items
provided by the different language-specific SPARQL endpoints as answer to the same query, w.r.t. a man-
ually annotated goldstandard, built following the methodology in Cabrio et al. [76]. More specifically, we
evaluate RADAR with two sets of experiments: in the first case, we start from the answers provided by the
different DBpedia endpoints to the 43 QALD questions, and we run RADAR on it. In the second case, we
add QAKiS in the loop, meaning that the data we use as input for the argumentation module are directly
produced by the system. In this second case, the input are the 43 natural language questions.
Table 4.4 reports on the results we obtained for the two experiments. As already noticed before,
the QALD dataset was created to query the English chapter of DBpedia only, and therefore this small
13http://www.sc.cit-ec.uni-bielefeld.de/qald/
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dataset does not capture the variability of possibly inconsistent answers that can be found among DBpe-
dia language-specific chapters. Only three categories of relations are present in this data – surface forms,
geo-specification, and inclusion – and for this reason RADAR has outstanding performances on it when
applied on the correct mapping between NL questions and the SPARQL queries. When QAKiS is added
into the loop, its mistakes in interpreting the NL question and translating it into the correct SPARQL query
are propagated in RADAR (that receives in those cases a wrong input), decreasing the total performances.
Notice that in some cases the question interpretation can be tricky, and can somehow bias the evaluation
of the answers provided by the system. For instance, for the question Which pope succeeded John Paul II?,
the English DBpedia provides Benedict XVI as the answer, while the Italian DBpedia provides also other
names of people that were successors of John Paul II in other roles, as for instance in being the Archbishop
of Krakow. But since in the goldstandard this question is interpreted as being the successor of John Paul II
in the role of Pope, only the entity Benedict XVI is accepted as correct answer.
When integrated into QAKiS, RADAR 2.0 outperforms the results obtained by a preliminary version
of the argumentation module, i.e. RADAR 1.0 [77], for the positive relation classification (the results of
the argumentation module only cannot be strictly compared with the results obtained by RADAR 2.0, since
i) in its previous version the relation categories are different and less fine-grained, and ii) in [77] only
questions from QALD-2 were used in the evaluation), showing an increased precision and robustness of
our framework. Note that this evaluation is not meant to show that QAKiS performance is improved by
RADAR. Actually, RADAR does not affect the capacity of QAKiS to answer questions: RADAR is used to
disambiguate among multiple answers retrieved by QAKiS in order to provide to the user the most reliable
(and hopefully correct) one.
One of the reasons why RADAR is implemented as a framework that can be integrated on top of an
existing QA system architecture (and is therefore system-independent), is because we would like it to be
tested and exploited by potentially all QA systems querying more than one DBpedia chapter (up to our
knowledge QAKiS is the only one at the moment, but given the potential increase in the coverage of a
QA system querying multiple DBpedia language-specific chapters [69], we expect other systems to take
advantage of these interconnected resources soon).
4.5 Related work
The present chapter is an extended version of our previous work [78, 77, 68] introducing RADAR 1.0. The
following common points are present: the idea of using argumentation theory to detect inconsistencies over
the result set of a question answering system exploiting DBpedia, and the bipolar extension of the original
fuzzy labeling algorithm [112] to judge an argument’s acceptability in presence of both support and attack
relations. However, the present chapter presents a substantial extension with respect to this preliminary
work. More specifically, the main enhancements are reported in the following:
Relation categorization. RADAR 2.0 exploits the categorization we introduced in [76], as mentioned in
Section 4.2. However, the work presented in [76] is purely theoretic and the contribution here is to
study how to make RADAR 2.0 match these linguistic relations with respect to the DBpedia use case.
Moreover, the categorization of the possible relations holding between the information items we adopt
here is different (more linguistically-motivated) and more fine-grained than the one we used in [77].
This fine-grained categorization allows for a more insightful justification graph.
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Table 4.4: Results on QALD relation classification
System Relation category Precision Recall F1
RADAR 2.0 (only)
surface form 1.00 0.98 0.99
geo-specification 0.88 0.80 0.84
inclusion 0.80 1.00 0.88
overall positive 1.00 0.98 0.99
baseline
surface form 1.00 0.97 0.98
geo-specification 0.00 0.00 0.00
inclusion 0.00 0.00 0.00
overall positive 1.00 0.86 0.92
QAKiS + RADAR 2.0
surface form 1.00 0.59 0.74
geo-specification 0.88 0.80 0.84
inclusion 0.80 1.00 0.88
overall positive 1.00 0.63 0.77
QAKiS + baseline
surface form 1.00 0.58 0.74
geo-specification 0.00 0.00 0.00
inclusion 0.00 0.00 0.00
overall positive 1.00 0.52 0.68
QAKiS + RADAR 1.0 [77]
overall positive 0.54 0.56 0.55
(on QALD-2 questions only)
Relation extraction. The relations holding between the elements of the result set are here automatically ex-
tracted with the application of more robust techniques than in [77]. More precisely, the way RADAR
2.0 extracts these relations in an automated way is different from the way RADAR 1.0 extracts them:
RADAR 2.0 adopts external resources to improve the extraction of the correct relation, such as Mu-
sicBrainz, the BNCF (Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale di Firenze), DBpedia and Wikipedia, GeoNames,
and WikiData.
Evaluation. While in [68] only data from QALD-2 has been used, here we use all data available from the
QALD challenges (all editions), and the Italian chapter of DBpedia is added as RDF dataset to be
queried with QAKiS (not present in our previous works on the topic). Moreover, the results presented
in this chapter show a higher precision with respect to the results obtained with RADAR 1.0 and
reported in [77] (F1 increments from 0.55 to 0.77 for the positive relation classification if we consider
QALD-2 data only). In addition, the new evaluation considers 15 DBpedia chapters instead of the 3
chapters used in [68], i.e., English, German and French.
Resource. Differently from [77] where no resource resulted from the inconsistencies detection process, here
we generate a resource applying the proposed framework to 15 reconciled language-specific DBpedia
chapters, and we release it.
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State-of-the-art QA systems over Linked Data generally address the issue of question interpretation map-
ping a natural language question to a triple-based representation (see [210] for an overview). Moreover, they
examine the potential of open user friendly interfaces for the Semantic Web to support end users in reusing
and querying the Semantic Web content. None of these systems considers language-specific DBpedia chap-
ters, and they do not provide a mechanism to reconcile the different answers returned by heterogenous
endpoints. Finally, none of them provides explanations about the answer returned to the user.
Several works address alignment agreement based on argumentation theory. More precisely, Laera et
al. [190] address alignment agreement relying on argumentation to deal with the arguments which attack
or support the candidate correspondences among ontologies. Doran et al. [128] propose a methodology
to identify subparts of ontologies which are evaluated as sufficient for reaching an agreement, before the
argumentation step takes place, and dos Santos and Euzenat [283] present a model for detecting inconsis-
tencies in the selected sets of correspondences relating ontologies. In particular, the model detects logical
and argumentation inconsistency to avoid inconsistencies in the agreed alignment. We share with these ap-
proaches the use of argumentation to detect inconsistencies, but RADAR goes beyond them: we identify
in an automated way relations among information items that are more complex than owl:sameAs links
(as in ontology alignment). Moreover, these approaches do not consider trust-based acceptance degrees of
the arguments, lacking to take into account a fundamental component in the arguments’ evaluation, namely
their sources.
We mentioned these works applying argumentation theory to address ontology alignment agreements
as examples of applications of this theory to open problems in the Semantic Web domain. Actually, the
two performances cannot be compared to show the superiority of one of the two approaches, as the task is
different.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have introduced and evaluated the RADAR 2.0 framework for information reconciliation
over language-specific DBpedia chapters. The framework is composed of three main modules: a module
computing the confidence score of the sources depending either on the length of the related Wikipedia
page or on the geographical characterization of the queried entity, a module retrieving the relations holding
among the elements of the result set, and finally a module computing the reliability degree of such elements
depending on the confidence assigned to the sources and the relations among them. This third module is
based on bipolar argumentation theory, and a bipolar fuzzy labeling algorithm [77] is exploited to return the
acceptability degrees. The resulting graph of the result set, together with the acceptability degrees assigned
to each information item, justifies to the user the returned answer and it is the result of the reconciliation
process. The evaluation of the framework shows the feasibility of the proposed approach. Moreover, the
framework has been integrated in the question answering system over Linked Data called QAKiS, allowing
to reconcile and justify the answers obtained from four language-specific DBpedia chapters (i.e. English,
French, German and Italian). Finally, the resource generated applying RADAR to 300 properties in 15
DBpedia chapters to reconcile their values is released.
There are several points to be addressed as future work. First, the user evaluation should not be un-
derestimated: we will soon perform an evaluation to verify whether our answer justification in QAKiS
appropriately suits the needs of the data consumers, and to receive feedback on how to improve such visu-
alization. Second, at the present stage we assign a confidence score to each source following two criteria,
however another possibility is to let the data consumer itself assign such confidence degree to the sources
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depending on the kind of information she is looking for. Finally, the proposed framework is not limited to
the case of multilingual chapters of DBpedia. The general approach RADAR is based on allows to extend it
to various cases like inconsistent information from multiple English data endpoints. The general framework
would be the same, the only part to be defined are the rules to extract the relations among the retrieved
results. Investigating how a module of this type can be adopted as a fact checking module is part of our
future research plan.
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Table 4.5: QALD questions used in the evaluation (in bold the ones correctly answered by QAKiS; x means
that the corresponding language specific DBpedia chapter (EN, FR, DE, IT) contains at least one value for
the queried relation; dbo means DBpedia ontology)
ID, question set Question DBpedia relation EN FR DE IT
84, QALD-2 train Give me all movies with Tom Cruise. starring x x x
10, QALD-2 train In which country does the Nile start? sourceCountry x x
63, QALD-2 train Give me all actors starring in Batman Begins. starring x x x x
43, QALD-2 train Who is the mayor of New York City? leaderName x x x
54, QALD-2 train Who was the wife of U.S. president Lincoln? spouse x x
6, QALD-2 train Where did Abraham Lincoln die? deathPlace x x x
31, QALD-2 train What is the currency of the Czech Republic? currency x x x x
73, QALD-2 train Who owns Aldi? keyPerson x x x
20, QALD-2 train How many employees does IBM have? numberOfEmployees x x x x
33, QALD-2 train What is the area code of Berlin? areaCode x
2, QALD-2 test Who was the successor of John F. Kennedy? successor x x
4, QALD-2 test How many students does the Free University numberOfStudents x x x
in Amsterdam have?
14, QALD-2 test Give me all members of Prodigy. bandMember x x
20, QALD-2 test How tall is Michael Jordan? height x x x
21, QALD-2 test What is the capital of Canada? capital x x x x
35, QALD-2 test Who developed Skype? product x x
38, QALD-2 test How many inhabitants does Maribor have? populationTotal x x
41, QALD-2 test Who founded Intel? foundedBy x x x
65, QALD-2 test Which instruments did John Lennon play? instrument x x
68, QALD-2 test How many employees does Google have? numberOfEmployees x x x
74, QALD-2 test When did Michael Jackson die? deathDate x x x
76, QALD-2 test List the children of Margaret Thatcher. child x x
83, QALD-2 test How high is the Mount Everest? elevation x x x
86, QALD-2 test What is the largest city in Australia? largestCity x x
87, QALD-2 test Who composed the music for Harold and Maude? musicComposer x x x
34, QALD-4 test Who was the first to climb Mount Everest? firstAscentPerson x x
21, QALD-4 test Where was Bach born? birthPlace x x x x
32, QALD-4 test In which countries can you pay using the West currency x x
African CFA franc?
12, QALD-4 test How many pages does War and Peace have? numberOfPages x x
36, QALD-4 test Which pope succeeded John Paul II? successor x x
30, QALD-4 test When is Halloween? date x x
259, QALD-5 train Who wrote The Hunger Games? author x x
280, QALD-5 train What is the total population of Melbourne, Florida? populationTotal x x x
282, QALD-5 train In which year was Rachel Stevens born? birthYear x x x x
283, QALD-5 train Where was JFK assassinated? deathPlace x x x x
291, QALD-5 train Who was influenced by Socrates? influencedBy x x
295, QALD-5 train Who was married to president Chirac? spouse x x
298, QALD-5 train Where did Hillel Slovak die? deathPlace x x x x
7, QALD-5 test Which programming languages were influenced by Perl? influencedBy x x x x
18, QALD-5 test Who is the manager of Real Madrid? manager x x
19, QALD-5 test Give me the currency of China. country x x
32, QALD-5 test What does the abbreviation FIFA stand for? name x x x
47, QALD-5 test Who were the parents of Queen Victoria? parent x x x
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Chapter 5
Mining natural language argumentation
5.1 Introduction
This chapter synthesizes my contributions in the area of argument mining, dealing with the detection of the
argument components and the relations holding among them from raw texts. These contributions are across
the Natural Language Processing research area and the computational models of argument one. These
contributions have been published in several venues:
• Elena Cabrio, Serena Villata. Natural Language Arguments: A Combined Approach. 20th European
Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI 2012): 205-210 [72],
• Elena Cabrio, Serena Villata. Combining Textual Entailment and Argumentation Theory for Sup-
porting Online Debates Interactions. 50th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational
Linguistics (ACL 2012): 208-212 [71],
• Elena Cabrio, Serena Villata, Fabien Gandon. A Support Framework for Argumentative Discussions
Management in the Web. 10th International Conference on Semantic Web: 412-426 [75],
• Tom Bosc, Elena Cabrio, Serena Villata. DART: a Dataset of Arguments and their Relations on
Twitter. Tenth International Conference on Language Resources and Evaluation (LREC 2016) [60],
• Tom Bosc, Elena Cabrio, Serena Villata. Tweeties Squabbling: Positive and Negative Results in
Applying Argument Mining on Social Media. Computational Models of Argument (COMMA 2016):
21-32 [59],
• Mihai Dusmanu, Elena Cabrio, Serena Villata. Argument Mining on Twitter: Arguments, Facts and
Sources. 2017 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing (EMNLP 2017):
2317-2322 [136],
• Stefano Menini, Elena Cabrio, Sara Tonelli, Serena Villata. Never Retreat, Never Retract: Argu-
mentation Analysis for Political Speeches. Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(AAAI 2018) [223],
• Elena Cabrio, Serena Villata. A natural language bipolar argumentation approach to support users
in online debate interactions. Argument & Computation 4(3): 209-230 (2013) [70].
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The contributions reported in this chapter are the results of several collaborations: first of all, the collab-
oration with Elena Cabrio (UNS), with whom we initiated this research field and with whom I have a fruitful
collaboration since 2012; second, the collaboration with Sara Tonelli and Stefano Menini (FBK Trento). In
the context of these contributions, I have supervised the activity of one research engineer (Tom Bosc), and
one internship of 3 months (Mihai Dusmanu).
If you had the dream that one day, in the broad Artificial Intelligence (AI) area, Natural Language
Processing (NLP) researchers and Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KRR) researchers were able
to sit down together at the table of a joint panel, discussing on how to make progress and realize automated
argument detection, then this chapter is for you. This is the story of a research area called Argument Mining
(AM), and how it has become an important topic in AI.
The first approaches to what is now called argument mining started to appear around 2010, when the
first methods to mine (different connotations of) arguments from natural language documents were pro-
posed: [299] introduced the definition of argumentative zoning for scientific articles, and [227] proposed a
way to detect arguments from legal texts. Since these seminal approaches, the need for automated methods
to mine arguments and the relations among them from natural language text was brought to light, but it was
only briefly touched upon. The parallel advances, from the formal point of view in the research field of
computational models of arguments, and from the point of view of the computational techniques for learn-
ing and understanding human language content in the NLP and the Machine Learning fields, boosted the
almost contemporary organization of two events in 2014 targeting open discussions about the challenge of
mining arguments from text. Both the workshop on Argument Mining1 co-located with ACL, and the work-
shop on Frontiers and Connections between Argumentation Theory and Natural Language Processing 2 we
organized, shared the same goal: bringing together the communities of NLP and of formal argumentation to
jointly work towards the definition of the new research area of argument mining. Since then, two Dagstuhl
Seminars have been organized on such topic3, the Argument Mining workshop holds every year, two tutori-
als on AM have been given at IJCAI-20164 and ACL-20165, three ESSLLI courses6 in 2017, and AM has
became a topic in major AI and NLP conferences. All these clues prove its growing importance in AI.
Argument mining involves several research areas from the AI panorama: NLP provides the methods to
process natural language text, to identify the arguments and their components (i.e., premises and claims) in
texts and to predict the relations among such arguments, KRR contributes with the reasoning capabilities
upon the retrieved arguments and relations so that, for instance, fallacies and inconsistencies can be automat-
ically identified in such texts, and Human-Computer Interaction guides the design of good human-computer
digital argument-based supportive tools.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 presents the argument mining framework and its main
tasks, and then I detail the different scenarios and challenges I addressed in the argument mining area,
namely online debate platforms (Section 5.3), the Wikipedia revision history (Section 5.4), social media
with a particular attention to Twitter data (Section 5.5), and political speeches (Section 5.6). Related work
compare the proposed approaches to the existing literature, and a discussion about strong and weak points
of the raising argument mining field concludes the chapter.
1https://goo.gl/kF4Eep
2https://goo.gl/ttVUZk
3I.e., Debating Technologies (https://goo.gl/osqEY3) and Natural Language Argumentation: Mining, Processing, and
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5.2 Background
Argument(ation) mining has been defined as “the general task of analyzing discourse on the pragmatics level
and applying a certain argumentation theory to model and automatically analyze the data at hand” [162].
Two stages are crucial in the argument mining framework:
Arguments’ extraction : The first stage is the identification of arguments within the input natural lan-
guage text. This step may be further split in two different stages such as the detection of argument
components (e.g., claim, premises) and the further identification of their textual boundaries. Many ap-
proaches have recently been proposed to address such task, that adopt different methods like Support
Vector Machines (SVM) [248, 204, 289, 235, 12], Naïve Bayes classifiers [137], Logistic Regres-
sion [198].
Relations’ prediction : The second stage consists in predicting what are the relations holding between
the arguments identified in the first stage. This is an extremely complex task, as it involves high-
level knowledge representation and reasoning issues. The relations between the arguments may be
of heterogeneous nature, like attacks and supports. They are used to build the argument graphs,
in which the relations connecting the retrieved arguments (i.e., the nodes in the graph) correspond
to the edges. Different methods have been employed to address this task, from standard SVMs to
Textual Entailment [70]. This stage is also in charge of predicting, in structured argumentation, the
internal relations of the argument’s components, such as the connection between the premises and the
claim [289].
To clarify such tasks, let us consider the following example from the political debate of the Campaign
“Trump - Clinton” on September 2016.7 The first task of the argument mining framework consists in de-
tecting the arguments from the text. In the example below, we highlight the arguments that can be identified
(premises underlined and claims in bold):












































































It appears evident that the argumentative sentences “in the wild”, i.e., in natural language text as the ones
reported in the examples, are pretty far from the prototypical argumentation patterns usually investigated in
KRR, increasing the complexity of the task.
Let us consider now another example from an online debate about Random sobriety tests for drivers8,
where we identify again premises and claims.
A3: :::::Little ::::::::evidence:::::::random:::::::alcohol:::::tests:::::deter::::::drunk:::::::driving. There is a dearth of research regarding the
deterrent effect of checkpoints. The only formally documented research regarding deterrence is a survey of
Maryland’s “Checkpoint Strikeforce” program. The survey found no deterrent effect: To date, there is no
evidence to indicate that this campaign, which involves a number of sobriety checkpoints and media
7Debate extracted from the Commission on Presidential Debates (http://debates.org).
8http://www.debatepedia.com/en/index.php/Debate:_Random_sobriety_tests_for_drivers
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activities to promote these efforts, has had any impact on public perceptions, driver behaviors, or










































































A5: Random sobriety tests for drivers are effective at deterring drunk driving.
Given these three arguments, the relations among them have to be predicted. Let us consider that the two
relations we aim at identifying are attack (a negative relation between two arguments, e.g., a contradiction)
and support (a positive relation between two arguments) only. In this case, we have that argument A3
supports argument A4, and argument A4 attacks argument A5.
It is important to underline at this point that argument mining differs from well known opinion mining (or
sentiment analysis): while opinion mining focuses on understanding what users think about a certain topic
or product, argument mining revolves around why users have a certain opinion about a topic or product.
Both the main argument mining tasks require high-quality annotated corpora to train and to evaluate the
performances of automated approaches. The reliability of an annotated corpus is guaranteed by the calcu-
lation of the inter-annotator agreement that measures the degree of agreement in performing the annotation
task among the involved annotators. For instance, when building a dataset for relation prediction, the statis-
tical measure to be used to calculate the inter-rater agreement among the labels assigned by the annotators
is the Cohen’s kappa coefficient which takes into account also agreement occurring by chance. The equa-
tion for κ is κ = Pr(a)−Pr(e)1−Pr(e) where Pr(a) is the relative observed agreement among raters, and Pr(e) is the
hypothetical probability of chance agreement. If the raters are in complete agreement then κ = 1, if there
is no agreement among the raters other than what would be expected by chance, κ = 0. For NLP tasks, the
agreement is considered as significant when κ >0.6.9
5.3 A natural language bipolar argumentation approach for online debate
interactions
In the last years, the Web has changed in the so called Social Web. The Social Web has seen an increasing
number of applications like Twitter10, Debatepedia11, Facebook12 and many others, which allow people to
express their opinions about different issues. Let us consider for instance the following debate published on
Debatepedia: the issue of the debate is “Making Internet a right only benefits society”. The participants have
proposed various pro and con arguments concerning this issue, e.g., a pro argument claims that the Internet
delivers freedom of speech, and a con argument claims that the Internet is not as important as real rights like
the freedom from slavery. These kinds of debates are composed by tens of arguments in favour or against
a proposed issue. The main difficulty for newcomers is to understand the current holding position in the
debate, i.e., to understand which are the arguments that are accepted at a certain moment. This difficulty is
twofold: first, the participants have to remember all the different, possibly long, arguments and understand
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which are the relations among these arguments, and second they have to understand, given these relations,
which are the accepted arguments.
In this section, we answer the following research question: how to support the participants in natural
language (NL) debates to detect which are the relations among the arguments, and which arguments are
accepted? Two kinds of relations connect the arguments in such online debate platforms: a positive relation
(i.e., a support relation), and a negative relation (i.e., an attack relation). To answer to our research question
we need to rely on an argumentative framework able to deal with such bipolar relations. [133]’s abstract the-
ory defines an argumentation framework as a set of abstract arguments interacting with each others through
a so called attack relation. In the last years, several proposals to extend the original abstract theory with a
support relation have been addressed, leading to the birth of bipolar argumentation frameworks (BAF) [94],
and the further introduction of a number of additional attacks among the arguments [93, 55, 237].
Our research question breaks down into the following subquestions:
1. How to automatically identify the arguments, as well as their relationships, from natural language
debates?
2. What is the relation between the notion of support in bipolar argumentation and the notion of textual
entailment in natural language processing?
First, we propose to combine natural language techniques and Dung-like abstract argumentation to iden-
tify and generate the arguments from natural language text, and then to evaluate this set of arguments to know
which are the accepted ones. Starting from the participants’ opinions, we detect which ones imply or contra-
dict, even indirectly, the issue of the debate using the textual entailment approach. Beside formal approaches
to semantic inference that rely on logical representation of meaning, the notion of Textual Entailment (TE)
has been proposed as an applied framework to capture major semantic inference needs across applications
in the Computational Linguistics field [118]. The development of the Web has witnessed a paradigm shift,
due to the need to process a huge amount of available (but often noisy) data. TE is a generic framework
for applied semantics, where linguistic objects are mapped by means of semantic inferences at a textual
level. We use TE to automatically identify, from a natural language text, the arguments. Second, we adopt
bipolar argumentation [94] to reason over the set of generated arguments with the aim of deciding which
are the accepted ones. Proposals like argumentation schemes [318], Araucaria [271], Carneades [156], and
ArguMed [304] use natural language arguments, but they ask the participants to indicate the semantic rela-
tionship among the arguments, and the linguistic content remains unanalyzed. As underlined by [270], “the
goal machinery that leads to arguments being automatically generated has been only briefly touched upon,
and yet is clearly fundamental to the endeavor”. Summarizing, we combine the two approaches, i.e., tex-
tual entailment and abstract bipolar argumentation, in a framework whose aim is to (i) generate the abstract
arguments from the online debates through TE, (ii) build the argumentation framework from the arguments
and the relationships returned by the TE module, and (iii) return the set of accepted arguments. We evaluate
the feasibility of our combined approach on a data set extracted from a sample of Debatepedia debates.
Second, we study the relation among the notion of support in bipolar argumentation [94], and the notion
of TE in Natural Language Processing (NLP) [118]. In the first study of the current work, we assume the
TE relation extracted from NL texts as equivalent to a support relation in bipolar argumentation. This is a
strong assumption, and in this second part of our work we aim at verifying on a sample of real data from
Debatepedia whether it is always the case that support is equivalent to TE. In particular, for addressing this
issue we focus both on the relation between support and entailment, and on the relation between attack and
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contradiction. We show that TE and contradiction are more specific concepts than support and attack, but
still hold in most of the argument pairs. Moreover, starting from the comparative study addressed by [92],
we consider four additional attacks proposed in the literature: supported (if argument a supports argument
b and b attacks argument c, then a attacks c) and secondary (if a supports b and c attacks a, then c attacks
b) attacks [93], mediated attacks [55] (if a supports b and c attacks b, then c attacks a), and extended attacks
[238, 237] (if a supports b and a attacks c, then b attacks c). We investigate the presence and the distribution
of these attacks in NL debates on a data set extracted from Debatepedia, and we show that all these models
are verified in human debates, even if with a different frequency.
The originality of the proposed framework consists in the combination of two techniques which need
each other to provide a complete reasoning model: TE has the power to automatically identify the arguments
in the text and to specify which kind of relation links each couple of arguments, but it cannot assess which
are the winning arguments. This is addressed by argumentation theory which lacks automatic techniques
to extract the arguments from free text. The combination of these two approaches leads to the definition
of a powerful tool to reason over online debates. In addition, the benefit of the proposed deeper analysis
of the relation among the two notions of support and TE is twofold. First, it is used to verify, through a
data driven evaluation, the “goodness” of the proposed models of bipolar argumentation to be used in real
settings, going beyond ad hoc NL examples. Second, it can be used to guide the construction of cognitive
agents whose major need is to achieve a behavior as close as possible to the human one.
NLP approaches to semantic inference
Classical approaches to semantic inference rely on logical representations of meaning that are external
to the language itself, and are typically independent of the structure of any particular natural language.
Texts are first translated, or interpreted, into some logical form and then new propositions are inferred
from interpreted texts by a logical theorem prover. But, especially after the development of the Web, we
have witnessed a paradigm shift, due to the need to process a huge amount of available (but often noisy)
data. Addressing the inference task by means of logical theorem provers in automated applications aimed
at natural language understanding has shown several intrinsic limitations [48]. As highlighted in [232], in
formal approaches semanticists generally opt for rich (i.e. including at least first order logic) representation
formalisms to capture as many relevant aspects of the meaning as possible, but practicable methods for
generating such representations are very rare. The translation of real-world sentences into logic is difficult
because of issues such as ambiguity or vagueness [259]. Moreover, the computational costs of deploying
first-order logic theorem prover tools in real world situations may be prohibitive, and huge amounts of
additional linguistic and background knowledge are required. Formal approaches address forms of deductive
reasoning, and therefore often exhibit a too high level of precision and strictness as compared to human
judgments, that allow for uncertainties typical of inductive reasoning [58]. While it is possible to model
elementary inferences on the precise level allowed by deductive systems, many pragmatic aspects that play
a role in everyday inference cannot be accounted for. Inferences that are plausible but not logically stringent
cannot be modeled in a straightforward way, but in NLP applications approximate reasoning should be
preferred in some cases to having no answers at all.
Especially in data-driven approaches, like the one sought in this work, where patterns are learnt from
large-scale naturally-occurring data, we can settle for approximate answers provided by efficient and robust
systems, even at the price of logic unsoundness or incompleteness. Starting from these considerations,
[232] propose to address the inference task directly at the textual level instead, exploiting currently available
NLP techniques. While methods for automated deduction assume that the arguments in input are already
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expressed in some formal meaning representation (e.g. first order logic), addressing the inference task at a
textual level opens different and new challenges from those encountered in formal deduction. Indeed, more
emphasis is put on informal reasoning, lexical semantic knowledge, and variability of linguistic expressions.
The notion of Textual Entailment has been proposed as an applied framework to capture major semantic
inference needs across applications in NLP [118]. It is defined as a relation between a coherent textual
fragment (the Text T) and a language expression, which is considered as the Hypothesis (H). Entailment
holds (i.e. T ⇒ H) if the meaning of H can be inferred from the meaning of T, as interpreted by a typical
language user. The TE relationship is directional, since the meaning of one expression may usually entail
the other, while the opposite is much less certain. Consider the pairs in Example 31 and 32.
Example 31.
T1: Internet access is essential now; must be a right. The internet is only that wire that delivers freedom
of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of the press in a single connection.
H: Making Internet a right only benefits society.
Example 32 (Continued).
T2: Internet not as important as real rights. We may think of such trivial things as a fundamental right,
but consider the truly impoverished and what is most important to them. The right to vote, the right to liberty
and freedom from slavery or the right to elementary education.
H: Making Internet a right only benefits society.
A system aimed at recognizing TE should detect an inference relation between T1 and H (i.e. the
meaning of H can be derived from the meaning of T) in Example 31, while it should not detect an entailment
between T2 and H in Example 32. As introduced before, TE definition is based on (and assumes) common
human understanding of language, as well as common background knowledge. However, the entailment
relation is said to hold only if the statement in the text licenses the statement in the hypothesis, meaning
that the content of T and common knowledge together should entail H, and not background knowledge
alone. In this applied framework, inferences are performed directly over lexical-syntactic representations of
the texts. Such definition of TE captures quite broadly the reasoning about language variability needed by
different applications aimed at NL understanding and processing, e.g. information extraction [275] and text
summarization [24]. Differently from the classical semantic definition of entailment [106], the notion of TE
accounts for some degree of uncertainty allowed in applications (see Example 31).
In 2005, the PASCAL Network of Excellence started an attempt to promote a generic evaluation frame-
work covering semantic-oriented inferences needed for practical applications, launching the Recognizing
Textual Entailment challenge [118], with the aim of setting a unifying benchmark for the development and
evaluation of methods that typically address similar problems in different, application-oriented, manners.
As many of the needs of several NLP applications can be cast in terms of TE, the goal of the evaluation
campaign is to promote the development of general entailment recognition engines, designed to provide
generic modules across applications. Since 2005, such initiative has been repeated yearly13, asking the
participants to develop a system that, given two text fragments (the text T and the hypothesis H), can de-
termine whether the meaning of one text is entailed, i.e. can be inferred, from the other. For pairs where
13http://aclweb.org/aclwiki/index.php?title=Recognizing_Textual_Entailment
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the entailment relation does not hold between T and H, systems are required to make a further distinction
between pairs where the entailment does not hold because the content of H is contradicted by the content
of T (i.e. contradiction, see Example 32), and pairs where the entailment cannot be determined because the
truth of H cannot be verified on the basis of the content of T (i.e. unknown, see Example 33). [215] provide
a definition of contradiction for the TE task, claiming that it occurs when two sentences i) are extremely
unlikely to be true simultaneously, and ii) involve the same event. This three-way judgment task (entailment
vs contradiction vs unknown) was introduced since RTE-4, while before a two-way decision task (entail-
ment vs no entailment) was asked to participating systems. However, the classic two-way task is offered as
an alternative also in recent editions of the evaluation campaign (contradiction and unknown judgments are
collapsed into the judgment no entailment).
In our work, we consider the three way scenario to map TE relation with bipolar argumentation, focusing
both on the relation between support and entailment, and on the relation between attack and contradiction.
As will be discussed later on in this section, we consider argument pairs connected by a relation of support
(but where the first argument does not entail the second one), and argument pairs connected by a relation
of attack (but where the first argument does not contradict the second one) as unknown pairs in the TE
framework.
Example 33 (Continued).
T3: Internet “right” means denying parents’ ability to set limits. Do you want to make a world when
a mother tells her child: “you cannot stay on the internet anymore” that she has taken a right from him?
Compare taking the right for a home or for education with taking the “right” to access the internet.
H: Internet access is essential now; must be a right. The internet is only that wire that delivers freedom
of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of the press in a single connection.
The systems submitted to the RTE challenge are tested against manually annotated data sets, which
include typical examples that correspond to success and failure cases of NLP applications. A number of
data-driven approaches applied to semantics have been experimented throughout the years. In general, the
approaches still more used by the submitted systems include Machine Learning (typically SVM), logical
inference, cross-pair similarity measures between T and H, and word alignment - for an overview, see [5],
and [118].
Bipolar argumentation
This section provides the basic concepts of bipolar argumentation [94].
Bipolar argumentation frameworks, firstly proposed by [94], extend Dung’s framework taking into ac-
count both the attack relation and the support relation. In particular, an abstract bipolar argumentation
framework is a labeled directed graph, with two labels indicating either attack or support. In this section,
we represent the attack relation by a→ b, and the support relation by a⇒ b.
Definition 63. (Bipolar argumentation framework) A bipolar argumentation framework (BAF) is a tuple
〈Ar,→,⇒〉 where A is the set of elements called arguments, and two binary relations over Ar are called
attack and support, respectively.
[92] address a formal analysis of the models of support in bipolar argumentation to achieve a better
understanding of this notion and its uses. [94, 93] argue about the emergence of new kinds of attacks from the
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interaction between attacks and supports in BAF. In the rest of the section, we will adopt their terminology
to refer to additional attacks, i.e., complex attacks. In particular, they specify two kinds of complex attacks
called secondary and supported attacks, respectively.
Definition 64. (Secondary and supported attacks) Let BAF = 〈Ar,→,⇒〉 where a,b ∈ Ar. A supported
attack for b by a is a sequence a1R1 . . .Rn−1an, n≥ 3, with a1 = a,an = b, such that ∀i = 1 . . .n−2,Ri =⇒
and Rn−1 =→. A secondary attack for b by a is a sequence a1R1 . . .Rn−1an, n≥ 3, with a1 = a,an = b, such
that R1 =→ and ∀i = 2 . . . n-1,Ri =⇒.
According to the above definition, these attacks hold in the first two cases depicted in Figure 5.1, where
there is a supported attack from a to c, and there is a secondary attack from c to b. In this section, we
represent complex attacks using a dotted arrow.
b ca a bc b ca
Supported attack Secondary attack Mediated attack
Figure 5.1: Additional attacks emerging from the interaction of supports and attacks.
The support relation has been specialized in other approaches where new complex attacks emerging from
the combination of existing attacks and supports are proposed. [55] propose a deductive view of support in
abstract argumentation where, given the support a⇒ b the acceptance of a implies the acceptance of b, and
the rejection of b implies the rejection of a. They introduce a new kind of complex attacks called mediated
attacks (Figure 5.1).
Definition 65. (Mediated attacks) Let BAF = 〈Ar,→,⇒〉 where a,b ∈ Ar. A mediated attack on b by a is a
sequence a1R1 . . .Rn−2an−1 and anRn−1an−1, n ≥ 3, with a1 = a,an−1 = b,an = c, such that Rn−1 =→ and
∀i = 1 . . . n-2,Ri =⇒.
[238, 237] propose, instead, an account of support called necessary support. In this framework, given
a⇒ b then the acceptance of a is necessary to get the acceptance of b, i.e., the acceptance of b implies the
acceptance of a. They introduce two new kinds of complex attacks called extended attacks (Figure 5.1).
Note that the first kind of extended attacks is equivalent to the secondary attacks introduced by [94, 93],
and that the second case is the dual of supported attacks. See [92] for a formal comparison of the different
models of support in bipolar argumentation.
Definition 66. (Extended attacks) Let BAF = 〈Ar,→,⇒〉 where a,b ∈ Ar. An extended attack on b by a is
a sequence a1R1a2R2 . . .Rnan, n ≥ 3, with a1 = a,an = b, such that R1 =→ and ∀i = 2 . . . n,Ri =⇒, or a
sequence a1R1 . . .Rnan and a1Rpap, n≥ 2, with an = a,ap = b, such that Rp =→ and ∀i = 1 . . . n,Ri =⇒.
All these models of support in bipolar argumentation address the problem of how to compute the set of
extensions from the extended framework providing different kinds of solutions, i.e., introducing the notion
of safety in BAF [94], or computing the extensions in the meta-level [55, 93]. In this section, we are not
interested in discussing and evaluating these different solutions. Our aim is to evaluate how much these
different models of support occur and are effectively “exploited” in natural language dialogues, towards a
better understanding of the notion of support and attack in bipolar argumentation.
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We are aware that the notion of support is controversial in the field of argumentation theory. In particular,
another view of support sees this relation as a relation holding among the premises and the conclusion of
a structured argument, and not as another relation among atomic arguments [263]. However, given the
amount of attention bipolar argumentation is receiving in the literature [266], a better account of this kind
of frameworks is required.
Another approach to model support has been proposed by [241] and [242], where they distinguish among
prima-facie arguments and standard ones. They show how a set of arguments described using Dung’s
argumentation framework can be mapped from and to an argumentation framework that includes both attack
and support relations. The idea is that an argument can be accepted only if there is an evidence supporting
it, i.e., evidence is represented by means of prima-facie arguments. In this section, we do not intend to take
a position in this debate. We focus our analysis on the abstract models of bipolar argumentation proposed in
the literature [93, 55, 237], and we leave as future work the account of support in structured argumentation
and the model proposed by [241] and [242].
Casting bipolar argumentation as a TE problem
The goal of our work is to propose an approach to support the participants in forums or debates (e.g. Debate-
pedia, Twitter) to detect which arguments among the ones expressed by the other participants on a certain
topic are accepted. As a first step, we need to (i) automatically generate the arguments (i.e. recognize a
participant’s opinion on a certain topic as an argument), as well as (ii) detect their relation with respect to
the other arguments. We cast the described problem as a TE problem, where the T-H pair is a pair of argu-
ments expressed by two different participants in a debate on a certain topic. For instance, given the argument
“Making Internet a right only benefits society” (that we consider as H as a starting point), participants can be
in favor of it (expressing arguments from which H can be inferred, as in Example 31), or can contradict such
argument (expressing an opinion against it, as in Example 32). Since in debates one participant’s argument
comes after the other, we can extract such arguments and compare them both w.r.t. the main issue, and
w.r.t. the other participants’ arguments (when the new argument entails or contradicts one of the arguments
previously expressed by another participant). For instance, given the same debate as before, a new argument
T3 may be expressed by a third participant to contradict T2 (that becomes the new H (H1) in the pair), as
shown in Example 34.
Example 34 (Continued).
T3: I’ve seen the growing awareness within the developing world that computers and connectivity matter
and can be useful. It’s not that computers matter more than water, food, shelter and healthcare, but that
the network and PCs can be used to ensure that those other things are available. Satellite imagery sent to
a local computer can help villages find fresh water, mobile phones can tell farmers the prices at market so
they know when to harvest.
T2 ≡ H1: Internet not as important as real rights. We may think of such trivial things as a fundamental
right, but consider the truly impoverished and what is most important to them. The right to vote, the right
to liberty and freedom from slavery or the right to elementary education.
With respect to the goal of our work, TE provides us with the techniques to identify the arguments in a
debate, and to detect which kind of relation underlies each couple of arguments. A TE system returns indeed
a judgment (entailment or contradiction) on the arguments pairs related to a certain topic, that are used as
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input to build the argumentation framework, as described in the next section. Example 35 presents how we
combine TE with bipolar argumentation to compute at the end the set of accepted arguments.
Example 35 (Continued).
The textual entailment phase returns the following couples for the natural language opinions detailed in
Examples 31, 32, and 34:
• T1 entails H
• T2 attacks H
• T3 attacks H1 (i.e., T2)
Given this result, the argumentation module of our framework maps each element to its corresponding
argument: H ≡ A1, T1 ≡ A2, T2 ≡ A3, and T3 ≡ A4. The resulting argumentation framework, visualized in
Figure 5.2, shows that the accepted arguments (using admissibility-based semantics) are {A1,A2,A4}. This
means that the issue “Making Internet a right only benefits society”’ A1 is considered as accepted. Double
bordered arguments are the accepted ones.
A1A4 A3
A2
Figure 5.2: The argumentation framework built from the results of the TE module for Examples 31, 32,
and 34.
Experimental setting
As a case study to experiment the combination of TE and argumentation theory to support the interaction of
participants in online debates, we select Debatepedia, an encyclopedia of pro and con arguments on critical
issues. First, we describe the creation of the data set of T-H pairs extracted from a sample of Debatepedia
topics, then we present the TE system we use, and we report on obtained results.
Data set. To create the data set of arguments pairs to evaluate our task, we follow the criteria defined
and used by the organizers of RTE (see Section 5.3). To test the progress of TE systems in a comparable
setting, the participants to RTE are provided with data sets composed of T-H pairs involving various levels
of entailment reasoning (e.g. lexical, syntactic), and TE systems are required to produce a correct judgment
on the given pairs (i.e. to say if the meaning of one text snippet can be inferred from the other). The data
available for the RTE challenges are not suitable for our goal, since the pairs are extracted from news and
are not linked among each others (i.e. they do not report opinions on a certain topic).
For this reason, we created a data set to evaluate our combined approach focusing on Debatepedia. We
manually selected a set of topics (Table 5.3 column Topics) of Debatepedia debates, and for each topic we
apply the following procedure:
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1. the main issue (i.e., the title of the debate in its affirmative form) is considered as the starting argument;
2. each user opinion is extracted and considered as an argument;
3. since attack and support are binary relations, the arguments are coupled with:
a) the starting argument, or
b) other arguments in the same discussion to which the most recent argument refers (i.e., when a
user opinion supports or attacks an argument previously expressed by another user, we couple
the former with the latter), following the chronological order to maintain the dialogue structure;
4. the resulting pairs of arguments are then tagged with the appropriate relation, i.e., attack or support14.
Using Debatepedia as case study provides us with already annotated arguments (pro ⇒ entailment15,
and con⇒ contradiction), and casts our task as a yes/no entailment task. To show a step-by-step application
of the procedure, let us consider the debated issue Can coca be classified as a narcotic?. At step 1, we
transform its title into the affirmative form, and we consider it as the starting argument (a). Then, at step 2,
we extract all the users opinions concerning this issue (both pro and con), e.g., (b), (c) and (d):
Example 36.
(a) Coca can be classified as a narcotic.
(b) In 1992 the World Health Organization’s Expert Committee on Drug Dependence (ECDD) undertook
a “prereview” of coca leaf at its 28th meeting. The 28th ECDD report concluded that, “the coca leaf is
appropriately scheduled as a narcotic under the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, since cocaine
is readily extractable from the leaf.” This ease of extraction makes coca and cocaine inextricably linked.
Therefore, because cocaine is defined as a narcotic, coca must also be defined in this way.
(c) Coca in its natural state is not a narcotic. What is absurd about the 1961 convention is that it considers
the coca leaf in its natural, unaltered state to be a narcotic. The paste or the concentrate that is extracted
from the coca leaf, commonly known as cocaine, is indeed a narcotic, but the plant itself is not.
(d) Coca is not cocaine. Coca is distinct from cocaine. Coca is a natural leaf with very mild effects when
chewed. Cocaine is a highly processed and concentrated drug using derivatives from coca, and therefore
should not be considered as a narcotic.
At step 3a we couple the arguments (b) and (d) with the starting issue since they are directly linked with it,
and at step 3b we couple argument (c) with argument (b), and argument (d) with argument (c) since they
follow one another in the discussion (i.e. user expressing argument (c) answers back to user expressing
argument (b), so the arguments are concatenated - the same for arguments (d) and (c)).
At step 4, the resulting pairs of arguments are then tagged with the appropriate relation: (b) supports (a),
(d) attacks (a), (c) attacks (b) and (d) supports (c).
We collected 200 T-H pairs (Table 5.3), 100 to train and 100 to test the TE system (each data set is com-
posed by 55 entailment and 45 contradiction pairs). The pairs considered for the test set concern completely
new topics, never seen by the system.
14The data set is freely available at http://bit.ly/debatepedia_ds.
15Here we consider only arguments implying another argument. Arguments “supporting” another argument, but not inferring it
will be discussed in Section 5.3.




Violent games boost aggressiveness 16 15 8 7
China one-child policy 11 10 6 4
Consider coca as a narcotic 15 14 7 7
Child beauty contests 12 11 7 4
Arming Libyan rebels 10 9 4 5
Random alcohol breath tests 8 7 4 3
Osama death photo 11 10 5 5
Privatizing social security 11 10 5 5
Internet access as a right 15 14 9 5




Ground zero mosque 9 8 3 5
Mandatory military service 11 10 3 7
No fly zone over Libya 11 10 6 4
Airport security profiling 9 8 4 4
Solar energy 16 15 11 4
Natural gas vehicles 12 11 5 6
Use of cell phones while driving 11 10 5 5
Marijuana legalization 17 16 10 6
Gay marriage as a right 7 6 4 2
Vegetarianism 7 6 4 2
TOTAL 110 100 55 45
Table 5.1: The Debatepedia data set used in our experiments.
TE system. To detect which kind of relation underlies each couple of arguments, we take advantage of the
modular architecture of the EDITS system (Edit Distance Textual Entailment Suite) version 3.0, an open-
source software package for recognizing TE16 [189]. EDITS implements a distance-based framework which
assumes that the probability of an entailment relation between a given T-H pair is inversely proportional to
the distance between T and H (i.e., the higher the distance, the lower is the probability of entailment).17
Within this framework the system implements different approaches to distance computation, i.e., both edit
distance algorithms (that calculate the T-H distance as the cost of the edit operations, i.e., insertion, deletion
16http://edits.fbk.eu/
17In previous RTE challenges, EDITS always ranked among the 5 best participating systems out of an average of 25 systems, and
is one of the few RTE systems available as open source http://aclweb.org/aclwiki/index.php?title=Textual_
Entailment_Resource_Pool
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no 0.56 0.55 0.58 0.55
Table 5.2: Systems performances on the Debatepedia data set (precision, recall and accuracy)
and substitution that are necessary to transform T into H), and similarity algorithms. Each algorithm returns
a normalized distance score. At a training stage, distance scores calculated over annotated T-H pairs are
used to estimate a threshold that best separates positive from negative examples. Such threshold is then used
at a test stage to assign a judgment and a confidence score to each test pair.
Evaluation. To evaluate our combined approach, we carry out a two-step evaluation: first, we assess the
performances of the TE system to correctly assign the entailment and contradiction relations to the pairs
of arguments in the Debatepedia data set. Then, we evaluate how much such performances impact on the
application of the argumentation theory module, i.e. how much a wrong assignment of a relation to a pair
of arguments is propagated in the argumentation framework.
For the first evaluation, we run EDITS on the Debatepedia training set to learn the model, and we test
it on the test set. We tuned EDITS in the following configuration: i) cosine similarity as the core distance
algorithm, ii) distance calculated on lemmas, and iii) a stopword list is defined to set no distance between
stopwords. We use the system off-the-shelf, applying one of its basic configurations. As future work,
we plan to fully exploit EDITS features, integrating background and linguistic knowledge in the form of
entailment rules, and to calculate the distance between T and H on their syntactic structure.
Table 5.2 reports on the obtained results both using EDITS and using a baseline that applies a Word
Overlap algorithm on tokenized text. Even using a basic configuration of EDITS, and a small data set (100
pairs for training) performances on Debatepedia test set are promising, and in line with performances of TE
systems on RTE data sets (usually containing about 1000 pairs for training and 1000 for test). In order to
understand if increasing the number of argument pairs in the training set could bring to an improvement in
the system performances, the EDITS learning curve is visualized in Figure 5.3. Note that augmenting the
number of training pairs actually improves EDITS accuracy on the test set, meaning that we should consider
extending the Debatepedia data set for future work.
As a second step in our evaluation phase, we consider the impact of EDITS performances on the ac-
ceptability of the arguments, i.e. how much a wrong assignment of a relation to a pair of arguments affects
the acceptability of the arguments in the argumentation framework. We use admissibility-based seman-
tics to identify the accepted arguments both on the correct argumentation framework of each Debatepedia
topic (where entailment/contradiction relations are correctly assigned, i.e. the goldstandard), and on the
framework generated assigning the relations resulted from the TE system judgments. The precision of the
combined approach we propose in the identification of the accepted arguments is on average 0.74 (i.e. ar-
guments accepted by the combined system and by the goldstandard w.r.t. a certain Debatepedia topic), and
the recall is 0.76 (i.e. arguments accepted in the goldstandard and retrieved as accepted by the combined
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Figure 5.3: EDITS learning curve on Debatepedia data set
system). Its accuracy (i.e. ability of the combined system to accept some arguments and discard some
others) is 0.75, meaning that the TE system mistakes in relation assignment propagate in the argumentation
framework, but results are still satisfying.
Extending the analysis on bipolar argumentation beyond TE
In the previous section, we assumed the TE relation extracted from NL texts as equivalent to the support
relation in bipolar argumentation. On closer view, this is a strong assumption. In this second part of our
work, we aim at verifying on an extended sample of real data from Debatepedia whether it is always the
case that support is equivalent to TE. In particular, for addressing this issue, we focus both on the relations
between support and entailment, and on the relations between attack and contradiction. We extend the
data set we presented, extracting an additional set of arguments from Debatepedia topics. Even if our
data set cannot be exhaustive, the methodology we apply for the arguments extraction aims at preserving
the original structure of the debate, to make it as representative as possible of daily human interactions in
natural language.
Two different empirical studies are presented in this section. The first one follows the analysis presented
in Section 5.3, and explores the relation among the notion of support and attack in bipolar argumentation,
and the semantic inferences as defined in NLP. The second analysis starts instead from the comparative
study of [92] of the four complex attacks proposed in the literature (see Section 5.3), and investigates their
distribution in NL debates.
Data set. We select the same topics as for the first version of the dataset, since this is the only freely
available data set of natural language arguments (Table 5.3, column Topics). But Since that data set was
created respecting the assumption that the TE relation and the support relation are equivalent, in all the
previously collected pairs both TE and support relations (or contradiction and attack relations) hold.
In this study we want to move a step further, to understand whether it is always the case that support
is equivalent to TE (and contradiction to attack). We therefore apply again the extraction methodology
described before to extend our data set. In total, our new data set contains 310 different arguments and
320 argument pairs (179 expressing the support relation among the involved arguments, and 141 expressing
the attack relation, see Table 5.3). We consider the obtained data set as representative of human debates in
a non-controlled setting (Debatepedia users position their arguments with respect to the others as PRO or
CON, the data are not biased), and we use it for our empirical studies.
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DEBATEPEDIA data set
Topic #argum #pairs
VIOLENT GAMES BOOST AGGRESSIVENESS 17 23
CHINA ONE-CHILD POLICY 11 14
CONSIDER COCA AS A NARCOTIC 17 22
CHILD BEAUTY CONTESTS 13 17
ARMING LIBYAN REBELS 13 15
RANDOM ALCOHOL BREATH TESTS 11 14
OSAMA DEATH PHOTO 22 24
PRIVATIZING SOCIAL SECURITY 12 13
INTERNET ACCESS AS A RIGHT 15 17
GROUND ZERO MOSQUE 11 12
MANDATORY MILITARY SERVICE 15 17
NO FLY ZONE OVER LIBYA 18 19
AIRPORT SECURITY PROFILING 12 13
SOLAR ENERGY 18 19
NATURAL GAS VEHICLES 16 17
USE OF CELL PHONES WHILE DRIVING 16 16
MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION 23 25
GAY MARRIAGE AS A RIGHT 10 10
VEGETARIANISM 14 13
TOTAL 310 320
Table 5.3: Debatepedia data set.
First study: support and TE. Our first empirical study aims at a better understanding of the relation
among the notion of support in bipolar argumentation [92], and the definition of semantic inference in NLP
(in particular, the more specific notion of TE) [118].
Basing on the TE definition, an annotator with skills in linguistics has carried out a first phase of an-
notation of the Debatepedia data set. The goal of such annotation is to individually consider each pair of
support and attack among arguments, and to additionally tag them as entailment, contradiction or null. The
null judgment can be assigned in case an argument is supporting another argument without inferring it, or
the argument is attacking another argument without contradicting it. As exemplified in Example 36, a cor-
rect entailment pair is (b) ⇒ (a), while a contradiction is (d) ; (a). A null judgment is assigned to (d) -
(c), since the former argument supports the latter without inferring it. Our data set is an extended version
of [72]’s one allowing for a deeper investigation.
To assess the validity of the annotation task, we calculate the inter-annotator agreement. Another anno-
tator with skills in linguistics has therefore independently annotated a sample of 100 pairs of the data set.
We calculated the inter-annotator agreement considering the argument pairs tagged as support and attacks
by both annotators, and we verify the agreement between the pairs tagged as entailment and as null (i.e. no
entailment), and as contradiction and as null (i.e. no contradiction), respectively. Applying κ to our data,
the agreement for our task is κ = 0.74. As a rule of thumb, this is a satisfactory agreement.
Table 5.4 reports the results of the annotation on our Debatepedia data set, as resulting after a reconcili-
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ation phase carried out by the annotators18.
Relations % arguments (# arg.)
support
+ entailment 61.6 (111)
- entailment (null) 38.4 (69)
attack
+ contradiction 71.4 (100)
- contradiction (null) 28.6 (40)
Table 5.4: Support and TE relations on Debatepedia data set.
On the 320 pairs of the data set, 180 represent a support relation, while 140 are attacks. Considering
only the supports, we can see that 111 argument pairs (i.e., 61.6%) are an actual entailment, while in 38.4%
of the cases the first argument of the pair supports the second one without inferring it (e.g. (d) - (c) in
Example 36). With respect to the attacks, we can notice that 100 argument pairs (i.e., 71.4%) are both attack
and contradiction, while only the 28.6% of the argument pairs does not contradict the arguments they are
attacking, as in Example 37.
Example 37.
(e) Coca chewing is bad for human health. The decision to ban coca chewing fifty years ago was based on a
1950 report elaborated by the UN Commission of Inquiry on the Coca Leaf with a mandate from ECOSOC:
“We believe that the daily, inveterate use of coca leaves by chewing is thoroughly noxious and therefore
detrimental”.
(f) Chewing coca offers an energy boost. Coca provides an energy boost for working or for combating
fatigue and cold.
Differently from the relation between support-entailment, the difference between attack and contradic-
tion is more subtle, and it is not always straightforward to say whether an argument attacks another argument
without contradicting it. In Example 37, we consider that (e) does not contradict (f) even if it attacks (f),
since chewing coca can offer an energy boost, and still be bad for human health. This kind of attacks is less
frequent than the attacks-contradictions (see Table 5.4).
Considering the three way scenario to map TE relation with bipolar argumentation, argument pairs con-
nected by a relation of support (but where the first argument does not entail the second one), and argument
pairs connected by a relation of attack (but where the first argument does not contradict the second one)
have to be mapped as unknown pairs in the TE framework. The unknown relation in TE refers to the T-H
pairs where the entailment cannot be determined because the truth of H cannot be verified on the basis of
the content of T. This is a broad definition, that can apply also to pairs of non related sentences (that are
considered as unrelated arguments in bipolar argumentation).
From an application viewpoint, as highlighted in [270] and [167], argumentation theory should be used
as a tool in on-line discussions applications to identify the relations among the statements, and provide a
structure to the dialogue to easily evaluate the user’s opinions. Starting from the methodology proposed in
Section 5.3 for passing from natural language arguments to a bipolar argumentation framework, our study
18In this phase, the annotators discuss the results to find an agreement on the annotation to be released.
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demonstrates that applying the TE approach would be productive in the 66% of the Debatepedia data set.
Other techniques should then be experimented to cover the other cases, for instance measuring the semantic
relatedness of the two propositions using Latent Semantics Analysis techniques [191].
Second study: complex attacks. We carry out now a comparative evaluation of the four additional attacks
proposed in the literature, and we investigate their meaning and distribution on the sample of NL arguments.
Basing on the additional attacks (Section 5.3), and the original AF of each topic in our data set (Ta-
ble 5.3), the following procedure is applied: the supported (secondary, mediated, and extended, respectively)
attacks are added, and the argument pairs resulting from coupling the arguments linked by this relation are
collected in the data set “supported (secondary, mediated, and extended, respectively) attack”. Collecting
the argument pairs generated from the different types of complex attacks in separate data sets allows us to
independently analyze each type, and to perform a more accurate evaluation.19 Figures 5.4a-d show the four
AFs resulting from the addition of the complex attacks in the example Can coca be classified as a narcotic?.
Note that the AF in Figure 5.4a, where the supported attack is introduced, is the same of Figure 5.4b where
the mediated attack is introduced. Notice that, even if the additional attack which is introduced coincide,
i.e., d attacks b, this is due indeed to different interactions among supports and attacks (as highlighted in the
figure), i.e., in the case of supported attacks this is due to the support from d to c and the attack from c to b,






















Figure 5.4: The bipolar argumentation framework with the introduction of complex attacks. The top figures
show which combination of support and attack generates the new additional attack.
A second annotation phase is then carried out on the data set, to verify if the generated argument pairs
of the four data sets are actually attacks (i.e., if the models of complex attacks proposed in the literature are
represented in real data). More specifically, an argument pair resulting from the application of a complex
attack can be annotated as: attack (if it is a correct attack) or as unrelated (in case the meanings of the
two arguments are not in conflict). For instance, the argument pair (g)-(h) (Example 38) resulting from the
insertion of a supported attack, cannot be considered as an attack since the arguments are considering two
different aspects of the issue.
Example 38. (g) Chewing coca offers an energy boost. Coca provides an energy boost for working or for
combating fatigue and cold.
19Data sets freely available for research purposes at http://bit.ly/VZIs6M
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(h) Coca can be classified as a narcotic.
In the annotation, attacks are then annotated also as contradiction (if the first argument contradicts the
other) or null (in case the first argument does not contradict the argument it is attacking, as in Example
37). Due to the complexity of the annotation, the same annotation task has been independently carried
out also by a second annotator, so as to compute inter-annotator agreement. It has been calculated on a
sample of 80 argument pairs (20 pairs randomly extracted from each of the “complex attacks” data set), and
it has the goal to assess the validity of the annotation task (counting when the judges agree on the same
annotation). We calculated the inter-annotator agreement for our annotation task in two steps. We (i) verify
the agreement of the two judges on the argument pairs classification attacks/unrelated, and (ii) consider
only the argument pairs tagged as attacks by both annotators, and we verify the agreement between the pairs
tagged as contradiction and as null (i.e. no contradiction). Applying κ to our data, the agreement for the first
step is κ = 0.77, while for the second step κ = 0.71. As a rule of thumb, both agreements are satisfactory,
although they reflect the higher complexity of the second annotation (contradiction/null), as pointed out
before.
The distribution of complex attacks in the Debatepedia data set, as resulting after a reconciliation phase
carried out by the annotators, is shown in Table 5.5. As can be noticed, the mediated attack is the most fre-
quent type of attack, generating 335 new argument pairs in the NL sample we considered (i.e. the conditions
that allow the application of this kind of complex attacks appear more frequently in real debates). Together
with secondary attacks, they appear in the AFs of all the debated topics. On the contrary, extended attacks
are added in 11 out of 19 topics, and supported attacks in 17 out of 19 topics. Considering all the topics,
on average only 6 pairs generated from the additional attacks were already present in the original data set,
meaning that considering also these attacks is a way to hugely enrich our data set of NL debates.
Proposed models # occ. attacks unrelated
+ contr (null) - contr (null)
Supported attacks 47 23 17 7
Secondary attacks 53 29 18 6
Mediated attacks 335 84 148 103
Extended attacks 28 15 10 3
Table 5.5: Complex attacks distribution in our data set.
Figure 5.5 graphically represents the complex attacks distribution. Considering the first step of the
annotation (i.e. attacks vs unrelated), the figure shows that the latter case is very infrequent, and that (except
for mediated attacks) on average only 10% of the argument pairs are tagged as unrelated. This observation
can be considered as a proof of concept of the four theoretical models of complex attacks we analyzed. Due
to the fact that the conditions for the application of the mediated attacks are verified more often in the data,
it has the drawback of generating more unrelated pairs. Still, the number of successful cases is high enough
to consider this kind of attack as representative of human interactions. Considering the second step of the
annotation (i.e. attacks as contradiction or null), we can see that results are in line with those reported in
our first study (Table 5.4), meaning that also among complex attacks the same distribution is maintained.
The research presented in this section is interdisciplinary. We have integrated in a combined framework
an approach from computational linguistics and a technique for non-monotonic reasoning. The aim of this
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Figure 5.5: Complex attacks distribution in our data set.
research is to provide the participants of online debates and forums with a framework supporting their inter-
action with the application. In particular, the proposed framework helps the participants to have an overview
of the debates, understanding which are the accepted arguments at time being. The key contribution of our
research is to allow the automatic detection and generation of the abstract arguments from natural language
texts.
5.4 A Support Framework for Argumentative Discussions Management in
the Web
On the Social Web, wiki-like platforms allow users to publicly publish their own arguments and opinions.
Such arguments are not always accepted by other users on the Web, leading to the publication of additional
arguments attacking or supporting the previously proposed ones. The most well known example of such
kind of platform is Wikipedia20 where users may change pieces of text written by other users to support,
i.e., further specify them, or attack them, i.e., correcting factual errors or highlighting opposite points of
view. Managing such kind of “discussions” using the revision history is a tricky task, and it may be affected
by a number of drawbacks. First, the dimension of these discussions makes it difficult for both users and
community managers to navigate, and more importantly, understand the meaning of the ongoing discussion.
Second, the discussions risk to re-start when newcomers propose arguments which have already been pro-
posed and addressed in the same context. Third, these discussions are not provided in a machine-readable
format to be queried by community managers to discover insightful meta-information on the discussions
themselves, e.g., discover the number of attacks against arguments about a particular politician concerning
the economic growth during his government.
In this section, we answer the following research question: how to support community managers in
managing the discussions on the wiki pages? This question breaks down into the following subquestions:
(i) how to automatically discover the arguments and the relations among them?, and (ii) how to have the
overall view of the ongoing discussion to detect the winning arguments? The answer to these sub-questions
allows us to answer to further questions: how to detect repeated arguments and avoid loops of changes?,
20http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page
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and how to discover further information on the discussion history? Approaches such as the lightweight
vocabulary SIOC Argumentation [193] provide means to model argumentative discussions of social media
sites, but they are not able to automatically acquire information about the argumentative structures. As
underlined by Lange et al. [193], such a kind of automatic annotation needs the introduction of Natural
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Figure 5.6: An overview of the proposed approach to support community managers.
In this work, we propose a combined framework where a natural language module that automatically de-
tects the arguments and their relations (i.e. support or challenge), is coupled with an argumentation module
to have the overall view of the discussion and detect the winning arguments, as visualized in Figure 5.6.
First, to automatically detect natural language arguments and their relations, we rely on the Textual En-
tailment (TE) framework, proposed as an applied model to capture major semantic inference needs across
applications in the NLP field [118]. Differently from formal approaches to semantic inference, in TE lin-
guistic objects are mapped by means of semantic inferences at a textual level.
Second, we adopt abstract argumentation theory [132] to unify the results of the TE module into a unique
argumentation framework able not only to provide the overall view of the discussion, but also to detect the
set of accepted arguments relying on argumentation semantics. Argumentation theory aims at representing
the different opinions of the users in a structured way to support decision making.
Finally, the generated argumentative discussions are described using an extension of the SIOC Argu-
mentation vocabulary21 thus providing a machine readable version. Such discussions expressed using RDF
allow the extraction of a kind of “meta-information” by means of queries, e.g., in SPARQL. These meta-
information cannot be easily detected by human users without the support of our automatic framework.
The aim of the proposed framework is twofold: on one side, we want to provide a support to commu-
nity managers for notification and reporting, e.g., notify the users when their own arguments are attacked,
and on the other hand, we support community managers to extract further insightful information from the
argumentative discussions. As a case study, we apply and experiment our framework on Wikipedia revision
history over a four-year period, focusing in particular on the top five most revised articles.
21http://rdfs.org/sioc/argument
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The Combined Framework
In a recent work, Cabrio and Villata [67] propose to combine natural language techniques and Dung-like
abstract argumentation to generate the arguments from natural language text and to evaluate this set of argu-
ments to know which are the accepted ones, with the goal of supporting the participants in natural language
debates (i.e. Debatepedia22). In particular, they adopt the TE approach, and in their experiments, they rep-
resent the TE relation extracted from natural language texts as a support relation in bipolar argumentation.
In this section, we start from their observations, and we apply the combined framework proposed in [67] to
this new scenario.
Let us consider the argument in Example 39 from the Wikipedia article “United States”, and its revised
versions in the last four years23:
Example 39.
In 2012: The land area of the contiguous United States is 2,959,064 square miles (7,663,941 km2).
In 2011: The land area of the contiguous United States is approximately 1,800 million acres (7,300,000 km2).
In 2010: The land area of the contiguous United States is approximately 1.9 billion acres (770 million hectares).
In 2009: The total land area of the contiguous United States is approximately 1.9 billion acres.
Several revisions have been carried out by different users during this four-year period, both to correct factual
data concerning the U.S. surface, or to better specify them (e.g. providing the same value using alternative
metric units). Following [67], we propose to take advantage of NLP techniques to automatically detect the
relations among the revised versions of the same argument, to verify if the revisions done on the argument
by a certain user at a certain point in time support the original argument (i.e. the user has rephrased the
sentence to allow an easier comprehension of it, or has added more details), or attack it (i.e. the user has
corrected some data, has deleted some details present in the previous version or has changed the semantics
of the sentence providing a different viewpoint on the same content). Given the high similarities among
the entailment and contradiction notions in TE and the support and attack relation in argumentation theory,
we cast the described problem as a TE problem, where the T-H pair is a pair of revised arguments in
two successive Wikipedia versions. We consider paraphrases as bidirectional entailment, and therefore
to be annotated as a positive TE pair (i.e. support). Moreover, since the label no entailment includes both
contradictions and pairs containing incomplete informational overlap (i.e. H is more informative than T), we
consider both cases as attacks, since we want community managers to check the reliability of the corrected
or deleted information. To build the T-H pairs required by the TE framework, for each argument we set the
revised sentence as T and the original sentence as H, following the chronological sequence, since we want
to verify if the more recent version entails or not the previous one, as shown in Example 40.
Example 40 (Continued).
pair id=70.1 entailment=NO
T (Wiki12): The land area of the contiguous United States is 2,959,064 square miles (7,663,941 km2).
H (Wiki11): The land area of the contiguous United States is approximately 1,800 million acres (7,300,000 km2).
pair id=70.2 entailment=NO
T (Wiki11): The land area of the contiguous United States is approximately 1,800 million acres (7,300,000 km2).
H (Wiki10): The land area of the contiguous United States is approximately 1.9 billion acres (770 million hectares).
22http://bit.ly/Dabatepedia
23Since we are aware that Wikipedia versions are revised daily, we have picked our example from a random dump per year.
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pair id=70.3 entailment=YES
T (Wiki10): The land area of the contiguous United States is approximately 1.9 billion acres (770 million hectares).
H (Wiki09): The total land area of the contiguous United States is approximately 1.9 billion acres.
On such pairs we apply a TE system, that automatically returns the set of arguments and the relations
among them. The argumentation module starts from the couples of arguments provided by the TE module,
and builds the complete argumentation framework involving such arguments. It is important to underline a
main difference with respect to the approach of Cabrio and Villata [67]: here the argumentation frameworks
resulting from the TE module represent a kind of evolution of the same argument during time in a specific
Wikipedia article. From the argumentation point of view, we treat these arguments as separate instances of
the same natural language argument giving them different names. Figure 5.7.a visualizes the argumentation
framework of Example 40. This kind of representation of the natural language arguments and their evolution
allows community managers to detect whether some arguments have been repeated in such a way that loops
in the discussions can be avoided. The argumentation module, thus, is used here with a different aim from
the previous approach [67]: it shows the kind of changes, i.e., positive and negative, that have been addressed



















Figure 5.7: The bipolar argumentation framework resulting from Example 40.
The use of argumentation theory to discover the set of winning, i.e., acceptable, arguments in the frame-
work could seem pointless, since we could assume that winning arguments are only those arguments appear-
ing in the most recent version of the wiki page. However, this is not always the case. The introduction of
the support relation in abstract argumentation theory [92] leads to the introduction of a number of additional
attacks which are due to the presence of an attack and a support involving the same arguments. The addi-
tional attacks introduced in the literature are visualized in Figure 5.1, where dotted double arrows represent
the additional attacks. For the formal properties of these attacks and a comparison among them, see Cayrol
and Lagasquie-Schiex [92].
The introduction of additional attacks is a key feature of our argumentation module. It allows us to
support community managers in detecting further possible attacks or supports among the arguments. In par-
ticular, given the arguments and their relations, the argumentation module builds the complete framework
adding the additional attacks, and computes the extensions of the bipolar framework. An example of such
kind of computation is shown in Figure 5.7.b where an additional attack is introduced. In this example, the
set of accepted arguments would have been the same with or without the additional attack, but there are
situations in which additional attacks make a difference. This means that the explicit attacks put forward
by the users on a particular argument can then result in implicit additional attacks or supports to other argu-
ments in the framework. Consider the arguments of Example 41. The resulting argumentation framework
(see Figure 5.8) shows that argument A1 (Wiki09) is implicitly supported by argument A4 (Wiki12) since
the attack of A4 (Wiki12) against A3 (Wiki11) leads to the introduction of an additional attack against A2
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(Wiki10). The presence of this additional attack reinstates argument A1 (Wiki09) previously attacked by A2
(Wiki10). The two accepted arguments at the end are {A1,A4}.
Example 41.
pair id=7.1 entailment=NO
T (Wiki12): In December 2007, the United States entered its longest post-World War II recession, prompting the Bush
Administration to enact multiple economic programs intended to preserve the country’s financial system.
H (Wiki11): In December 2007, the United States entered the longest post-World War II recession, which included a
housing market correction, a subprime mortgage crisis, soaring oil prices, and a declining dollar value.
pair id=7.2 entailment=YES
T (Wiki11): In December 2007, the United States entered the longest post-World War II recession, which included a
housing market correction, a subprime mortgage crisis, soaring oil prices, and a declining dollar value.
H (Wiki10): In December 2007, the United States entered its longest post-World War II recession.
pair id=7.3 entailment=NO
T (Wiki10): In December 2007, the United States entered its longest post-World War II recession.
H (Wiki09): In December 2007, the United States entered the second-longest post-World War II recession, and his
administration took more direct control of the economy, enacting multiple economic stimulus packages.
Finally, in this section we further enhance the framework proposed in [67] with a semantic machine
readable representation of the argumentative discussions. We do not introduce yet another argumentation
vocabulary, but we reuse the SIOC Argumentation module [193], focused on the fine-grained representation
of discussions and argumentations in online communities.24 The SIOC Argumentation model is grounded









Figure 5.8: The bipolar argumentation framework resulting from Example 41.
We extend the SIOC Argumentation vocabulary with two new properties sioc_arg:challengesArg
and sioc_arg:supportsArg whose range and domain are sioc_arg:Argument. These proper-
ties represent challenges and supports from arguments to arguments, as required in abstract argumentation
theory.26 This needs to be done since in SIOC Argumentation challenges and supports are addressed from
arguments towards sioc_arg:Statement only. Figure 5.9.a shows a sample of the semantic represen-
tation of Example 31 and 32 where contradiction is represented through sioc_arg:challengesArg,
and entailment is represented through sioc_arg:supportsArg.
24For an overview of the argumentation models in the Social Semantic Web, see [286].
25http://purl.org/ibis
26The extended vocabulary can be downloaded at http://bit.ly/SIOC_Argumentation
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EXAMPLE OF CONTRADICTION
<http://example.org/jako/pair1t> rdf:type sioc_arg:Argument ;
     
     sioc:content "It was reported that Jackson had 
             offered to buy the bones of Joseph Merrick 
             (the elephant man) and although untrue, 
             Jackson did not deny the story." ;
        
     sioc_arg:challengesArg <http://example.org/jako/pair1h> .
<http://example.org/jako/pair1h> rdf:type sioc_arg:Argument ;
     
        sioc:content "Later it was reported that Jackson 
             bought the bones of The Elephant Man." .
EXAMPLE OF ENTAILMENT
<http://example.org/jako/pair2t> rdf:type sioc_arg:Argument ;
     
        sioc:content "Jackson had three sisters: Rebbie, 
             La Toya, and Janet, and six brothers: Jackie, 
             Tito, Jermaine, Marlon, Brandon (Marlon's twin
             brother, who died shortly after birth) and 
             Randy." ;
       sioc_arg:supportsArg <http://example.org/jako/pair2h> .
<http://example.org/jako/pair2h> rdf:type sioc_arg:Argument ;
    
        sioc:content "Jackson's siblings are Rebbie, Jackie, 
             Tito, Jermaine, La Toya, Marlon, Randy and 








SELECT ?a1 ?c1 WHERE {
   ?a1 a sioc_arg:Argument .
   ?a2 a sioc_arg:Argument .
   ?a1 sioc_arg:challengesArg ?a2 .
   ?a1 sioc:content ?c1 .
   ?a2 sioc:content ?c2
   FILTER regex(str(?c2),"crisis")
}
QUERY RESULT
T: "In December 2007, the United States entered its longest post–World 
War II recession, prompting the Bush Administration to enact multiple 
economic programs intended to preserve the country's financial system." 
ATTACKS
H: "In December 2007, the United States entered the longest post–World 
War II recession, which included a housing market correction, a subprime 
mortgage crisis, soaring oil prices, and a declining dollar value."
T: "Bush entered office with the Dow Jones Industrial Average at 10,587, 
and the average peaked in October 2007 at over 14,000." 
ATTACKS                                      
H: "The Dow Jones Industrial Average peaked in October 2007 at about 
14,000, 30 percent above its level in January 2001, before the subsequent 
economic crisis wiped out all the gains and more."     
Figure 5.9: (a) Sample of the discussions in RDF, (b) Example of SPARQL query.
The semantic version of the argumentative discussions can further be used by community managers to
detect insightful meta-information about the discussions themselves. For instance, given the RDF data set
being stored in a datastore with SPARQL endpoint, the community manager can raise a query like the one in
Figure 5.9.b. This query retrieves all those arguments which attack another argument having in the content
the word “crisis”. This simple example shows how the semantic annotation of argumentative discussions
may be useful to discover in an automatic way those information which are difficult to be highlighted by a
human user.
Experimental Setting
As a case study to experiment our framework we select the Wikipedia revision history. We first describe the
creation of the data set, then we discuss the TE system we used, and we report on obtained results.
Data Set. We create a data set to evaluate the use of TE to generate the arguments following the method-
ology detailed in [66]. We start from two dumps of the English Wikipedia (Wiki 09 dated 6.03.2009, and
Wiki 10 dated 12.03.2010), and we focus on the five most revised pages27 at that time (i.e. George W. Bush,
United States, Michael Jackson, Britney Spears, and World War II). We then follow their yearly evolution
up to now, considering how they have been revised in the next Wikipedia versions (Wiki 11 dated 9.07.2011,
and Wiki 12 dated 6.12.2012).
After extracting plain text from the above mentioned pages, for both Wiki 09 and Wiki 10 each document
has been sentence-splitted, and the sentences of the two versions have been automatically aligned to create
pairs. Then, to measure the similarity between the sentences in each pair, following [66] we adopted the
Position Independent Word Error Rate (PER), i.e. a metric based on the calculation of the number of words
27 http://bit.ly/WikipediaMostRevisedPages
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which differ between a pair of sentences. For our task we extracted only pairs composed by sentences
where major editing was carried out (0.2 < PER < 0.6), but still describe the same event.28 For each pair
of extracted sentences, we create the TE pairs setting the revised sentence (from Wiki 10) as T and the
original sentence (from Wiki 09) as H. Starting from such pairs composed by the same revised argument,
we checked in the more recent Wikipedia versions (i.e. Wiki 11 and Wiki 12) if such arguments have been
further modified. If that was the case, we created another T-H pair based on the same assumptions as before,
i.e. setting the revised sentence as the T and the older sentence as the H (see Example 40). Such pairs have
then been annotated with respect to the TE relation (i.e. YES/NO entailment), following the criteria defined
and applied by the organizers of the Recognizing Textual Entailment Challenges (RTE)29 for the two-way
judgment task.
As a result of the first step (i.e. extraction of the revised arguments in Wiki 09 and Wiki 10) we col-
lected 280 T-H pairs, while after applying the procedure on the same arguments in Wiki 11 and Wiki 12
the total number of collected pairs is 452. To carry out our experiments, we randomly divided such pairs
into training set (114 entailment, 114 no entailment pairs), and test set (101 entailment, 123 no entailment
pairs). The pairs collected for the test set are provided in their unlabeled form as input to the TE system. To
correctly train the TE system we balanced the data set with respect to the percentage of yes/no judgments.
In Wikipedia, the actual distribution of attacks and supports among revisions of the same sentence is slightly
unbalanced since generally users edit a sentence to add different information or correct it, with respect to a
simple reformulation.30
To assess the validity of the annotation task and the reliability of the obtained data set, the same anno-
tation task has been independently carried out also by a second annotator, so as to compute inter-annotator
agreement. It has been calculated on a sample of 140 argument pairs (randomly extracted).
The inter-annotator agreement results in κ = 0.82. As a rule of thumb, this is a satisfactory agreement,
therefore we consider these annotated data sets as the goldstandard31, i.e. the reference data set to which
the performances of our combined system are compared. As introduced before, the goldstandard pairs have
then been further translated into RDF using SIOC Argumentation.32
TE System. To detect which kind of relation underlies each couple of arguments, we use the EDITS sys-
tem (Edit Distance Textual Entailment Suite) version 3.0, an open-source software package for RTE33 [189].
EDITS implements a distance-based framework which assumes that the probability of an entailment relation
between a given T-H pair is inversely proportional to the distance between T and H (i.e. the higher the dis-
tance, the lower is the probability of entailment).34 Within this framework the system implements different
approaches to distance computation, i.e. both edit distance and similarity algorithms. Each algorithm returns
a normalized distance score (a number between 0 and 1). At a training stage, distance scores calculated over
annotated T-H pairs are used to estimate a threshold that best separates positive from negative examples,
that is then used at a test stage to assign a judgment and a confidence score to each test pair.
28A different extraction methodology has been proposed in [330].
29http://www.nist.gov/tac/2010/RTE/
30As introduced before, we set a threshold in our extraction procedure to filter out all the minor revisions, concerning typos or
grammatical mistakes corrections.
31The dataset is available at http://www-sop.inria.fr/NoDE/
32The obtained data set is downloadable at http://www-sop.inria.fr/NoDE/
33http://edits.fbk.eu/
34In previous RTE challenges, EDITS always ranked among the 5 best participating systems out of an average of 25 systems, and
is one of the two RTE systems available as open source http://aclweb.org/aclwiki/index.php?title=Textual_
Entailment_Resource_Pool
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Table 5.6: Systems performances on Wikipedia data set
Train Test












no 0.77 0.37 0.76 0.34
Evaluation. To evaluate our framework, we carry out a two-step evaluation: first, we assess the perfor-
mances of EDITS to correctly assign the entailment and the no entailment relations to the pairs of arguments
on the Wikipedia data set. Then, we evaluate how much such performances impact on the application of
the argumentation theory module, i.e. how much a wrong assignment of a relation to a pair of arguments is
propagated in the argumentation framework. For the first evaluation, we run EDITS on the Wikipedia train-
ing set to learn the model, and we test it on the test set. In the configurations of EDITS we experimented,
the distance entailment engine applies cosine similarity and word overlap as the core distance algorithms.
In both cases, distance is calculated on lemmas, and a stopword list is defined to have no distance value
between stopwords. Obtained results are reported in Table 5.6. Due to the specificity of our data set (i.e. it
is composed by revisions of arguments), word overlap algorithm outperforms cosine similarity since there is
high similarity between revised and original arguments (in most of the positive examples the two sentences
are very close, or there is an almost perfect inclusion of H in T). For the same reason, obtained results are
higher than in [67], and than the results obtained on average in RTE challenges. For these runs, we use
the system off-the-shelf, applying its basic configuration. As future work, we plan to fully exploit EDITS
features, integrating background and linguistic knowledge in the form of entailment rules, and to calculate
the distance between T and H based on their syntactic structure.
As a second step in our evaluation phase, we consider the impact of EDITS performances (obtained
using word overlap, since it provided the best results) on the acceptability of the arguments, i.e. how much
a wrong assignment of a relation to a pair of arguments affects the acceptability of the arguments in the
argumentation framework. We use admissibility-based semantics [132] to identify the accepted arguments
both on the correct argumentation frameworks of each Wikipedia revised argument (where entailment/con-
tradiction relations are correctly assigned, i.e. the goldstandard), and on the frameworks generated assigning
the relations resulted from the TE system judgments. The precision of the combined approach we propose
in the identification of the accepted arguments is on average 0.90 (i.e. arguments accepted by the combined
system and by the goldstandard w.r.t. a certain Wikipedia revised argument), and the recall is 0.92 (i.e. argu-
ments accepted in the goldstandard and retrieved as accepted by the combined system). The F-measure (i.e.
the harmonic mean of precision and recall) is 0.91, meaning that the TE system mistakes in relation assign-
ment propagate in the argumentation framework, but results are still satisfying and foster further research
in this direction. For this feasibility study, we use four Wikipedia versions, so the resulting AFs are gener-
ally composed by four couples of arguments connected by attacks or supports. Reduced AFs are produced
when a certain argument is not revised in every Wikipedia version we considered, or when an argument is
deleted in more recent versions. Using more revised versions will allow us to generate even more complex
argumentation graphs.
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In this section, we presented a framework to support community managers in managing argumentative
discussions on wiki-like platforms. In particular, our approach proposes to automatically detect the nat-
ural language arguments and the relations among them, i.e., support or challenges, and then to organize
the detected arguments in bipolar argumentation frameworks. This kind of representation helps community
managers to understand the overall structure of the discussions and which are the winning arguments. More-
over, the generated data set is translated in RDF using an extension of the SIOC Argumentation vocabulary
such that the discussions can be queried using SPARQL in order to discover further insightful information.
The experimental evaluation shows that in 85% of the cases, the proposed approach correctly detects the
accepted arguments. SIOC35 allows to connect the arguments to the users who propose them. This is im-
portant in online communities because it allows to evaluate the arguments depending on the expertise of
their sources. In this section, we do not represent users neither in the argumentation frameworks nor in the
RDF representation of the discussions, and this is left as future work. Moreover, we plan to move from the
crisp evaluation of the arguments’ acceptability towards a more flexible evaluation where the expertise of
the users proposing the arguments plays a role. As future work on the NLP side, we consider experimenting
a TE system carrying out a three-way judgment task (i.e. entailment, contradiction and unknown), to allow
for a finer-grained classification of non entailment pairs (i.e. to separate when T contradicts H, from when
H is more informative than T).
5.5 Argument Mining on Social Media
Argumentation has come to be increasingly central as a main study within Artificial Intelligence, due to its
ability to conjugate representational needs with user-related cognitive models and computational models for
automated reasoning. An important source of data for many of the disciplines interested in such studies
is the Web, and social media in particular. Newspapers, microblogs, online debate platforms and social
networks provide an heterogeneous flow of information where natural language arguments can be identified
and analyzed. The availability of such data, together with the advances in Natural Language Processing and
Machine Learning, supported the rise of a new research area called argument mining, whose main goal is the
automated extraction of natural language arguments and their relations from generic textual corpora, with
the final purpose of providing machine-processable data for computational models of argument.
Despite the increasing amount of argument mining approaches [206], none of them has tackled the
challenge of extracting arguments and their relations on social media like Twitter or Facebook. Such a kind
of natural language arguments raises further issues in addition to the standard problems faced by argument
mining approaches typically dealing with newspapers, novels or legal texts: messages from Twitter are
squeezed, noisy and often unstructured. More specifically, the following issues have to be considered: i)
the 140-characters limit forces users to express their ideas very succinctly; ii) the quality of the language in
Twitter is deteriorated, including a lot of variants in spelling, mistakes and abbreviations, and iii) Twitter’s
API filters tweets on hashtags but cannot retrieve all the replies to these tweets if they do not contain the
same hashtags.
In this section, we provide a preliminary answer to the following research question: how to extract the
arguments and predict the relations among them on Twitter data? and we highlight the open challenges still
to be addressed. We consider both the two main stages in the typical argument mining pipeline, from the
unstructured natural language documents towards structured data: we first detect arguments within the nat-
ural language texts from Twitter, the retrieved arguments will thus represent the nodes in the final argument
35http://sioc-project.org
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graph returned by the system, and second, we predict what are the relations, i.e., attack or support, holding
between the arguments identified in the first stage.
The main advantage of our approach is that it provides a whole argument mining pipeline to analyze
flows of tweets, allowing for the application of reasoning techniques over the output structured data, like
the identification of the set of widely accepted arguments or trends analysis. However, being it an ongoing
work, we highlight in this section both positive and negative results in applying argument mining on Twitter
data, analyzing solutions and potential alternatives to be explored.
Figure 5.10: Pipeline architecture
Argument Mining on Twitter
The argument mining pipeline we propose, visualized in Figure 5.10, is composed of four main steps,
that consist in: i) separating tweet-arguments from non-argument tweets; ii) grouping tweet-arguments
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discussing about the same issue, and create pairs of arguments; iii) predicting the relations of attack and
support among the tweets in the pairs; and iv) building argumentation graphs.
First of all, we need to clarify what we mean by argument in this section: an argument gives a reason
to support a claim that is questionable, or open to doubt. In the computational models of argument field,
an argument is made of three components: the premises representing the reason, a conclusion which is
the supported claim, and a relation showing how the premises lead to this conclusion. Facing the issue of
dealing with Twitter data, i.e., dealing with textual arguments of length inferior or equal to 140 characters,
we (almost) never find such a kind of complete structure of the arguments. We have thus labeled as argu-
ments all those text snippets providing a portion of a standard argument structure, e.g., opinions under the
form of claim, data like in the Toulmin model [302], or persuasive conclusions. Future work includes the
“composition” of such elements to build a single well-structured argument. Second, it is worth noticing that
the support and the attack relations are not symmetric: we considered the temporal dimension to decide the
direction of these relations, i.e., a tweet that is proposed at time t +1 attacks (resp. supports) a tweet which
has been provided at time t. In the following, each step of the pipeline is described in detail, together with
the experimented approach, and the obtained results of this ongoing work.
Dataset. Up to our knowledge, DART [61] is the only existing dataset of arguments and their relations on
Twitter, therefore it has been chosen to test our pipeline. It is composed of:
(a) 4000 tweets annotated as argument/not argument: 1000 tweets for each of the following 4 topics: the
letter to Iran written by 47 senators on 10/03/2015; the referendum in Greece for or against Greece
leaving European Union on 10/07/2015; the release of Apple Watch on 10/03/2015; the airing of
episode 4 (season 5) of the serie Game of Thrones on 4/05/2015. A tweet is annotated as argument
if it contains an opinion or factual information, or if it is a claim expressed as question (rhetorical
questions, attempts to persuade, containing sarcasms/irony). The argument annotation task is carried
out on a single tweet and not on subparts of it.
A text containing an opinion is considered as an argument. For example, in the following tweet the
opinion of the author is clearly expressed in the second sentence (i.e., I won’t be running out to get
one):
RT @mariofraioli: What will #AppleWatch mean for runners? I can’t speak for everyone,
but I won’t be running out to get one. Will you? http://t.co/xBpj0HWK
We consider as arguments also claims expressed as questions (either rhetorical questions, attempts to
persuade, containing sarcasm or irony), as in the following example:
RT @GrnEyedMandy: What next Republicans? You going to send North Korea a love
letter too? #47Traitors
or:
Perhaps Apple can start an organ harvesting program. Because I only need one kidney,
right? #iPadPro #AppleTV #AppleWatch
Tweets containing factual information are annotated as arguments, given that they can be considered
as premises or conclusions. For example:
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RT @HeathWallace: You can already buy a fake #AppleWatch in China http://t.co/WpHEDqYuUC
via @cnnnews @mr_gadget http://t.co/WhcMKuM
Defining the amount of world knowledge needed to determine whether a text is a fact or an opinion
when it contains unknown acronyms and abbreviations can be pretty tough. Consider the following
tweet:
RT @SaysSheToday: The Dixie Chicks were attacked just for using 1A right to say they
were ashamed of GWB. They didn’t commit treason like the #47Senators
where the mentioned entities The Dixie Chicks, GWB, and 1A right are strictly linked to the US
politics, and hardly interpreted by people out of the US politics matters. In this case, annotators are
asked to suppose that the mentioned entities exist, and focus on the phrasing of the tweets.
However, if tweets contain pronouns only (preventing the understanding of the text), we consider
such tweets as not “self-contained” , and thus non arguments. It can be the case of replies, as in the
following example, in which the pronoun he is not referenced anywhere in the tweet.
@FakeGhostPirate @GameOfThrones He is the one true King after all ;)
For tweets containing an advertisement to push into visiting a web page, if an opinion or factual
information is also present, then the tweet is considered as an argument, otherwise it is not. Consider
the following example:
RT @NewAppleDevice: Apple’s smartwatch can be a games platform and here’s why
http://t.co/uIMGDyw08I
It contains factual information that can be understood even without visiting the link. On the contrary,
the following tweet is not an argument, given that it does not convey an independent message while
excluding the link:
For all #business students discussing #AppleWatch this morning. Give it a test drive thanks
to @UsVsTh3m: http://t.co/x2bGc9j1Gl.
(b) 2181 tweet-arguments on the Apple Watch release classified in 7 categories (i.e. features (F), price
(P), look (L), buying announcement (B), advertisement (A), forecast on the product success (S), news
(N), others (O)) (see Table 5.9). Moreover, the tweets contained in the category features have been
grouped in the following more fine-grained categories: health, innovation, battery.
(c) 1891 pairs of tweet-arguments of the categories: price, health, look, predictions annotated with the
following relations: support (446), attack (122), unknown (1323). After a first annotation round to
test the guidelines provided in [70], we realized that a few additional instructions should be added
with the aim to consider the specificity of the Twitter scenario. The instructions we introduced are as
follows:
If both Tweet-A and Tweet-B in a pair are factual tweets, and they are related to the same issue, the
pair must be annotated as support, as in:
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Tweet-A: .@AirStripmHealth + #AppleWatch provides HIPPA compliant capabilities for
physicians, mothers, babies, and more #AppleEvent
Tweet-B: accessible heart rate monitors and opinions on that #iWatch #apple #accessibil-
ity #ios https://t.co/ySYM8dk0Pf via @audioBoom
If both Tweet-A and Tweet-B in a pair are opinion tweets, and they are related to the same issue, the
pair must be annotated as support, as in:
Tweet-A: Think of how much other stuff you can buy with the money you spend on an
#AppleWatch
Tweet-B: #AppleWatch Tempting, but not convinced. #appletv Yes.
#iPhone6sPlus No plan to upgrade #iPadPro little high price, wait & watch
If Tweet-B is a factual tweet, and Tweet-A is an opinion on the same issue, the pair must be annotated
as support, as in:
Tweet-A: Wow. Your vitals on your iwatch. That’s bonkers. #AppleEvent
Tweet-B: accessible heart rate monitors and opinions on that #iWatch #apple #accessibil-
ity #ios https://t.co/ySYM8dk0Pf via @audioBoom
If Tweet-A is a factual tweet, and Tweet-B expresses someone’s wishes to buy the product or an
opinion about it, the pair must be annotated as unknown, as in:
Tweet-A: Mom can listen to baby’s heart rate with #AppleWatch #airstrip
Tweet-B:Wow!!! Look at what the #Ap, pleWatch can do for #doctors that’s amazing!
Seeing their vitals? I just got chills! In a good way #AppleEvent
Concerning the annotation of the arguments/non arguments, in the reconciliation phase among the three
students annotators, the label that was annotated by at least 2 annotators out of 3 was chosen (majority voting
mechanism). If all the annotators disagree or if more than one annotator labels the tweet as unknown, then
such tweet is discarded. The inter-annotator agreement has been calculated between the expert annotators
and the reconciled student annotations on 250 tweets of the first batch, resulting in α47traitors = 0.81 (Krip-
pendorff’s α handles missing values, the label “unknown” in our case). Concerning the pair annotation
with the support/attack/unknown relations, the inter-annotator agreement has been calculated on 99 pairs
(33 pairs randomly extracted from each of the three first topics), resulting in Krippendorff α = 0.67.
Step 1: Argument identification.
The first task in our pipeline is the binary classification of tweets as argument/non argument. To train a
generic, domain-independent argument detector, we separate the training, validation and test data according
to the topics of dataset (a) to avoid overfitting. We train and validate on the first three topics, and we test
on the Apple Watch dataset (Table 5.7 provides some statistics on the data).We ignore tweets classified as
unknown. We use 3-fold cross-validation (we alternately train the model on the tweets of the first two topics
and leave the third topic out as a validation set) with randomized hyperparameter search [40].36 Because
36A randomized hyperparameter search samples parameter settings a fixed number of times and has been found to be more
effective in high-dimensional spaces than exhaustive search.
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Dataset # tweet-arg. not-arg. unknown total
Training set 2079 829 92 3000
Test set 623 352 25 1000
Table 5.7: Statistics of dataset (a)
Approach Average F1
baseline 0.64
baseline + tokens 0.66
baseline + tokens + bigrams tokens 0.67
Table 5.8: Validation of the model and feature use
the classes are unbalanced and the balance is not necessarily the same across all datasets, the training phase
weights the errors inversely proportional to class frequencies.
As baseline, we use raw character counts as features (causing smileys, capital letters, punctuation marks
to influence the model). Then, tweets have been tokenized with Twokenize37 and annotated with their PoS
applying Stanford POS tagger. POS tags are then used as features, as well as bigrams of tags. As a baseline
model, we train a logistic regression model38 on these features only.
We also augment features with normalized tokens and bigrams of tokens, and this effectively improves
over the baseline (see Table 5.8). The best model (Logistic regression, L2-penalized with λ = 100) is
obtained by using all the features and re-training on the 3 folds. It yields an F1-score of 0.78 over the test
set, that can be considered as satisfactory. The difference between the average F1-score over the validation
set (see Table 5.8) and the F1 over the test set is due to the addition of the tweets of the validation set (around
1000 additional tweets) for training the final model.
Step 2: Pairs creation.
Once we are able to identify tweet-argument, we create pairs of them to predict the relations among them.
Given a stream of tweets, it would be impossible to apply a naive approach comparing all the pairs of tweets,
since this would lead to the creation of numerous unrelated pairs.
To deal with this issue, we firstly tested the solution of clustering the tweets into sub-topics, and then
create pairs from these sub-topics. The major problem that we faced is the difficulty of automatically finding
meaningful sub-topics. We tested both Latent Dirichlet Allocation39 [50] and more powerful models such
as Correlated Topic Models40 [49], but the interpretability of the clusters did not improve [101].
37http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~ark/TweetNLP/
38Like all regression analyses, the logistic regression is a predictive analysis. It is used to describe data and to measure the
relationship between one dependent variable and one or more independent variables by estimating probabilities using a logistic
function, i.e., the cumulative logistic distribution.
39Latent Dirichlet allocation is a generative probabilistic model of a corpus. The basic idea is that documents are represented as
random mixtures over latent topics, where each topic is characterized by a distribution over words.
40Correlated Topic Models use a more flexible distribution for the topic proportions that allows for covariance structure among
the components. This gives a more realistic model of latent topic structure where the presence of one latent topic may be correlated
with the presence of another.
CHAPTER 5. MINING NATURAL LANGUAGE ARGUMENTATION 164
O A B F L N P S
# 720 175 370 619 205 65 189 112
Table 5.9: Statistics on dataset (b), # tweets
F L P S
average F1-score (train set) 0.36 0.57 0.60 0.15
F1-score (test set) 0.56 0.58 0.60 0.00
Table 5.10: Classification results (step 2)
Instead, since we have classified goldstandard data for Apple Watch (dataset (b), see Table 5.9), we
decided to focus on this topic only, and turn the clustering problem into a classification problem. Another
possibility would have been to tune the hyperparameters before applying the clustering algorithms to retrieve
the annotated categories, but given the small size of the goldstandard, we could not explore that direction
further.
In particular, we focus on categories F (features), L (look), P (price) and S (predictions about the success
of the product) because they contain the most interesting tweets. We use the same features and same hyper-
parameters selection scheme as in step 1. The training set contains 2031 tweets, and the test set contains
150 tweets. The 3 folds are randomly created across all the training set, and we take the average of all the
macro F1-scores on all the folds to select the best model. We use regularized logistic regression and the
results obtained by the best model (L1-penalized with λ = 100) are reported in Table 5.10 for each category,
averaged over all the folds. As can be observed, some categories are harder to predict than others, but the
performance on the easy classes (F, L, P here) are quite satisfactory. A paraphrase detection tool could be
added at this step to deduplicate similar tweets and give more weights to the arguments that are often used
in subsequent steps.
Step 3: Relation detection.
Given the pairs of tweet-arguments returned by step 2, the next step consists in predicting the relation holding
between the tweets in a pair. Dataset (c) contains ∼600 tweets each for look, price and health categories of
the Apple Watch: we put pairs concerning the product price in the test set, whereas all the other tweets are
in the training set. An additional validation set contains 100 tweets on the user predictions on the product
success.
Given the closeness of the task with textual entailment [70], we decide to explore first a prediction of the
support and attack relations using the Excitement Open Platform (EOP)41 for recognizing textual entailment.
The intuition is to consider the support relation as an entailment, and the attack relation as a contradiction,
following the approach in Cabrio and Villata [71].
In addition, following the same guidelines proposed by [70], pairs are also annotated according to the
Recognizing Textual Entailment (RTE) framework, i.e., pairs linked by a support relation as entailment/non-
entailment, and pairs linked by an attack relation as contradiction/non-contradiction.
41http://hltfbk.github.io/Excitement-Open-Platform/
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Model EOP (MaxEnt) Neural model
F1-score Support 0.17 0.20
F1-score Attack 0.0 0.16
Table 5.11: Comparing the two models
However, given the specificity of Twitter data and the fact that predicting support and attack relations is
not the same as recognizing entailment, results were far from being satisfying (see Table 5.11), also due to
the huge number of unrelated pairs (tagged as unknown in Dataset (c)). Then we decided to implement a neu-
ral sequence classifier inspired by [273]. We encode the tokens as precomputed GloVe embeddings42 [257]
of size 200. When a token does not have an embedding, we generate a random embedding according to a
multivariate normal distribution with empirical mean and variance of existing embeddings.
Such a neural classifier is an encoder-decoder architecture with two distinct Long Short-Term Memory
networks43 (LSTM) [170], where we pass the last hidden-state of the first LSTM to initialize the second.
The probabilities over the 3 categories are given by a softmax function, i.e., a function which takes as input
a C-dimensional vector z and outputs a C-dimensional vector y of real values between 0 and 1, at the output
layer of the second LSTM at the last pass. Our objective is cross entropy, and we oversample the attack
and support categories so that the probability of drawing a tweet from a category is uniform on the three
categories. We use Stochastic Gradient Descent with Adam44 [188] to optimize. We periodically test our
model against the validation set, and stop the training when the validation error stops improving. We select
the best performing model on the validation set. However, also in this case, results are not satisfying (see
Table 5.11).
We realize that such classification step on Twitter is pretty hard, even for human. As an example, con-
sider the following pair:
T1: Can’t believe the designers of #AppleWatch didn’t present a better shaped watch. It’s still too clunky
looking & could’ve been more sleek.
T2: @APPLEOFFIClAL amazing product updates. Apple TV looks great. BUT! Please make a bigger
iWatch! Not buying it until it’s way bigger.
On the one hand, the tweets agree in that the watch is not properly sized. On the other hand, they disagree
since one user finds it too big and the other one too small, which are opposite viewpoints.
The neural model is more promising because it can be easily used in a semi-supervised settings, but the
lack of a large-sized corpus is a huge hurdle for training such a model (however, there is a huge amount of
data in the DART dataset that has not been labeled yet, for which an annotation effort should be considered).
42GloVe is an unsupervised learning algorithm for obtaining vector representations for words. Training is performed on ag-
gregated global word-word co-occurrence statistics from a corpus, and the resulting representations showcase interesting linear
substructures of the word vector space.
43Long Short-Term Memory networks are a special kind of Recurrent Neural Networks, capable of learning long-term depen-
dencies.
44Adam is an algorithm for first-order gradient-based optimization of stochastic objective functions, based on adaptive estimates
of lower-order moments.
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Step 4: Graph building
We can now build an argument graph whose nodes are the arguments and whose edges are the predicted
relations (supports/ attacks). An example of such a graph is visualized in Figure 5.11, where an extract of
the tweets for the iWatch topic is presented. It is easy to note that such a kind of visualization allows for
a deeper understanding of the ongoing Twitter discussion, and would provide a valuable support for social
media content analysis.
Figure 5.11: Example of argumentation graph (where single edges represent attack and double ones repre-





Apple watch the only $10000 watch to lose its value 
after being used for a year lmao #AppleWatch
Watched the #AppleEvent yesterday. Mesmerized by the #applewatch. 
Of course, the one I loved was $17,000. $17K. 
SEVENTEEN THOUSAND DOLLARS
A6
$17,000 for a gold #AppleWatch that will be obsolete 
in 2 years?  Tech & jewelry shouldn't mingle. 
Just Choose. #cash4gold bound in 2017
Analysts are breathlessly claiming the #AppleWatch is useless, 
too expensive, etc. Guess it's important to be wrong as early as possible!
18-karat gold #AppleWatch Edition starting 
price: $10,000 http://t.co/fX25zZsYfu
Pretty underwhelmed by the #AppleWatch Seems 
like just a money grab by @apple  Seriously, a $10000 
watch that will be obsolete in a year?
The last step of the pipeline consists in applying argumentation semantics to identify the set(s) of ac-
cepted arguments. Several systems can be adopted to perform such a computation in a scalable way, as those
participating to the ICCMA challenge [300]. In our framework, we used the ASPARTIX-D system45, after
the flattening of the bipolar argumentation framework to an abstract Dung-like argumentation framework, as
done in [70]. This step returns the set of acceptable arguments such that the different (coherent) viewpoints
expressed through the tweets are highlighted, as well as the identifiable attack points in the stream.
Some considerations can be drawn about the resulting graphs. First of all, graphs are, differently
from [73] for instance, rather sparse, meaning that they do not present a star structure. They are more
like a set of subgraphs connected with each other, where each subgraph concerns a different sub-issue of the
general topic, i.e., the price of the Hermes iWatch band inside the Price issue of the iWatch topic. This is
a specificity of Twitter discussions being them a continuous stream of messages. Second, as for the case of
the debates extracted in [73], no cycle is present.
Given the unsatisfactory results obtained for the relation prediction task given the huge difference in the
selected topics of the DART dataset, we decided to go a step further and address the following sub-questions,
starting from the argument detection component, that arise in the context of social media: i) how to distin-
guish factual arguments from opinions? ii) how to automatically detect the source of factual arguments?
To answer these questions, we extend and annotate a dataset of tweets extracted from the streams about the
Grexit and the Brexit news. To address the first task of argument detection, we apply supervised classi-
45https://ddll.inf.tu-dresden.de/web/Sarah_Alice_Gaggl/ASPARTIX-D
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fication to separate argument-tweets from non-argumentative ones. By considering only argument-tweets,
in the second step we apply again a supervised classifier to recognize tweets reporting factual information
from those containing opinions only. Finally, we detect, for all those arguments recognized as factual in
the previous step, what is the source of such information (e.g., the CNN), relying on the type of the Named
Entities recognized in the tweets. The last two steps represent new tasks in the argument mining research
field, of particular importance in social media applications.
From arguments to facts and sources
Dataset. The only available resource of annotated tweets for argument mining is DART [60].46 From the
highly heterogeneous topics contained in such resource (i.e. the letter to Iran written by 47 U.S. senators; the
referendum for or against Greece leaving the EU; the release of Apple iWatch; the airing of the 4th episode of
the 5th season of the TV series Game of Thrones), and considering the fact that tweets discussing a political
topic generally have a more developed argumentative structure than tweets commenting on a product release,
we decided to select for our experiments the subset of the DART dataset on the thread #Grexit (987 tweets).
Then, following the same methodology described in [60], we have extended such dataset collecting 900
tweets from the thread on #Brexit. From the original thread, we filtered away retweets, accounts with a
bot probability >0.5 [120], and almost identical tweets (Jaccard distance, empirically evaluated threshold).
Given that tweets in DART are already annotated for task 1 (argument/non-argument, see Section 5.5), two
annotators carried out the same task on the newly extracted data. Moreover, the same annotators annotated
both datasets (Grexit/Brexit) for the other two tasks of our experiments, i.e. i) given the argument tweets,
annotation of tweets as either containing factual information or opinions (see Section 5.5), and ii) given
factual argument tweets, annotate their source when explicitly cited (see Section 5.5). Tables 5.12, 5.13 and
5.14 contain statistical information on the datasets.
Inter annotator agreement (IAA) [86] between the two annotators has been calculated for the three
annotation tasks, resulting in κ=0.767 on the first task (calculated on 100 tweets), κ=0.727 on the second
task (on 80 tweets), and Dice=0.84 [125]47 on the third task (on the whole dataset). More specifically, to
compute IAA, we sampled the data applying the same strategy: for the first task, we randomly selected
10% of the tweets of the Grexit dataset (our training set); for task 2, again we randomly selected 10% of the
tweets annotated as argument in the previous annotation step; for task 3, given the small size of the dataset,
both annotators annotated the whole corpus.
dataset # argument # non-arg total
Brexit 713 187 900
Grexit 746 241 987
total 1459 428 1887
Table 5.12: Dataset for task 1: argument detection
46Annotated data are available upon request to the authors.
47Dice is used instead of κ to account for partial agreement on the set of sources detected in the tweets.
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dataset # factual arg. # opinion total
Brexit 138 575 713
Grexit 230 516 746
total 368 1091 1459
Table 5.13: Dataset for task 2: factual arguments vs opinions classification
dataset # arg. with # arg. without total
source cit. source cit.
Brexit 40 98 138
Grexit 79 151 230
total 119 249 368
Table 5.14: Dataset for task 3: source identification
Classification algorithms. We tested Logistic Regression (LR) and Random Forest (RF) classification
algorithms, relying on the scikit-learn tool suite48. For the learning methods, we have used a Grid Search
(exhaustive) through a set of predefined hyper-parameters to find the best performing ones (the goal of our
work is not to optimize the classification performance but to provide a preliminary investigation on new
tasks in argument mining over Twitter data). We extract argument-level features from the dataset of tweets
(following [319]), that we group into the following categories:
• Lexical (L): unigram, bigram, WordNet verb synsets;
• Twitter-specific (T): punctuation, emoticons;
• Syntactic/Semantic (S): we have two versions of dependency relations as features, one being the orig-
inal form, the other generalizing a word to its POS tag in turn. We also use the syntactic tree of the
tweets as feature. We apply the Stanford parser [214] to obtain parse trees and dependency relations;
• Sentiment (SE): we extract the sentiment from the tweets with the Alchemy API49, the sentiment
analysis feature of IBM’s Semantic Text Analysis API. It returns a polarity label (positive, negative
or neutral) and a polarity score between -1 (totally negative) and 1 (totally positive).
As baselines we consider both LR and RF algorithms with a set of basic features (i.e., lexical).
Task 1: Argument detection
The task consists in classifying a tweet as being an argument or not. We consider as arguments all those text
snippets providing a portion of a standard argument structure, i.e., opinions under the form of claims, facts
mirroring the data in the Toulmin model of argument [302], or persuasive claims, following the definition
48http://scikit-learn.org/
49https://www.ibm.com/watson/alchemy-api.html
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of argument tweet provided in [60, 59]. Our dataset contains 746 argument tweets and 241 non-argument
tweets for Grexit (that we use as training set), and 713 argument tweets and 187 non-argument tweets for
Brexit (the test set). Below we report an example of argument tweet (a), and of a non-argument tweet (b).
(a) Junker asks “who does he think I am”. I suspect elected PM Tsipras thinks Junker is an unelected
Eurocrat. #justsaying #democracy #grexit
(b) #USAvJPN #independenceday #JustinBieberBestIdol Macri #ConEsteFrioYo happy 4th of july #Grefend-
erum Wireless Festival
We cast the argument detection task as a binary classification task, and we apply the supervised algo-
rithms described in Section 5.5. Table 5.15 reports on the obtained results with the different configurations,
while Table 5.16 reports on the results obtained by the best configuration, i.e., LR + All features, per each
category.
Approach Precision Recall F1
RF+L 0.76 0.69 0.71
LR+L 0.76 0.71 0.73
LR+all features 0.80 0.77 0.78
Table 5.15: Results obtained on the test set for the argument detection task (L=lexical features)
Category P R F1 #arguments
per category
non-arg 0.46 0.60 0.52 187
arg 0.89 0.82 0.85 713
avg/total 0.80 0.77 0.78 900
Table 5.16: Results obtained by the best model on each category of the test set for the argument detection
task
Most of the miss-classified tweets are either ironical, e.g.:
If #Greece had a euro for every time someone mentioned #Grexit and #Greferendum they would probably
have enough for a bailout. #GreekCrisis
that was wrongly classified as argument, or contain reported speech, e.g.:
Jeremy Warner: Unintentionally, the Greeks have done themselves a favour. Soon, they will be out of the
euro http://t.co/YmqXi36lGj #Grexit
that was wrongly classified as non argument. Our results are comparable to those reported in [59] (they
trained a supervised classifier on the tweets of all topics in the DART dataset but the iWatch, used as test
CHAPTER 5. MINING NATURAL LANGUAGE ARGUMENTATION 170
set). Better performances obtained in our setting are most likely due to a better feature selection, and to the
fact that in our case the topics in the training and test sets are more homogeneous.
Task 2: Factual vs opinion classification
This task consists in classifying argument-tweets as containing factual information or being opinion-based
[251]. Our interest focuses in particular on factual argument-tweets, as we are interested then in the auto-
mated identification of their sources. This would allow then to rank factual tweet-arguments depending on
the reliability or expertise of their source for subsequent tasks as fact checking. Given the huge amount of
work in the literature devoted to opinion extraction, we do not address any further analysis on opinion-based
arguments here, referring the interested reader to [208].
An argument is annotated as factual if it contains a piece of information which can be proved to be true
(see example (a) below), or if it contains “reported speech” (see example (b) below). All the other argument
tweets are considered as “opinion” (see example (c) below).
(a) 72% of people who identified as “English” supported #Brexit (while no majority among those identifying
as “British”) https://t.co/MuUXqncUBe
(b) #Hollande urges #UK to start #Brexit talks as soon as possible. https://t.co/d12TV8JqYD.
(c) Trump is going to sell us back to England. #Brexit #RNCinCLE
Our dataset contains 230 factual argument tweets and 516 opinion argument tweets for Grexit (training set),
and 138 factual argument tweets and 575 opinion argument tweets for Brexit (test set).
To address the task of factual vs opinion arguments classification, we apply the supervised classification
algorithms described in Section 5.5. Tweets from Grexit dataset are used as training set, and those from
Brexit dataset as test set. Table 5.17 reports on the obtained results, while Table 5.18 reports on the results
obtained by the best configuration, i.e. LR + All features, per each category.
Approach Precision Recall F1
RF+L 0.75 0.68 0.71
LR+L 0.75 0.75 0.75
LR+all features 0.81 0.79 0.80
Table 5.17: Results obtained on the test set for the factual vs opinion argument classification task (L=lexical
features)
Most of the miss-classified tweets contain reported opinions/reported speech and are wrongly classified by
the algorithm as opinion - such behaviour could be expected given that sentiment features play a major role
in these cases, e.g.,
Thomas Piketty accuses Germany of forgetting history as it lectures Greece http://t.co/B0UqPn0i6T
#grexit
Again, the other main reason for miss-classification is sarcasm/irony contained in the tweets, e.g.,
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Category P R F1 #arguments
per category
fact 0.49 0.50 0.50 138
opinion 0.88 0.87 0.88 575
avg/total 0.81 0.79 0.80 713
Table 5.18: Results obtained by the best model on each category of the test set for the factual vs opinion
argument classification task
So for Tsipras, no vote means back to the table, for Varoufakis, meant Grexit?
that was wrongly classified as fact.
Task 3: Source identification
Since factual arguments (as defined above) are generally reported by news agencies and individuals, the
third task we address - and that can be of a value in the context of social media - is the recognition of the
information source that disseminates the news reported in a tweet (when explicitly mentioned). For instance,
in:
The Guardian: Greek crisis: European leaders scramble for response to referendum no vote. http:
//t.co/cUNiyLGfg3
the source of information is The Guardian newspaper. Such annotation is useful to rank factual tweet-
arguments depending on the reliability or expertise of their source in news summarization or fact-checking
applications, for example.
Our dataset contains 79 factual argument tweets where the source is explicitly cited for Grexit (training
set), and 40 factual argument tweets where the source is explicitly cited for Brexit (test set). Given the
small size of the available annotated dataset, to address this task we implemented a simple string match-
ing algorithm that relies on a gazetteer containing a set of Twitter usernames and hashtags extracted from
the training data, and a list of very common news agencies (e.g. BBC, CNN, CNBC). If no matches
are found, the algorithm extracts the NEs from the tweets through [236]’s system, and applies the fol-
lowing two heuristics: i) if a NE is of type dbo:Organisation or dbo:Person, it considers such
NE as the source; ii) it searches in the abstract of the DBpedia50 page linked to that NE if the words
“news”, “newspaper” or “magazine” appear (if found, such entity is considered as the source). In the ex-
ample above, the following NEs have been detected in the tweet: “The Guardian” (linked to the DBpe-
dia resource http://dbpedia.org/page/The_Guardian) and “Greek crisis” (linked to http:
//dbpedia.org/page/Greek_government-debt_crisis). Applying the mentioned heuris-
tics, the first NE is considered as the source. Table 5.19 reports on the obtained results. As baseline,
we use a method that considers all the NEs detected in the tweet as sources.
50http://www.dbpedia.org
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Approach Precision Recall F1
Baseline 0.26 0.48 0.33
Matching+heurist. 0.69 0.64 0.67
Table 5.19: Results obtained on the test set for the source identification task
Most of the errors of the algorithm are due to information sources not recognized as NEs (in particular,
when the source is a Twitter user), or NEs that are linked to the wrong DBpedia page. However, in order
to draw more interesting conclusions on the most suitable methods to address this task, we would need the
increase the size of the dataset.
5.6 Argument mining on political speeches
In recent years, the analysis of argumentation using Natural Language Processing methods, so-called ar-
gument mining [158], has gained a lot of attention in the Artificial Intelligence research community and
has been applied to a number of domains, from student essays [290] to scientific articles [299] and online
user-generated content [314, 165]. However, while some of these approaches have been proposed to detect
claims in political debates, e.g. [205, 233], little attention has been devoted to the prediction of relations
between arguments, which could help historians, social and political scientists in the analysis of argumen-
tative dynamics (e.g., supports, attacks) between parties and political opponents. For example, this analysis
could support the study of past political speeches and of the repercussions of such claims over time. It could
also be used to establish relations with the current way of debating in politics. In order to find argumenta-
tion patterns in political speeches, typically covering a wide range of issues from international politics to
environmental challenges, the application of computational methods to assist scholars in their qualitative
analysis is advisable.
In this work, we tackle the following research question: To what extent can we apply argument mining
models to support and ease the analysis and modeling of past political speeches? This research question
breaks down into the following subquestions:
• Given a transcription of speeches from different politicians on a certain topic, how can we automati-
cally predict the relation holding between two arguments, even if they belong to different speeches?
• How can the output of the above-mentioned automated task be used to support history and political
science scholars in the curation, analysis and editing of such corpora?
This issue is investigated by creating and analysing a new annotated corpus for this task, based on the
transcription of discourses and official declarations issued by Richard Nixon and John F. Kennedy during
the 1960 US Presidential campaign. Moreover, we develop a relation classification system with specific
features able to predict support and attack relations between arguments [206], distinguishing them from
unrelated ones. This argumentation mining pipeline ends with the visualization of the resulting graph of the
debated topic using the OVA+ tool.51
The main contributions of this section are (1) an annotated corpus consisting of 1,462 pairs of arguments
in natural language (around 550,000 tokens) covering 5 topics, (2) a feature-rich Support Vector Machines
51http://ova.arg-tech.org/
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(SVM) model for relation prediction, and (3) an end-to-end workflow to analyse arguments that, starting
from one or more monological corpora in raw text, outputs the argumentation graph of user-defined topics.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no approaches in the argument mining literature that tackle
the problem of relation prediction over political speeches. The most important feature of such speeches
is their monological nature, with unaligned arguments, while debates are typically characterised by two
interlocutors answering each other. This leads to more implicit attack and support relations between the
arguments put forward by the candidates.52 Applying the argument mining pipeline, and more precisely, the
relation prediction stage to such speeches is the goal of our contribution.
Corpus Extraction and Annotation
Since no data for this task are available, we collect the transcription of speeches and official declarations
issued by Nixon and Kennedy during 1960 Presidential campaign from The American Presidency Project.53
The corpus includes 881 documents, released under the NARA public domain license, and more than 1,6
million tokens (around 830,000 tokens for Nixon and 815,000 tokens for Kennedy). We select this document
collection because of its relevance from a historical perspective: the 1960 electoral campaign has been
widely studied by historians and political scientists, being the first campaign broadcast on television. The
issues raised during the campaign shaped the political scenario of the next decades, for example the rising
Cold War tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union or the relationship with Cuba.
Dataset creation. In order to include relevant topics in the dataset, we asked a history scholar to list a
number of issues that were debated during 1960 campaign, around which argumentation pairs could emerge.
With his help, we selected the following ones: Cuba, disarmament, healthcare, minimum wage and unem-
ployment (henceforth topics). We then extracted pairs of candidate arguments as follows. For each topic,
we manually define a set of keywords (e.g., [medical care, health care]) that lexically express the topic.
Then, we extract from the corpus all sentences containing at least one of these keywords, plus the sentence
before and after them to provide some context: each candidate argument consists then of a snippet of text
containing three consecutive sentences and a date, corresponding to the day in which the original speech
was given during the campaign.
In the following step, we combine the extracted snippets into pairs using two different approaches.
Indeed, we want to analyse two different types of argumentations: those between candidates, and those
emerging from the speeches uttered by the same candidate over time. In the first case, for each topic, we
sort all the candidate arguments in chronological order, and then create pairs by taking one or more snippets
by a politician and the one(s) immediately preceding it by his opponent. These data are thus shaped as a
sort of indirect dialogue, in which Nixon and Kennedy talk about the same topics in chronological order.
However, the arguments of a speaker are not necessarily the direct answer to the arguments of the other one,
making it challenging to label the relation holding between the two.
In the second case, we sort by topic all the candidate arguments in chronological order, as in the previous
approach. However, each candidate argument is paired with what the same politician said on the same topic
in the immediately preceding date. These data provide information about how the ideas of Nixon and
Kennedy evolve during the electoral campaign, showing, if any, shifts in their opinions. We follow these
two approaches also with the goal to obtain a possibly balanced dataset: we expect to have more attack
52In argument mining, a support is a statement (source of the relation) that underpins another statement (target of the relation).
It holds between a target and a source statement if the source statement is a justification or a reason for the target statement.
53The American Presidency Project (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/1960_election.php)
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relations holding between pairs of arguments from different candidates, while pairs of arguments from the
same candidate should be coherent, mainly supporting each other.
Through this pairing process, we obtain 4,229 pairs for the Cuba topic, 2,508 pairs for disarmament,
3,945 pairs for health-care, 6,341 pairs for minimum wage, and 2,865 pairs for unemployment, for a total of
19,888 pairs.
Annotation. From the pool of automatically extracted pairs, we manually annotate a subset of 1,907 pairs
randomly selected over the five topics. Annotators were asked to mark if between two given arguments
there was a relation of attack (see Example 42 on minimum wage), a relation of support (see Example 43
on disarmament) or if there was no relation (arguments are neither supporting, nor attacking each other,
tackling different issues of the same topic).
Example 42.
Nixon: And here you get the basic economic principles. If you raise the minimum wage, in my opinion -
and all the experts confirm this that I have talked to in the Government - above $1.15, it would mean un-
employment; unemployment, because there are many industries that could not pay more than $1.15 without
cutting down their work force. $1.15 can be absorbed, and then at a later time we could move to $1.25 as
the economy moves up.
Kennedy: The fact of the matter is that Mr. Nixon leads a party which has opposed progress for 25 years,
and he is a representative of it. He leads a party which in 1935 voted 90 percent against a 25-cent minimum
wage. He leads a party which voted 90 percent in 1960 against $1.25 an hour minimum wage.
Example 43.
Nixon: I want to explain that in terms of examples today because it seems to me there has been a great
lack of understanding in recent months, and, for that matter in recent years, as to why the United States has
followed the line that it has diplomatically. People have often spoken to me and they have said, Why can’t
we be more flexible in our dealings on disarmament? Why can’t we find a bold new program in this area
which will make it possible for the Soviet Union to agree? The answer is that the reason the Soviet Union
has not agreed is that they do not want apparently to disarm unless we give up the right to inspection.
Nixon: People say, Now, why is it we can’t get some imaginative disarmament proposals, or suspension of
nuclear test proposals? Aren’t we being too rigid? And I can only say I have seen these proposals over the
years, and the United States could not have been more tolerant. We have not only gone an extra mile - we
have gone an extra 5 miles - on the tests, on disarmament, but on everything else, but every time we come
to a blocking point, the blocking point is no inspection, no inspection.
The annotation guidelines included few basic instructions: if the statements cover more than one topic,
annotators were asked to focus only on the text segments dealing with the chosen topic. Annotation was
carried out by strictly relying on the content of the statements, avoiding personal interpretation. Examples
of attack are pairs where the candidates propose two different approaches to reach the same goal, where
they express different considerations on the current situation with respect to a problem, or where they have
a different attitude with respect to the work done in the past. For example, in order to increase minimum
wage, Nixon proposed to set it to 1.10$ per hour, while Kennedy opposed this initiative, claiming that 1.35$
should be the minimum wage amount. In this example, the opponents have the same goal, i.e., increase
minimum wage, but their statements are annotated as an attack because their initiatives are different, clearly
expressing their disagreement.
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After an initial training following the above guidelines, 3 annotators were asked to judge a common
subset of 100 pairs to evaluate inter-annotator agreement. This was found to be 0.63 (Fleiss’ Kappa), which
as a rule of thumb is considered a substantial agreement [192]. After that, each annotator judged a different
set of argument pairs, with a total of 1,907 judgements collected. In order to balance the data, we discarded
part of the pairs annotated with no relation (randomly picked).
Overall, the final annotated corpus54 is composed of 1,462 pairs: 378 pairs annotated with attack, 353
pairs annotated with support, and 731 pairs where these relations do not hold. An overview of the annotated
corpus is presented in Table 5.20.
Topic Attack Support No Relation
Cuba 38 40 180
Disarmament 76 108 132
Medical care 75 72 142
Minimum wage 125 80 107
Unemployment 64 53 170
Table 5.20: Topic and class distribution in the annotated corpus
Experiments on Relation Prediction
To facilitate the construction of argument graphs and support the argumentative analysis of political speeches,
we propose an approach to automatically label pairs of arguments according to the relation existing between
them, namely support and attack.
Given the strategy adopted to create the pairs, the paired arguments may happen to be also unrelated
(50% of the pairs are labeled with no relation). Therefore, we first isolate the pairs connected through
a relation, and then we classify them as support or attack. Each step is performed by a binary classifier
using specific features, which we describe in the following subsection. In the section, we present the results
obtained with the feature set that achieved the best performance on 10-fold cross validation.
Experimental setting. The first step concerns the binary classification of related and unrelated pairs. In
this step the pairs annotated with support and attack have been merged under the related label. We first
pre-process all the pairs using the Stanford CoreNLP suite [214] for tokenization, lemmatization and part-
of-speech tagging. Then, for each pair we define three sets of features, representing the lexical overlap
between snippets, the position of the topic mention in the snippet, as a proxy for its relevance, and the
similarity of snippets with other related / unrelated pairs.
Lexical overlap: the rationale behind this information is that two related arguments are supposed to
be more lexically similar than unrelated ones. Therefore, we compute i) the number of nouns, verbs and
adjectives shared by two snippets in a pair, normalized by their length, and ii) the normalized number of
nouns, verbs and adjectives shared by the argument subtrees where the topic is mentioned.
Topic position: the rationale behind this information is that, if the same topic is central in both candidate
arguments, then it is likely that these arguments are related. To measure this, we represent with a set of
54The dataset is available at https://dh.fbk.eu/resources/political-argumentation
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features how often the topic (expressed by a list of keywords, see previous section on dataset creation)
appears at the beginning, in the central part or at the end of each candidate argument.
Similarity with other related / unrelated pairs: the intuition behind this set of features is that related
pairs should be more similar to other related pairs than to unrelated ones. For each topic, its merged related
and unrelated pairs are represented as two vectors using a bag-of-words model. Their semantic similarity
with the individual pairs in the dataset is computed through cosine similarity and used as a feature.
For classification, we adopt a supervised machine learning approach training Support Vector Machines
with radial kernel using LIBSVM [100].
In the second step of the classification pipeline, we take in input the outcome of the first step and classify
all the pairs of related arguments as support or attack. We rely on a set of surface, sentiment and semantic
features inspired by Menini and Tonelli (2016) and Menini et al. (2017). We adopt the Lexical overlap set
of features used also for the first step, to which we add the features described below. In general, we aim
at representing more semantic information compared to the previous step, in which lexical features were
already quite informative.
Negation: this set of features includes the normalized number of words under the scope of a negation
in each argument, and the percentage of overlapping lemmas in the negated phrases of the two arguments.
Keyword embeddings: we use word2vec [225] to extract from each argument a vector representing the
keywords of a topic. These vectors are extracted using the continuous bag-of-word algorithm, a windows
size of 8 and a vector dimensionality of 50.
Argument entailment: these features indicate if the first argument entails the second one, and vice-
versa. To detect the presence of entailment we use the Excitement Open Platform [213].
Argument sentiment: a set of features based on the sentiment analysis module of the Stanford CoreNLP
suite [288] are used to represent the sentiment of each argument, calculated as the average sentiment score
of the sentences composing it.
Additional features for lexical overlap, entailment and sentiment are obtained also considering only the
subtrees containing a topic keyword instead of the full arguments. The feature vectors are then used to train
a SVM with radial kernel with LIBSVM, like in the first classification step.
Evaluation. We test the performance of the classification pipeline using the 1,462 manually annotated
pairs with 10-fold cross-validation. The first classification step separates the argument pairs linked by either
an attack or a support relation from the argument pairs with no relation (that will be subsequently discarded).
The purpose of this first step is to pass the related pairs to the second step. Thus, we aim at the highest
precision, in order to minimise the number of errors propagated to the second step. Table 5.21 shows the
results of the classification for the first step. We choose a configuration that, despite a low recall (0.23),
scores a precision of 0.88 on the attack/support pairs, providing for the second step a total of 194 argument
pairs.
Unrelated Attack/Support Average
Precision 0.56 0.88 0.72
Recall 0.97 0.23 0.60
F1 0.71 0.36 0.65
Table 5.21: Step 1: classification of related / unrelated pairs
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The second step classifies the related pairs assigning an attack or a support label. We provide two
evaluations: we report the classifier performance only on the gold attack and support pairs (Table 5.22), and
on the pairs classified as related in the first step (Table 5.23). In this way, we evaluate the classifier also in a
real setting, to assess the performance of the end-to-end pipeline.
Attack Support Average
Precision 0.89 0.75 0.82
Recall 0.79 0.86 0.83
F1 0.84 0.80 0.82
Table 5.22: Step 2: classification of Attack and Support using only gold data.
Attack Support Average
Precision 0.76 0.67 0.72
Recall 0.79 0.86 0.83
F1 0.77 0.75 0.77
Table 5.23: Step 2: classification of Attack and Support using the output of Step 1.
As expected, accuracy using only gold data is 0.82 (against a random baseline of 0.70), while it drops
to 0.72 (against a random baseline of 0.51) in the real-world setting. We also test a 3-class classifier, with
the same set of features used in the two classification steps, obtaining a precision of 0.57. This shows that
support/attack and no relation are better represented by using different sets of features, therefore we opt for
two binary classifiers in cascade.
Notice that a comparison of our results with existing approaches to predict argument relations, namely
the approach of [291] on persuasive essays, cannot be fairly addressed due to huge differences in the com-
plexity of the used corpus. With their better configuration, [291] obtain an F1 of 0.75 on persuasive essays
(that are a very specific kind of texts, human upperbound: macro F1 score of 0.854), and of 0.72 on mi-
crotexts [256]. The difference in the task complexity is highlighted also in the inter-annotator agreement.
Differently from persuasive essays, where students are requested to put forward arguments in favour and
against their viewpoint, in political speeches, candidates often respond to opponents in subtle or implicit
ways, avoiding a clear identification of opposing viewpoints.
Error analysis. If we analyse the classifier output at topic level, we observe that overall the performance
is consistent across all topics, with the exception of minimum wage. In this latter case, the classifier performs
much better, with an accuracy of 0.94 in the second step. This is probably due to the fact that Kennedy’s
and Nixon’s statements about minimum wage are very different and the discussion revolves around very
concrete items (e.g., the amounts of the minimum wage, the categories that should benefit from it). In
other cases, for example disarmament or Cuba, the speakers’ wording is very similar and tends to deal with
abstract concepts such as freedom, war, peace.
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Furthermore, we observe that the classifier yields a better performance with argument pairs by the same
person rather than those uttered by different speakers: in the first case, accuracy is 0.86, while in the second
one it is 0.79 (Step 2).
Looking at misclassified pairs, we notice very challenging cases, where the presence of linguistic devices
like rhetorical questions and repeated negations cannot be correctly captured by our features. Example 44
reports on a pair wrongly classified as Support belonging to the health care topic:
Example 44.
Nixon: Now, some people might say, Mr. Nixon, won’t it be easier just to have the Federal Government take
this thing over rather than to have a Federal-State program? Won’t it be easier not to bother with private
health insurance programs? Yes; it would be a lot simpler, but, my friends, you would destroy the standard
of medical care.
Kennedy: I don’t believe that the American people are going to give their endorsement to the leadership
which believes that medical care for our older citizens, financed under social security, is extreme, and I
quote Mr. Nixon accurately.
Visualization and Analysis of the Argumentation Graphs
In this section, we describe how the results of our relation prediction system are then used to construct the
argumentation graphs about the debated topics.
Several tools have been proposed to visualize (and then reason upon) argumentation frameworks in the
computational argumentation field, e.g., Carneades55, GRAFIX56, and ConArg257. However, two main
problems arise when trying to use such tools for our purposes: first, they are not tailored to long, natural
language snippets (the usual names of arguments in computational argumentation are of the form arg1), and
second, they do not consider the possibility to identify specific argumentation schemes over the provided
text. For all these reasons, we decided to rely upon a well-know tool called OVA+ [178], an on-line interface
for the manual analysis of natural language arguments. OVA+ grounds its visualization on the Argument In-
terchange Format (AIF) [105], allowing for the representation of arguments and the possibility to exchange,
share and reuse the resulting argument maps. OVA+ handles texts of any type and any length.
The last step of our argument mining pipeline takes in input the labeled pairs returned by the relation
prediction module and translates this output to comply with the AIF format. This translation is performed
through a script converting the CSV input file into json file to be load on OVA+ through its online inter-
face.58 In this mapping, each argument is extracted in order to create an information node (I-node) [105],
and then, it is possible to create the associated locution node (L-node) and to specify the name of the speaker.
The locution appears, preceded by the name of the participant assigned to it, and edges link the L-node to the
I-node via an “Asserting” YA-node, i.e., the illocutionary forces of locutions, as in the Inference Anchoring
Theory (IAT) model [64]. Supports or attacks between arguments are represented as follows, always relying
upon the standard AIF model. A RA-node (relation of inference) should connect two I-nodes. To elicit an
attack between two arguments, RA-nodes are changed into CA-nodes, namely schemes of conflict. Nodes




58The script and the argumentation graphs about the five topics in our corpus (both gold standard and system’s output) are
available at https://dh.fbk.eu/resources/political-argumentation
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Figure 5.12: The argumentation graph about the topic minimum wage visualized through the OVA+ tool.
nodes, respectively. Figure 5.12 shows (a portion of) the argumentation graph resulting from the relation
prediction step about the topic minimum wage, where three I-nodes (i.e., arguments) are involved in one
support and one attack relation. The Asserting nodes connect each argument with its own source (e.g., K for
Kennedy and N for Nixon).
OVA+ allows users to load an analysis, and to visualize it. Given the loaded argumentation graph, the
user is supported in analyzing the graph by identifying argumentation schemes [318], and adding further
illocutionary forces and relations between the arguments. This final step substantially eases the analysis
process by historians and social scientists. Moreover, at the end of the analysis, OVA+ permits to save the
final argumentation graph on the user’s machine (image or json file).
This graph-based visualization is employed to support political scientists and historians in analysing
and modeling political speeches. This proves the usefulness of applying the argumentation mining pipeline
over such kind of data: it allows users to automatically identify, among the huge amount of assertions put
forward by the candidates in their speeches, the main points on which the candidates disagree (mainly corre-
sponding to the solutions they propose to carry out or their own viewpoints on the previous administrations’
effectiveness) or agree (mainly, general-purpose assertions about the country’s values to promote).
In the following, we analyze the argumentative structure and content of two of the graphs resulting from
the discussed topics (i.e., minimun wage and health care), highlighting main conflicting arguments among
candidates, and other argumentative patterns. Note that this analysis is carried out on the proposed dataset,
that contains a subset of all the speeches of the candidates, but gives a clear idea of the kind of analysis
that could be performed by scholars on the entirety of the speeches. In general (and this is valid for all the
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analyzed graphs), we notice that the candidates almost always disagree either on the premises (e.g., who
caused the problem to be faced) or on the proposed solutions (the minor claims).
Minimum wage. A widely discussed topic by both candidates was minimum wage, i.e., the bill to set the
lowest remuneration that employers may legally pay to workers. It is worth noticing that the argumentation
graph for the minimum wage corpus is rather complicated, and it highlights some main controversial issues.
The candidates do not agree about the causes of the low minimum wage in 1960 in the US. More precisely,
Kennedy attacks the fact that the administration supported an increase in the minimum wage by attacking
Nixon’s argument “The misstatement: In the second debate Senator Kennedy said: The Republicans in
recent years, not only in the last 25 years, but in the last 8 years, have opposed minimum wage. The facts:
[. . . ] The administration supported an increase in the minimum wage in 1955, and in 1957 urged legislation
to extend minimum wage coverage to some 3 million additional workers, an extension which the Democratic-
led Congress failed to approve. In 1960, this administration sought to extend minimum wage coverage to
3.1 million additional workers and indicated support of an increase in the minimum wage to $1.15 per
hour.”. This argument is attacked from different perspectives, leading to a disagreement on the actions the
administration carried out in the past years to deal with the minimum wage problem. For instance, as shown
in Figure 5.12, Kennedy states that “In the midthirties, 90 percent of the Republican Party voted against a
25-cent minimum wage. This summer, as your Congressman can tell you, in the House of Representatives,
90 percent of the Republicans voted against a minimum wage of $1.25 an hour, $50 a week for a 40-hour
week, for a business that makes more than a million dollars a year, and Mr. Nixon called it extreme. He
is frozen in the ice of his own indifference”. While we may say that this source of disagreement is about
the causes of the minimum wage issue, another main source of disagreement is represented by the solutions
proposed by the two candidates, which mainly differ regarding the amount of increase of the minimum
wage and the coverage of the two respective bills. All these issues become evident with ease in the resulting
argumentation graph about the minimum wage topic.
Medical care. The problem of medical care for the elderly was a main problem in 1960, and this topic was
widely discussed in the campaign. The resulting argumentation graph highlights some relevant argumenta-
tive patterns that are worth analyzing. In general, in the argumentation graphs we are analyzing, the support
relation holds between arguments proposed by the same candidate, ensuring in this way a certain degree of
coherence in their own argumentation. Interestingly, in the argumentation graph on the topic medical care,
we can observe that a support relation holds between an argument from Kennedy and one from Nixon, i.e.,
“Those forced to rely on surplus food packages should receive a more balanced, nourishing diet. And to
meet the pressing problem confronting men past working age, and their families, we must put through an
effective program of medical care for the aged under the social security system. The present medical care
program will not send one penny to needy persons without further action by the Congress and the State
legislatures.” supports “N: We stand for programs which will provide for increased and better medical care
for our citizens, and particularly for those who need it, who are in the older age brackets - and I will discuss
that more a little later. We stand for progress in all of these fields, and certainly, as I stand here before you,
I am proud to be a part of that platform and of that program”. These instances of support among candidates
mostly concern general issues, i.e., a program of medical care for the elderly is needed.
In summary, our system allows the detection of such argumentation patterns (i.e., topics on which both
candidates agree or disagree, topics on which they provide contradictory assertions) and the analysis of
how they connect with the other statements asserted in the speeches. As for future work, we face two
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major challenges. First, to improve the system performances, we need a finer-grained argument boundary
definition. Namely, the goal is to identify within an argument its evidences and claims, so that the relations of
support and attack may also be addressed towards these precise argument components. This would also have
an impact on facilitating the work of scholars in the manual analysis of the argumentation graphs generated
by our system. Second, we plan to evaluate the system with scholars in history and political sciences, who
will be asked to judge not only the classification output but also the way in which it is displayed. We are
currently working at a more interactive interface to display graphs with their textual content, so that users
can select and visualize subgraphs according to the selected argumentative pattern.
5.7 Related work
Argument mining on online debate platforms
Among the set of online debate systems, Debategraph59 is an online system for debates supporting the
incremental development of argument structures, but it is not grounded on argument theory to decide the
accepted arguments.
Gilbert [154] addresses the topic of human/computer argumentation, where the ability to identify and
classify various locutions as facts, values and goals is discussed. The paper does not present a solution to
the problem of automatically generating the arguments from NL text. The author grounds his observations
on Toulmin [302] argumentation model.
Chesnevar et al. [104] use defeasible argumentation to assist the language usage assessment. Their
system provides recommendations on language patterns using indices (computed from Web corpora) and
defeasible argumentation, where the preference criteria for language usage are formalized as defeasible and
strict argumentation rules. The aim of the paper is different from ours. No NL techniques are used to
automatically detect and generate the arguments.
Carenini et al. [85] present a computational framework for generating evaluative arguments. The frame-
work, based on the user’s preferences, produces the arguments following the guidelines of argumentation
theory to structure and select evaluative arguments. Then, a natural language processing step returns the
argument in natural language. The output of the argumentation strategy is a text plan indicating the propo-
sitions to include in the argument and its overall structure. The aim of the paper is different from our one:
we do not use natural language generation to produce the arguments, but we use textual entailment to detect
the arguments in natural language text. We use the word “generation” with the meaning of generation of
the abstract arguments from the text, and not with the meaning of natural language generation. Concerning
argumentation, we use bipolar argumentation to reason over the arguments to identify the accepted ones.
We do not address argumentation-based persuasion or planning.
Leite et al. [197] envision a self-managing online debating system able to accommodate different kinds
of participation of the agents. However, while we re-use Dung’s abstract theory, they depart from this
approach and defend the view that these debates should provide more than an accepted/rejected classification
of the issue at stake. They do not apply natural language processing techniques to identify the arguments in
natural language debates.
Wyner et al. [325] present a policy making support tool based on forums. They propose to couple NLP
and argumentation to provide the set of well structured statements that underlie a policy. Apart from the
different goal of this work, there are several points which distinguish our proposal from this one. First,
59http://debategraph.org
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their NLP module guides the participant in writing the input text using Attempt to Controlled English which
allows the usage of a restricted grammar and vocabulary. After parsing the text, the sentences are translated
to FOL. We do not have any kind of lexicon or grammar restriction, and we do not support the participant
in writing the text, but we automatically extract the arguments from the debates. Second, the inserted
statements are associated with a mode indicating the relation between the existing statements and the input
statement. We do not ask the participants to explicit the relation among the arguments, we infer them using
TE. Moreover, no evaluation of their framework is provided.
Heras et al. [167] show how to model the opinions put forward on business oriented websites using
argumentation schemes. The idea is to associate a scheme to each argument to have a formal structure
which makes the reasoning explicit. We share the same goal, that is providing a formal structure to on-
line dialogues to evaluate them, but, differently from [167], in our proposal we achieve this issue using an
automatic technique to generate the arguments from natural language texts as well as their relations.
Rahwan et al. [268] present Avicenna, a Web-based system used to reason about arguments, ranging
from automatic argument classification to reason about chained argument structures. In Avicenna, the ar-
guments are inserted by participants through a form, and the participants can decide to attack or support
existing arguments, while in our framework participants do not enter arguments: it automatically returns the
abstract arguments, the relationships among them highlighting the accepted arguments.
Mochales et al. [231] experiment ML approaches to recognize features characterizing legal arguments.
We adopt a more general framework, i.e. TE (implementable also using ML techniques) to extract open-
domain arguments, and automatically assign their relations.
Argument mining on Wikipedia history
A few works investigate the use of Wikipedia revisions in NLP tasks. In Zanzotto and Pennacchiotti [330],
two versions of Wikipedia and semi-supervised machine learning methods are used to extract large TE data
sets, while Cabrio et al. [66] propose a methodology for the automatic acquisition of large scale context-rich
entailment rules from Wikipedia revisions. [328] focus on using edit histories in Simple English Wikipedia
to extract lexical simplifications. Nelken and Yamangil [326] compare different versions of the same docu-
ment to collect users’ editorial choices, for automated text correction and text summarization systems. Max
and Wisniewski [219] create a corpus of natural rewritings (e.g. spelling corrections, reformulations) from
French Wikipedia revisions. Dutrey et al. [138] analyze part of this corpus to define a typology of local
modifications.
Other approaches couple NLP and argumentation. Chasnevar and Maguitman [104] use defeasible ar-
gumentation to assist the language usage assessment. Their system provides recommendations on language
patterns and defeasible argumentation. No natural language techniques are applied to automatically detect
and generate the arguments. Carenini and Moore [85] present a complete computational framework for
generating evaluative arguments. The framework, based on the user’s preferences, produces the arguments
following the guidelines of argumentation theory to structure and select evaluative arguments. Differently
from their work, we do not use natural language generation to produce the arguments, but we use TE to
detect the arguments in natural language text. We use the word “generation” with the meaning of genera-
tion of the abstract arguments from the text, and not with the meaning of NL generation. Wyner and van
Engers [325] present a policy making support tool based on forums. They propose to couple NLP and ar-
gumentation to provide the set of well structured statements that underlie a policy. Beside the goals, several
points distinguish the two works: i) their NLP module guides the user in writing the text using a restricted
grammar and vocabulary, while we have no lexicon or grammar restrictions; ii) the inserted statements are
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associated with a mode indicating the relation between the existing and the input statements. We do not ask
the user to explicit the relation among the arguments, we infer them using TE; iii) no evaluation of their
framework is provided. Heras et al. [167] show how to model the opinions on business oriented websites
using argumentation schemes. We share the same goal (i.e. providing a formal structure to on-line dialogues
for evaluation,), but in our proposal we achieve it using an automatic technique to generate the arguments
from natural language texts as well as their relations.
Argument mining on Twitter
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first tackling the challenge of applying argument mining to Twitter
data. Argumentation is applied to Twitter by Grosse et al. [161] who extract a particular version of arguments
they called “opinions” based on incrementally generated queries. Their goal is to detect conflicting elements
in an opinion tree to avoid potentially inconsistent information. Both the goal and the adopted methodology
is different from the one we present in this chapter.
5.8 Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to show how the joint effort of two, rather disjoint, research communities in
AI resulted in the development of a new research area: argument mining. This synergy among researchers
from both NLP and KRR communities has led to the conception and development of systems able to mine
a variety of textual documents, e.g., legal cases, persuasive essays, online debates and tweets, to detect
premises and claims, and predict the relations among them. The results obtained so far in AM have attracted
the interest (and investment) of companies (e.g., IBM), and have raised high expectations for the future
findings in the area.
Since the standard definition of the AM framework, in the last years, a number of new challenges
have been proposed in the literature. In particular, Dusmanu et al. [136] select argumentative tweets and
distinguish those conveying an opinion from those containing factual information, to detect their source of
information (e.g., the BBC). Other colleagues [163, 258, 135] focused on arguments persuasion to study the
relation “argument A is more convincing than argument B”.
In addition, AM is strongly connected with hot topics in AI, as deep learning (heavily used in AM), fact
checking and misinformation detection (the prediction of the attacks between arguments is a building block
for fake news detection), and explanations of machine decisions (AM can disclose how the information on
which the machine relies to make its own decisions is retrieved). Other scenarios where AM can contribute
are medicine (where AM can detect information needed to reason upon clinical trials), politics (where AM
can provide the means to automatically identify fallacies and unfair propaganda), and for cyberbullism
prevention (where AM can support the detection of repeated attacks against a person60).
Alas, all that glitters is not gold, and some open issues in AM should be tackled to actually attain
the expectations. First of all, system performances should improve. Despite the good results obtained
in some application scenarios, i.e., persuasive essays [289] (where the structure of the essays themselves
eases the argument component detection task), for other kinds of documents, e.g., legal cases [298] and
microtexts [255], more work is still required. It is important to underline here that also human agreement
(generally viewed as the upper bound on automatic performance in annotation tasks) is affected by the com-
plexity of the AM tasks. Moreover, various heterogeneous datasets have been produced since the beginning
60http://creep-project.eu/
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of research in AM. Because of the immaturity of a rising field, and the lack of clear definitions, each dataset
has been annotated relying on slightly different definitions of argument components and of the relations
holding between them, thus preventing the possibility of a straightforward alignment among datasets. While
on the one side, it would be worth trying some kind of unification of existing resources, on the other side,
this fact shows that the AM framework is flexible enough to adapt to different use case scenarios, e.g.,
premises and claims are not the same in legal cases, persuasive essays and Twitter. In [121], a qualitative
analysis of six different datasets commonly used in AM is presented, to underline the different conceptual-
ization of claims. The question about the worthiness of unifying the existing datasets is still open and under
debate. [315] highlight and empirically study a related issue, i.e., the question of how different the theoret-
ical (computational models of arguments) and practical views of argumentation quality actually are. Their
results show that, on the one hand, most reasons for quality differences in practice seem well-represented in




Emotions in human argumentation
6.1 Introduction
This chapter synthesizes my contributions in the area of argumentation and emotions, dealing with the anal-
ysis and study of how emotions impact on human argumentation and viceversa. These contributions are
across the Cognitive Science research area and the computational models of argument one. These contribu-
tions have been published in several venues:
• Sahbi Benlamine, Maher Chaouachi, Serena Villata, Elena Cabrio, Claude Frasson, Fabien Gandon.
Emotions in Argumentation: an Empirical Evaluation. Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference
on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2015): 156-163 [39],
• Sahbi Benlamine, Serena Villata, Ramla Ghali, Claude Frasson, Fabien Gandon, Elena Cabrio. Per-
suasive Argumentation and Emotions: An Empirical Evaluation with Users. 19th International Con-
ference on Human-Computer Interaction (HCI 2017): 659-671 [38],
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The contributions presented in this chapter are the result of the collaboration with the Heron Laboratory
at the University of Montreal, started in the context of the SEEMPAD project.
Understanding how humans reason and take decisions in debates and discussions is a key issue in cogni-
tive science and a challenge for social applications. Moreover, with the growing importance of the Web, this
issue is complicated by the fact that in such a hybrid space heterogeneous actors, both human and artificial,
interact. As a typical example, Wikipedia is managed by users and bots who constantly contribute, agree,
disagree, debate and update the content of the encyclopedia. In this context, several dimensions of the in-
teraction affect the reasoning and decision making process, i.e., the arguments that are proposed online, the
emotions of those who propose such arguments as well as the emotions of those reading these arguments,
the social relationships among the involved actors, the writing of their messages, etc. This underlines the
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need for multidisciplinary approaches and research for Web applications in general and for detecting and
managing the emotional state of a user in particular to allow artificial and human actors to adapt their re-
actions to others’ emotional states. It is also a useful indicator for community managers, moderators and
editors to help them in handling the communities and the content they produce.
In this chapter, we argue that in order to apply argumentation to scenarios like e-democracy and online
debate systems, designers must take both the argumentation and the emotions into account. In order to
efficiently manage and interact with such a hybrid society, we need to improve our means to understand
and link the different dimensions of the exchanges (e.g. social interactions, textual content of the messages,
dialogical structures of the interactions, emotional states of the participants). Beyond the challenges individ-
ually raised by each dimension, a key problem is to link these dimensions and their analysis together with
the aim to detect, for instance, a debate turning into a flame war, a content reaching an agreement, a good or
bad emotion spreading in a community.
In this chapter, we aim to answer the research question: What is the connection between the argumenta-
tion and the emotions in online debate interactions? Such question breaks down into sub-questions:
• How are the arguments and their relations correlated with the polarity of the detected facial emotions?
• Is the relation between the kind and the amount of arguments proposed in a debate correlated with the
mental engagement and workload detected for each participant in the debate?
• How do personality traits and opinions affect participants’ emotions during the debate?
To answer these questions, we propose an empirical evaluation of the connection between argumenta-
tion, personality traits, and emotions in online debate interactions. This chapter describes an experiment
with human participants which investigates the correspondences between the arguments and their relations
put forward during a debate, the emotions detected by emotions recognition systems in the debaters, and
the personality traits of the debaters. We designed an experiment where 12 debates were addressed by 4
participants each. Participants were asked to discuss about 12 topics in total proposed by moderators, e.g.,
“Religion does more harm than good” and “Cannabis should be legalized”. Participants argue in plain En-
glish proposing arguments, that are in positive or negative relation with the arguments proposed by the other
participants and by moderators. During these debates, participants are equipped with emotion detection
devices, recording their emotions. Moreover, each participant filled in a questionnaire for Big Five person-
ality traits [180]. We hypothesize that mental engagement and emotions are correlated to the argumentation
holding in the debates, namely to the number of arguments that are proposed, and the kind of relations
connecting them (i.e., support or attack). Moreover, we hypothesize that personality traits of debaters and
debaters’ opinions regarding the discussed topics modulate their emotional experiences during the debates.
In this chapter, we also present another study where we investigate how emotions and mental states
impact on the persuasion strategies used by humans when they argue to each other. Also in this case,
participants discuss on an online debate platform and they are equipped with emotion recognition and mental
state detection tools.
A key point in our work is that, up to our knowledge, no user experiment has been carried out yet
to determine what is the connection between the argumentation addressed during a debate, the emotions
emerging in the participants, as well as their personality traits. An important result of the work reported here
is the development of a publicly available dataset, capturing several debate situations, annotated with their
argumentation structure and the emotional states automatically detected.
CHAPTER 6. EMOTIONS IN HUMAN ARGUMENTATION 187
It is worth highlighting that bipolar abstract argumentation is used in our experimental setting to pair
the arguments, connect them with the appropriate relation (either support or attack), and combine them in
bipolar argumentation graphs. This structure allows for further reasoning activities over the data, where for
instance the acceptability of the arguments depends on the mental engagement associated to their concep-
tion by their proposer, or a ranking is established over the acceptable arguments depending on the emotions
(mostly positive, mostly negative, neutral) they generated in the audience. The definition and evaluation of
these reasoning processes are not in the scope of the present chapter, and we left them for future research. It
is worth clarifying also that, in this chapter, we are not interested in verifying explanation and reasoning the-
ories proposed in cognitive psychology like, among others, those of Lombrozo and colleagues [323] about
explanations in category learning, and Keil and colleagues [181] about explanatory reasoning through an ab-
ductive theory. We rely on bipolar argumentation for representing the debates, and to foster the application
of reasoning techniques.
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2 we describe the main insights of the two components
of our framework, then in Section 6.3, we describe the experimental protocol and the questionnaires we
proposed to the debaters during the experiment, and our research hypotheses. In Section 6.4, we provide
a detailed analysis of the experimental results. Section 6.5 discusses the field experiment we conducted to
study the relation of emotions and mental states on argumentative persuasion strategies, and the obtained
resuts. We compare this work with the relevant literature in Section 6.6. Conclusions end the chapter.
6.2 Emotions and personality traits in argumentation
In this section, we present the two main components involved in our experimental framework: i) bipolar
argumentation theory, i.e., the formalism used to analyze and represent the argumentation elements from
the debates, and ii) the methodologies and tools used to detect the degrees of attention, engagement, and
workload of each participant involved in the debate, as well as her facial emotions.
Argumentation Theory
In order to analyze from the argumentation point of view the debates in which the participants to our experi-
ment have been involved, we rely on abstract bipolar argumentation. In this way, we do not need distinguish
the internal structure of the arguments (i.e., premises, conclusion), but we consider each argument proposed
by the participants in the debate as a unique element, then analyzing the relation (positive or negative) it has
with the other pieces of information put forward in the debate. The following example extracted from one
of the debates addressed in our experiment shows how the arguments are connected to each other through
a defeat or a support relation. Consider the following three arguments proposed by the participants of the
debate about “Religion does more harm than good”. We have that the issue of the debate is also our first
argument whose proponent is the debate moderator, then the other two arguments are proposed by two
different participants:
Argument 1 : Religion does more harm than good.
Argument 2 : During all the existence of the human being, religion makes a lot of issues. It makes more
hurts than cures.
Argument 3 : I think for people, religion is a refuge against the horrors of the world.
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Given such a kind of debate, we have that three arguments are proposed (namely Argument 1, Argument
2 and Argument 3) whose relations with each other are as follows: (Argument 2) supports (Argument 1),
(Argument 3) attacks (Argument 1), and (Argument 3) attacks (Argument 2).
Note that in this chapter we are not interested in applying natural language processing techniques to
detect automatically the relations among the arguments. On the contrary, we have manually built our data
set of argumentation and emotions from the data retrieved during the debates of our experiment. Experiments
with natural language processing approaches will be part of future work.
Emotion Detection
Human emotion analysis during traditional face-to-face or computer-mediated interaction has always been
a challenging and attractive task mainly because of how emotions are closely associated to human behavior
and experience. Several theories state that emotions serve as an adaptive function to our behavior, e.g.,
[148, 175, 194, 285]. Following these theories, the appraisal of an experience and the intention to act to
maintain, adjust or change a condition related to this experience is impacted by emotions. During a debate,
emotional reactions provoked by others’ arguments could be, for example, a trigger for developing attacking
or supporting arguments.
Emotion recognition methods can be categorized into three groups, each of them defining one level of
how a usual emotional response is displayed, namely, experiential, behavioral and physiological [160]. For
example if an individual is annoyed by someone else’s argument, the subjective experience could be the
anger; the behavioral response will be displayed through a higher voice tone (during a face-to-face conver-
sation) or an angry facial expression; and the physiological response will be activated by an increasing level
of heart rate. Usually, the experiential methods use subjective self-report instruments (such as surveys and
questionnaires) to determine the emotion relative to a specific event. The behavioral methods are based on
external observable clues detected from the individual’s behavior (such as gestures, body movements, facial
expression, voice tone and pitch, etc.) that can indicate the type of the emotion. The physiological meth-
ods rely on physical sensors (such as EDA, EEG, heart rate, respiration rate, temperature, etc.) to measure
specific physiological shifts and patterns that can be related to specific emotions. In a computer-mediated
context, the use of self-report surveys to recognize the individuals’ emotions could be inconvenient. If
these surveys are administrated at frequent intervals during the task, it could be disrupting for the task
performance. However, non-frequent administration intervals of the survey could result into an undetailed
and ambiguous assessment of the different emotions experienced during the task. Therefore, growing re-
search interest has arisen towards using and combining behavioral and physiological methods for emotion
recognition [265, 182, 183]. These methods allow automatic, objective and reasonably precise emotional
recognition level.
In our study, we selected a behavioral method to extract the emotional manifestations. We used a set
of webcams (one for each participant in the discussion) whose recordings have been analyzed with the
FaceReader software1 to detect a set of discrete emotions from facial expressions. Furthermore, we also
recoded the EEG data from each participant in order to extract more complex information about their internal
cognitive state. This cognitive information was aligned and analyzed jointly with the emotional information
to have a global overview of the debate experience for each participant.
1http://www.noldus.com/human-behavior-research/products/facereader
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Detecting emotions from facial expressions The emotional detection from facial expression is one of the
most commonly and predominantly used methods [322, 8, 171]. In fact, facial expressions of basic emo-
tions are widely believed to be naturally and universally expressed and recognized. In this study, we used the
FaceReader software (version 6.0) to automatically extract the emotional reactions from the frame-by-frame
videos recoded by the webcam. The FaceReader software launched by Noldus Information technology is
able to recognize six basic emotions, namely, happy, sad, angry, surprised, scared and disgusted with an ac-
curacy reaching 87%. The detection process is performed by extracting and classifying in real-time 500 key
points in facial muscles of the target face. These key points are provided as input to a neural network trained
on a dataset of 10000 manually annotated images corresponding to these six basic emotions. In addition to
the probability of the presence of these six emotions, the software output also contains the probability of the
neutral state as well as the valence, and the arousal of the emotional state. Information about the emotional
valance defines the nature of the emotion and is ranging from −1 to +1. A positive valence value refers
to pleasant emotion, whereas a negative valence value characterizes unpleasant emotions. The information
about the arousal of the emotion defines its intensity and is also ranging from −1 to +1. A high arousal
value indicates a high emotional intensity and a low value the opposite.
In this study, at each second in the debate, a dominant emotion is computed for each one of the four
participants. This dominant emotion corresponds to the emotion (among the six detected by FaceReader)
with the highest probability. Moreover, information about the valence and arousal of this emotion as well as
their class (pleasant or unpleasant for the valence, high or low for the arousal) was also considered.
Emotiv EPOC EEG headset In order to record physiological data of the participants during the debate
sessions, we used the 4 Emotiv Epoc EEG headsets (one for each participant). This device contains 14
electrodes spatially organized according to International 10−20 system2. The pads of each electrode were
moistened with a saline solution (contact lens cleaning solution) in order to enhance the quality of the signal.
Figure 6.1 depicts the recorded sites, namely: AF3, AF4, F3, F4, F7, F8, FC5, FC6, P7, P8, T7, T8, O1, and
O2. The reference of this EEG setup is represented by two other electrodes located behind the user’s ears.
The generated data are in (µV ) with a 128Hz sampling rate. The signal frequencies are between 0.2 and
60Hz. An artifact rejection procedure based on the signal amplitude was performed in order to reduce the
impact of blinking and body movement effect [146, 147]. More precisely, if the amplitude of any 1-s EEG
in any site exceeds in 25% of the data point a predefined threshold, the segment is rejected.
Extracting the engagement index The term mental engagement refers to the level of attention and alert-
ness during a task. The engagement index used in our study is based on the findings of [260] and [146]. In
their study, it was found that the user’s performance improved when an EEG index is used as a criterion for
switching between manual and automated piloting mode. This index is computed from three EEG frequency





This index is computed each second from the EEG signal. To smooth the values of this index and reduce
its fluctuation, we used a moving average on a 40-second mobile window. More precisely, the value of the
2International 10−20 system is an internationally recognized method to describe and apply the location of scalp electrodes in
the context of an EEG test or experiment.
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Figure 6.1: Emotiv Headset sensors/data channels placement.
index at time t corresponds to the total average of the ratios calculated on a period of 40 seconds preceding
t. The extraction of the frequency bands (namely α , β and θ ) was performed by multiplying every second
of the EEG signal by a Hamming window (to reduce the spectral leakage) and applying a Fast Fourier
Transform (FFT). As the Emotiv headset measures 14 regions at the same time, we used a combined value of
α , β and θ frequency bands by summing their values over all the measured regions. To examine participants’
engagement, we extract their minimum, average and maximum values during the debate, and we use such
values to identify the range of engagement (High, Medium, Low) of every participant. Since its development
by Pope and his colleagues, this engagement index has become a very important and popular technique for
real time or offline tracking and analysis of individuals’ engagement in several laboratory studies. In the
educational sittings for example, this engagement index was used for monitoring learners’ engagement and
adapting learning activities according to their level of mental engagement by [294] and [102]. In robotics,
this index was also used to leverage the interaction between a robot and a user by providing the robot real-
time information about the user’s engagement while the robot is speaking to him by [295]. The robot was
successfully able to detect when the user is not anymore engaged in listening to him and tried to regain
his attention by employing verbal and nonverbal techniques. This engagement index was also selected as a
criterion for adapting a game’s difficulty according to the player’s level of engagement, showed promising
results [99].
Extracting the workload index The term workload (or cognitive load in a learning context) refers to a
measurable quantity of information processing demands placed on an individual by a task [249]. The mental
workload is generally related to the working memory and could be viewed as a mental effort produced to
process the quantity of information involved in the task.
Unlike the engagement index which is directly extracted from the EEG data, the EEG workload index
was based on pre-trained predictive model [103]. This model was trained using a set of EEG data collected
from a training phase during which a group of seventeen participants performed a set of brain training exer-
cises. This training phase involved three different types of cognitive exercises, namely: digit span, reverse
digit span and mental computation. The objective of these training exercises was to induce different levels of
mental workload while collecting the learner’s EEG data. The manipulation of the induced workload level
was done by varying the difficulty level of the exercises: by increasing the number of the digits in the se-
quence to be recalled for digit span and reverse digit span, and the number of digits to be added or subtracted
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for the mental computation exercises - we refer to [103] for more details on the procedure. After performing
each difficulty level, the participants were asked to report their workload level using the subjective scale of
NASA Task load index (NASA_TLX) [166]. Once this training phase was completed, the collected EEG
raw data were cut into 1-second segments and multiplied by a Hamming window. A FFT was applied to
transform each EEG segment into a spectral frequency and generate a set of 40 bins of 1 Hz ranging from
4 to 43 Hz (EEG pre-treated vectors). The dimensionality of the data was then reduced using a Principal
Component Analysis (PCA) to 25 components (the score vectors). Next, a Gaussian Process Regression
(GPR) algorithm with an exponential squared kernel and a Gaussian noise [269] was run in order to train a
mental workload predictive model (the EEG workload index) from the normalized score vectors. Normal-
ization was done by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation of all vectors. In order to
reduce the training time of the predictive model, a faster version of GPR the local Gaussian Process Re-
gression algorithm was used [139]. The evaluation of this model showed a correlation with the participants’
subjective scores NASA_TLX reaching 82% (mean correlation 72%). This same approach was used within
an intelligent tutoring system called (MENTOR) fully controlled by this workload index to automatically
select the most adapted learning activity for the learner. The experimental results showed positive impact of
using such index on learners’ performance and satisfaction.
The reader may question about the reliability of such kind of neural metrics. Actually, many contri-
butions have tackled the issue of predicting human behavior from neural metrics, e.g., [244, 184, 144], by
collecting EEG data to detect cognitive interest, emotional engagement and decision making of consumers
towards communication messages or advertisements in order to optimize them.
6.3 Experimental setting
This section details the experimental session we set up to analyze the relation between the emotions and the
argumentation process. More precisely, we detail the protocol we have defined to guide the experimental
setting, and the resulting datasets we have manually annotated in order to combine the arguments proposed
in the debates with the detected emotions. Finally, we specify the hypotheses we aim at verifying in this
experiment.
Protocol
The general goal of the experimental session is to investigate the relation (if any) holding between the
emotions detected in the participants during a debate session and the argumentation flow of the debate
itself. The idea is to associate the arguments and the relations among them to the participants’ mental
engagement and workload detected via the EEG headset, and the facial emotions identified via the Face
Emotion Recognition tool.
More precisely, starting from an issue to be discussed provided by the moderators, e.g., We have to ban
animal testing, the aim of the experiment is to collect the arguments proposed by the participants on the
topic, as well as the relations among them (i.e., support or attack), and to associate such arguments/relations
to the mental engagement and workload states and to the facial emotions expressed by the participants.
During a post-processing phase on the collected data, we synchronize the arguments put forward by the
different participants at time t with the emotional indexes we retrieved. Finally, we build the resulting
bipolar argumentation graph of each debate, such that the resulting argumentation graphs are labelled with
the source who has proposed each argument, and the emotional state of each participant at the time of the
introduction of the argument in the discussion.
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The first point to clarify in this experimental setting is the terminology. In this experiment, an argument
is each single piece of text that is proposed by the participants in the debate. Typically, arguments have
the goal to promote the opinion of the debater in the debate. Thus, an opinion in our setting represents the
overall opinion of the debater about the issue to be debated. The opinion is promoted in the debate through
arguments, that will support (if the opinions converge) or attack (otherwise) the arguments proposed in the
debate by the other participants.
The experiment involves two kinds of persons:
• Participant: she is expected to provide her own opinion about the issue of the debate proposed by the
moderators, and to argue with the other participants in order to make them understand the goodness
of her viewpoint (in case of initial disagreement).3
• Moderator: she is expected to propose the initial issue to be discussed to the participants. In case of
lack of active exchanges among the participants, the moderator is in charge of proposing pro and con
arguments (with respect to the main issue) to reactivate the discussion.
The experimental setting of each debate is conceived as follows: there are 4 participants involved in each
discussion group, and 2 moderators. Each participant is placed far from the other participants, even if they
are in the same room, while moderators are placed in another room. Moderators interact with the participants
uniquely through the debate platform, and the same holds for the interactions among participants. The
language used for debating is English.
In order to provide an easy-to-use debate platform to the participants, without requiring from them any
background knowledge, we decide to rely on a simple IRC network4 as debate platform. The debate is
anonymous and participants are visible to each others with their nicknames, e.g., participant1, while the
moderators are visualized as moderator1 and moderator2. Each participant has been provided with 1 laptop
device equipped with internet access and a camera used to detect facial emotions. Moreover, each participant
has been equipped with an EEG headset to detect the engagement and workload indexes. Moderators were
equipped with a laptop only.
The procedure we follow for each debate is:
• Participants are firstly equipped with the EEG headset and the good connection of the headset is
verified;
• Participants are familiarized with the debate platform;
• The debate starts - Participants take part into two debates each, about two different topics for a maxi-
mum of about 20 minutes for each debate:
– The moderator(s) provides the debaters with the topic to be discussed;
– The moderator(s) asks each participant to provide a general statement about his/her opinion on
the topic;
– Participants expose their opinion to the others;
– Participants are asked to comment on the opinions expressed by the other participants;
3Note that, in this experimental scenario, we do not evaluate the connection between the emotions and persuasive argumenta-
tion. This analysis is out of the scope of this chapter and it is left for future research.
4http://webchat.freenode.net/
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– If needed (no active debate among the participants), the moderator(s) posts an argument and
asks for comments from the participants;
The variables measured in this experimental setting are the following: (i) engagement and workload
indexes (measurement tool: EEG headset), and (ii) facial emotions, i.e., Neutral, Happy, Sad, Angry, Sur-
prised, Scared and Disgusted (measurement tool: FaceReader).
The post-processing phase of the experimental setting involves the following steps:
• manual annotation of the support and attack relations holding between the arguments proposed in
each discussion, following the methodology described in Section Dataset;
• manual annotation of the opinion of the participants at the beginning and at the end of the debates
they participated in, and synchronization with the debriefing questionnaire data;
• synchronization of the argumentation (i.e., the arguments/relations proposed at time instant t) with the
emotional indexes retrieved at time t using the EEG headset and FaceReader.
Participants The experiment was distributed over 6 sessions of 4 participants each; the first session was
discarded due to a technical problem while collecting data. We had a total of 20 participants (7 women, 13
men), whose age range was from 22 to 35 years. All of them were students in a North American university,
and all of them had good computer skills. Since not all of them were native English speakers, the use of the
Google translate service was allowed. They have all signed an ethical agreement before proceeding to the
experiment.
Participants have been asked to complete a short questionnaire about their viewpoints on the discussed
topics. Thus, after each debate session, a debriefing phase was addressed. The questionnaire contained the
following questions5:
• What was your starting opinion about the discussed topic before entering into the debate?
• What is your final opinion about the discussed topic after the debate?
• If you changed your mind, why (i.e., which was the argument(s) that has made you change your
mind)?
These questions allowed us to know what is the opinion of the participants about the specific topics they
debated about, without the need to infer it from the arguments they propose in the debates. The answers
participants provided to these questions have been then used to correlate their opinions with the emotions
they felt during the debates.
Finally, participants have been asked to fill in a questionnaire for Big Five personality traits. More
precisely, participants filled in a questionnaire of 50 items of the kind:
• I get stressed out easily;
• I don’t like to draw attention on myself;
• I spend time reflecting on things;
5Such material is available at http://bit.ly/DebriefingData.
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• . . .
where the possible values range over a typical five-level Likert scale: Totally Disagree, Disagree, Neutral,
Agree, Totally Agree. Such information allowed us to extract the OCEAN personality dimensions, i.e.:
O Openness, Originality, Open-mindedness
C Conscientiousness, Control, Constraint
E Extraversion, Energy, Enthusiasm
A Agreeableness, Altruism, Affection
N Neuroticism, Negative Affectivity, Nervousness
These dimensions have been analyzed with respect to their correlation with the detected emotions of partic-
ipants during the debates. More details about this analysis are provided in the Results Section.
Dataset
In this section, we describe the dataset of textual arguments we have created from the debates among the
participants. The dataset is composed of four main layers: (i) the basic annotation of the arguments proposed
in each debate (i.e. the annotation in xml of the debate flow downloaded from the debate platform); (ii) the
annotation of the relations of support and attack among the arguments; (iii) starting from the basic annotation
of the arguments, the annotation of each argument with the emotions felt by each participant involved in the
debate; and (iv) starting from the basic annotation, the opinion of each participant about the debated topic
at the beginning, in the middle and at the end of debate is extracted and annotated with its polarity. In
the reminder of this section, we describe the annotation process of the four layers and the resulting inter-
annotator agreement to ensure the reliability of the produced linguistic resource.
The basic dataset is composed of 598 different arguments proposed by the participants in 12 different
debates. The debated issues and the number of arguments for each debate are reported in Table 6.1. We
selected the topics of the debates among the set of popular discussions addressed in online debate platforms
like iDebate6 and DebateGraph7.
The annotation (in xml) of this dataset is as follows: we have assigned to each debate a unique numerical
id, and for each argument proposed in the debate we assign an id and we annotate who was the participant
putting this argument on the table, and in which time interval the argument has been proposed. An example
of basic annotation is provided below:
<debate id="1" title="Ban_Animal_Testing">
<argument id="1" debate_id="1" participant="mod"
time-from="19:26" time-to="19:27">Welcome to
the first debate! The topic of the first debate
is that animal testing should be banned.</argu-
ment>
<argument id="3" debate_id="1" participant="2"
time-from="20:06" time-to="20:06">If we don’t
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The second level of our dataset consists in the annotation of arguments pairs with the relation holding
between them, i.e., support or attack. To create the dataset, for each debate of our experiment we apply the
following procedure, detailed in Section 5.3:
1. the main issue (i.e., the issue of the debate proposed by the moderator) is considered as the starting
argument;
2. each opinion is extracted and considered as an argument;
3. since attack and support are binary relations, the arguments are coupled with:
• the starting argument, or
• other arguments in the same discussion to which the most recent argument refers (e.g., when an
argument proposed by a certain user supports or attacks an argument previously expressed by
another user);
4. the resulting pairs of arguments are then tagged with the appropriate relation, i.e., attack or support.
To show a step-by-step application of the procedure, let us consider the debated issue Ban Animal Test-
ing. At step 1, we consider the issue of the debate proposed by the moderator as the starting argument (a):
(a) The topic of the first debate is that animal testing should be banned.
Then, at step 2, we extract all the users opinions concerning this issue (both pro and con), e.g., (b), (c) and
(d):
(b) I don’t think the animal testing should be banned, but researchers should reduce the pain to the animal.
(c) I totally agree with that.
(d) I think that using animals for different kind of experience is the only way to test the accuracy of the
method or drugs. I cannot see any difference between using animals for this kind of purpose and eating
their meat.
(e) Animals are not able to express the result of the medical treatment but humans can.
At step 3a we couple the arguments (b) and (d) with the starting issue since they are directly linked
with it, and at step 3b we couple argument (c) with argument (b), and argument (e) with argument (d) since
they follow one another in the discussion. At step 4, the resulting pairs of arguments are then tagged by
one annotator with the appropriate relation, i.e.: (b) attacks (a), (d) attacks (a), (c) supports (b) and (e)
attacks (d). For the purpose of validating our hypotheses, we decided to not annotate the supports/attacks
between arguments proposed by the same participant (e.g., situations where participants are contradicting
themselves). Note that this does not mean that we assume that such situations do not arise: no restriction
was imposed to the participants of the debates, so situations where a participant attacked/supported her
own arguments are represented in our dataset. We just decided to not annotate such cases in the dataset of
argument pairs, as it was not necessary for verifying our assumptions.
CHAPTER 6. EMOTIONS IN HUMAN ARGUMENTATION 196
To assess the validity of the annotation task and the reliability of the obtained dataset, the same anno-
tation task has been independently carried out also by a second annotator, so as to compute inter-annotator
agreement. It has been calculated on a sample of 100 argument pairs (randomly extracted). The complete
percentage agreement on the full sample amounts to 91%. Applying such formula to our data, the inter-
annotator agreement results in κ = 0.82. As a rule of thumb, this is a satisfactory agreement, therefore we
consider these annotated datasets as reliable (i.e., our goldstandard dataset where arguments are associated
to participants’ emotions detected by EEG/FaceReader) to be exploited during the experimental phase.
Dataset
Topic #arg #pair #att #sup
BAN ANIMAL TESTING 49 28 18 10
GO NUCLEAR 40 24 15 9
HOUSEWIVES SHOULD BE PAID 42 18 11 7
RELIGION DOES MORE HARM 46 23 11 12
THAN GOOD
ADVERTISING IS HARMFUL 71 16 6 10
BULLIES ARE LEGALLY 71 12 3 9
RESPONSIBLE
DISTRIBUTE CONDOMS IN SCHOOLS 68 27 11 16
ENCOURAGE FEWER PEOPLE TO 55 14 7 7
GO TO THE UNIVERSITY
FEAR GOVERNMENT POWER OVER 41 32 18 14
INTERNET
BAN PARTIAL BIRTH ABORTIONS 41 26 15 11
USE RACIAL PROFILING FOR 31 10 1 9
AIRPORT SECURITY
CANNABIS SHOULD BE LEGALIZED 43 33 20 13
TOTAL 598 263 136 127
Table 6.1: The dataset of argument pairs resulting from the experiment.
Table 6.1 reports on the number of arguments and pairs we extracted applying the methodology de-
scribed before to all the mentioned topics. In total, our dataset contains 598 different arguments and 263
argument pairs (127 expressing the support relation among the involved arguments, and 136 expressing the
attack relation among the involved arguments).
The dataset resulting from these three layers of annotation adds to all previously annotated information
the player characteristics (gender, age and personality type), FaceReader data (dominant emotion, Valence
(pleasant/ unpleased) and Arousal (activated/ inactivated)), and EEG data (Mental Engagement levels)8. A
correlation matrix has been generated to identify the correlations between arguments and emotions in the
debates, and a data analysis is performed to determine the proportions of emotions for all participants. We
consider the obtained dataset as the reference dataset to carry out our empirical study.
An example, from the debate about the topic “Religion does more harm than good” where arguments
are annotated with emotions (i.e., the third layer of the annotation of the textual arguments we retrieved), is
as follows:
8The datasets of textual arguments are available at http://project.inria.fr/seempad/datasets/.
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Indeed but there exist some advocates of the devil
like Bernard Levi who is decomposing arabic
countries. </argument>




I don’t totally agree with you Participant2:
science and religion don’t explain each other,
they tend to explain the world but in two
different ways.</argument>




Participant4: for recent wars ok but what
about wars happened 3 or 4 centuries ago?
</argument>
Finally, the fourth annotation task starts from the basic one, and it selects for each participant one
argument at the beginning of the debate, one argument in the middle of the discussion, and one argument
at the end of the debate. These arguments are then annotated with their polarity with respect to the issue
of the debate: negative, positive, or undecided. The negative polarity is assigned to an argument when
the opinion expressed in such argument is against the debated topic, while the positive polarity label is
assigned when the argument expresses a viewpoint that is in favor of the debated issue. The undecided
polarity is assigned when the argument does not express a precise opinion in favor or against the debated
topic. Selected arguments are evaluated as the most representative arguments proposed by each participants
to convey her own opinion, in the three distinct moments of the debate. The rationale behind this annotation
is that it allows to easily detect when a participant has changed her mind with respect to the debated topic.
An example is provided below from the debate “Ban partial birth abortions”, where Participant4 starts the
debate being undecided and then turns to be positive about banning partial birth abortions in the middle and
at the end of the debate:
<argument id="5" participant="4" time-from="20:36"
time-to="20:36" polarity="undecided">Description’s
gruesome but does the fetus fully lives at that
point and therefore, conscious of something ? Hard
to answer. If yes, I might have an hesitation to
accept it. If not, the woman is probably mature
enough to judge.</argument>
<argument id="24" participant="4" time-from="20:46"
time-to="20:46" polarity="positive">In the animal
world, malformed or sick babies are systematically
abandoned.</argument>
<argument id="38" participant="4" time-from="20:52"
time-to="20:52" polarity="positive">Abortion is
legal and it doesn’t matter much when and how.
It’s an individual choice for whatever reason
it might be.</argument>
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Hypotheses
The experiment we have carried out aims at verifying the link between the emotions detected on the partici-
pants of the debate, and the arguments and their relations proposed in the debate. Our hypotheses therefore
revolve around the assumption that the participants’ emotions arise out of the arguments they propose in the
debate:
H1 : The argumentation process in a debate requires high mental engagement and generates negative emo-
tions when the interlocutor’s arguments are attacked.
H2 : The number of arguments and attacks proposed by the debaters are correlated with negative emotions.
H3 : The number of expressed arguments is connected to the degree of mental engagement and social
interactions.
H4 : The personality of the participants modulates their emotional experiences during the debates.
H5 : The debaters’ opinions regarding the discussed topics have an impact on their emotions.
6.4 Results
In order to verify the above mentioned hypotheses, we first computed the mean percentage of appearance
of each basic emotion across the 20 participants. Results show (with 95% of confidence interval) that the
most frequent emotion expressed by participants was anger, with a mean appearance frequency ranging
from 8.15% to 15.6% of the times. The second most frequent emotion was another negative emotion,
namely disgust, which was present 7.52% to 14.8% of the times. The overall appearance frequency of other
emotions was very low. For example, the frequency of appearance of happiness was below 1%. Even if
this result might be surprising at a first glance, this trend can be justified by a phenomenon called negativity
effect [279]. This means that negative emotions have generally more impact on a person’s behavior and
cognition than positive ones. So, negative emotions like anger and disgust have a tendency to last in time
more than positive emotions like happiness.
With regard to the mental engagement, participants show in general a high level of attention and vigi-
lance in 70.2% to 87.7% of the times. This high level of engagement is also correlated with appearance of
anger (r=0.306), where r refers to the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient. This coefficient is a
standard measure of the linear correlation between two variables X and Y , giving a value between [1,−1],
where 1 is a total positive correlation, 0 means no correlation, and −1 is a total negative correlation. This
trend confirms that, in such context, participants may be thwarted by the other participant arguments or
attacks, thus the level of engagement tends to be high as more attention is allowed to evaluate the other ar-
guments or to formulate rebutting or offensive arguments. Thus, our experiments confirm behavioral trends
as expected by the first hypothesis.
Figure 6.2 shows an evolution of the first participant’s emotions at the beginning of the first debate.
The most significant lines of emotions are surprise and disgust (respectively, the line with squares and the
line with circles). The participant is initially surprised by the discussion (and so mentally engaged) and
then, after the debate starts, this surprise switches suddenly into disgust, due to the impact of the rejection
of one of her arguments; the bottom line with circles grows and replaces the surprise as the participant is
now actively engaged in an opposed argument (thus confirming our hypothesis 2). Finally, the participant
is calming down. In this line, Figure 6.3 highlights that we have a strong correlation (r= 0.83) in Session 2
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Figure 6.2: Emotional evolution of Participant 1 in Debate 1 (lines with squares and circles represent,
respectively, the surprise and disgust emotions.
NB#ARG ATTACK SUPPORT
Pleasant 0,0962 0,1328 )0,0332
Unpleasant )0,0962 )0,1328 0,0332
High#ENG )0,0718 :0,6705 0,2459
LowENG )0,2448 0,2115 )0,1063
Neutral 0,0378 0,6173 )0,1138
Disgusted )0,0580 :0,4367 )0,3621
Scared 0,1396 )0,0952 0,5755
Angry )0,1018 )0,4386 0,0582
Figure 6.3: Correlation table for Session 2 (debated topics: Advertising is harmful and Bullies are legally
responsible.
showing that the number of attacks provided in the debate increased linearly with the manifestation of more
disgust emotion.
In the second part of our study, we were interested in analyzing how emotions correlate with the number
of attacks, supports and arguments. We have generated a correlation matrix to identify the existent correla-
tions between arguments and emotions in debates. Main results show that the number of arguments tends to
decrease linearly with manifestations of sadness (r=-0.25). So when the participants start to feel unpleasant
emotions, such as sadness, the number of arguments decreases, showing a less positive social behavior9 and
a tendency to retreat into herself. This negative correlation between the number of arguments and sadness
9By positive social behavior, we mean that a participant aims at sharing her arguments with the other participants. This attitude
is mitigated if unpleasant emotions start to be felt by the participant.
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NB#ARG ATTACK SUPPORT
Pleasant 0,7067 !0,3383 !0,3800
Unpleasant !0,7067 0,3383 0,3800
High#ENG >0,6903 !0,3699 !0,1117
LowENG !0,1705 0,5337 !0,0615
Neutral 0,8887 !0,0895 !0,3739
Disgusted 0,1017 0,8379 0,5227
Scared 0,2606 !0,4132 >0,7107
Angry >0,7384 !0,5072 !0,0937
Figure 6.4: Correlation table for Session 3 (debated topics: Distribute condoms at schools and Encourage
fewer people to go to the university).
NB#ARG ATTACK SUPPORT
Pleasant 0,1534 0,0134 &0,0493
Unpleasant &0,1534 &0,0134 0,0493
High#ENG &0,0246 &0,0437 0,3185
LowENG 0,2054 0,1147 0,1592
Neutral 0,0505 0,1221 &0,2542
Disgusted &0,0177 &0,0240 0,2996
Scared &0,0278 0,0297 &0,2358
Angry 0,0344 M0,2206 0,0782
Figure 6.5: General correlation table of the results.
even reaches very high level in certain debates (i.e. a mean correlation r= -0.70 is registered in the two
debates of the second session). Another negative linear relationship is registered with regard to the number
of attacks and the anger expressed by the participant (r=0.22). Participants who tend to attack the others in
the debate are less angry than those whose number of attacks is smaller. Figure 6.4 shows the correlation
table for Session 3. The analysis of the results we obtained shows the occurrence of strong correlations
between emotions and attacks / media / number of arguments in some discussions, but not in others. This is
an interesting index to investigate in future work.
Figure 6.5 shows the most significant correlations we detected. For instance, the number of supports pro-
vided in the debate increased linearly with the manifestation of high levels of mental engagement (r=0.31).
This trend is more pronounced when the debate does not trigger controversies and conflicts between the
participants. For example, in the debate Encourage fewer people to go to university, all the participants
shared the same opinion (against the main issue as formulated by the moderator) and engaged to support
each other’s arguments. The correlation between the number of supports and the engagement was very high
(r=0.80) in this debate. The number of attacks is more related to low engagement. The moderator can
provide more supporting arguments to balance participants’ engagement, and if the attacks are increasing,
that means participants tend to disengage. The experiments show that participants maintaining high levels
of vigilance are the most participative in the debate and resulted in a more positive social behavior (thus
confirming our hypothesis 3).
Our next objective was to check whether participants’ emotions during the debates were modulated by
their personality. In other words, we wanted to see whether there was any impact of the debaters’ personality
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on their emotional responses in terms of facial expressions, valence, engagement and cognitive load indexes.
The Big Five inventory data [180] were considered for this analysis. Participants were classified accord-
ing to each of the five OCEAN personality dimensions, namely openness (imaginative vs. more pragmatic
participants), conscientiousness (conscientious vs. non conscientious), extroversion (extroverted vs. intro-
verted), agreeableness (compassionate toward others vs. more antagonistic), and neuroticism (anxious vs.
emotionally stable). Multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVA) were run with the OCEAN personality
traits as fixed factors and the debaters’ emotions as dependent variables. These included the following com-
bined measures: (1) the proportions of occurrences of the six facial expressions, i.e. happiness, anger, fear,
sadness, disgust, and surprise, (2) the proportions of negative and positive emotional valence, (3) the propor-
tions of high, medium and low levels of mental engagement, and (4) the proportions of high, medium and
low workload. In total, 20 MANOVA were conducted, crossing the 5 personality traits with the 4 dependent
variables.
Three statistically reliable MANOVA were found, showing significant relationships between the de-
baters’ personality traits and emotional responses10:
• Extroversion and facial expressions (F(6, 33) = 2.574, p < 0.05, Pillai’s Trace = 0.319). In partic-
ular, extroverted participants showed significantly more frequently expressions of surprise than the
introverted participants (M = 6.70%, SE = 1.10% vs. M = 1.70%, SE = 1.30%; F(1, 38) = 8.385,
p < 0.008). This can be explained by the fact that introverted people tend to hide their emotions as
compared to extroverted people.
• Conscientiousness and workload (F(3, 36) = 5.200, p < 0.05, Pillai’s Trace = 0.302). More precisely,
participants with a non conscientious temperament had significantly more occurrences of low levels
of workload as compared to the other participants (M = 29.6%, SE = 3.8% vs. M = 16.0%, SE =
3.8%; F(1, 38) = 6.525, p < 0.016). They seemed to experience on average less cognitive load during
the discussions.
• Neuroticism and mental engagement (F(3, 36) = 3.518, p< 0.05, Pillai’s Trace = 0.227). In particular,
participants with an anxious temperament had on average significantly fewer proportions of high
engagement levels during the debates as compared to the other participants (M = 18.0%, SE = 2.4%
vs. M = 28.5%, SE = 3.0%; F(1, 38) = 7.423, p < 0.016) . This can be seen as follows: anxious
people tend to be easily stressed. They are thus likely to have trouble concentrating, and hence have
difficulties being mentally engaged, as opposed to less emotionally vulnerable people.
To summarize, these results validate our fourth hypothesis: the personality has an important impact on
the debaters’ emotional responses. Inner emotions (brain activity) seem to be modulated by the neuroticism
and the conscientiousness temperament traits. Outer emotions (facial expressions) were modulated by the
extroversion traits. Neuroticism and conscientiousness have both a negative impact on the debaters’ brain
indexes, with respectively, a reduced mental engagement index and an increased cognitive load. For facial
expressions, we have particularly found that the emotion of surprise was more frequent among the debaters
with an extroverted temperament. This is an important aspect considering that this expression was the least
observed during our experiments. Indeed when analyzing the debaters’ emotions with FaceReader, we ob-
served that the expression of surprise was hardly dominant (compared with neutral) during the discussions.
10A Bonferroni correction (.05 divided by the number of dependent variables) has been applied within the MANOVA follow-up
analyses to account for multiple ANOVAs being run.
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The dominance of the other facial expressions, namely anger, fear, sadness and disgust does not seem to be
influenced by the participants’ personality.
Our next concern was to investigate if there were any differences in terms of emotional experiences
(facial expressions, emotional valence, mental engagement and workload) during the debates according
to the participants’ opinions on the discussed topics. These opinions were given during the debriefing as
previously mentioned. Each participant was either for or against the topic of the debate: for means that the
participant agreed with the subject of the debate (e.g. for distributing condoms to students), and against
means that the participant disagreed with the addressed topic (e.g. against distributing condoms in schools).
A participant could also have no particular opinion (no-opinion) regarding the topic of the debate if he
was neither for nor against. Moreover, each participant was asked to give a starting opinion, before the
discussion, and a final opinion, after the debate. The goal was to assess the impact, if any, of changes in
opinions on the debaters’ emotions. Table 6.2 enumerates participants’ initial and final opinions.
Starting/Final No-opinion For Against Total
No-opinion 2 5 0 7
For 0 12 1 13
Against 0 1 19 20
Total 2 18 20 40
Table 6.2: Number of opinions before and after the debates (in bold the number of debaters who kept the
same opinion).
As for the previous hypothesis, distinct MANOVA were performed to analyze the proportions of occur-
rence of (1) facial expressions: happy, sad, angry, surprised, scared and disgusted; (2) valences of emotions:
positive and negative; (3) engagement levels: high, medium and low; and (4) cognitive load levels: high,
medium and low. First, we wanted to check whether there were any significant differences in terms of emo-
tions between the participants who kept the same opinion during the debates (N = 33) and the participants
who changed their opinion (N = 7) . Then, for those who kept the same opinion, we wanted to compare the
emotional responses between the participants who were for and the participants who were against11.
No statistically reliable effect was found in any of the performed analyses (p = n.s.) suggesting that there
were no significant differences in terms of facial expressions, valence, engagement and workload, neither
between the debaters who kept the same opinions and the debaters who changed their opinion, nor between
those who were for and those who were against the discussed topics throughout the debates.
In addition to these analyses, the debaters’ starting and final opinions were studied independently. That
is, we checked whether either the former or the latter opinions had (independently of each other) an impact
on the emotions expressed during the debates. Again no statistically significant effect was found. This has
led us to conclude that neither the initial nor the final opinions had an impact on the debaters’ emotional
states. To summarize, the emotional experience during the debates does not seem to be related to the opinion
of the debaters regarding the addressed topics. Emotions are rather depending on the person’s temperament
and the dynamics of the debate (i.e. arguments, supports and attacks).
11The two participants who did not have an opinion throughout the debate were discarded since they have reported they could
not follow the discussions because of their lack of understanding of English.
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Examples of correlations on single debates
In this section we provide some examples of correlations among the emotions and the argumentative ele-
ments emerging from the single debates. The goal is to provide a more detailed analysis, given the fact that
some debates have been more passionate than others because of the personal involvement of the participants
in the subject of the debate. It is worth noticing that as the number of instances involved in our debates is
4, these correlations cannot be considered as significative. However, we believe that these examples may
show interesting insights to be investigated in our future experiments. The categories of correlations we
investigate are the following: engagement vs argumentation; engagement vs emotions; workload vs argu-
mentation; workload vs emotions; pleasant/unpleasant vs argumentation; Big5 vs emotions. Correlation
values are comprised between -1 (negative correlation) and +1 (positive correlation). In our analysis we
consider as strong correlations the values between -0.7 and -1 (strong negative correlation), and between
0.7 and 1 (strong positive correlation). All values in between cannot be considered significant to verify our
hypothesis.
Debate: Advertising is harmful Number of arguments in the debate: 71 (64 from participants and 7 from
moderators).
Workload vs emotions: The more the participants feel surprised, the higher the workload is high (r = 0.80)
meaning that the mental load increases if the participants feel surprised about the arguments proposed
in the ongoing debate. Moreover, the more the participants feel neutral, the lower the workload
(r = 0.82) meaning that the mental load decreases if the participants feel neutral with respect to the
ongoing debate, i.e., they are not interested in the topic of the debate as well as in the the other
participants’ arguments.
Big5 vs emotions: Participants with a high degree of agreeableness are more inclined to be surprised (r =
0.90), while participants with a high degree of conscientiousness tend to get sad or angry if the debate
is not going in the desired direction (correlations r = 0.82 and r = 78, respectively), since they are
inclined to do their duty well and thoroughly.
Debate: Students are legally responsible for bulling Number of arguments in the debate: 71 (66 from
participants and 5 from moderators).
Engagement vs emotions: On the one side, we have a strong correlation between the high engagement and
the emotion happy (r = 0.94), meaning that when the participants of this debate are experiencing such
positive emotion they become more passionate (and therefore engaged) in the discussed topic. On the
other side, we have also a strong correlation between the low engagement and the emotion disgusted
(r = 0.82), meaning that when participants experience such negative emotion, then they become less
interested in the ongoing debate.
Pleasant/Unpleasant vs argumentation: Strong correlation between positive valence (pleasant) and the
number of arguments proposed in the debate (r = 0.74), meaning that when participants propose
more arguments in the debate, they are more interested in the debated topic and therefore there is a
higher degree of pleasantness in the air.
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Big5 vs emotions: Participants with a high degree of extroversion or of agreeableness are more inclined to
externalize that they fell surprised about the ongoing debate (correlations r = 0.96 and r = 89, respec-
tively). Moreover, participants with a high degree of neuroticism are more inclined to be disgusted
about the arguments proposed in the debate (r = 0.82).
Debate: Distribute condoms in schools Number of arguments in the debate: 68 (63 from participants
and 5 from moderators).
Engagement vs emotions: Strong correlation between the high engagement and the emotion angry (r =
0.96), meaning that when the participants are experiencing such negative emotion they become more
passionate (and therefore engaged) in the discussed topic.
Workload vs argumentation: Strong correlation between a high degree of workload and the number of
supports among the arguments (r = 0.86), meaning that when the number of supports increases then
the participants of this debate are required with a higher mental load to understand how the debate is
going on.
Workload vs emotions: The more the participants feel disgusted, the higher the workload is (r = 0.92)
meaning that the mental load increases if the participants feel disgusted about the arguments proposed
in the ongoing debate, as they need to construct in their minds new arguments to defeat the ones
proposed by the other participants that make them feel disgusted.
Big5 vs emotions: Participants with a high degree of extroversion are more inclined to externalize that they
fell surprised about the ongoing debate (r = 0.77). Moreover, participants with a high degree of
neuroticism are more inclined to be angry about the arguments proposed in the debate (r = 0.75).
Debate: We should fear the power of government over the internet Number of arguments in the debate:
41 (37 from participants and 4 from moderators).
Engagement vs emotions: Strong correlation between the high engagement and the emotion disgusted (r =
0.93), meaning that when the participants are experiencing such negative emotion they become more
passionate (and therefore engaged) in the discussed topic.
Workload vs argumentation: Strong correlation between a low degree of workload and the number of
supports among the arguments (r = 0.86), meaning that when the number of supports increases par-
ticipants require a lower mental load to understand how the debate is going on.
Workload vs emotions: The more the participants feel angry, the lower the workload is (r = 0.93). This
means that those participants that become angry due to the arguments that are proposed in the ongoing
debate tend to use less mental resources to propose new, possibly effective, arguments.
Pleasant/Unpleasant vs argumentation: Strong correlation between negative valence (unpleasant) and the
number of attacks between arguments (r = 0.70), meaning that when participants disagree attacking
each others there is an higher degree of unpleasantness in the air.
Big5 vs emotions: Participants with a high degree of extroversion are more inclined to externalize that
they feel happy about the ongoing debate (r = 0.99). Moreover, participants with a high degree of
neuroticism are more inclined to be disgusted about the arguments proposed in the debate (r = 0.90).
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Note that this study is dealing with correlation between the nature of the arguments and their relations
(support/attack) and the participants’ emotions, and we are not claiming to have found a direct causal relation
between the arguments and such users’ emotions - which is out of the scope of this current study. It is
however an interesting direction for further work with larger sample size using [157]’s causality test.
Discussion
We have learnt several lessons from the realized experiment. First, the different debates and participants have
confirmed the correctness of our hypotheses. Debates constitute the underlying framework for generating
emotions which evolve with the argumentation flow. The difference of opinions is the starting point of the
rise and successive transformation of specific emotions. However, so far we have not taken into account the
initial emotional state of the participants (i.e. before starting the discussion on the topic), that can influence
the participants reactions during the debate. We will have to consider this in further studies.
Facial emotion recognition and EEG measures allowed us to identify not only the type of emotion
generated, but also the intensity and the evolution of emotions. Associated with the workload index, this
also allowed us to detect how the participant is engaged in the discussion and so, how he holds on to his
arguments. Being strongly convinced by an opinion provokes the birth of a mental energy strong enough
to increase the workload and develop a justification. Contradictions with the flow of arguments generate
anger which evolves progressively into disgust if the participant’s arguments apparently cannot convince
the opponents. In the classification of emotion, disgust (which is close in terms of emotion) is a normal
evolution of anger and appears when the participant feels a dual feeling for two reasons: 1) he is not pleased
with himself for not having convinced the opponent (internal feeling), and 2) he has a very low opinion of
the opponent (external feeling). We highlighted the evolution of this emotion in several debates showing
the important consequence of the argumentation by provoking internal evolution of emotions. This can be
explained by the impact of a contradiction on an in depth conviction. The more a participant is convinced
of the merits of his position, the more he will be subject to a strong emotion.
The three dimensions of our evaluation framework (emotion recognition, engagement and workload)
allowed us to assess more precisely the impact of argumentation on emotional response throughout the
debate. Workload decreases when participants feel angry, which means that they reduce their ability to
use or construct new arguments. When this emotion evolves to disgust, the workload increases which
means that they have to reconsider their own set of arguments either for an update or a new construction.
High engagement provokes the rise of strong positive or negative emotions while, on the other side, we
have confirmed that disgusted participants become less engaged in the ongoing debate. Finally, we have
considered the influence of personality to the type of generated emotion. Participants with a high degree
of neuroticism are converging to be angry or disgusted, which are close emotions. Participants with a high
degree of agreeableness or extroversion are more open to feel surprise.
Note that the goal of this experiment is not to learn how to best intervene to improve online discourse but
to study what are the insights that online cognitive agents and bots need to implement to address dialogues
with humans. A cognitive agent, in order to behave like humans in debates, has to feel emotions and
generate them in the other agents (being them humans or artificial) that interact with it. This extensive study
is the first but essential step towards a better comprehension of the relation between human emotions and
argumentation. As a shorter term objective, the aim of this contribution is to guide the definition of the next
argumentation frameworks such that not only objective elements are taken into account but also cognitive
ones.
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From this experiment, we learnt that argumentation in online debates cannot be considered as a stan-
dalone process, as it discloses many emotional aspects, e.g., when users are more engaged in a discussion
more arguments are proposed, and the most engaging discussions are correlated with negative emotions
like anger and disgust. Moreover, a strong correlation exists among personality traits and the emotions felt
by participants during online argumentation, e.g., the dominance of emotions like anger, fear, sadness and
disgust does not seem to be influenced by the participants’ personality where emotions of happiness and
surprise were more frequent among the debaters with an extroverted temperament.
6.5 Argumentative persuasion and emotions in humans: a field experiment
In everyday life situations like online discussions and political debates, “the aim of persuasion is for the
persuader to change the mind of the persuadee” [173]. This process, called persuasive argumentation, may
employ different strategies. In the Ethos strategy, persuasion relies on the authority of the persuader with
respect to the topic of the debate. The Logos strategy is grounded on logical arguments leading to a sound
inference process to derive conclusions, while the Pathos strategy solicits the emotions of the interlocutors
to generate empathy. These strategies have been used to define formal models of persuasion, e.g., [173], to
be employed by intelligent agents to persuade the others to change their beliefs. However, analyzing how
these strategies are perceived by humans when they argue, and what is the impact of these strategies on the
humans’ mental states like engagement and emotions has not been explored. Yet, this would be of valuable
importance for argumentative agents to be able to apply persuasion strategies as humans do, resulting in
more effective interactions with people.
In this chapter, we answer the following research question: what is the impact of persuasion strategies
on the mental states and emotions of the debaters?
Three kinds of argumentative persuasion exist: Ethos, Logos, and Pathos [277]. Ethos deals with the
character of the speaker, whose intent is to appear credible. The main influencing factors for Ethos en-
compass elements such as vocabulary, and social aspects like rank or popularity. Logos is the appeal to
logical reason: the speaker wants to present an argument that appears to be sound to the audience. Pathos
encompasses the emotional influence on the audience.
In this chapter, we investigate also the distribution of engagement among the brain lobes [297, 313]:
the Frontal lobe has two key functions, i.e., controlling motor activities (including speech), and human
“executive functions” (e.g., planning, reasoning, making decision); the Temporal lobe controls visual and
auditory memories; the Parietal lobe is responsible for processing sensory information, comprehending oral
and writing language, and controlling working memory; the Occipital lobe is responsible for vision.
We conducted a field experiment with users, starting from three hypotheses to be validated. We raised a
number of debates in which, together with the participants of the experiment, a persuader was involved to
convince the other participants about the goodness of her viewpoint, applying one of the three persuasion
strategies. The persuader is a person who has been provided with particular argumentation frameworks but
appears to the other participants as just another participant, e.g., she does not dominate the debate. Every
participant was equipped with an Electroencephalography (EEG) Headset to detect mental engagement,
and cameras to detect facial emotions. The collected data was synchronized to assess the validity of our
hypotheses. Results highlight the higher persuasion impact of the Pathos strategy.
We combined physiological sensors (EEG) with facial expression analysis system (FaceReader 6.1).12
By analyzing the user’s face streamed via webcam, the FaceReader software is able to recognize six basic
12www.noldus.com/human-behavior-research/products/facereader
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emotions: happy, sad, angry, surprised, scared and disgusted. The FaceReader model reaches 87% accuracy
by extracting and classifying in real-time 500 key points in facial muscles. As output, FaceReader provides
the probability of the presence of these six emotions, as well as the probability of the neutral state.
Experimental setting
The goal of our experiment was to investigate how the argumentative persuasion process in debates is af-
fected by the mental states and emotions of the participants, and vice-versa. In each debate, besides the
participants equipped with the EEG Emotiv EPOC devices, there is a participant who plays the role of the
persuader, called the PP in the remainder of the chapter. The PP adopts and maintains a predefined view-
point in the debate (i.e., pro or con), together with an argumentation strategy (i.e., Logos, Pathos or Ethos).
PP intends to persuade other debaters of her viewpoint on the debated issue. The goal is to evaluate the
following hypotheses:
H1: Argumentation strategies trigger negative emotions and engagement having an impact on the persua-
sion.
H2: Specific brain lobes are activated when a Logos or an Ethos argument is proposed by the PP, while
other lobes are solicited when the PP puts forward a Pathos argument.
H3: Pathos arguments activate a higher empathy, triggering a number of arguments put forward by the other
participants to support PP’s arguments. Pathos arguments have a more effective persuasive power in
the debate.
Participants and roles. 4 participants aged from 19 to 45 were involved in each of the 5 debate sessions, and
each participant received a compensation of 20$ at the end of the session. In total, we collected data from 20
participants (7 women, 13 men). The size of the experiment is driven by the complexity of the experimental
setting (devices, protocol). Debaters were preselected after filling an online form that collects their initial
opinions about all the debate subjects, data is anonymized and kept confidential. This step was necessary to
ensure possibly conflicting initial opinions in the debates. The ideal configuration includes 2 participants in
favor and 2 against the debated topic. When not possible, a random assignment has been carried out. Each
participant was kept separate from the others to avoid interactions out of the debate platform. In addition
to the four participants and the PP, a moderator who proposes the debated issue and solicits unresponsive
participants participated too. Each group of participants was involved in two debates. All participants
(including the PP) were identified in the debate platform through a nickname. The PP cannot be identified
by her nickname. No personal information about participants was disclosed during the debates.
Protocol. Phase 0: Participants fill in the self-reporting questionnaire about their initial opinions on the
debate topics. They are associated to the debate sessions.
Phase 1: Familiarization of the participants with the Internet Relay Chat debate platform, the EEG headset,
the camera for emotion recognition, and signature of a consent form.
Phase 2: The debate starts. Participants are involved in two debates for a maximum of 20 minutes each.
The moderator provides the debaters with the topic to be discussed, and asks each participant to provide a
general statement about her opinion on the topic. Each participant writes her viewpoint to the others, then the
others are asked to comment on the expressed opinions. The PP plays the predefined persuasion strategy to
convince the others with a different opinion, meaning that all arguments put forward by the persuader apply
only the selected strategy. No turn taking was applied. Participants were free to propose their arguments,
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and the PP participates in the debate with the same amount of arguments as the other participants. The
debaters were free to put forward generic arguments about the debated topic, or to explicitly refer to the
other participants’ argument to attack or support them. Arguments proposed by the PP were pre-instantiated
arguments retrieved on online debate platforms13, and categorized with the three persuasion strategies we
identified. These arguments allowed us to provide a fixed stimulus in the debate. When necessary, the PP
slightly adapted the pre-defined argument to precisely refer to another participant’s argument, e.g., “I don’t
agree with you Participant1 because predefined argument”. After about 15 minutes of debate, the
moderator asked to provide their final viewpoint on the topic, and the debate is closed. Strategies have
not been randomized. For each debate session, the PP applies the logos strategy for one debate, and either
Pathos or Ethos for the second debate to compare for each set of debaters a more rational strategy (i.e.,
Logos) vs a more empathic one (either Ethos or Pathos). The contingency table below shows the correlation
of the strategy adopted by the persuader and her stance in the 10 debates.14
Phase 3: Participants are asked to fill a second self-reporting questionnaire on their experience in the debate.
Post-processing phase. we synchronized the textual argument collected during the debates, with the en-
gagement index and the emotions.
Stance
Strategy Pro Con Total by Strategy
Pathos 0 3 3
Logos 4 1 5
Ethos 1 1 2
Total by Stance 5 5 10
We are aware that field experiments, as the one proposed in this chapter, suffer from the possibility of
contamination, and we agree about the fact that experimental conditions can be controlled with more pre-
cision in a constrained experimental setting. However, field experiments have the advantage that outcomes
are observed in a natural setting rather than in a contrived environment, thus showing higher external valid-
ity than “laboratory” experiments. For instance, the reader may argue about our choice of an experimental
setting where 5 persons are involved at the same time, instead of a more controlled setting with a 1:1 face-
to-face exchange. However, our interest is not in studying the effect of a single strategy on a single person
with respect to a single dialogue move, but in considering a more realistic setting where several persons
interact, like on social media.
Dataset. Two annotation tasks have been carried out offline on the collected data15 by two annotators.
Each argument is annotated with debate identifier, argument identifier, participant, and timestamp.In total,
791 arguments, and 162 argument pairs (74 linked by an attack and 88 by a support) were annotated. We
13www.debate.org/, www.createdebate.com/
14The Pathos strategy has not been used with a Pro stance because i) we had 6 debate sessions but the EEG data of the first
session, where we considered Pathos/Pro, was corrupted, and ii) the stance depends also on the arguments used on the debate
platforms we collected to construct PP’s ones.
15The corpus is available at https://goo.gl/xSykTi.
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computed the inter-annotator agreement for the relation annotation task on 1/3 of the pairs of the dataset (54
randomly extracted pairs), obtaining a satisfactory agreement: κ = 0.83.
Experimental results
This section reports on the obtained results for our hypotheses. We divided the debate into three phases:
the introduction (INTRO) where the PP states her own opinion on the topic of the debate; the argumentation
(ARG) includes the reformulation, the refutation and the contribution of new ideas according to the strategy
adopted by the PP; the conclusion (CONC) where the PP recalls her position and final opinion. This structure
is inspired from the conversation structure in pragmatics, where conversations have a linear structure, i.e.,
initiation, maintenance and termination [187]. For data synchronization, we considered the participants’
physiological reactions during 10 seconds after each intervention of the PP [195], and we computed the
average emotion values of the 10 seconds after each argument proposal. We considered the anger scores in
the result analysis because it was the most predominant emotion during the debates [278].
There is a significant correlation between the NO H1
persuasion strategy and the participants’ emotions
Engagement in supporters and anger in opponents YES H1
grow in an inversely proportional way
Logos activates language comprehension YES H2
and situations correlation
Logos activates planning and decision making NO H2
Ethos leads to the higher percentage of attacks YES H3
wrt. PP’s arguments
Pathos leads to the higher percentage of supports YES H3
wrt. PP’s arguments
Table 6.3: Experiments finding at a glance.
H1 - Persuasion vs. emotions and engagement. In this first hypothesis, we verified for each strategy, the
means of anger generated throughout the different phases of the debate. To verify the impact of anger and
engagement on persuasion, we ran a repeated ANOVA measure. As within-subjects factors, we consider the
debate phases (INTRO, ARG, CONC). As between-subjects factors, we consider PP_strategy (Ethos, Logos,
Pathos), measure (anger, engagement), and participant’s final position (Neutral, Opponent, Supporter). We
validate the repeated ANOVA measures with [218] test for sphericity on the dependent variable Deb_phases
(sig=.013) (we assess the significance of the corresponding F with [159]’s correction). For the within-subject
effect test, we have a significant effect of debate phases and PP_strategy on measuring (engagement and
anger) with p=0.016 and F(8.857, 113.372)=2.405. The between-subject effects results show that there are
significant main effects of the PP_strategy∗Final_Position, F(8,64)=2.178, p=0.041, meaning a significant
effect of the persuasion strategy, anger and engagement on persuasion. Fig. 6.6 presents the correspond-
ing engagement to compare the effect of emotions on the engagement. Note that if anger decreases, the
engagement increases in all persuasion strategies.
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Figure 6.6: Means of anger (continuous lines) and engagement (dashed lines) (y axis) by debates’ phases
(x axis) for the different persuasion strategies. Blue, red and green colors correspond, respectively, to the
participants’ final position (Neutral, Opponent, and Supporter) to PP’s opinion.
For the Logos strategy (Fig. 6.6-B), participants who stayed Neutral all over the debates had low negative
emotions and their engagement was high. So participants who have not decided about the PP’s opinion were
more engaged in looking for logical reasons to support opinions. This can be interpreted as follows: neutral
participants follow the arguments deployed by Logos and show a high engagement in trying to be persuaded.
The opponents show a clear increase of negative emotions and loss of engagement. They are more engaged
in the ARG phase in refuting the PP’s arguments (emotional resistance) whereas the supporters were less
engaged because they already accepted PP’s logic. Hence, for the Logos strategy, neutral participants show
decreasing negative emotions and engagement growth, whereas opponents are mostly subject to negative
emotions and disengaged to follow the logical reasoning.
For the Ethos strategy (Fig. 6.6-A), opponents rejected the credibility of the PP and were not engaged in
following her opinion. Their position does not change during the debates end where the negative emotion
is higher. The neutrals were less engaged throughout the debate phases compared to the other participants.
This can be due to the lack of interest in the subject of the debate and even disengagement in taking a
position face to an expert opinion. We may notice that the supporters’ engagement is higher in the INTRO
phase, and continues to decrease at the ARG and CONC phases while their negative emotion is the lowest
through the debate phases compared to other participants, indicating their satisfaction towards the expert’s
opinion.
For the Pathos strategy (Fig. 6.6-C), there are no neutral participants. We have opponents with increasing
engagement related to the resistance to the emotional examples proposed by the PP. They were suppressing
their negative emotion elicited by the Pathos strategy so their anger is low. Supporters were affected by
Pathos, so their negative emotions are higher and their engagement is lower compared to the opponents
because of the emotional effect of this strategy.
H2 - Brain solicitation vs. strategies. To verify the second hypothesis, we compute the differences
in terms of engagement of each brain region for each participant, running a repeated ANOVA measure.
The goal is to measure the effect of persuasion strategies on the engagement of each participant, consider-
ing both the different brain lobes that are activated, and the debate phases (the latter is the within-subject
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Figure 6.7: Estimated marginal means of engagements (y axis) in brain lobes by debates’ phases (x axis)
for the different persuasion strategies. Blue, red, green and violet lines correspond to the Frontal, Occipital,
Parietal and Temporal brain lobes.
factor). As between-subjects factors, we consider the strategies and the brain lobes. Considering the re-
sulting correlations among the strategy applied and the brain lobes activated in the participants in the dif-
ferent phases of the debate, we found F(1.243,30.683)=4.495 and p=0.027. The factor Deb_phases has
a significant effect on the participant’s engagement. We also have a significant interaction of the factors
Deb_phases ∗PP_strategy with F(2.486,30.683)=4.059 and p=0.012, meaning a significant effect on en-
gagement16. The between-subject effects results show that there is a significant main effect of PP_strategy
on the engagement, F(2,148)=3.885, p=0.023.
For the Logos strategy, the most activated brain region is the parietal. Fig. 6.7-(B) shows that there is
a significant difference between the INTRO and ARG phases for the parietal, which is the most activated
lobe. By looking at the simple effect comparison, we found that the only significant mean difference is
of parietal engagement between the ARG and INTRO phases with the Logos strategy (Mean difference=
.115, p = .019). This result was unexpected, as we know that the frontal lobe is normally in charge of
the planning, and rational decisions. By analyzing Logos arguments, we find that the PP used examples to
justify her point of view, and imagination, residing in the parietal lobe, was triggered.
For the Ethos strategy, we have found that the parietal region was also activated. Looking at Fig. 6.7-
(A), we see that the engagement in the parietal is high in the INTRO phase and decreases in the ARG
phase. By looking at the simple effect comparison, we found that the only significant mean difference is of
parietal engagement between the ARG and INTRO phases with the Ethos strategy (Mean difference =−.174,
p = .024). For the CONC phase, the engagement remains similar to the ARG phase both with the Logos and
Ethos strategies. Engagement is related to the resistance towards the persuader’s arguments: the more there
is a resistance, the more there is engagement. For the Ethos strategy, as the PP is assimilated to an expert, the
engagement is decreasing in the ARG phase. Parietal lobes play a role in interpreting sensory information
and orientation, meaning that the participant tries to establish new rules to take decisions. Recent studies
discuss the correlation between this region and the process of decision making [172], and other studies have
shown the role of right temporal-parietal junction for thinking about thoughts, e.g., people’s belief, desires
and emotions [284].
16Complete SPSS’s results: http://bit.ly/2nmbygV.
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For the Pathos strategy, the PP tried to induce empathy in participants. This resulted in the generation of
strong emotions, and the circuit of emotions starts from the frontal to reach, through the cingulate Cortex,
amygdala and hippocampus in the limbic system. The most important difference of engagement between
the INTRO and ARG phases is indeed in the frontal lobe (see Fig. 6.7-(C)). In the simple effect analysis,
the mean difference of the frontal engagement between INTRO and ARG with the Pathos strategy is the
most important compared to the other brain lobes, even if it is not statistically significant (Mean diff.=0.61,
p = 0.332).
H3 - Pathos persuasiveness. We hypothesize (H3) that the Pathos strategy impacts more than the other
strategies in terms of persuasive power, and consequently it gathers more support towards the PP’s arguments
than the others. Table 6.4 reports about the changes of opinion of participants by comparing their initial
opinion, and the final opinion after the debate. Since self-reporting is not predictive [292], the table reports
also about participants who have changed their opinions but did not disclose this change in the questionnaire.
Debate Strategy PP position P1 P2 P3 P4
DeathPenalty Pathos Con Y N N Y
Torture Logos Pro N Y N Y
Suicide Ethos Pro N N N Y
Profiling Logos Con N N Y Y
Nuclear Logos Pro N N N Y
Religion Pathos Con N N Y Y
Vaccines Logos Pro N N N N
GunRights Ethos Con N N N Y
Schools Logos Pro N N Y N
Organs Pathos Con N N Y Y
Table 6.4: Participants’ changes of opinion. Y: an opinion change occurred; N: no change; underlined:
change from neutral; italic: a change not reported by the participant (detected by comparing his initial and
after-debate opinions).
To verify this hypothesis, we first need to normalize the number of attacks and supports for each debate
wrt. the different strategies. Fig. 6.8 shows that the number of attacks and supports significantly changes
depending on the strategy employed by the PP: Ethos is the strategy leading to the higher percentage of
attacks in the argumentation, much more than the Logos and the Pathos strategies, while Pathos is the
strategy leading to the higher percentage of supports wrt. the arguments proposed by the PP. Logos is
in-between, as it is the most balanced strategy wrt. the percentage of attacks and supports. These results
confirmed from the argumentation perspective what we already observed in H1 and H2: Pathos leads to the
higher empathy leading to more supports than the other strategies. Note that these supports come even from
those participants who do not agree with the PP, but they “cannot” attack the Pathos arguments she proposes,
so they tend to agree on minor points related to the main topic. Ethos leads to more attacks than Logos: this
can be explained by the fact that when an Ethos argument is proposed, the other participants do not evaluate
the source as reliable, and tend to attack these arguments asking for evidences. Given that participants do
not know each other, this behavior makes sense as authority is assessed by reputation and recommendation,
and not only by claims.













A6acks	 Supports	 Changed	opinion	 Unchanged	opinion	
Figure 6.8: Percentage of attacks and supports for and against PP’s arguments (1st columns), and percentage
of participants with changed/unchanged opinion (2nd columns).
The validation of H3 is confirmed by analyzing the percentage of participants who changed/did not
change their opinions wrt. the persuasion strategies (see Figure 6.8). On the one side, Pathos is the most
effective strategy wrt. the percentage of participants who actually changed their mind after the debate, in
line with the fact that participants tend to support Pathos arguments in the debate. On the other side, Logos
and particularly Ethos are the less effective strategies with few participants persuaded by the PP.
6.6 Related Work
A first analysis of the experimental results presented in this chapter has been proposed in [39]. However,
several aspects of the collected data were neglected in that work. In this extended version, the following
issues have been tackled:
• Personality traits, emotions and argumentation: in [39], we did not consider in our analysis the Big
Five inventory data we collected during the experiments. In this chapter, an additional hypothesis is
formulated concerning the connection among participants’ personality and emotions. The hypothesis
has been then validated on the data collected from our experiments.
• Opinions and emotions: in [39], we did not consider the opinions of the participants with respect to
the debated topics, their possible change during the debate, and the emotions. In this chapter, a fifth
hypothesis is formulated and then validated on the collected data.
• Correlations on single debates: in [39], we considered correlations holding over the whole set of de-
bates, i.e., over the whole set of collected data. However, we realized that some of the debates showed
significant correlations that were not present in others, due to the involvement of different partici-
pants and to the interest of the participants in the debated topic. In this chapter, we have proposed an
analysis of some of the more relevant debates held in our experimental sessions. These single debate
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analysis considers also the workload index, computed at the data collection time but never discussed
in the first version of the chapter [39].
• Fourth layer of annotation: in [39], three layers of annotation have been proposed over the collected
textual data. In this chapter, we included a fourth annotation layer with the aim to highlight the change
in the viewpoint of the participants during the debate.
In the literature, only few works deal with empirical experiments involving human participants to verify
assumptions from argumentation theory. Cerutti et al. [96] propose an empirical experiment with humans in
the argumentation theory area. However, the goal of this work is different from ours, since emotions are not
considered and their aim is to show a correspondence between the acceptability of arguments by human sub-
jects and the acceptability prescribed by the formal theory in argumentation. Rahwan and colleagues [267]
study whether the meaning assigned to the notion of reinstatement in abstract argumentation theory is per-
ceived in the same way by humans. They propose to the participants of the experiment a number of natural
language texts where reinstatement holds, and then ask them to evaluate the arguments. Also in this case,
the purpose of the work differs from ours, and emotions are not considered at all.
Emotions are considered, instead, by Nawwab et al. [234] that propose to couple the model of emotions
introduced by Ortony and colleagues [243] in an argumentation-based decision making scenario. They show
how emotions, e.g., gratitude and displeasure, impact on the practical reasoning mechanisms. A similar
work has been proposed by Dalibon et al. [119] where emotions are exploited by agents to produce a line
of reasoning according to the evolution of its own emotional state. Finally, Lloyd-Kelly and Wyner [209]
propose emotional argumentation schemes to capture forms of reasoning involving emotions. All these
works differ from our approach since they do not address an empirical evaluation of their models, and
emotions are not detected from humans.
Several works in philosophy and linguistics have studied the link between emotions and natural argu-
mentation, like [87, 155, 317]. These works analyze the connection of emotions and the different kind
of argumentation that can be addressed. The difference with our approach is that they do not verify their
theories empirically, on emotions extracted from people involved in an argumentation task. A particularly
interesting case is that of the connection between persuasive argumentation and emotions, studied for in-
stance by DeSteno and colleagues [124].
Concerning the empirical study of workload and emotional changes, [320] study pupillary response to
detect workload and emotional changes performing an arithmetical task associated with pleasant/unpleasant
images. The idea of the empirical study on workload and emotional changes is similar, even if the goal of
the experiment is different, as our goal is connected to the argumentative process and not with arithmetical
tasks performed by isolated participants.
Very few approaches in persuasive argumentation involve humans in the loop. Among them,[276] eval-
uate a methodology for human persuasion through argumentative dialogs, with human users. The huge
difference wrt. [276] is that we do not analyze the argumentation style, but we capture the emotions and
mental states directly on human participants through sensors. In [39], we studied the connections between
emotions and argumentation, but we do not consider persuasion. In[38], we studied the correlation of the
engagement index in brain hemispheres with the persuasion strategies. The difference with H2 is twofold:
i) here, we provide a more fine grained analysis of the correlation of theengagement wrt. the four lobes
instead of the left and right sides, ii) we concentrate on the correlation with the persuasion strategies, while
in [38] we correlated with the neutral vs. opinionated (pro/con) stance of the participants. To the best of our
knowledge, in neuroscience [80], no other work investigates the correlation between persuasive argumenta-
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tion and mental states captured from users’ brain through sensors. Usually, these factors are studied based
on questionnaires with the participants.
6.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented an investigation into the links between the argumentation people use when
they debate with each other, the emotions they feel during these debates, and their personality traits. We
conducted an experiment aimed at verifying our hypotheses about the correlation between the positive/nega-
tive emotions emerging when positive/negative relations among the arguments are put forward in the debate,
and the correlation between the personality traits of the debaters and their opinions on the debated topics,
and the emotions felt during the debate interactions. The results suggest that there exist trends that can be
extracted from emotion analysis. Moreover, we also provide the first annotated dataset and gold standard to
compare and analyze emotion detection in an argumentation session.
The take-home message of this chapter is twofold: first, high engagement is correlated with negative
emotions showing that participants are mentally involved in producing arguments to rebut those which are
not in line with their viewpoint, and second, neuroticism and conscientiousness have both a negative impact
on the debaters’ brain indexes ending up into a reduced mental engagement index and an increased cognitive
load. Finally, the surprise emotion is shown by extroverted debaters.
The main contributions concerning persuasion in human argumentation are: i) the first field experiment
to study the correlation of persuasion strategies, argumentation and emotions using EEG headsets and cam-
eras, ii) an annotated dataset of arguments characterized by a persuasion strategy, and iii) the first steps
towards the definition of human-like empathic argumentative agents.
The analysis of the results allowed us to highlight some drawbacks of our experimental setting to be
addressed: i) more fine grained persuasion strategies may be considered, as these categories are highly
general and sometimes difficult to be evaluated; ii) the strategies adopted by the other participants should
be taken into account to expand the scenario (here, to overcome this issue, we consider them as random and
we focus on the punctual reactions of the participants to PP’s arguments); iii) the binary variable (pro/con)
expressing the stance of the participants wrt. the debated issue may not fully capture the effect of a strategy,
so allowing the expression of degrees of pro/con could be preferable.
Several lines of research have to be considered as future work. First, we aim to study how emotions per-
sistence influences the attitude of the debates: this kind of experiment has to be repeated a number of times
in order to verify whether positive/negative emotions before the debate influence new interactions. Second,
we plan to add a further step, namely to study how sentiment analysis methods developed in Computational
Linguistics are able to automatically detect the polarity of the arguments proposed by the debaters, and
how they are correlated with the detected emotions. More precisely, the annotated dataset we published
provides a valuable resource to improve the performances of sentiment analysis systems allowing them to
learn about the correlation among the relations among the arguments and the emotions aligned with the
arguments. Moreover, we plan to study emotions propagation among the debaters, and to verify whether an
emotion can be seen as a predictor of the solidity of an argument, e.g., if I write an argument when I am
angry I may make wrong judgments. Finally, argumentation theory has often been proposed as a technique
for supporting critical thinking, thus studying the relation of these philosophical theories with emotions and




This document provided an overview of my research activity from 2010 to 2018. It has taken place within
various local, national and international projects. My research areas are Artificial Intelligence, Knowledge
Representation and Reasoning, Argumentation Theory and Normative Reasoning, with the general aim of
supporting machine decision making by providing formal models able to explain the reasons behind the
decisions, whether the sources of information are trustable or not, and how emotions impact the deliberation
process. During this 8-year period, I addressed the following three general research questions:
1. how to define argumentation models able to support decision making and to be used to justify the
deliberation process?
2. how to mine arguments from documents in natural language and what is their relation with the emo-
tions and mental states of their proposers?
3. how to mine and reason about normative information?
My contributions have been published in main international conferences and journals of my research
communities. They mainly deal with:
1. Computational models of argument, focusing on the definition of formal models of argument with the
goal of supporting deliberation and explanation, taking into account external components like trust,
emotions and norms;
2. Natural models of argument, focusing on the definition of empirical methods for detecting argumen-
tative structures and predicting the relations among them from natural language texts, considering
application scenarios like social media (e.g., Twitter, Wikipedia, Debatepedia), medical trials, and
political debates;
3. Norm mining and normative reasoning, focusing on the definition of both empirical and formal meth-
ods to extract and reason on norms and rights information to define the next generation of legal infor-
matics systems.
In this document I have made the decision of presenting a number of my contributions that show my
unconventional journey in the field of computational models of argument, starting from a formal approach to
define modularity and decomposability in abstract argumentation frameworks to the modeling of the notion
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of trust using argumentation theory, to the definition of mining algorithms for natural language argumenta-
tion, to the study of emotions in human argumentation.
In the continuation of my ongoing research work, and in line with the objectives of the Wimmics team,
I will keep tackling the three general research questions discussed in this document, in line with the recents
trends in Artificial Intelligence. Since the field’s early years, Artificial Intelligence (AI) has the goal to
understand the principles governing intelligent behavior and to encode such principles in so called intelligent
machines. In the latest years, progress in AI seems to be accelerating, given the recent results Machine
Learning, Natural Language Processing and Computer Vision, leading to important investments in AI from
main information technologies companies like Google, and IBM. These companies see in this field new
potential markets. However, together with the increasing popularity of AI and the expectations on it, new
concerns are now rising around the development of super-intelligent machines. Actually, these concerns are
not new, as Turing pointed out in 1951 “If a machine can think, it might think more intelligently than we do,
and then where should we be? Even if we could keep the machines in a subservient position, for instance
by turning off the power at strategic moments, we should, as a species, feel greatly humbled. ... [T]his
new danger ... is certainly something which can give us anxiety.”. More recently, popular public figures
like Elon Musk1 and Stephen Hawking also underlined the negative impact that super-intelligent machines
may have on society, even fostering apocalyptic scenarios where machines take the control of the human
society. It must be said, however, that even if many precise intelligent tasks can be performed autonomously
by machines, still the emulation of human behavior is far [226, 65, 287, 282, 281]. Important human-like
intelligence features like the ability to conceive new actions, and the capability of being conscious of our
own decisions and their consequences are unachievable by current intelligent machines, as Searle pointed
out after the victory of IBM Watson on the TV show “Jeopardy!” “Watson did not understand the questions,
nor its answers, not that some of its answers were right and some wrong, not that it was playing a game,
nor that it won.” [287].
The panorama offered to AI researchers is thus the following: on the one hand, many of the goals of
the field’s early years are becoming reality, but on the other hand, the question to be asked to ourselves is
whether we still actually want human-level AI, considering the risks that are in front of us 2. It must be
stressed at this point that AI can be enormously beneficial for human flourishing, but we need to take care
about the design of AI in order to reach a so-called good AI hybrid society. In this society, mixed teams of
intelligent machines and humans jointly realize human values and promote the public good. Using Russell’s
words, “These problems require a change in the definition of AI itself, from a field concerned with pure
intelligence, independent of the objective, to a field concerned with systems that are provably beneficial for
humans.”, and Wooldridge’s ones “The technology is right here, right now. It’s just a matter of rolling it
out and the big social and legal issues that go with that.”.3 The definition of a “good AI society” [65] or
“beneficial AI” [281] may sound like an utopia, but it is not the case. It is a matter of ensuring that these
machines, with an arbitrary degree of autonomy and intelligence, remain under human control, and doing so
is possible only if we start from now to design them in a way such as their goal is the preservation of human
values and dignity. My future research goes in this direction, and sets to tackle the challenge of designing
intelligent machines towards a good AI hybrid society.
My long-term program is to design intelligent machines with the capability to form machine-human
teams acting in a good AI hybrid society. In a short- and mid-term perspective, my goal is to answer these
1https://goo.gl/RFGfzm
2We refer the reader to Russell [281], who discussed the danger in dismissing the arguments against AI with too much levity.
3The root of this trend may be found in the 60s when there was the trend of Intelligence Amplification [10] and Intelligence
Augmentation [142] that addressed this idea by considering from the beginning that the goal is to help humans.
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precise research questions:
• how to design intelligent machines able to explain and justify to humans their decisions?
• how to design intelligent machines grounding their decisions on moral values?
• how to design intelligent machines employing sentimental values in their deliberation process?
Explanations and justifications for intelligent machine deliberation. Machine accountability is
strongly linked to explanation and justification, as included in the new European General Data Protec-
tion Regulation, and needs to be grounded in moral and social concepts, including moral and emotional
values. Every intelligent machine acting for a good AI hybrid society should operate within a moral and
social framework, in explainable and justified ways. It goes without saying that they must operate within
the bounds of the law, including, for example, the legal requirements associated with the handling of the
user data acquired and collected to improve predictions, suggestions and response times. The full impact
of these legal requirements may soon impact the technical requirements of the next generation of intelligent
machines, requiring new types of collaboration between lawyers and computer scientists.
Only very few approaches have tackled the problem of explaining the decisions taken by intelligent ma-
chines. For instance, Lei et al. [196] propose a new way to train neural networks so that they provide not
only predictions and classifications but rationales for their decisions. The need for explainability is even
more pronounced with recent advances in neural models. Some efforts in this area include analyzing and
visualizing state activation [169, 186, 199], and linking word vectors to semantic lexicons or word prop-
erties [145, 168]. Also attention based models have been successfully applied to many Natural Language
Processing problems, improving visualization and interpretability [280, 273, 169].
Despite these approaches, the explanation and justification of the decisions of intelligent machines are
still far from being achieved. The main open challenge is that these approaches do not return explanations
understandable by humans, as they are more likely to be used for justifying the output to other domain
experts. What I target, instead, is the definition of appropriate methods to explain machine decisions to
whoever human, in a way humans can understand and more importantly interact. This is a key point of the
explanation methods on which I focus: humans need to understand machines and their decisions through
the arguments they propose to explain their course of action, and this process is an interactive process so
that humans can ask for more details about certain arguments, they can ask for more support to an argument,
and finally they may at their turn explain why a certain course of action is / is not compliant with the human
values and/or the social welfare. This kind of explanation is what adults address to children to let them learn
new values. I argue that the same approach should be applied to machines as our final objective is to make
them behave in order to achieve human values.
To achieve this goal, we will rely on argumentation theory and on recent advances in processing natural
language arguments (i.e., argument mining). My first goal is to enhance transparency in the interactions
among intelligent machines and humans. The methodology to tackle this goal combines argument mining,
and NLP methods in general, (to extract arguments from textual information sources, and as a further step
to analyse written or oral speech and to generate natural language arguments), KRR formalisms like ar-
gumentation theory but also case-based reasoning and decision making models (to reason over the mined
information), and semantic knowledge graphs (to provide machines with background knowledge). In order
to allow intelligent machines to build their own arguments explaining their actions or claims, we will make
them mine the biggest information source ever: the Web. This is a recursive procedure such that the inter-
actions of the intelligent machines with humans will trigger mining further arguments to support specific
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aspects of the deliberation. The output will consist of constrained Natural Language explanations, auditable
by humans. The evaluation will be empirical (precision, recall, F1) for the argument mining part, together
with a user evaluation to assess the human satisfaction about the returned explanations. The output will be
enriched also by considering moral and sentimental values in the justification process. This future work is
the natural continuation of my current research activity about argumentation theory and argument mining.
The need of transparency will be addressed in the mid-term perspective concerning the scenarios of clinical
trials (transparency and explanation of clinical decisions) and political debates (transparency and fallacies
detection in political speeches and debates).
Ethics and responsibility for intelligent machine deliberation. Intelligent machine ethics is about
understanding, developing and evaluating ethical agency and reasoning abilities as part of the behavior of
AI systems (such as intelligent machines and robots). Even though intelligent machines are increasingly
able to take decisions and perform actions that have a moral impact, they are still artifacts and therefore they
are neither ethically nor legally responsible. Human beings should remain the moral agent. We can delegate
control to purely synthetic intelligent machines without delegating responsibility or liability to them. With
the term machine ethics, we refer to the computational and theoretical methods and tools that support the
representation, evaluation, verification, and transparency of ethical deliberation by machines with the aim of
supporting human values and human dignity on shared tasks with those machines. That is, machine ethics
concerns the methods, algorithms, and tools needed to endow intelligent machines with the capability to
reason about the ethical aspects of their decisions, and the ethically informed design guidelines for devel-
oping intelligent machines whose behavior is guaranteed to remain within acceptable ethical constraints.
Research is needed to understand what suitable constraints on system behavior are, and to elicit desiderata
on the representation and use of moral values by intelligent machines. One of my objectives is to identify
appropriate methods for eliciting and representing ethical and emotional requirements, and suitable machine
deliberation architectures for explicit reasoning in terms of moral and social features as one mechanism for
handling moral dilemmas [56] and providing explanations of behavior through argumentation.
Some formal representation approaches to ethical behavior of intelligent machines address these issues
but they mainly focus either on modeling moral reasoning [56] as a direct translation of some well-known
moral theory, on modeling moral machines in a general way [211], or on designing an ethical intelligent
machine architecture. Such architectures include implicit ethical architectures [7] which design the ma-
chines’s behavior (either by implementing or learning) for each situation in order to avoid potential unethi-
cal behaviors, or cognitive ethical architectures [108, 109] consisting of full explicit representations of each
component of the machine, from the classical beliefs (information on the environment and other machines),
desires (goals of the intelligent machine) and intentions (the chosen actions), to heuristics and emotional
machinery. Even though these approaches successfully address some problems [31, 4, 126, 110], the defini-
tion of general frameworks to model computational morality in AI is still a major and urgent open challenge.
Furthermore, these approaches do not clearly take into account the collective and distributed dimension of
the interaction.
I am also involved in the submitted COST Action proposal titled “Responsible Artificial Intelligence”.
This project aims at building a network of researchers from different disciplines such as computer science,
law, philosophy, linguistics, and psychology. The project is about human responsibility for the development
of intelligent systems along fundamental human principles and values, to ensure human flourishing and
wellbeing in a sustainable world. I was also involved in the organization of the Thematic Day about “Ethics
by design” organized in co-location with PRIMA-2017 conference.
My second goal is to define design principles for intelligent machines taking into account moral val-
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ues in their deliberation process. Such principles will be implemented in moral-based reward functions to
provide machine deliberation with the ethical dimension. I will consider decision-making to be performed
through a collective deliberative procedure, i.e., a moral dialogue. The methodology to tackle this ambitious
goal combines argumentation theory and legal reasoning to model moral dialogues. The role of norms to
characterize moral autonomy has been differently, but successfully proposed by (competing) moral views
like Kantianism and rule utilitarianism [185]. Drawing from these traditions, I will formally explore the
following intuition: autonomous machines take decisions about the moral theory governing their society,
and elicit new theories that would improve the welfare. Game theoretic approaches to compute reward func-
tions will be enhanced with moral values, and argumentation-based conflict detection mechanisms will be
included. The evaluation will be formal. The principles will be validated by the experts involved in the
RAI COST Action and the MIREL partners. This future work is the natural continuation of my research
about normative reasoning, in particular my current research activity connecting argumentation theory and
normative reasoning. Another interesting application of these formal models is to make autonomous agents
more resilient to attacks like the ones that targeted the Microsoft Agent to make it return racist/xenopho-
bic/. . . arguments. The idea would be to use moral reasoning to protect the agent from bad influences and
test it with replays or synthetic attacks.
Emotional values for intelligent machine deliberation. Human-level AI and human-AI teams imply
the fact that the AI acting in this hybrid society actually learns human values. A very important part of
these values deals with emotions and empathy, so intelligent machines for a good AI hybrid society cannot
underestimate the importance of sentimental values for human beings. As these intelligent machines need
to learn from human behavior what are the sentimental values, how to express them, and more importantly,
how do they influence rational reasoning, a deep analysis of how emotional values appear in human beings is
required. I also target the goal of first addressing field experiments to analyze how human emotions influence
reasoning, and more specifically, how they influence explanations and arguments acceptance, and second,
using the obtained results to design emphatic intelligent machines able to cope with human emotional values.
Some formal representation approaches to representing emotional values in intelligent machines have
been proposed, but they mainly focus on proposing formal frameworks including emotions in the reasoning
process [234, 119, 209]. None of these works has addressed first an empirical evaluation to analyze how
this kind of reasoning actually holds for human beings. Moreover, their goal is not to define a framework
such that emotional values elicit the goals and actions of intelligent machines.
My third set of goals is i) to define the principles to design intelligent machines taking into account
emotional values in their deliberation process, and ii) to formally define reward functions ensuring that such
emotional values play a role in decision-making. I will study the impact of emotions in deliberation dia-
logues by addressing a new field experiment with humans. I will use the FaceReader software to recognize
basic emotions (i.e., happy, sad, angry, surprised, scared and disgusted), and I will also consider mental
states (captured by using Emotiv Epoc EEG headsets), that is, mental engagement (i.e., the level of atten-
tion in performing a task [260, 146]), and workload (i.e., the quantity of information processing required
to perform a task [249]). The whole equipment, i.e., EEG headsets and FaceReader, will be provided by
the CoCoLab platform of the Université Côte d’Azur-CNRS. Emotion-based reward functions for machine
deliberation will be defined based on the results of such field experiment. The evaluation is empirical for
what concerns the data collected from the field experiment (ANOVA, MANOVA), whilst it is formal for the
emotional reward functions and the resulting framework. This future work is the natural continuation of my
research line about argumentation and emotions.
To summarize, my future research perspectives shared the common goal to define and develop AI solu-
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tions to support human values and and promote the public good. To tackle this challenging and wide goal,
I plan to investigate three main research directions: i) explaining and justifying machine decisions through
natural language arguments and reasoning formalisms, ii) defining formal models for ethical and responsible
machine deliberation, and iii) defining machine deliberation models based on human emotional values.
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